I KARL MARX FRIEDRICH ENGELS GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA) E R S TE A B T E I L U NG W E R KE · A R T I K EL · E N T W Ü R FE B A ND 13 Herausgegeben vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion und vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands KARL MARX FRIEDRICH ENGELS WERKE · ARTIKEL E N T W Ü R FE JANUAR BIS DEZEMBER 1854 T E XT D I E TZ V E R L AG B E R L IN 1985 Redaktionskommission der Gesamtausgabe: Günter Heyden und Anatoli Jegorow (Leiter), Erich Kundel und Alexander Malysch (Sekretäre), Georgi Bagaturija, Rolf Dlubek, Heinrich Gemkow, Lew Golman, Michail Mtschedlow, Richard Speri Redaktionskommission der Ersten Abteilung: Rolf Dlubek (Leiter), Erich Kundel, Alexander Malysch, Richard Speri, Inge Taubert Bearbeitung des Bandes: Manfred Neuhaus (Leiter), Helmut Findeisen, Karl-Frieder Grube, Giesela Neuhaus und Klaus-Dieter Neumann Gutachter: Brigitte Rieck, Walentina Smirnowa und Galina Woitenkowa Text und Apparat Mit 13 Abbildungen, 9 Karten sowie 3 Kartenskizzen von Friedrich Engels © Dietz Verlag Berlin 1985 Lizenznummer 1 LSV0046 Technische Redaktion: Friedrich Hackenberger, Heinz Ruschinski und Waltraud Schulze Korrektur: Hanna Behrendt, Marlies Fischer und Jutta Knopp Einband: Albert Kapr Typografie: Albert Kapr/Horst Kinkel Schrift: Times-Antiqua und Maxima Printed in the German Democratic Republic Gesamtherstellung: INTERDRUCK Graphischer Großbetrieb Leipzig, Betrieb der ausgezeichneten Qualitätsarbeit Papierherstellung: VEB Druck- und Spezialpapiere Golzern Best.-Nr.: 7448152 13500 I n h a lt Einleitung Editorische H i n w e i se T e xt Apparat 13* 41 " Verzeichnis d er Abkürzungen, Siglen und Z e i c h en 625 KARL MARX · FRIEDRICH ENGELS: ARTIKEL ENTWÜRFE · JANUAR BIS DEZEMBER 1 8 54 Friedrich Engels • T he European W ar Karl Marx · T he W e s t e rn P o w e rs and T u r k ey Karl Marx • T he W ar in t he East Friedrich Engels • T he Last Battle in Europe Karl Marx • T he Fighting in t he East—Finances of Austria and France—Fortification of C o n s t a n t i n o p le Karl Marx • T he C z a r 's Views—Prince Albert Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Fortification of Constanti • nople—Denmark's Neutrality—Composition of British Parlia ment—Crop Failure in Europe Karl Marx • C o u nt Orlov's Mission—Russian Finances during t he W ar Karl Marx • Blue Books—Parliamentary D e b a t es on Febru ary 6—Count Orlov's Mission—Operations of t he Allied Fleet— T he Irish Brigade—Concerning t he C o n v o c a t i on of t he Labour Parliament 3 8 18 27 30 35 39 46 657 661 668 675 677 680 683 688 50 692 5* Inhalt Karl Marx · Russian Diplomacy—The Blue Book on t he Eastern Q u e s t i o n — M o n t e n e g ro Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T he W ar Q u e s t i on in Europe Karl Marx • Declaration of t he Prussian Cabinet—Napoleon's Plans—Prussia's Policy Karl Marx • D e b a t es in Parliament Karl Marx • Parliamentary D e b a t es of February 22—Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch—The Policy of t he W e s t e rn P o w e rs Karl Marx • English and French W ar Plans—Greek Insur rection—Spain—China Karl Marx · Austrian Bankruptcy Karl Marx · O p e n i ng of t he Labour Parliament—English W ar Budget Karl Marx • Letter to t he Labour Parliament Karl Marx • T he Labour Parliament Friedrich Engels • Retreat of t he Russians from Kalafat Karl Marx · T he G r e ek Insurrection Karl Marx • T he D o c u m e n ts on t he Partition of Turkey Karl Marx • T he S e c r et Diplomatic C o r r e s p o n d e n ce Karl Marx • Declaration of War—On t he History of t he Eastern Q u e s t i on Friedrich Engels · T he Fortress of Kronstadt Karl Marx • British Finances—The T r o u b l es at Preston Friedrich Engels • T he Russian Army Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T he European W ar Karl Marx • T he W ar D e b a te in Parliament Karl Marx • Russia and t he G e r m an P o w e r s - C o rn Prices Friedrich Engels • Position of t he Armies in Turkey Karl Marx • Reshid Pasha's Note—An Italian N e w s p a p er on t he Eastern Q u e s t i on Karl Marx • G r e e ce and Turkey—Turkey and t he W e s t e rn Powers—Falling off in W h e at Sales in England 6* T e xt Apparat 56 63 67 69 699 703 705 706 81 713 88 94 717 723 100 728 107 111 116 120 123 136 150 158 168 173 178 181 192 198 202 207 731 732 734 740 742 747 752 756 765 769 772 775 780 785 787 794 Inhalt Friedrich Engels • T he Turkish W ar T e xt 211 Apparat 796 Karl Marx • T he G r e ek Insurrection—The Polish Emigra tion—The Austro-Prussian Treaty—Russian D o c u m e n ts 214 798 Karl Marx • T he B o m b a r d m e nt of O d e s s a — G r e e c e - P r o c l a mation of Prince Daniel of Montenegro—Manteuffel's S p e e ch Friedrich Engels • N e ws from t he European C o n t e st Karl Marx • British Finances Friedrich Engels • A Famous Victory Karl Marx · Attack upon Sevastopol—Clearing of Estates in Scotland Friedrich Engels • T he W ar Friedrich Engels · T he P r e s e nt Condition of t he English Army—Tactics, Uniform, C o m m i s s a r i a t, e t c. Friedrich Engels • Ships and Forts 221 228 230 237 241 246 253 259 806 814 816 822 827 829 833 836 Karl Marx • T he Treaty b e t w e en Austria and Prussia—Parlia m e n t a ry D e b a t es of May 29 264 840 Karl Marx • T he Formation of a Special Ministry of W ar in Britain—The W ar on t he Danube—The Economic Situation 269 843 Karl Marx • Reorganisation of t he British W ar Administra tion—The Austrian Summons—Britain's Economic Situation— St. Arnaud 275 846 Friedrich Engels • T he Siege of Silistria Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • State of t he Russian W ar Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T he Russian R e t r e at Karl Marx · T he W a r - D e b a te in Parliament Karl Marx • T he Insurrection at Madrid—The Austro-Turkish T r e a t y - M o l d a v ia and Wallachia Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T he W ar on t he D a n u be 281 290 296 300 308 316 851 856 860 862 866 871 Karl Marx · T he Details of t he Insurrection at Madrid—The Austro-Prussian Summons—The N ew Austrian Loan—Walla chia 321 874 Karl Marx • Excitement in Italy—The Events in Spain—The Position of t he G e r m an States—British M a g i s t r a t es 329 881 7* Inhalt Karl Marx • A C o n g r e ss at Vienna—The Austrian Loan—Proc lamations of Dulce and O'Donnell—The Ministerial Crisis in Britain Karl Marx • T he Spanish Revolution—Greece and T u r k ey Karl Marx • T he W ar D e b a t es in Parliament Karl Marx • T he Policy of Austria—The W ar D e b a t es in t he H o u se of C o m m o ns Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • T h at Bore of a W ar Karl Marx • Espartero T e xt Apparat 342 886 348 354 361 370 375 891 896 899 903 906 Friedrich Engels • T he Attack on t he Russian Forts 381 910 Karl Marx • Evacuation of t he Danubian Principalities—The Events in Spain—A N ew Danish Constitution—The C h a r t i s ts Karl Marx • Evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia—Poland- D e m a n ds of t he Spanish People Karl Marx · T he Eastern Question—The Revolution in Spain— T he Madrid Press Karl Marx · Revolution in Spain—Bomarsund Friedrich Engels • T he C a p t u re of Bomarsund (First Article) Friedrich Engels • T he C a p t u re of Bomarsund (Second Article) Karl Marx · Revolutionary Spain First Article S e c o nd Article Third Article Fourth Article Fifth Article Sixth Article S e v e n th Article Eighth Article Ninth Article Karl Marx • Centraljunta (Draft) Karl Marx • Spain-Intervention (Draft) Karl Marx • T he Reaction in Spain 383 390 396 403 408 412 416 416 422 427 431 436 439 448 452 458 466 473 476 912 916 920 928 932 935 938 962 969 979 Karl Marx • P r o g r e ss of t he War. S e p t e m b er 8 , 1 8 54 482 983 Karl Marx • T he Rumours a b o ut Mazzini's Arrest—The Austrian C o m p u l s o ry Loan—Spain—The Situation in Wallachia 490 986 8* Inhalt T e xt Apparat Karl Marx • T he Actions of t he Allied Fleet—The Situation in t he Danubian Principalities—Spain—British Foreign T r a de Friedrich Engels • T he Attack on Sevastopol Friedrich Engels • T he N e ws from t he C r i m ea Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels · T he Sevastopol Hoax Karl Marx/ Friedrich Engels N e ws · T he Sevastopol Hoax—General Friedrich Engels · T he Battle of t he Alma Friedrich Engels • T he Military P o w er of Russia Friedrich Engels • T he S i e ge of Sevastopol Friedrich Engels • T he C a m p a i gn in t he C r i m ea Friedrich Engels • T he W ar in t he East Friedrich Engels • T he Battle of Inkerman Friedrich Engels • T he C r i m e an C a m p a i gn Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels • P r o g r e ss of t he W a r. D e c e m b er 1 4 / 1 5, 1854 Friedrich Engels • T he Military P o w er of Austria A N H A NG D u b i o sa T he W ar T he English Middle Class (First Article) T he English Middle Class (Second Article) 495 503 509 514 518 522 527 533 537 544 551 556 562 568 989 993 997 1000 1003 1007 1012 1016 1019 1022 1029 1034 1039 1042 575 1047 577 579 583 1049 1051 1054 Artikel, d ie mit Hilfe v on M a rx und E n g e ls v e r f a ßt w u r d en 585 1057 Wilhelm Pieper • T he C o b u r gs Ernest Jones • Different F e a t u r es of Popular Feeling Ernest Jones · Discoveries M a de T oo Late 587 589 592 1059 1061 1063 9* Inhalt Von M a rx und Engels m i t u n t e r z e i c h n e te D o k u m e n te P r o g r a m me of t he Labour Parliament T e xt 597 599 Apparat 1065 1067 Verzeichnis nicht ü b e r l i e f e r t er Arbeiten REGISTER Literaturregister I. A r b e i t en von Marx und Engels II. Arbeiten a n d e r er Autoren III. Periodica N a m e n r e g i s t er G e o g r a p h i s c h es Register S a c h r e g i s t er V e r z e i c h n is d er A b b i l d u n g en 1069 1075 1075 1077 1118 1124 1168 1184 The People's Paper. London. Nr. 98, 18. März 1854. Titelseite (Aus schnitt) mit Marx' „Letter to the Labour Parliament" New-York Weekly Tribune. Nr. 656, 8. April 1854. Titelseite (Aus schnitt) mit Marx' Artikel „The Documents on the Partition of Turkey" Friedrich Engels: The Fortress of Kronstadt. Seite 1 Kartenskizze von Engels aus seinem Artikel „The Fortress of Kron stadt". Seite 6 The People's Paper. London. Nr. 108, 27. Mai 1854. Titelseite (Aus schnitt) mit Engels' Artikel „The War" Notizen von Jenny und Karl Marx über das Absenden einiger Artikel an die „New-York Tribune" im Mai und Juni 1854 New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune. Nr.957, 28.Juli 1854. Titelseite (Ausschnitt) mit Marx' Artikel „Excitement in Italy..." Titelseiten (Ausschnitte) von drei Ausgaben der„New-YorkTribune", in denen Marx' Artikel „Excitement in Italy" erschien Karl Marx: Central junta (Draft). Seite 1 Karl Marx: Spain-Intervention (Draft). Seite 3 Notizen von Marx über das Absenden einiger Artikel an die „New- York Tribune" im August, September und Oktober 1854 109 125 159 163 247 261 331 335 467 471 486 10* Inhalt Text Apparat Notizen von Marx über das Absenden einiger Artikel an die „New- York Tribune" im Oktober und November 1854 529 Kronstat. From the Russian Survey. London 1853 Cronstadt in the Baltic with the Fortifications, Batteries & Range of the Guns 6c. London 1854 Town & Harbour of Odessa. London 1854 The Town & Harbour of Sevastopol with the Batteries & Approaches. London 1854 Plan der Belagerung von Silistria 1828/1829. Nach: [Helmut Karl Bernhard] von Moltke: Der russisch-türkische Feldzug in der euro päischen Türkei 1828 und 1829. Berlin 1845 Map of the Ottoman Empire, Kingdom of Greece, and the Russian Provinces on the Black Sea. Nach: The Illustrated London News. Ν r. 697, 12. August 1854 Seite aus Marx' Exzerpten zur spanischen Geschichte Plan of the Battle of the Alma. Nach: The Illustrated London News. 757 761 823 837 853 921 941 Ν r. 709, 28. Oktober 1854 1009 Kartenskizze von Engels aus seiner Vorarbeit zum Artikel „The Military Power of Russia" Gefechtsskizze von Engels aus seiner Vorarbeit zum Artikel „The War in the East" Seite aus Engels' Vorarbeit zum Artikel „The War in the East" The Environs of Sevastopol with the Batteries & Approaches. London 1854 Sebastopol and Balaklava. Shewing the Position of the Allied Forces. Nach: The Illustrated London News. Nr.716, 9. Dezember 1854 1013 1023 1027 1 031 1 037 11* KARL M A RX F R I E D R I CH E N G E LS W E R KE · ARTIKEL · E N T W Ü R FE J A N U AR BIS D E Z E M B ER 1 8 54 Friedrich Engels The European War The European War. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 3992, 2. Februar 1854 5 At last, the long-pending question of T u r k ey a p p e a rs to h a ve r e a c h ed a stage w h e re diplomacy will n ot m u ch longer be able to monopolize t he g r o u nd for its ever-shifting, ever-cowardly, and ever-resultless m o v e m e n t s. T he F r e n ch and British fleets h a ve entered t he B l a ck S ea in order to p r e v e nt t he R u s s i an N a vy from doing h a rm either to t he T u r k i sh fleet or the T u r k i sh coast. T he C z ar Nicholas long since declared t h at s u ch a step would b e, for him, t he signal for a declaration of w a r. Will he n ow stand it quietly? 10 15 It is n ot to. be e x p e c t ed t h at t he c o m b i n ed fleets will at o n ce attack and d e s t r oy either t he R u s s i an s q u a d r on or t he fortifications a nd n a v y - y a r ds of Sevastopol. On t he contrary, we m ay r e st a s s u r ed t h at the instructions w h i ch diplomacy has p r o v i d ed for t he t wo admirals are so contrived as to e v a d e, as m u ch as possible, t he c h a n ce of a collision. B ut naval and military m o v e m e n t s, o n ce o r d e r e d, are subject n ot to t he desires a nd plans of diplomacy, b ut to laws of their o wn w h i ch c a n n ot be violated without endangering the safety of t he whole expedition. D i p l o m a cy n e v er intended t he R u s s i a ns to be b e a t en at Oltenitza; b ut a little latitude o n ce given to O m er P a s h a, and military m o v e m e n ts o n ce begun, t he action of t he t wo hostile c o m m a n d e rs w as carried on in a sphere w h i ch w as to a great e x t e nt uncontrollable by the 20 E m b a s s a d o rs at Constantinople. T h u s, t he fleets o n ce r e m o v ed from their moorings in the Beicos r o a d s, t h e re is no telling h ow s o on t h ey m ay find t h e m s e l v es in a position from which L o rd A b e r d e e n 's prayers for p e a c e, or L o rd P a l m e r s t o n 's collusion with R u s s ia c a n n ot d r aw them, and w h e re t h ey will h a ve to c h o o se b e t w e en an infamous r e t r e at or a resolute struggle. A n a r r ow land-locked sea like the E u x i n e, w h e re the opposing navies can hardly contrive to get out of sight of e a ch other, is precisely the locality in w h i ch conflicts u n d er such c i r c u m s t a n c e s, m ay b e c o me n e c e s s a ry almost daily. A nd it is n ot to be e x p e c t ed t h at t he C z ar will allow, without opposition, his fleet to be b l o c k a d ed in Sevastopol. 25 3 Friedrich Engels If, t h e n, a E u r o p e an w ar is to follow from this step, it will be in all likelihood a w ar b e t w e en Russia on one h a n d, a nd England, F r a n ce a nd T u r k ey on t he o t h e r. T he e v e nt is p r o b a b le e n o u gh to w a r r a nt us in comparing the c h a n c es of s u c c e ss and striking t he b a l a n ce of active strength on e a ch side, so far as we c an do so. 5 10 B ut will Russia stand alone? W h at p a rt will Austria, P r u s s ia and the G e r m an and Italian S t a t e s, their d e p e n d a n t s, t a ke in a general w a r? It is r e p o r t ed that L o u is B o n a p a r te has notified the A u s t r i an G o v e r n m e nt t h at if in c a se of a conflict with Russia, Austria should side with t h at p o w e r, the F r e n ch G o v e r n m e nt w o u ld avail itself of t he elements of insurrection w h i ch in Italy a nd H u n g a ry only require a spark to be kindled again into a raging fire, and that t h en t he restoration of Italian a nd H u n g a r i an nationality w o u ld be a t t e m p t ed by F r a n c e. S u ch a threat m ay h a ve its effect u p on A u s t r i a; it m ay c o n t r i b u te to k e ep h er neutral as long as possible, b ut it is not to be e x p e c t ed t h at Austria will long be enabled to k e ep aloof f r om s u ch a struggle, should it c o me to p a s s. T he v e ry fact of the t h r e at having b e en u t t e r e d, m ay call forth partial insurrectionary m o v e m e n ts in Italy, w h i ch could n ot b ut m a ke A u s t r ia a still m o re d e p e n d a nt and still m o re subservient vassal of Russia. A nd t h e n, after all, h as not this N a p o l e o n ic g a me b e en played o n ce a l r e a d y? Is it to be e x p e c t ed t h at the m an w ho r e s t o r ed the P o pe to his 20 t e m p o r al t h r o n e, and w ho h as a candidate c ut and dried for the Neapolitan m o n a r c h y, will give to the Italians w h at t h ey w a nt as m u ch as i n d e p e n d e n ce from A u s t r ia — unity? Is it to be e x p e c t ed t h at t he Italian people will r u sh headlong into such a snare? No d o u bt t h ey are sorely o p p r e s s ed by A u s t r i an rule, b ut t h ey will n ot be v e ry anxious to contribute to t he glory of an E m p i r e, w h i ch is already tottering in its native soil of F r a n c e, a nd of a m an w ho w as t he first to c o m b at their o wn revolution. T he Austrian G o v e r n m e nt k n o ws all this, and therefore we m ay a s s u me that it will be m o re influenced by its o wn financial e m b a r r a s s m e n ts t h an by t h e se Bonapartistic t h r e a t s; we m ay also be certain t h at at t he decisive m o m e n t, t he influence of the Czar will be p a r a m o u nt at Vienna, a nd will entangle A u s t r ia on t he side of Russia. 25 30 15 P r u s s ia is attempting t he same game w h i ch she p l a y ed in 1780,1800 and 1805. H er plan is to form a league of neutral Baltic, or N o r th G e r m an S t a t e s, at t he h e ad of w h i ch she c an perform a p a rt of s o me i m p o r t a n c e, a nd t u rn to w h i c h e v er side offers her t he greatest a d v a n t a g e s. T he almost comical uniformity with w h i ch all these attempts h a ve e n d ed by throwing t he greedy, vacillating a nd pusillanimous Prussian G o v e r n m e nt into t he a r ms of Russia, belongs to history. It is n ot be e x p e c t ed that P r u s s ia will n ow e s c a pe her habitual fate. S he will p ut out feelers in every direction, offer herself at public auction, intrigue in b o th c a m p s, swallow camels and strain at g n a t s, lose 40 w h a t e v er c h a r a c t er m ay p e r c h a n ce y et be left to her, get b e a t e n, a nd at last 35 4 The European War be k n o c k ed d o wn to t he l o w e st bidder, w h o, in this a nd in e v e ry o t h er instance, will be Russia. S he will n ot be an ally, b ut an i n c u m b r a n ce to Russia, for she will t a ke c a re to h a ve h er a r my d e s t r o y ed b e f o r e h a n d, for h er o wn a c c o u nt a nd gratification. 5 20 15 10 Until at least o ne of the G e r m an P o w e rs is involved in a E u r o p e an w a r, t he conflict c an only rage in T u r k e y, on t he B l a ck S ea and in t he Baltic. T he naval struggle m u s t, during this period, be the m o st important. T h at t he allied f l e e ts c an d e s t r oy Sevastopol a nd t he R u s s i an Black S ea fleet; t h at t h ey c an t a ke and hold the Crimea, o c c u py O d e s s a, close the S ea of Azoff, a nd let loose t he m o u n t a i n e e rs of t he C a u c a s u s, t h e re is no doubt. W i th rapid and energetic action nothing is m o re e a s y. Supposing this to o c c u py the first m o n th of active o p e r a t i o n s, a n o t h er m o n th might bring t he steamers of the combined fleets to the British C h a n n e l, leaving the sailing vessels to follow; for t he T u r k i sh fleet w o u ld t h en be capable of doing all t he w o rk w h i ch might be required in t he B l a ck Sea. To coal in t he C h a n n el and m a ke other prepara tions, might t a ke another fortnight; a nd t h e n, united to t he Atlantic and C h a n n el fleets of F r a n ce and Britain, t h ey might a p p e ar before the e nd of M ay in t he r o a ds of C r o n s t a dt in s u ch a force as to assure t he s u c c e ss of an attack. T he m e a s u r es to be t a k en in t he Baltic are as self-evident as those in t he Black Sea. T h ey consist in an alliance, at any price, with S w e d e n; an act of intimidation against D e n m a r k, if n e c e s s a r y; an insurrection in Finland, w h i ch w o u ld b r e ak o ut u p on landing a sufficient n u m b er of t r o o ps a nd a g u a r a n t ee that no p e a ce w o u ld be c o n c l u d ed e x c e pt u p on t he condition of this province being reunited to S w e d e n. T he t r o o ps landed in Finland w o u ld 25 m e n a ce P e t e r s b u r g, while t he fleets should b o m b a rd Cronstadt. This place is certainly v e ry strong by its position. T he c h a n n el of d e ep w a t er leading up to the r o a ds will hardly admit of t wo men-of-war a b r e a st presenting their b r o a d s i d es to the batteries, w h i ch are established n ot only on the main island, b ut on smaller r o c k s, b a n ks a nd islands a b o ut it. A certain sacrifice, n ot only of m e n, b ut of ships, is unavoidable. B ut if this be t a k en into a c c o u nt in the v e ry plan of t he attack, if it be o n ce resolved t h at s u ch a nd s u ch a ship m u st be sacrificed, a nd if t he plan be carried out vigorously a nd unflinchingly, C r o n s t a dt m u st fall. T he m a s o n ry of its b a t t l e m e n ts c a n n ot for a ny length of time withstand t he c o n c e n t r a t ed fire of h e a vy Paixhans guns, t h at m o st destructive of all a r ms w h en e m p l o y ed against stone walls. L a r ge screw- s t e a m e r s, with a full c o m p l e m e nt of s u ch guns amidships, would v e ry soon p r o d u ce an irresistible effect, t h o u gh of c o u r se t h ey w o u ld in t he a t t e m pt risk their o wn existence. B ut w h at are t h r ee or four screw-ships of t he line in c o m p a r i s on with C r o n s t a d t, the k ey of the R u s s i an E m p i r e, w h o se p o s s e s- sion w o u ld leave St. P e t e r s b u rg without defense. 35 30 40 W i t h o ut O d e s s a, C r o n s t a d t, Riga, S e v a s t o p o l, with Finland e m a n c i p a t e d, 5 Friedrich Engels a nd a hostile a r my at the gates of the capital, w i th all her rivers a nd h a r b o rs closed u p, w h at would R u s s ia b e? A giant without a r m s, w i t h o ut e y e s, with no o t h er r e s o u r ce t h an trying to c r u sh h er o p p o n e n ts u n d er t he weight of h er c l u m sy t o r s o, t h r o wn h e re and t h e re at r a n d om w h e r e v er a hostile battle-cry w as h e a r d. If the maritime p o w e rs of E u r o pe should act t h us resolutely a nd vigorously, t h en P r u s s ia and A u s t r ia might so far be relieved from the control of R u s s ia t h at t h ey might e v en join t he allies. F or b o th t he G e r m an p o w e r s, if secure at h o m e, w o u ld be r e a dy to profit by t he e m b a r r a s s m e n ts of Russia. B ut it is n ot to be e x p e c t ed that L o rd A b e r d e en a nd M. D r o u yn de L ' H u ys should a t t e m pt s u ch energetic steps. T he p o w e rs t h at be are n ot for striking their b l o ws home, and if a general w ar b r e a ks out, t he energy of t he c o m m a n d e rs will be shackled so as to r e n d er t h em i n n o c u o u s. If n e v e r t h e l e s s, decisive victories occur, care will be t a k en t h at it is by m e re c h a n c e, and t h at their c o n s e q u e n c es are as harmless as possible for t he e n e m y. 5 10 15 T he w ar on the Asiatic shore of the Black S ea might at o n ce be p ut an e nd to by t he f l e e t s; t h at on t he E u r o p e an side w o u ld go on comparatively u n i n t e r r u p t e d. T he Russians, b e a t en o ut of t he Black Sea, deprived of O d e s sa a nd Sevastopol, could not c r o ss t he D a n u be without g r e at risk, (except in t he direction of Servia, for insurrectionary p u r p o s e s ,) b ut t h ey might v e ry well hold t he Principalities, until superior forces a nd t he risk of large bodies of t r o o ps being landed on their flank and r e ar should drive t h em o ut of Wallachia. Moldavia they n e ed n ot e v a c u a te without a general action, for flank a nd rear d e m o n s t r a t i o ns w o u ld t h e re be of little i m p o r t a n c e, as long as C h o t in a nd Kishenieff offered t h em a safe c o m m u n i c a t i on with Russia. B ut as long as t he w ar is confined to the W e s t e rn P o w e rs and T u r k ey on t he o ne h a n d, a nd R u s s ia on t he other, it will not be a E u r o p e an w ar s u ch as we h a ve seen since 1792. H o w e v e r, let it o n ce c o m m e n c e, and the in dolence of the W e s t e rn P o w e r s, and t he activity of R u s s ia will s o on c o m p el A u s t r ia and Prussia to decide for the A u t o c r a t. P r u s s ia will p r o b a b ly be of no great a c c o u n t, as it is m o re t h an likely t h at h er a r m y, w h a t e v er its capaci- ties m ay b e, will be w a s t ed by p r e s u m p t i on at s o me second J e n a. Austria, notwithstanding h er b a n k r u pt condition, notwithstanding t he insurrections t h at m ay o c c ur in Italy and H u n g a r y, will be no contemptible o p p o n e n t. R u s sia herself obliged to k e ep up h er a r my in t he Principalities, a nd on t he Cau casian frontier, to o c c u py Poland, to h a ve an a r my for the defense of the Baltic coast, a nd especially of St. P e t e r s b u rg a nd Finland, will h a ve v e ry few t r o o ps to spare for offensive o p e r a t i o n s. If Austria, R u s s ia a nd Prussia, (al w a ys supposing t he latter not y et p ut to rout,) c an m u s t er five or six h u n d r ed t h o u s a nd m en on t he Rhine and the A l p s, it will be m o re t h an c an be r e a s o n ably e x p e c t e d. A nd for five h u n d r ed t h o u s a nd allies, t he F r e n ch alone are a m a t c h, supposing t h em to be led by Generals n ot inferior to t h o se of their 20 25 30 35 40 6 The European War o p p o n e n t s, a m o ng w h om the A u s t r i a ns alone p o s s e ss c o m m a n d e rs w o r t hy of the n a m e. T he R u s s i an Generals are n ot formidable, a nd as to the P r u s s i a n s, t h ey h a ve no Generals at all; their officers are hereditary subalterns. 10 B ut we m u st n ot forget t h at t h e re is a sixth p o w er in E u r o p e, w h i ch at given 5 m o m e n ts asserts its s u p r e m a cy over t he w h o le of t he five so-called " g r e a t" p o w e rs and m a k es t h em t r e m b l e, e v e ry o ne of t h e m. T h at p o w er is the Revolution. L o ng silent and retired, it is n ow again called to action by t he commercial crisis, and by t he scarcity of food. F r om M a n c h e s t er to R o m e, from Paris to W a r s aw a nd P e s t h, it is omnipresent, lifting up its h e ad a nd awaking from its slumbers. Manifold are t he s y m p t o ms of its returning life, e v e r y w h e re visible in t he agitation a nd disquietude w h i ch h a ve seized t he proletarian class. A signal only is w a n t e d, and this sixth and greatest E u r o p e an p o w er will c o me forward, in shining armor, a nd sword in h a n d, like M i n e r va from the h e ad of t he Olympian. This signal the impending E u r o p e an 15 w ar will give, a nd t h en all calculations as to t he b a l a n ce of p o w er will be u p s et by t he addition of a n ew element w h i c h, e v er b u o y a nt and youthful, will as m u ch baffle the plans of t he old E u r o p e an p o w e r s, a nd their Generals, as it did from 1792 to 1800. 7 Karl Marx The Western Powers and Turkey F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 3988, 28. Januar 1854 L o n d o n, T u e s d a y, J a n. 10, 1854. T he charge against Mr. S z e m e re of having revealed the place w h e re the H u n g a r i an c r o wn w as concealed, w as first b r o u g ht f o r w a rd by t he V i e n na Soldatenfreund, the a v o w ed organ of the Austrian police, and this single fact should h a ve sufficed to p r o ve t he falsehood of t he accusation. T he police is n ot u s ed to gratuitously d e n o u n ce its o wn accomplices, while it is o ne of its habitual tricks to t h r ow suspicion on t he innocent, in o r d er to c o v er t he culpable. A m an of t he standing and the influence of M r. S z e m e re w o u ld be t he v e ry last to be spontaneously sacrificed by t he A u s t r i an police, h ad t h ey b e en able to secure his cooperation. If the secret w as n ot b e t r a y ed by t he indiscretion of o ne of t he agents of Mr. Kossuth—a c a se by no m e a ns im probable—I c a n n ot b ut suspect the C o u nt K. B a t t h y a n y, n ow resident at Paris, of having b e en t he traitor. He w as o ne of t he v e ry f ew p e r s o ns initiated into the secret of the place w h e re the regalia w e re hidden, and he is the only m an a m o ng t h em w ho has applied to the V i e n na C o u rt for an amnesty. This last fact I h a ve r e a s on to s u p p o s e, he will n ot d e n y. L o rd H a r d i n g e, t he British Commander-in-Chief, h as b e en prevailed u p on to w i t h d r aw his resignation. As to t he D u ke of Norfolk, we are informed by t he c o r r e s p o n d e nt of The Dublin Evening Mail, t h at "a bit of p a l a ce gossip h as got w i n d. A certain noble D u k e, w ho holds an office at court, in com- mendam, with t he highest hereditary feudal dignity in t he S t a t e, m a de a little t oo free, it is said, with t he c h a m p a g ne at t he royal table, t he result of w h i ch w as the loss of his m o st noble equilibrium in t he dining-room, and the in v o l v e m e nt of Majesty itself in t he c a t a s t r o p h e. T he c o n s e q u e n ce of this annoying contretemps h as b e en the resignation of the noble D u ke and the a p p o i n t m e nt of E a rl S p e n c er as L o rd H i gh S t e w a rd of h er M a j e s t y 's H o u s e h o l d ." M r. Sadleir, t he b r o k er of the Irish brigade, h as again t e n d e r ed his resigna- 5 10 15 20 25 8 The Western Powers and Turkey tion of his ministerial post, w h i ch h as this t i me b e en a c c e p t ed by L o rd A b e r d e e n. This position h as b e c o me u n t e n a b le after the public disclosures m a de before an Irish c o u rt of law as to t he scandalous m e a ns by w h i ch he h ad contrived to get into Parliament. T he control of t he Cabinet of all t he 5 T a l e n ts over t he Irish brigade will n ot be strengthened by this u n t o w a rd event. T he bread-riots w h i ch o c c u r r ed on F r i d ay and S a t u r d ay at C r e d i t t o n, D e v o n s h i r e, w e re a sort of popular a n s w er to t he glowing descriptions of prosperity w h i ch t he ministerial and free t r a de p a p e rs thought fit to a m u se their r e a d e rs with at t he obsequies of t he y e ar 1853. 10 15 T he Patrie states from T r e b i z o nd t h at t he R u s s i an " C h a r gé d'Affaires at T e h e r a n, having d e m a n d ed t he dismissal of t wo of t he most popular Minis ters of the S h ah of Persia, the p e o p le b e c a me excited, and the C o m m a n d er of t he G u a rd said he would n ot a n s w er for public tranquillity if this d e m a nd w e re complied with. A c c o r d i ng to this a c c o u n t, it w as the dread of an e x- plosion from t he dislike of t he people for R u s s ia t h at i n d u c ed t he S h ah to r e n ew his relations with the Chargé d'Affaires of E n g l a n d ." 20 25 To the huge m a ss of diplomatic p a p e r s, c o m m u n i c a t ed to the public, are n ow a d d ed a Note of the Four Powers d a t ed t he 12th of D e c e m b er a nd jointly a d d r e s s ed by their respective E m b a s s a d o rs at Constantinople to t he P o r t e, a nd a n ew circular of Mr. D r o u yn de T H u ys to t he F r e n ch diplomatic agents, dated Paris, D e c. 30. On perusing t he n o te of the F o ur P o w e r s, we u n d e r s t a nd t he e x t r e me agitation which prevailed at Constantinople after t he a c c e p t a n ce of the N o te by t he P o r te b e c a me k n o w n, t he insurrectionary m o v e m e nt occurring on the 21st., and t he necessity t he T u r k i sh Ministry w as placed in, solemnly to proclaim that t he o p e r a t i o ns of the w ar w o u ld not be inter r u p t ed nor interfered with by t he r e n e w ed p e a ce negotiations. Just nine d a ys after the intelligence of the t r e a c h e r o us and c o w a r d ly b u t c h e ry at Sinope h ad r e a c h ed Constantinople and a r o u s ed t h r o u g h o ut the O t t o m an E m p i re o ne t r e m e n d o us cry for r e v e n g e, the F o ur P o w e rs coolly invite, and t he 30 E m b a s s a d o rs of G r e at Britain a nd F r a n ce force t he P o r te to enter into negotiations with t he C z a r, t he b a se of w h i ch is t h at all t he ancient treaties shall be renewed; t h at t he firmans relative to t he spiritual privileges o c t r o y ed by the Sultan to his Christian subjects, shall be a c c o m p a n i ed by n ew assur a n c es given to e a ch of t h e se p o w e r s, c o n s e q u e n t ly to t he C z a r; t h at t he P o r te shall n a me a plenipotentiary to establish an armistice: t h at it shall allow R u s s ia to e r e ct a c h u r ch and a hospital at J e r u s a l em a nd pledge itself to the P o w e r s, consequently to the Czar, to ameliorate its internal administrative system. T he P o r te shall n ot only n ot receive any indemnity at all for t he h e a vy losses it has u n d e r g o ne c o n s e q u e nt on t he piratical acts of the M u s c o v i t e; all t he chains in w h i ch R u s s ia h as m a de T u r k ey d a n ce for a quarter of a c e n t u r y, shall n ot only be forged a n e w, b ut the prisoner shall be k e pt closer 35 40 9 Karl Marx t h an b e f o r e; t he P o r te shall lay itself at t he m e r cy of t he A u t o c r at by giving him humble a s s u r a n c es with regard to t he firmans relative to the spiritual privileges of its Christian subjects, and pledging itself to h im with regard to its internal administrative s y s t e m; t h us surrendering at o n ce the religious p r o t e c t o r a te a nd t he dictation over its civil g o v e r n m e nt to t he Czar. In c o m p e n s a t i on for such a surrender the P o r te receives t he p r o m i se of " t he m o st speedy evacuation possible of t he Principalities," t he invasion of w h i ch L o rd Clanricarde declared to be " an act of p i r a c y ," a nd t he a s s u r a n ce that t he p r e a m b le of the treaty of July 13,1841 — w h i ch h as p r o v ed so t r u s t w o r t hy a safeguard against Russia — shall be formally confirmed. 5 10 Although the unfathomable abjectness of t h e se pitiful " P o w e r s" r e a c h ed its highest possible pitch in frightening, s o me d a ys after t he e v e nt of Sinope, the Porte into a negotiation on s u ch b a s e s, t h ey will n ot get rid of their e m b a r r a s s m e nt in this sneaking way. T he Czar h as g o ne t oo far to suffer e v en t he a p p e a r a n ce of his p r e t e n d ed exclusive p r o t e c t o r a te over t he Christian subjects of T u r k ey to be supplanted by a E u r o p e an o n e, a nd already we are informed by the V i e n na c o r r e s p o n d e nt of The Times t h at " A u s t r ia h as d e m a n d ed w h e t h er t he Russian Court w o u ld object to a E u r o p e an protector ate o v er t he Christians in T u r k e y. T he reply, in m o st positive language, w as t h at R u s s ia would permit no other P o w er to meddle in t he question of t he G r e ek C h u r c h. R u s s ia had treaties with t he P o r te a nd .would settle t he question w i th h er a l o n e ." We are also informed by The Standard t h at " N i c h o l as will n ot a c c e pt any proposition n ot p r o c e e d i ng directly from the T u r k i sh sovereign individually, t h us rejecting any right of mediation or interference on the p a rt of the E u r o p e an Powers—an insult to t h o se P o w e rs w h i ch n o ne c an regard as u n m e r i t e d ." 15 20 25 T he only important passage of the circular of M o n s i e ur D r o u yn de l ' H u ys is t h at announcing the e n t r a n ce of t he united s q u a d r o ns into t he Black Sea, with a view to " c o m b i ne their m o v e m e n ts in s u ch a m a n n er as to p r e v e nt t he territory or t he flag of T u r k ey from being t he object of any fresh attack on t hé p a rt of t he naval forces of R u s s i a ." Non bis in idem. Lamoutarde après la viande. The Morning Chronicle of y e s t e r d ay p u b l i s h ed a telegraphic dis p a t ch from its c o r r e s p o n d e nt at Constantinople, d a t ed t he 30th, stating t h at t he c o m b i n ed fleets h ad entered t he Black Sea. " T he fleets m ay enter t he B l a ck S e a ," says The Daily News, " o n ly to do w h at t h ey h a ve b e en doing in t he Bosphorus—nothing." According to The Press, " O r d e rs h a ve already b e en sent o ut for o ne ship from the English a nd o ne from t he F r e n ch fleet to enter t he Black Sea, a nd u n d er flag of truce to enter Sevastopol. W h en t h e re t h ey are to inform the Russian Admiral t h at if he leaves the p o rt of S e v a s t o p ol he will be immediately fired i n t o ." Although t he R u s s i an fleet, 40 at this n ot v e ry propitious season, and after their glorious exploit at Sinope, 35 30 10 The Western Powers and Turkey h a ve nothing w h a t e v er to call t h em out into t he Black Sea, t he Czar will n ot allow England and F r a n ce to exclude him, e v en temporarily, from w a t e rs from which he h as s u c c e e d ed in excluding t h em e v er since 1833. His prestige w o u ld be gone w e re he n ot to a n s w er this c o m m u n i c a t i on by a declaration of war. "A declaration of w ar of R u s s ia against F r a n ce and E n g l a n d ," says t he Neue Preussische Zeitung, " is m o re p r o b a b le t h an a speedy p e a ce b e t w e en Russia and T u r k e y ." At N e w ry (Ulster), a great meeting w as held for the p u r p o se of taking into consideration the u n p r o v o k ed aggression of R u s s ia against T u r k e y. I am glad to be enabled, t h r o u gh t he friendly c o m m u n i c a t i on from Mr. U r q u h a rt of t he N e w ry report, to give y o ur r e a d e rs t he m o st r e m a r k a b le passages of t h at gentleman's speech. H a v i ng explained, on several o c c a s i o n s, my o wn views of t he Oriental question, I n e ed n ot point out t h o se topics on w h i ch I m u st disagree from Mr. U r q u h a r t. L et me only r e m a rk t h at his views are confirmed by t he intelligence t h at " t he p e a s a n ts of L e s s er Wallachia, assisted by t he Wallachian soldiery, h a ve r i s en against t he R u s s i a n s. T he whole c o u n t ry in t he environs of Kalefat and along t he left shore of t he D a n u b e, is in motion. T he R u s s i an functionaries h a ve e v a c u a t ed T u r m a l ." After some introductory r e m a r ks M r. U r q u h a rt said: . .. " In those m a t t e rs w h i ch affect our g r a v e st interests and intercourse with foreign States, t h e re is neither restraint of law, nor guidance of system, t h e re is no responsibility to the nation, no penalties for the omission of a ny duty, or for t he p e r p e t r a t i on of any c r i m e; y ou are entirely destitute of all Constitutional m e a ns of restraint, b e c a u se y ou are either k e pt in ignorance or y ou are misinformed. This s y s t em is, t h e r e f o r e, o ne calculated to p e r v e rt the nation, to corrupt t he G o v e r n m e nt and to e n d a n g er the State. M e a n w h i l e, y ou are o p p o s ed to a G o v e r n m e n t, t he m o st crafty a nd systematic, t he most hostile and u n s c r u p u l o u s, and w h i ch h as w o r k ed its w ay to t h at p r e e m i n e n ce of p o w er by which it t h r e a t e ns t he world, t h r o u gh the u se which it h as b e en enabled to m a ke of the v e ry G o v e r n m e n ts w h i ch it labors to overthrow—and t h e re is this peculiarity in our condition, as t h e re w as formerly in t h at of Athens—that R u s s ia has found or formed t he chief instruments of her great n e ss in t he b r e a st of t h at S t a t e, w h o se public councils m o st o p p o s ed h er policy. T h e re is for this a substantive r e a s on t h at England in such m a t t e rs is t he black spot of ignorance. T he U n i t ed States has a President, and he exercises the due prerogatives of r o y a l t y; t h e re is a S e n a te w h i ch controls the executive, and has prior k n o w l e d ge of its a c t s; ( h e a r, h e ar and c h e e r s .) In F r a n c e, t h e re h a ve b e en r e p e a t e d ly C o m m i t t e es of Parliament, to in vestigate t he national transactions, calling for d o c u m e n t s, and bringing b e f o re t h em the Foreign Minister for examination. T h e r e, t o o, the nation is alert, according, at least, to its k n o w l e d g e, a nd so is t he G o v e r n m e n t; for 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 11 Karl Marx 5 10 15 on s u ch m a t t e rs hinge the existence of ministries and of dynasties. In Austria, t h e re is at least a m o n a r c h, a nd he h as k n o w l e d ge of t he acts of his s e r v a n t s. In T u r k ey and in Russia, y ou see t h at in o ne c o u n t ry t he feeling of the p e o p le c o n s t r a i ns t he G o v e r n m e n t, a nd in t he other t he G o v e r n m e nt r e p r e s e n ts t he will of the nation. England alone r e m a i ns w i th a c r o w n, w i t h o ut authority, w i th a G o v e r n m e nt without s y s t e m, with a Parliament w i t h o ut control, a nd a nation without k n o w l e d g e. ( H e a r, H e a r .) Reverting n ow to the application of this state of things, to the facts before u s, I h a ve first to tell you—and it is the salient matter—that R u s s ia has no force to effect her t h r e a t s, and t h at she h as calculated merely u p on t he facility of terrifying y ou by groundless f e a r s, t h at she h as h ad no p u r p o se w h a t e v er of m a k i ng w ar on T u r k e y, t h at she h as no m e a ns for doing so, t h at she h as n ot e v en m a de disposition for s u ch an object, t h at she has calculated u p on y ou restraining T u r k e y, so t h at she might o c c u py her p r o v i n c e s, and calculates further u p on y ou for forcing from t h at State such compliance w i th insolent d e m a n ds as shall b r e ak up the O t t o m an E m p i r e. (Hear, hear.) It is by y o ur E m b a s s a d or in Constantinople a nd by y o ur s q u a d r on in the B o s p h o r us t h at she is a b o ut to achieve her e n d s. A nd h e re I must a d v e rt to a statement m a de by my gallant friend Colonel C h e s n e y, and at t he same time supply an omission w h i ch he has m a d e. He stated, t h at as matters stood before t he P r u th w as c r o s s e d, T u r k ey w as m o re t h an a m a t ch for Russia, b ut he did not give y ou the high estimate he en tertains and h as e x p r e s s ed of t he military qualities of t he T u r k s. He stated, e v en at the p r e s e nt m o m e n t, and w i th all the i m m e n se a d v a n t a g es w h i ch y ou h a ve enabled R u s s ia to acquire, he w as still in d o u bt w h e t h er T u r k ey w as n ot a m a t ch for Russia. On this point I h a ve n ot the s h a d ow of a doubt, if y ou grant me t wo conditions—the first, t h at y o ur E m b a s s a d or a nd y o ur s q u a d r on are w i t h d r a w n, the second, t h at T u r k ey r e c o v e rs its emasculating reliance on foreigners. B ut after t h at c a me a n o t h er statement, doubtingly indeed m a d e, b ut w h i ch from his high authority, and t h e re is no higher authority in t h e se matters—may carry an u n d ue weight or b e ar an u n- justifiable interpretation. He said t h at the m o m e nt might be at p r e s e nt favor able for Russia, b e c a u se the D a n u be w as frozen, a nd she might p u sh her f o r c es across into Bulgaria. B ut w h at forces h as she got to p u sh into Bulgar ia? E u r o pe h as for m a ny m o n t hs given h e ed to exaggerated s t a t e m e n t s; we h a ve b e en industriously informed of the v a st a c c u m u l a t i o ns of her forces p r e p a r ed to c o me in action. T h ey w e re currently r a t ed for 150,000 m e n, a nd t he people w e re r e a dy to believe that 150,000 m en sufficed for the c o n q u e st of T u r k e y. I r e c e i v ed some time ago an official s t a t e m e nt w h i ch r e d u c ed to 80,000 m e n, the w h o le n u m b er that h ad crossed the P r u t h, of w h i ch b e t w e en 20,000 or 30,000 h ad already perished by disease or w e re in hospital. T he 40 s t a t e m e nt w as sent by me to o ne of the n e w s p a p e r s, b ut w as n ot inserted, 25 20 30 35 12 The Western Powers and Turkey 5 10 being considered incredible. R u s s ia has n ow published her o wn statement, reducing the entire n u m b er to 70,000 m e n. (Cheers.) Putting aside t h en t he relative strength of b o th E m p i r e s, if all their forces w e re brought up it m u st be clear t h at R u s s ia h ad no intention of making w ar with s u ch an a m o u nt of force as this. N ow w h at w as t he force w h i ch T u r k ey h ad to o p p o s e? No less t h a n, at t he time referred t o, 180,000 m en b e t w e en the Balkan and t he D a n u b e, n ow increased to 200,000 m en in strong, fortified positions, with a Russian force r e d u c ed to 50,000 m en at t he outside, a nd t h e se demoralized by defeat a nd infected by desertion. As to t he qualities of t he T u r k i sh t r o o ps and their superiority to the R u s s i a n s, y ou h a ve heard the t e s t i m o ny of General Bern; y ou h a ve t he living t e s t i m o ny of Colonel Chesney—confirmed by t he e v e n ts w h i ch h a ve filled E u r o pe w i th a s t o n i s h m e nt a nd admiration. O b s e r ve we are n ot n ow u p on t he point of t he relative p o w er of t he t wo E m p i r es b ut of t h at of the intention a nd m o de of proceeding of t he one— 15 Russia. My argument is t h at she did n ot p r o p o se making w a r; b e c a u s e, on the o ne hand, she h ad n ot u p on the spot t he requisite force, a n d, on t he o t h e r, t h at she could r e c k on on t he Cabinet of England. R u s s ia h ad no intention of making war—she has no intention n o w. This is w h at I h a ve stated b e f o re t he war—that she w o u ld enter and o c c u py t he Principalities by t he aid of 20 England. H ow h a ve I b e en able to prognosticate? N o t, certainly, by t he knowledge of R u s s i a 's designs, w h i ch t h o u s a n ds k n ow as well or b e t t er t h an m e, b ut by the knowledge of E n g l a n d 's c h a r a c t e r. B ut let us reconsider t he case—it is t oo important to p a ss it over. Colonel C h e s n ey said t h at the real question w as t he r e s e r ve w h i ch R u s s ia h ad b e h i nd the P r a t h. Of t h at r e s e r ve he h ad h e a rd lately a great deal. O s t en S a c k e n, with his 50,000 m e n, w as on full m a r ch on the D a n u be to retrieve the disaster of Oltenitza. N o w, t he 50,000 m en dwindled to 18,000, a nd t he b e st of all is, that e v en t h ey h a ve not arrived. ( L a u g h t er and cheering.) Taking t h en Colonel C h e s n e y 's n u m b e r, 75,000, r e d u c ed by d e a t hs a nd sickness to 50,000, a nd throwing into t h e se the 18,000 of ubiquitous r e s e r v e, we shall only h a v e, after all, 70,000 m en to o p e r a te against 200,000 strongly e n t r e n c h ed a nd in a m o u n tainous region, and at a s e a s on of t he y e ar w h e n, h i t h e r t o, t he Russians h a ve invariably retired from t he field. N ow let me recall t he e v e n ts of the late w ar in 1828 and '29. T u r k ey w as t h en in convulsions. T h en M u s s u l m a n 's sword 35 w as t u r n ed against M u s s u l m a n ' s; t he p r o v i n c es w e re in revolt, G r e e ce in insurrection, the old military force annihilated, t he n ew conscripts scarcely disciplined, a nd amounting only to 33,000 m e n. T he c o m m a nd of t he B l a ck Sea w r e n c h ed from T u r k ey by British b r o a d s i d e s, delivered in full force in t he harbor of N a v a r i n o; and t h en it w as t h at Russia, b a c k ed by England and F r a n c e, m a de a spring u p on T u r k ey and r e a c h ed t he center of her p r o v i n c es b e f o re she k n ew t h at w ar w as declared. A nd h ow m a ny m en do y ou think 25 30 40 13 Karl Marx she t h en judged it p r u d e nt to e m p l o y? T wo h u n d r ed and sixteen t h o u s e n d. ( C h e e r s .) A nd y et it w as only by deception a nd t h r o u gh t he influence of t he English E m b a s s a d o r, w ho unfortunately h ad r e t u r n e d, t h at she w as seduced to sign t h at t r e a ty of Adrianople t h at w as surprised from her. ( H e a r, h e a r .) L o ok at T u r k ey n o w, united in h e a rt and feeling, with a heroism inspired at o n ce by t he love of country and detestation of outrages—with united au thority, ample r e s o u r c e s, able to dispose of 300,000 v o l u n t e e r s, of the m o st martial c h a r a c t er to be found on t he face of t he earth—of 250,000 disciplined troops—victorious in Asia—with the c o m m a nd of t he B l a ck Sea—not lost, be it o b s e r v e d, as I shall presently show, at Sinope—with steam to c o n v e y, w i t h o ut loss of m en or time, her contingents to t he scene of action from the r e m o t e st p r o v i n c es of the E m p i r e, from t he s n o wy hights of the C a u c a s us to the arid deserts of Arabia, from the w a s t es of Africa to the Persian Gulf—one spirit of indignation prevails—of m a n h o od has b e en a r o u s e d. ( H e ar and c h e e r s .) Y e s, b ut as in the former w a r, a N a v a r i no b r o u g ht t he C o s s a c ks a c r o ss t he Balkan; so n ow m ay t he screw propellers of Britain, e v en without w a r, bring Russian hulks to the Dardanelles. B ut I am speaking of R u s s i an intentions, t h at is t he point. It is in Downing-st. t h at this victory is to be achieved, and n ot in the E a s t. M e a n w h i l e, are y ou u n s c a t h e d? Is t h e re a m an b e f o re me w ho d o es n ot suffer in s u b s t a n c e? Is t h e re o ne the price of w h o se b r e ad is not e n h a n c e d, w h o se e m p l o y m e n t, or the e m p l o y m e nt of his capital is not curtailed? ( H e a r, hear. ) W h o se t a x es are n ot i n c r e a s e d? Is not Change- alley c o n v u l s e d? H a ve we n ot seen by this m o v e m e nt of Russian t r o o ps a d i s t u r b a n ce of t he m o n ey m a r k et p r o d u c ed equal to two-thirds of t h at e x p e r i e n c ed in 1847—and yet R u s s ia has n e v er intended w a r. H a ve we n ot seen t he G o v e r n m e n ts of E u r o pe degraded a nd t he g r o u nd w o rk laid of insurrections and convulsions—and yet R u s s ia n e v er intended w a r. H a ve we n ot seen the O t t o m an E m p i re exhausting itself by an e n o r m o us military establishment of half a million of m e n, b e c a u se R u s s ia has displaced 70,000 t r o o ps to feed at her e x p e n se a nd at the e x p e n se of t he operatives of Great Britain? And—all this b e c a u se you h a ve believed p e o p le e a sy of belief t h at R u s s ia w as so strong t h at she could not be resisted—Turkey so w e ak t h at she could n ot be supported. Really we live in an age of d r e a ms and of fables; we are m en not to believe this only, we are m en to believe t h at R u s s ia is more powerful t h an all t he p o w e rs of the world b a n d ed against her. The Times m a k es light of t he a r my of M o s l e m s, m a k es equally light of t he armies of F r a n ce a nd the navies of England, and gravely tells us t h at all E u r o pe and T u r k ey to b o ot m ay as soon attempt to k e ep t he R u s s i a ns o ut of Con stantinople, as to k e ep the n o r th winds from blowing a c r o ss the Sarmatian Plains. A nd t he argument as regards E u r o pe is j u st as g o od as respecting T u r k e y; yet T u r k ey will fall, if y ou p e r s e v e r e. R u s s ia has displaced 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 14 The Western Powers and Turkey 10 15 70,000 m e n, and in c o n s e q u e n ce T u r k ey is m o v ed with terror and in dignation—England convulsed with fear and panic—Russia, t o o, c o n v u l s ed with shouts of laughter. ( L a u g h t er a nd prolonged cheering.) I h a ve said I w o u ld r e v e rt to the affair of Sinope, or as it h as b e en justly t e r m e d, t he little 5 N a v a r i n o. I d o n 't refer to t h at ungraceful e v e nt in reference to our conduct— for we h a ve d o ne in this nothing m o re disgraceful t h an in the rest—but I refer to it as bearing u p on t he relative strength of t he t wo parties. So considered, it has a d d ed nothing to R u s s i a 's p o w e r, and t a k en nothing from that of T u r k e y, b ut the r e v e r s e. It has placed in the m o st unmistakable light the justifiable fears of the R u s s i a ns of T u r k i sh p r o w e s s. H e re we h a ve seen a fact without parallel e v en in our o wn naval annals—frigates laying t h e m s e l v es alongside line-of-battle ships, and c o m m a n d e rs casting the t o r ch into t he p o w d er magazine, and offering t h e m s e l v es up for h o l o c a u st on their c o u n t r y 's shrine. W h at m ay n ot be achieved against a G o v e r n m e nt w h i ch in e v e ry act, a nd especially in this, is t he object of a b h o r r e n ce and disgust to e v e ry h u m an being. O b s e r ve t h at t he maritime force of T u r k ey is u n t o u c h e d; n ot a line-of-battle ship, n ot a steamer has b e en sacrificed. N ow she is doubly insured in the c o m m a nd of t he Black S ea if the diplomatists are w i t h d r a w n; and it is t h e y, a nd t h ey alone, w ho h a ve p r o d u c ed t he so-called disaster of Sinope. B ut that disaster w as p r e p a r ed for another e n d; it w as as a rod a nd a goad to urge the lagging b e a s ts of b u r d en in Paris a nd in L o n d o n, and to drive t h em into enforcing t he t e r ms of settlement u p on t he belligerents. Before I e n t e r ed this meeting, I h e a rd it stated by a gentleman of t he C o m mittee, that it w as perfectly c o m p e t e nt for E n g l a nd and F r a n ce to interpose b e t w e en t h em if t h ey e x p e c t ed by so doing to secure p e a c e. I k n ow t h at w h at he h as stated is t he general impression t h r o u g h o ut this land, b ut I did not t he less on that a c c o u nt listen to h im with horror. W ho g a ve y ou t he right to go a b o ut the world enforcing p e a ce by a r m s? It is o ne thing to resist aggression, it is another thing to c o m m it it. ( H e a r, h e a r !) Y ou c a n n ot inter- p o se even to save T u r k e y, save by declaring w ar against Russia. Y o ur inter position, h o w e v e r, will be for R u s s i a 's behoof, a nd at h er dictation, a nd with the effect of imposing conditions on T u r k ey w h i ch m u st bring h er fall . .. In y o ur negotiations y ou will p r o p o se to T u r k ey to relieve her from h er p a st treaties with R u s s ia in consideration of a E u r o p e an settlement. T h is h a s, indeed, b e en already p ut forward, a nd h as b e en received with acclamation by a nation w h i ch h as acclaims r e a dy for e v e ry perversion. G o od H e a v e n s! a E u r o p e an settlement! T h at is w h at T u r k ey has to rely upon. Surely your treaty of V i e n na w as a E u r o p e an settlement, and w h at w as the result? T h at settlement w as important by its establishment of Poland; a nd what befell P o l a n d? W h en Poland h ad fallen, w h at did your Minister tell y ou respecting t h at t r e a t y? W h y, it w as this: " T h at it h ad given to England the right to 20 25 30 35 40 15 Karl Marx e x p r e ss an opinion regarding the e v e n ts of P o l a n d ." After going on to state t h at he h ad r e m o n s t r a t ed on t he subject b e f o re t he event, he s a y s: " B ut R u s s ia t o ok another view of the c a s e ." A nd so it will be with your p r e s e nt settlement; she will t a ke another view of t he c a s e. ( L o ud c h e e r s .) T h e se w o r ds w e re stated in the H o u se of C o m m o n s; t h ey w e re uttered by the very Minister (Lord Palmerston) w ho h as n ow in his h a n ds t he fate of T u r k e y, as he h ad of Poland. B ut n ow you are w a r n e d; t h en y ou w e re u n c o n s c i o u s. . .. L et me refer to a piece of intelligence recently published in The Times n e w s p a p e r. It is t h e re stated that o ur Minister in Persia had had a difference with t he G o v e r n m e nt of t he S h a h, w ho w as on t he point of yielding, w h en the Minister of Russia interposed to e x a s p e r a te the quarrel. T h us t h e re y ou h a ve at the o ne and at the s a me m o m e nt R u s s ia driving England out of Persia, a nd England imposing Russia on T u r k e y. This s a me letter mentions that an e m b a s sy h ad r e a c h ed T e h e r a n; that t he Affghans w e re in t he greatest state of ferment, and that D o st M a h o m e d, the implacable e n e my of Russia, had m u ch at h e a rt the success of his e m b a s sy w h i ch w as to m o ve P e r s ia to s u p p o rt T u r k e y. N o w, y ou will recollect t h at sixteen y e a rs ago, England m a de w ar against t he Affghans, with t he p u r p o se of dethroning D o st Ma h o m e d, b e c a u se he w as the e n e my of England and t he firm ally of Russia. N o w, p e r h a ps your G o v e r n m e nt believed this. If it did, it is v e ry strange t h at it w as not u p on R u s s ia t h ey m a de war, b ut u p on t he Affghans, w h i ch w as exactly the c o u r se to throw t h em into t he a r ms of Russia. B ut y o ur G o v e r n m e nt entertained no such belief; it t h en perfectly k n ew t h at D o st M a h o m e d, as n ow a p p e a r s, was t he implacable foe of Russia, a nd it was on t h at v e ry a c c o u nt that it had attacked him. T he fact has b e en established, and in the H o u se of C o m m o ns it has b e en t h e re p r o v e d, t h at d o c u m e n ts h ad b e en absolutely forged representing D o st M a h o m ed falsely as the ally of Russia. T he E n v oy of England himself sent h o me t he original for publication. ( S h a m e .) This is b ut the legitimate result of the secrecy in the G o v e r n m e nt a nd t h at ignorance in the nation to which I already referred. T h e re is n ot a m an in this a s s e m b ly u p on w h om my e y es c an r e s t, w ho is not by sufferance a participator in this crime, a nd w ho by this indifference to his c o u n t r y 's acts and h o n or is n ot degraded to the position of a slave, while u n d er the delusion t h at he is a freeman. ( H e a r, h e a r .) May I tell y ou something of w h at is thought of y ou by strangers? Y ou h a ve h e a rd recently m u ch of G e r m an influences at Court. P e r h a ps y ou would like to h e ar something of t he opinions of G e r m an cousins of the Q u e e n; and let me tell y o u, if G e r m a ny is Russian, it is E n g l a nd t h at has made her so. Listen n ow to. t h e se w o r d s: 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 "If T u r k ey is not interfered with by England and F r a n ce she will conquer. If, on the contrary, the W e s t e rn P o w e r s, in their infatuated subservience c a n n ot refrain from 'mediating,' or from meddling w i th t he affairs of the E a s t, 40 16 The Western Powers and Turkey 5 T u r k ey is d o o m e d, and universal dominion of the M u s c o vy C o s s a c ks will soon sway the destinies of this world! Y et h ow noble has hitherto b e en t he position and attiude of poor T u r k e y, in spite of all diplomatic e m b e z z l e m e n t, and though she mistook a b a nd of assassins for her friends. M a t t e rs look, indeed, gloomy! and I h a ve hourly b e en expecting a b o m b a r d m e nt by t he allied fleets of her capital in o r d er to b e nd her moral heroism to disgraceful 'Longa est injuria, longae ambages, submission. T he T u r ks m ay truly s a y: sed summa sequar fastigia rerum/'What a c o n t r a st in their p r e s e nt b e h a v i or as c o m p a r ed with that of England on similar occasions ! they ' m a ke war'— 10 England carries on piracy. Recollect only t he 'Declaration of L i m a' and t he invasion of Affghanistan, the b o m b a r d m e nt of C o p e n h a g en and t he battle of N a v a r i no and then think of T u r k ey as it stands there at present—abased and threatened, e v en invaded and p r o v o k ed by the 'civilized world;' she remains amid all her trials, calm and judicious, firm and resolute, b ut se- r e n e. 15 Y ou m ay judge by this t h at there are t h o se in the loftiest station w ho m ay sigh in vain for the privilege w h i ch y o ur indulgence affords to me of finding a v e nt for my indignation, a nd the opportunity of warning of coming e v e n t s. Suffer me then to tell y ou t he position in w h i ch y ou stand. Britain p r e s e n ts t wo features, she is an idiot at h o m e, she is a m a n i ac abroad, an armed m a n i a c, endangering h er o wn life and the lives of o t h e r s. Y ou are n ot so individually though y ou are so collectively. A w a k en t h en your individual intelligence and restrain the c o r p o r a te m a n i ac until y ou have time to treat the disordered brain—this system from w h i ch all the evil p r o c e e d s ." ( L o ud and long continued c h e e r i n g ). I m ay add to Mr. U r q u h a r t 's s p e e ch t h at L o rd P a l m e r s t o n 's last coup d'éclat and the favor of the people b e s t o w ed u p on him, h a ve m a de him Prime Minister in reality, if n ot in n a m e. 20 25 Karl M a r x. 17 Karl Marx The War in the East The Zuid Africaan. Kapstadt, 6. März 1854 L o n d o n, J a n u a ry 14, 1854. At last, this long pending " E a s t e rn Q u e s t i o n" a p p e a rs to h a ve r e a c h ed a step w h e re diplomacy will not m u ch longer be enabled to m o n o p o l i ze this ground for its e v er shifting a nd e v er resultless m o v e m e n t s. On t he 3rd inst. the F r e n ch a nd British fleets h a ve entered the Black Sea, in o r d er to p r e v e nt t he R u s s i an n a vy from doing h a rm either to the T u r k i sh fleet or t he T u r k i sh coast. O n ce b e f o re the C z ar Nicholas h as declared t h at s u ch a step w o u ld b e, for him, the signal for a declaration of w a r. Will he n ow stand it quietly? T h e re is a r e p o rt to-day that the combined F r e n ch a nd English fleets, together w i th t he first division of the T u r k i sh n a v y, are transporting 17,000 T u r ks to B a t o u m. If this be correct, it is as m u ch an act of w ar as if t h ey m a de a direct a t t a ck u p on S e b a s t o p o l, and the Czar c a n n ot b ut declare w ar at o n c e. B ut w o u ld Russia stand alone? W h i ch p a rt w o u ld A u s t r ia and Prussia t a ke 5 10 in a general w a r? It is reported that Louis B o n a p a r te has notified to t he A u s t r i an g o v e r n m e nt t h a t, if in c a se of a conflict with Russia, A u s t r ia sided w i th this p o w e r, t he F r e n ch G o v e r n m e nt w o u ld avail itself of the e l e m e n ts of insurrection, w h i c h, in Italy and Poland, only required a spark to be kindled again into a raging fire, a nd that t h en the restoration of Italian and Polish nationality w o u ld be a t t e m p t ed by F r a n c e. T he Austrian g o v e r n m e n t, h o w e v e r, we m ay con- 20 fidently a s s u m e, will be m o re b a r r a s s m e n ts t h an by the threats of B o n a p a r t e. influenced by financial e m its o wn 15 T he state of the Austrian E x c h e q u er m ay be inferred from t he late aug m e n t a t i on of its depreciated n o t es a nd from t he r e c e nt e x p e d i e nt of the g o v e r n m e nt enacting a discount of 15 pet. u p on t he p a p er m o n ey issued by t h e m s e l v e s. This device, working t he depreciation of their o wn p a p e r, per h a ps carries tax-making ingenuity to its perfection, it is putting a t ax on the p a y m e nt of t a x e s. A c c o r d i ng to t he G e r m an p a p e r s, t he Austrian b u d g et for 1854 will show a deficit of 45,000,000 firs, on the ordinary service, and 50,000,000 firs, on the extraordinary. F or t he 100th time A u s t r ia is moving 30 t o w a r ds a loan, b ut in a m a n n er w h i ch p r o m i s es no s u c c e s s. It is n ow 25 18 The War in the East p r o p o s ed to raise a loan of 50,000,000 firs, for t he m o st ostensible p u r p o se of paying interest d ue and s o me other pressing d e m a n d s. W h en t he n e ws of t he intended e n t r a n ce of the united s q u a d r on into the Black S ea r e a c h ed Vienna, the m o n ey c h a n g e rs h ad e n o u gh to do to change p a p er c u r r e n cy for silver coin. P e o p le with 100 and 200 florins t h r o n g ed to their counting h o u s es with a view to secure their endangered t r e a s u r e s. N e v e r t h e l e s s, on t he decisive m o m e n t, the influence of St. P e t e r s b u rg at V i e n na will be p a r a m o u nt a nd entangle Austria, on the side of Russia, into t he coming struggle. As to Prussia she is attempting the same game as in 1780, in 1800 and 1805, to form a league of neutral Baltic or N o r t h e rn G e r m an S t a t e s, at the head of w h i ch she might play a p a rt of some i m p o r t a n ce and t u rn to w h i ch side w as to offer h er the greatest a d v a n t a g e s. 5 10 T h at t he T u r k o - E u r o p e an f l e e ts c an d e s t r oy Sebastopol and t he Russian Black S ea fleet, t h at t h ey c an t a ke p o s s e s s i on of, and hold the K r y m, o c c u py 15 Odessa, close t he sea of Azoff a nd let loose t he mountaineers of t he C a u c a s u s, t h e re is no doubt. T he m e a s u r es to be t a k en in the Baltic a re as self- evident as t h o se in t he Black S e a: an alliance at a ny price with S w e d e n; an act of intimidation against D e n m a r k, if n e c e s s a r y; an insurrection in Finland, w h i ch would b r e ak o ut u p on landing a sufficient n u m b er of t r o o p s, a nd a g u a r a n t ee that no p e a ce w o u ld be c o n c l u d ed e x c e pt u p on the condition of this province being re-united to S w e d e n: t he t r o o ps landed in Finland, to m e n a ce P e t e r s b u rg while t he fleet b o m b a r ds C r o n s t a d t. 20 All will d e p e nd on the maritime p o w e rs of E u r o pe acting resolutely and vigorously. 25 30 35 T he New Prussian Gazette of t he 29th ult. confirms t he a c c o u nt of the E m p e r or of R u s s ia having o r d e r ed t h at all t he forces in his empire to be placed on a war-footing. N ot only h as he w i t h d r a wn his deposits from the b a n ks of England and F r a n c e, b ut also o r d e r ed v o l u n t a ry collections to be raised on the p a rt of his nobility, and the railways in progress to be sus- p e n d e d, in order to d e v o te to w ar all t he m en a nd m o n ey required for their construction. On the other hand a r m a m e n ts in F r a n ce are going on m o re actively t h an e v e r, t he s e c o nd m o i e ty of the contingent of 80,000 m en of t he class of 1852 having b e en called out. In F r a n c e, t o o, a loan of 200,000,000 frs. (about £8,000,000) has long b e en c o n t e m p l a t e d, b u t, t he d e a r th of food, t he failure in t he w i ne and silk c r o p s, t he prevailing c o m m e r c i al a nd industrial distress, t he great a p p r e h e n s i o ns entertained a b o ut t he p a y m e n ts to be m a de at t he e nd of F e b r u a r y, t he d o w n w a rd t e n d e n cy of t he funds and railway shares, all t h e se c i r c u m s t a n c es t e nd by no m e a ns to facilitate such a transaction. 40 It is the intention of the British g o v e r n m e n t, as we are informed by the Times, to raise the n u m b er of s e a m en a nd marines for the c u r r e nt y e ar to 19 Karl Marx 53,000 m e n, w h i ch is an increase of a b o ut 8,000 on t he n u m b er v o t ed for last year, a nd a further addition to t he 5,000 men«raised u n d er t he o r d e rs of L o rd D e r b y 's administration. T he total increase in t he N a vy since 1852 m ay t h e r e f o re be stated of about 13,000 m e n. F or t he force n ow to be raised for the service of t he fleet 38,000 will be s e a m en a nd b o y s, and 15,000 m a r i n e s. At last the m u r d er is out, as regards t he affair of Sinope. T he s t a t e m e n ts published of the relative strength of R u s s ia a nd T u r k ey at t h at p l a c e, show t h at t he Russians had 3 steam t w o - d e c k e r s, o ne three-decker and 680 guns on their side m o re t h an the Turkish forces. So considered the e v e nt of Sinope h as a d d ed nothing to R u s s i a 's p o w e r, and t a k en nothing from t h at of T u r k e y, b ut the r e v e r s e. H e re we h a ve seen a fact w i t h o ut parallel e v en in o ur o wn annals—frigates laying themselves alongside line-of-battle ships, and c o m m a n d e rs casting the t o r ch into t he p o w d er m a g a z i ne and offering themselves up for holocaust on their c o u n t r y 's shrine. T he real maritime force of T u r k ey is u n t o u c h e d; n ot a line-of-battle ship, n ot a steamer having b e en sacrificed. This is n ot all. According to the last intelligence r e c e i v e d, o ne of the finest t h r e e - d e c k e rs of the R u s s i an fleet, the Rostislav, a 120-gun ship, h as b e en sunk by the T u r k s. This fact, k e pt b a ck hitherto u n d er t he specious p r e t e xt t h at the Rostislav did n ot sink during the action, b ut immediately afterwards, is n ow admitted by the R u s s i a n s, and forms a good set-off against the d e s t r o y ed T u r k i sh ships. If o ne three-decker w as actually sunk, we m ay e x p e ct t h at the other Russian vessels received v e ry serious h a rm indeed during the action, and after all the victory of Sinope m ay h a ve m o re disabled t he Russian t h an t he T u r k i sh fleet. W h en the P a s ha of E g y pt h e a rd of the disaster at Sinope, he o r d e r ed the immediate a r m a m e nt of 6 frigates, 5 cor v e t t es a nd 3 brigs, destined to fill up the c h a sm w h i ch has b e en p r o d u c ed in t he material of the T u r k i sh fleet. T he Egyptian steam-frigate Pervaz-Bahri disabled and t a k en after nearly 5 10 15 20 25 30 five h o u rs struggle by the far larger Russian steam-frigate Vladimir, w as so riddled w i th shot that she could hardly be b r o u g ht into S e b a s t o p o l, and w h en t h e r e, sank at o n c e. T he Pervaz-Bahri w as only carried into the h a r b o ur of S e b a s t o p ol by the aid of its chief-engineer, M r. Bell, an Englishman, w ho w as p r o m i s ed on t he p a rt of the Admiral Kornüoff, if he s u c c e e d ed in taking it t h e re in safety, to be set immediately at liberty. W h en arrived at Sebastopol, instead of being released, M r. Bell and his sub-engineers a nd stokers w e re p ut into close confinement, with the miserable allowance of 3d. a-day for their m a i n t e n a n ce and given to u n d e r s t a nd t h at t h ey w o u ld h a ve to m a r ch 80 miles on foot, at this inclement season, into t he interior. Prince M e n s h i- kof f, w ho c o m m a n ds at Sebastopol, w as a p p r o v ed by t he Czar and his minis- 40 t e r s, w ho t u r n ed a deaf ear to the r e p r e s e n t a t i o ns of o ur C o n s ul at O d e s sa 35 20 The War in the East 5 10 15 and the British A m b a s s a d or at St. P e t e r s b u r g. It w as already k n o wn t h at at the battle of Sinope t wo English m e r c h a n t - m e n, following private t r a d e, w e re heedlessly and ruthlessly involved in the general destruction. T he following is the simple narrative of t he destruction of o ne of t h e se vessels as given by a F r e n ch p a p e r: " On the 30th N o v e m b er the brigantine H o w a r d, belonging to Bideford, a seaport in the S o u th of E n g l a n d, had finished the discharge of a cargo of coals to t he Austrian C o n s u l, Mr. Pirentz, at Sinope, and w as then at a n c h or taking in ballast with a view of sailing to F a t s ah for a cargo of c o r n, w h i ch she had engaged to carry to E n g l a n d, w h en the Russian fleet suddenly c a me in sight, and without giving a ny notice w h a t e v e r, or affording any o p p o r t u n i ty for foreign vessels to r e m o ve o ut of danger, c o m m e n c ed a h e a vy fire of shot and shells on the T u r k i sh fleet lying at a n c h or and in a few m i n u t es entirely d e s t r o y ed the H o w a rd and other m e r c h a nt vessels in the h a r b o u r ." This atrocious infraction on international law is p a r a d ed in the O d e s sa bulletin, while the Russian journals simultaneously a n n o u n c ed in insulting language that, while the English fleets d a r ed n ot enter the Black Sea, t he English g o v e r n m e nt d a r ed n ot refuse the u se of its d o c k y a r ds to repair a R u s s i an man-of-war. 30 20 T he latest mails h a ve b r o u g ht us m o re supplementary n e ws with regard to the military e v e n ts w h i ch lately t o ok place in Asia. It a p p e a rs that t he T u r ks h a ve b e en compelled entirely to e v a c u a te t he R u s s o - A r m e n i an terri tory, b ut the precise result of t he e n g a g e m e n t s, w h i ch determined this retreat, is n ot y et k n o w n. O ne T u r k i sh c o r ps h ad p e n e t r a t ed on t he direct r o ad to 25 Akkalzikhe from A r d a h a n, while a n o t h er b o dy t o ok the m o re southern r o ad from K a rs by A l e x a n d r o p ol (in Georgian Giimri) to Tiflis. B o th t h e se c o r p s, it a p p e a r s, w e re m et by the R u s s i a n s. A c c o r d i ng to the Russian a c c o u n ts the T u r ks w e re r o u t ed on either line and lost a b o ut 40 pieces of c a n n o n; as to the T u r k i sh a c c o u n ts we h a ve nothing official b ut in private c o r r e s p o n d e n ce the retreat is explained by t he necessity of going into winter q u a r t e r s. Certain it is, that the T u r ks h a ve e v a c u a t ed the R u s s i an territory with the exception of F o rt St. N i c h o l a s, that t he R u s s i a ns followed t h e m, and that their ad v a n c ed guard e v en v e n t u r ed to within a mile of K a r s, w h e re it w as repulsed. We k n ow b e s i d e s, t h at t he T u r k i sh a r my of Anatolia, recruited as it is from the Asiatic p r o v i n c e s, the seat of old M o s l em barbarism, a nd counting in its r a n ks a great n u m b er of irregulars, unreliable t h o u gh generally b r a ve sol diers of a d v e n t u r e, fancy w a r r i o r s, a nd filibusters of Kurdistan—that t he a r my of Anatolia, is nothing like t he staid, disciplined and drilled a r my of Roumelia, w h e re t he c o m m a n d er k n o ws h ow m a ny a nd w h at m en he has from day to d ay u n d er his c o m m a n d, a nd w h e re t he thirst for i n d e p e n d e nt ad v e n t u re and private plunder is held u n d er c h e ck by articles of w ar and courts 35 40 21 Karl Marx martial. We k n ow t h at t he R u s s i a n s, v e ry h a rd up for t r o o ps in t he beginning of the Asiatic campaign, h a ve b e en reinforced by the 13th division of infantry (16,000 m e n) u n d er L i e u t e n a nt G e n e r al Obrucheff II, and by a b o dy of C o s s a c ks from t he D o n; we k n ow t h at t h ey h a ve b e en able to k e ep the m o u n t a i n e e rs in b o u n d s, to maintain their c o m m u n i c a t i on as well across the C a u c a s us by Vladikavkaz as by sea to O d e s sa a nd Sebastopol. U n d er t h e se c i r c u m s t a n c e s, and considering t h at the T u r k i sh c o m m a n d er A b di P a s ha w as either a traitor or a d u n ce (he has b e en recalled since and A h m ed P a s ha h as b e en sent in his stead), we should n ot w o n d er at all if t he T u r ks had b e en w o r s t e d, although t h e re c an be no d o u bt of t he exaggeration prevailing in t he R u s s i an bulletins. On t he D a n u b e, the Russians h a ve s o me time ago attacked Matchin, a fort situated on an arm of t he D a n u b e. A steamer c a me up with t wo gun b o a t s; t h ey w e re m et by a hot fire; t he gun b o a t s, it is said, w e re sunk, and the s t e a m er so far damaged that it had to m a ke the b e st of its w ay h o m e. T h r ee or four skirmishes o c c u r r e d, partly b e t w e en t he o u t p o s ts at Kalafat, partly b e t w e en the Russian p o s ts on the D a n u be a nd small T u r k i sh parties w ho c r o s s ed t he river in order to surprise t h e m. T he T u r ks ascribe to t h e m s e l v es t he advantage in all the e n c o u n t e r s. It is to be regretted t h at t he T u r k i sh irregulars, fit m o re for this duty t h an for a ny other, h a ve n ot long since b e en o r d e r ed to carry on this w ar on a small scale with the greatest activity. T h ey w o u ld h a ve p r o v ed m o re t h an a m a t ch for the C o s s a c k s, disorganized the necessarily faulty system of o u t p o s ts of the e n e m y, faulty b e c a u se extending o v er a line 300 miles in length: t h ey w o u ld h a ve disturbed the Russian p l a n s, obtained a perfect knowledge of t he e n e m y 's m o v e m e n ts a nd might w i th p r o p er caution and boldness h a ve b e en victorious in e v e ry e n c o u n t e r. F r om telegraphic n e w s, received this m o m e n t, it a p p e a rs t h at " on the 6th of this m o n t h, a Turkish division, 15,000 strong, with 15 pieces of artillery, a t t a c k ed the e n t r e n c h ed position of Citale, n ot far from Kalafat, and t o ok it with s t o r m; that the Russians lost 2,500 m en a nd that a reinforcement of 18,000 R u s s i a ns marching from K a r a k a l, w as forced to retire with a loss of 250 m e n ." A c c o r d i ng to another report, t he great majority of the population of L e s s er Wallachia has risen against, and K r a j o va b e en placed in a state of siege by, the R u s s i a n s. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 M e a n w h i le Russia e x h a u s t ed herself in efforts to s e d u ce or alarm in all q u a r t e rs of t he world, on o ur Indian frontiers, in Persia, Servia, S w e d e n, D e n m a r k, etc. In Persia t he British minister h ad h ad a difference with t he G o v e r n m e nt of t he Shah, w ho w as on the point of yielding, w h en the R u s s i an A m b a s s a d or interposed not only to e x a s p e r a te t he S h ah against England, b ut to drive him into active hostility t o o, a nd a declaration of w ar against the 40 22 The War in the East Porte. This intrigue, h o w e v e r, is said to h a ve b e en baffled by t he British C h a r gé d'Affaires, M r. T h o m p s o n 's m e n a ce of withdrawing from T e h e r a n, by the d r e ad of an immediate explosion from t he dislike of t he Persian p e o p le for Russia, and by the arrival of an Affghan E m b a s sy threatening, if Persia formed an alliance w i th Russia, an invasion of the Persian territory by t he Affghans. 5 15 10 A c r o wd of R u s s i an agents w as simultaneously o v e r r u n n i ng Servia— seeking o ut and applying t h e m s e l v es to t he places a nd p e r s o ns formerly k n o wn by their a t t a c h m e nt to the b a n i s h ed family of the Obrenovich—speak- ing to some of the y o u ng Prince Michael—to o t h e rs of his old father Milosh— now making t h em h o p e, t h r o u gh the p r o t e c t i on of Russia, [for] the extension of t he limits of Servia—the formation of a n ew kingdom of Illyria, w h i ch should unite all t h o se w ho s p o ke t he Servian language actually u n d er t he domination of T u r k ey and Austria,—and n ow announcing to t h e m, in c a se of r e s i s t a n c e, innumerable armies and utter subjugation. N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng t h e se intrigues, in opposite s e n s e s, t h at R u s s ia c e a s ed not to c a r ry on, she has not succeeded in breaking the b o n ds b e t w e en t he Servians and t he Sultan, but, on t he contrary, t wo firmans w e re e x p e c t ed from Constantinople at Belgrad, t he one suppressing all t he relations existing b e t w e en Servia a nd 20 Russia, a nd the other confirming all t he privileges c o n c e d e d, at different e p o c h s, to t he Servian p e o p l e. T h e n, t he R u s s i an G o v e r n m e nt h as actively p u r s u ed negotiations at Stockholm and C o p e n h a g e n, for the p u r p o se of inducing t he g o v e r n m e n ts of S w e d en and D e n m a rk to side with h er in t he approaching E u r o p e an struggle; the great object she has in securing their alliance, being to obtain the closing of the p a s s a g es of the S o u nd a nd Belts against the W e s t e rn P o w e r s. All she has effected till n o w, is the conclusion of a treaty b e t w e en S w e d e n, D e n m a rk a nd P r u s s ia concerning an a r m ed neutrality, and p r e p a r a t i o ns of a r m a m e n t s, ostensibly directed against her self. Private letters from S w e d en exult in the possibility of the D u c hy of Finland, so shamefully seized by R u s s ia w i t h o ut a declaration of w a r, being restored to the Scandinavian K i n g d o m. As to D e n m a r k, the attitude, n ot of the people, b ut of t he court, is m o re equivocal. It is e v en r u m o u r ed that t he p r e s e nt D a n i sh Minister of Foreign Affairs will resign a nd be replaced by C o u nt Reventlow-Criminil, a m an k n o wn to be intimately c o n n e c t ed w i th t he C o u rt of St. P e t e r s b u r g. In F r a n ce t he " f u s i o n" of t he Orleanists and Legitimists o w es to Russia t he sort of s u c c e ss it h as m et with, while t h at s a me p o w er is stirring up h e a v en a nd e a r th to d e s t r oy t he entente cordiale existing b e t w e en the G o v e r n m e n ts of England and F r a n ce a nd to sow distrust b e t w e en t h e m. A t t e m p ts are being m a de by s o me of the Paris journals, in t he p ay of Mr. Kisseleff, to create a belief that t he English g o v e r n m e nt is n ot sincere, a nd we see that in E n g l a nd a journal, in t he p ay of Mr. de B r u n n o w, 35 40 30 25 23 Karl Marx in r e t u rn casts d o u b ts on the sincerity of the F r e n ch G o v e r n m e n t. A n o t h er b l o w, principally aimed against the W e s t e rn p o w e r s, is the Russian prohibi tion relative to the exportation of Polish corn. In the m e an time the m o v e m e n ts of W e s t e rn diplomacy w e re by no m e a ns hostile to Russia, b ut exhibited, on the contrary, rather too anxious a tend e n cy to temporise w i th justice and to c o m p r o m i se w i th crime. It is n ow o b v i o us to e v e r y o ne that their c o u r se has b e en a mistaken and mischievous o n e. T he resurrection of the V i e n na c o n f e r e n ce and the p r o t o c ol d r a wn up by t h em on the 5th ult., the letter of the F r e n ch and British A m b a s s a d o rs at Constantinople to Reshid Pasha, the collective n o te of t he 4 great p o w e rs p r e s e n t ed to the P o r te on the 15th, and a c c e p t ed by t he Sultan on the 31st ult., the circular of M r . D r o u yn De l ' H u y s, a n n o u n c i ng the e n t r a n ce of the united fleets into the Black Sea, to the F r e n ch diplomatic agents, dated 30th ult., s u ch are the principal e v e n ts of the diplomatic history of the last 6 w e e k s. As to the protocol of the V i e n na conference your r e a d e rs will h a ve b e en informed of its c o n t e n ts before n o w. C an t h e re be anything m o re ludicrous t h an its assertion that " t he a s s u r a n c es given on several occasions by t he E m p e r or of R u s s ia exclude the idea that t h at august S o v e r e i gn entertains a ny w i sh to interfere with the integrity of the O t t o m an E m p i r e ," and anything m o re mischievous t h an its urging on T u r k ey the propriety of consenting to a 3 m o n t h s' armistice? T wo days after the n e ws of the disgraceful b u t c h e ry at Sinope h ad r e a c h ed Constantinople on t he 5th ult., Reshid P a s ha ad d r e s s ed a letter to L o rd Stratford de Redcliffe and G e n e r al B a r a g u ay D ' H i l- liers, c o m m u n i c a t i ng the n e ws from Sinope and asking that t he fleets might enter t he Black Sea. On t he 12th, a w e ek after t he d a te of Reshid P a s h a 's n o t e, he received a v e ry indifferent a n s w er on the p a rt of t he t wo A m b a s s a d o r s, intimating to him that " t he p r e s e n ce of the U n i t ed S q u a d r on had 'a political signification,' c o n s e q u e n t ly no military o n e, a nd t h at it w as 'a moral support,' c o n s e q u e n t ly no naval o n e ." T h us the P o r te w as c o e r c ed into the a c c e p t a n ce of the joint N o te of the 4 p o w e rs p r e s e n t ed to her on the 15th D e c e m b e r. This note grants the P o r te n ot only no c o m p e n s a t i on w h a t e v er for the losses she has u n d e r g o ne c o n s e q u e nt u p on t he piratical acts of t he A u t o c r a t; it insists n ot only u p on the r e n e w al of all the ancient treaties of Kainardji, Adrianople, Unkiar Skellessi, etc., w h i ch h a ve furnished, for a c e n t u ry and a half, the arsenal from w h i ch R u s s ia has d r a wn her w e a p o ns of fraud, interference, progress and incorporation; b ut it allows the Czar to c a r ry t he point of the religious p r o t e c t o r a te and administrative dictation over T u r k ey by stipulating that " t he communication of the firmans relative to the spiritual privileges o c t r o y ed by the Sublime P o r te to all its subjects n ot M u s u l m e n, should be m a de to all the p o w e r s, a nd a c c o m p a n i ed by suitable a s s u r a n c es given to e a ch of t h e m ," and t h at the P o r te shall declare on its 24 The War in the East p a rt its firm resolution to d e v e l op m o re efficaciously its administrative system and internal r e f o r m s. T h e se n ew propositions, while in their letter, investing the 5 p o w e rs of E u r o pe with a joint p r o t e c t o r a te o v er the Christian subjects of T u r k e y, give in reality, t he p r o t e c t o r a te to R u s s ia alone. T he a r r a n g e m e nt is to b e, t h at F r a n ce and Austria being R o m an Catholic countries, a re to h a ve t he p r o t e c torate over the R o m an Catholic Christians in T u r k e y, a nd England a nd P r u s s ia being P r o t e s t a nt countries, are to h a ve the p r o t e c t o r a te over t he P r o t e s t a nt subjects of the Sultan, while R u s s ia is to h a ve the p r o t e c t o r a te over those professing t he G r e ek faith. N o w, as the R o m an Catholics do n ot n u m b er 800,000, nor the P r o t e s t a n ts 200,000, while t h o se w ho profess t he G r e ek religion a m o u nt to nearly 10,000,000, it is plain that the Czar w o u ld indeed acquire the p r o t e c t o r a te o v er the Christian subjects in T u r k e y. T h e se proposals of the 4 p o w e rs w e re n ot a c c e p t ed by the P o r te till on the 19th ult., w h en Riza P a s ha and Halil P a s ha h ad e n t e r ed the ministry, t he s u c c e ss of the P e a ce or R u s s i an p a r ty having b e en t h us assured. On the 21st ult., w h en it b e c a me k n o wn that the Council of Ministers h ad notified to t he F o ur A m b a s s a d o rs t he a d o p t i on of t he propositions t h ey h ad suggested, the Sofias (students) a s s e m b l ed to p r e s e nt a petition against t he resolution t a k en by the g o v e r n m e n t, a nd the o u t b r e ak of disturbances w as only prevented by the arrest of the ringleaders. So g r e at w as the e x a s p e r a tion, which prevailed at Constantinople, t h at t he Sultan did not v e n t u re to repair o n . t he following d ay to the Divan, nor p r o c e e d, as usual, amidst the t h u n d er of the c a n n o n, and t he h u r r a hs of t he foreign w ar c r e w, to t he m o s q ue of T o p h a n a; and that Reshid P a s ha fled for refuge from his o wn palace in Stamboul to the palace contiguous to t he r e s i d e n ce of the Sultan. On t he following d ay the public mind w as s o m e w h at calmed by a proclamation on the part of the Sultan, that no stop should be p ut to the military o p e r a t i o n s. T h e se t o r t u o u s, pusillanimous and inexplicable m o v e m e n ts of the W e s t e rn diplomacy, w h i c h, t h r o u g h o ut the d r e a ry history of the last 9 m o n t h s, almost e x h a u s t ed public patience, h a ve t h r o wn d o u b ts u p on the sincerity of the British G o v e r n m e n t, and as the public feel t h e m s e l v es at a loss to u n d e r s t a nd the motives t h at m ay h a ve c a u s ed the long e n d u r a n ce on the p a rt of the W e s t e rn p o w e r s, secret influences are s p o k en of, and r u m o u rs are in- dustriously spread, that Prince Albert, t he h u s b a nd of the Q u e e n, is inter fering in t he affairs of t he E x e c u t i v e; t h at he is not only attending on his Sovereign L a dy at the meetings of her Council, b ut is using his influence to control the advice of the responsible a d v i s e r s; that, while exercising his opportunity to be p r e s e nt at the meeting of the Q u e en with her ministers, he is in c o n s t a nt and direct c o m m u n i c a t i on w i th foreign c o u r t s, including t he Russian o n e, b ut e x c e pt t h at of F r a n c e. A n o t h er tale is, t h at the " f u s i o n" 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 25 Karl Marx of the Orleans and elder B o u r b on b r a n c h es of the late royal family of F r a n ce r e c e i v es almost as m u ch c o u n t e n a n ce from o ur c o u rt as it d o es from that of Russia, and the visit of the D u ke of N e m o u rs at the court of Q u e en Victory, fresh from the meeting with " H e n ry the F i f t h ," is pointed at as a proof. A fourth report, that the negotiations in t he E a s t e rn Question, h a v e, with the a s s e nt of Russia, b e en delegated to t he sole intermediation of C o u nt Buol-Schauenstein, brother-in-law of C o u nt Meyendorf, is cited as evidence t h at this g o v e r n m e nt has never desired i n d e p e n d e nt or effective negotiations, b ut h a s, from t he first, sought to aid t he designs of R u s s ia a nd h er allies, while seeming to o p p o se her. Mr. R o e b u c k, it is confidently stated, will bring the whole question of C o b u rg influence b e f o re the H o u se of C o m m o n s, while L o rd B r o u g h am is said to intend bringing it b e f o re t he H o u se of L o r d s. T h e re is no d o u bt t h at t he Coburg influences form, at this m o m e n t, the almost exclusive topic of conversation in the metropolis. Parliament will r e a s s e m b le on the 31st instant. 5 10 15 So stern a winter as the p r e s e nt o ne h as n ot b e en k n o wn since 1809. T he intensity of the cold has b e en by no m e a ns t he m o st trying incident; the i n c e s s a nt changes b o th of t e m p e r a t u re and of the c h a r a c t er of the w e a t h er h a ve b e en far w o r s e. T he trains r un on the railway w i th t he greatest dif ficulty; in some parts transit a p p e a rs to be quite cut off; a nd in the m e a ns of c o m m u n i c a t i on England is t h r o wn b a ck to times forgotten. T he electric telegraph h as b e en u s ed to mitigate the inconvenience of c o m m e r c i al d o c u m e n t s, intercepted by snow drifts, and to p r e v e nt t he noting of bills for unexplained n o n - p a y m e n t. N e v e r t h e l e ss the noting of m o re t h an 500 bills in L o n d on illustrates the social a n a r c hy o c c a s i o n ed by t he u n c o m m on in- c l e m e n cy of the season. T he p a p e rs are filled with r e c o r ds of the fearful s h i p w r e c ks c a u s ed by the s n o w s t o r ms and gales, particularly on the E a s t e rn coast. Although the recently published tables of trading, navigation a nd r e v e n ue show a continuance of the prosperity w i th w h i ch 1853 began, the severity of the season, coupled with the rising prices of the first necessaries, principally of c o r n, coals and tallow, acts as a h a rd p r e s s u re u p on the con dition of the lower classes. N u m e r o us c a s es of starvation h a ve o c c u r r e d. B r e ad riots in t he W e st are n ow forming an a c c o m p a n i m e nt to t he lock-outs in the N o r t h. 20 25 30 T i m e, h o w e v e r, compels to defer a detailed a c c o u nt of t r a de and c o m m e r ce 35 to a following letter. 26 Friedrich Engels The Last Battle in Europe The Last Battle in Europe. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.3997, 8. Februar 1854 10 T he letters of o ur L o n d on c o r r e s p o n d e n ts a nd the E u r o p e an journals enable us at last to appreciate in all its bearings t he prolonged struggle b e t w e en t he T u r ks and R u s s i a n s, of w h i ch T s h e t a l e, a small village nine miles n o r th of 5 Kalefat, w as the arena. N e xt to the fact t h at the series of sanguinary actions in question w as characterized by great b r a v e ry a nd that the T u r ks c a me off victors, the m o st striking feature of the w h o le is that it is w i t h o ut practical result, so far as the expulsion of the R u s s i a ns from Wallachia is c o n c e r n e d. This c o m es from a mistake on the p a rt of the T u r ks to w h i ch we h a ve m o re t h an o n ce h ad occasion to direct the attention of our r e a d e r s. We allude to their sending a separate a r my to Kalefat, in order to shut up the r o ad to Servia, while the p r e s e n ce of a strong a nd c o n c e n t r a t ed force n e ar R u s t c h uk and H i r s o va would h a ve b e en the b e st g u a r a n t ee against the Russians ventur ing into t h at p r o v i n c e. S u ch a force w o u ld h a ve m e n a c ed the c o m m u n i c a t i o ns of any Russian a r my marching w e s t w a r d, while a bridge and bridge-head at Oltenitza or s o m e w h e re t h e r e a b o u t s, fortified like that of Kalefat, could h a ve maintained a footing for t h em on t he left b a nk of t he D a n u b e. B ut e v en w i t h o ut that, the R u s s i a ns could n ot c r o ss t he U p p er D a n u be and m a r ch into Servia, without leaving the T u r ks to c r o ss t he L o w er D a n u be and m a r ch u p on 20 B u c h a r e s t. Of c o u r s e, in saying this, we r e c k on the relative strength of the parties to be w h at it is in reality, and ascribe a decided superiority of n u m b e rs to the T u r k i sh a r my of Roumelia, o v er the R u s s i an a r my of Wallachia. 15 25 N ow the fact is t h at t he T u r ks h a ve u s ed their superiority in the v e ry w ay to nullify it and provide for being finally b e a t e n. T h ey did n ot c o n c e n t r a te their forces on t he L o w er D a n u b e, b ut divided t h e m. While 30,000 to 35,000 m en occupied Widdin and Kalefat, the r e st of the a r my r e m a i n ed on the Middle a nd L o w er D a n u b e. T h ey o c c u py t he a rc of a circle, while t he R u s s i a ns o c c u py t he c h o rd of this a r c. T h us t he latter h a ve less space to t r a v e r se in order to c o n c e n t r a te all their t r o o ps on a given spot. M o r e o v e r, 27 Friedrich Engels t he shorter r o a ds of t he Russians are t h r o u gh a level c o u n t r y, while t he longer o n es of t he T u r ks p a ss over hills and c r o ss m a ny m o u n t a in t o r r e n t s. T he T u r k i sh position is, then, as disadvantageous as c an b e, a nd yet it has b e en t a k en in order to satisfy t he old prejudice t h at t h e re is no b e t t er w ay of barring a r o ad against an e n e my than by placing yourself across it. 5 On the 20th of D e c e m b er O m er P a s ha knew at Shumla, t h at the Russians w e re preparing a general a t t a ck u p on Kalefat for the 13th of J a n u a r y. He h ad t w e n t y - t wo d a y s' time; y et such is the position of Kalefat with regard to t he other stations of the T u r k i sh a r m y, t h at it d o es n ot a p p e ar that he could bring on any re-enforcements e x c e pt a few r e s e r v es from Sofia. On t he other h a n d, t h at the R u s s i a n s, w i t h o ut having received a ny considerable re-en f o r c e m e n ts from home—on J a n u a ry 3rd O s t e n - S a c k e n 's ubiquitous c o r ps w as n ot y et at Bucharest—should v e n t u re u p on a c o n c e n t r a t i on so far w e s t, s h o ws t h at either the state of t he w e a t h er and of t he D a n u be did n ot allow t he T u r ks to cross the river lower d o w n, or that Gorchakoff h ad o t h er r e a s o ns to be assured of their inactivity in that quarter. T he T u r ks at Kalefat w e re o r d e r ed to attack the Russians while y et in t he act of concentrating t h e m selves. T he b e st w ay to do this w as to r e p e at the e x p e r i m e nt of Oltenitza. W hy w as not this d o n e? T he bridge at Kalefat s t a n d s, in spite of winter and floating ice, and t h e re w as no position lower d o wn w h e re a similar bridge and bridge-head could be erected. Or had O m er P a s ha b e en o r d e r ed to k e ep on the right b a nk of the river? T h e re is so m u ch of a contradictory n a t u re in the T u r k i sh proceedings, bold and clever m e a s u r es are so regularly fol lowed by t he m o st palpable sins of omission and c o m m i s s i on t h at diplomatic agency m u st be at the b o t t om of it. At all e v e n t s, Gorchakoff w o u ld n ot h a ve stirred an inch t o w a rd Kalefat, h ad he n ot b e en certain t h at the T u r ks w o u ld not r e p e at t he Oltenitza m o v e m e n t. Altogether some 30,000 Russians m u st h a ve b e en sent against Kalefat, for w i th a lesser force t h ey would hardly h a ve v e n t u r ed to attack a fortified position, defended by a garrison of 10,000 m e n, w i th at least 10,000 m o re for p u r p o s es of r e s e r ve or sally. At least one-half, then, of the Russian active a r my in Wallachia w as concentrated t h e r e. W h e re a nd h ow could the other half, spread over a long line, h a ve resisted a T u r k i sh force crossing at Olte nitza, Silistria or H i r s o v a? And if the c o m m u n i c a t i on b e t w e en Widdin and Kalefat could be k e pt up without difficulty, t h en t h e re w as a possibility of crossing at other points. T h us t he Russians by their position on the c h o rd of the a r c, the periphery of w h i ch w as held by the T u r k s, w e re enabled to bring a superior force to the field of battle at T s h e t a l e, while the T u r ks could not re-enforce their corps at Kalefat, though a w a re of t he intended a t t a ck long b e f o r e h a n d. T he T u r ks deprived of that m o v e m e nt of diversion which w o u ld h a ve p r e v e n t ed the w h o le battle, deprived of the c h a n ce of succor, 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 28 The Last Battle in Europe 5 10 15 20 w e re r e d u c ed to their b r a v e ry and to the h o pe of cutting up the e n e my in detail before his c o n c e n t r a t i on w as c o m p l e t e d. B ut e v en this h o pe w as slight, for t h ey could not m o ve v e ry far from Kalefat, and e v e ry hostile corps of inferior strength could retire o ut of t he circle of their operations. T h us they fought for five d a y s, generally w i th s u c c e s s, b ut at last h ad to retire again to their e n t r e n c h m e n ts in the villages a r o u nd Kalefat, the Russian forces being decidedly superior in strength at the e n d, w h en n ew r e - e n f o r c e m e n ts arrived. T he result is t h at the R u s s i an a t t a ck u p on Kalefat is m o st p r o b a b ly averted or delayed, and that [the] T u r ks h a ve s h o wn that in the o p en field, no less t h an behind r a m p a r ts and ditches, t h ey c an fight well. T he m u r d e r o us character of the e n c o u n t e rs m ay be inferred from the statement of a letter from Bucharest, to the effect that in the e n g a g e m e n ts o ne w h o le regiment of Russian rifles, and all but 465 m en of a regiment of lancers, w e re c o m pletely annihilated. At Oltenitza the T u r ks w e re a t t a c k ed in their e n t r e n c h ed positions by the R u s s i a n s; at Tshetale the Russians w e re a t t a c k ed in their e n t r e n c h ed posi tions by t he T u r k s. On b o th o c c a s i o ns the T u r ks h a ve p r o v ed victorious, b ut without reaping a ny positive results from their victory. T he battle of Olte nitza h a p p e n ed just w h en t he p r o c l a m a t i on of an armistice w as on its w ay from Constantinople to the D a n u b e. A nd t he battle of Tshetale curiously coincides with the n e ws of the D i v an having a c c e p t ed the last proposals of p e a c e, imposed u p on t h em by their W e s t e rn allies. In the o ne instance t he machinations of diplomacy are nullified in the clash of a r m s, while, in t he other, the bloody w o rk of w ar is simultaneously frustrated by some secret 25 diplomatic agency. 29 Karl Marx The Fighting in the East—Finances of Austria and F r a n c e- Fortification of Constantinople F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 3997, 8. Februar 1854 L o n d o n, F r i d a y, J a n. 20, 1854. T he latest mails h a ve brought us some s u p p l e m e n t a ry n e ws w i th regard to t he military e v e n ts which lately t o ok place in Asia. It a p p e a rs that the T u r ks h a ve b e en compelled entirely to e v a c u a te t he R u s s o - A r m e n i an territory, b ut t he precise result of the engagements w h i ch d e t e r m i n ed their r e t r e a t, is n ot k n o w n. T he T u r ks h ad p e n e t r a t ed on the direct r o ad to Akhaltzik from A r d a h a n, while a n o t h er b o dy t o ok the m o re s o u t h e rn r o ad from K a rs by A l e x a n d r o p ol (in Georgian, Giimri) to Tiflis. B o th t h e se c o r p s, it a p p e a r s, w e re m et by the R u s s i a n s; according to the Russian a c c o u n t s, the T u r ks w e re r o u t ed on either line and lost a b o ut forty pieces of c a n n o n; as to the T u r k i sh a c c o u n t s, we h a ve nothing official, b ut in private c o r r e s p o n d e n ce the r e t r e at is explained by the necessity of going into winter q u a r t e r s. T he only thing certain is this, that the T u r ks h a ve e v a c u a t ed t he R u s s i an territory with t he e x c e p t i on of t he F o rt St. N i c h o l a s; t h at t he R u s s i a ns followed t h e m, and that their advanced guard e v en v e n t u r ed to within a mile of K a r s, w h e re it w as repulsed. We k n o w, b e s i d e s, t h at t he T u r k i sh a r my of Anatolia, recruited as it is from the Asiatic p r o v i n c e s, t he seat of the old M o s l em b a r b a r i s m, a nd counting in its r a n ks a great n u m b er of irregulars, unreliable, though generally b r a v e, soldiers of a d v e n t u r e, fancy w a r r i o rs and fülibusters, t h at this a r my of Anatolia is nothing like t he stern, disciplined a nd drilled a r my of Roumelia, w h o se c o m m a n d er k n o ws h ow m a ny and w h at m en he h as from day to day u n d er his c o m m a n d, a nd w h e re t he thirst for i n d e p e n d e nt a d v e n t u re and private plunder is held u n d er c h e ck by articles of w ar and c o u r ts martial. We k n ow t h at t he R u s s i a n s, w ho w e re v e ry h a rd up for t r o o ps in the beginning of t he Asiatic campaign, h a ve b e en reenf o r c ed by 16,000 m en u n d er Lieut. Gen. Obrutscheff I I, a nd by a b o dy of C o s s a c ks from the D o n; we k n ow t h at t h ey h a ve b e en able to k e ep the m o u n t a i n e e rs within b o u n d s, to maintain their c o m m u n i c a t i o n, as well a c r o ss t he C a u s a s us by Vladikavkaz, as by sea to O d e s sa and Sevastopol. 5 10 15 20 25 30 30 The Fighting in the East—Finances of Austria and France U n d er t h e se c i r c u m s t a n c es and considering t h at the T u r k i sh c o m m a n d er Abdi P a s ha w as either a traitor or a d u n ce (he h as b e en recalled since a nd placed u n d er arrest at K a r s; A h m ed P a s ha w as sent in his place) we should n ot w o n d er at all if t he T u r ks h ad b e en w o r s t e d, although t h e re c an be no d o u bt of the exaggeration prevailing in t he R u s s i an bulletins. We r e ad in t he Augsburger Zeitung t h at " t o w a r ds t he e nd of N o v e m b e r, S h a m yl m a de a d e s p e r a te a t t e m pt to force his w ay to the south, in order to effect a direct c o m m u n i c a t i on with t he T u r k s. T he strength of his c o r ps w as estimated at from 10,000 to 16,000 m e n, a nd it is affirmed t h at the M u r i d e s, t he flower of his t r o o p s, w e re cut to p i e c e s ." This h o w e v er w a n ts confirmation. At last the m u r d er is out, as r e g a r ds the affair at Sinope. O ne of t he finest t h r e e - d e c k e rs of the R u s s i an fleet—the Rostislav, 120-gun ship—was sunk t h e re by t he T u r k s. T h is fact—kept b a ck hitherto u n d er the specious p r e t e xt that the Rostislav did n ot sink during t he action, b ut immediately afterward— is n ow admitted by t he R u s s i a n s, a nd f o r ms a good set-off against t he d e s t r o y ed T u r k i sh ships. If o ne t h r e e - d e c k er w as actually sunk, we m ay suppose t h at the other R u s s i an vessels received v e ry serious h a rm indeed during the action—and, after all, t he v i c t o ry of Sinope m ay h a ve m o re dis abled the Russian t h an t he T u r k i sh fleet. Altogether, the T u r ks a p p e ar to fight like T u r ks w h en on t he water. T he E g y p t i an steam frigate P e r v az Bahri, disabled and t a k en after nearly five h o u rs struggle by the far larger R u s s i an steam-frigate Vladimir, w as so riddled with shot t h at she could hardly be b r o u g ht into Sevastopol, a nd w h en t h e r e, s a nk at o n c e. So far, t h e n, t he prizes carried off by the Russians a m o u nt to nothing, a nd indeed t he impossibility for t h em to carry off a single prize from Sinope s h o ws b o th the o b s t i n a cy of t he T u r k i sh defense a nd t he mutilated state of t he R u s s i an fleet after t he action. 5 10 15 20 25 30 T h e re is a r e p o rt t h at the c o m b i n ed F r e n ch and English fleets, together with t he first division of the T u r k i sh N a v y, are transporting 17,000 T u r ks to B a t u m. If this be t r u e, it is as m u ch an a ct of w ar as if t h ey m a de a direct attack u p on Sevastopol, a nd t he C z ar c a n n ot b ut declare w ar at o n c e. Immediately prior to t he e n t r a n ce of the c o m b i n ed fleets into t he B l a ck Sea, t he Czar is said to h a ve sent his m a n d a te for the withdrawal of all his vessels of w ar from the w a t e rs of the E u x i ne to Sevastopol. A letter dated Odessa, 35 D e c e m b er 24, r e p o r ts t h at " t he c o m m a n d er of t he Russian flotilla in the sea of Azoff h ad sent o ne of his aides-de-camp to Sevastopol to explain h ow critical his position w a s. T wo c o r ps of 12,000 m en e a ch w e re r e a dy to be e m b a r k ed at Sevastopol, w h en this o p e r a t i on of w ar w as p a r a l y z ed by the n e ws of t he imminent e n t r a n ce of t he u n i t ed fleets into t he E u x i n e ." 40 F r om the last telegraphic n e ws r e c e i v ed it a p p e a rs t h at the R u s s i a ns in t e n d ed attempting a general a t t a ck on t he T u r k i sh lines at Kalefat, on the 31 Karl Marx themselves confess a loss of 1,000 killed and 13th inst., t he Russian N e w - Y e a r 's day. T h ey h ad already p u s h ed f o r w a rd a b o ut 10,000 m en in e n t r e n c h m e n ts at T s h e t a l e, a village nine English miles n o r th of Kalefat, b ut w e re p r e v e n t ed from concentrating their whole avail able force by t he Turkish General's getting t he start of t h e m, storming t he e n e m y 's e n t r e n c h m e n ts with 15,000 or 18,000 m e n, proving victorious in a series of most m u r d e r o us e n c o u n t e rs t h at t o ok place on t he 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th a nd 10th inst., and finally forcing t he Russians to retire in t he direction of K r a j o v a. T he Russians 4,000 w o u n d e d. General A n r e p, we are told by the telegraph, " w ho c o m m a n d ed t he R u s s i a n s, w as severely w o u n d e d, as well as General T u i n o n t ." On the 10th, it is stated, the T u r ks w ho w e re c o m m a n d ed by Selim P a s h a, (the Pole Zedlinsky,) again retired to Kalefat. T h us far t he telegraphic n e w s, hitherto the only source of information a b o ut t h e se m o st important e v e n t s. T he r e p o rt winding u p, on t he one h a n d, with t he r e t i r e m e nt of t he R u s s i a ns on K r a j o v a, and of the T u r k s, on the other, to Kalefat, e v o k es a suspicion t h at great strategical faults h a ve again b e en c o m m i t t ed on b o th sides. T h e re is o ne report afloat that O m er P a s ha c a u s ed a w h o le corps to p a ss t he t he c o m [Danube] b e t w e en munications of the Russian corps at K r a j o v a. B ut h ow could the T u r ks c r o ss the D a n u b e, w h i ch is filled with floating m a s s es of ice, at any other point t h an Kalefat, w h e re alone t h ey w e re p r e p a r ed for such an e m e r g e n c y? t h us menacing the Aluta and t he Shyl, T he defeats t he Russians m et with at Kalefat are p e r h a ps m o re i m p o r t a nt in a political t h an a military view. Coupled with t he e n t r a n ce of the united fleets into the Black Sea, they cut off the last probability of the C z a r 's yielding to the h u m b le supplication for p e a ce f o r w a r d ed by t he courier of to St. Petersburg. On t he other h a nd t h ey m u st the V i e n na conference p r o d u ce t he immediate effect on neighboring Servia of strengthening t he N a t i o n al p a r ty and intimidating the Russian o n e, w ho h a ve lately b e en lifting up their h e a ds with amazing i m p u d e n ce at Belgrade. P r i n ce Alexander, it is t r u e, and the m a ss of the Servian p e o p l e, could n ot be prevailed u p on to b r e ak t he b o n ds b e t w e en their c o u n t ry a nd t he Sultan, although a c r o wd of Russian agents is simultaneously overrunning Servia, carrying on their intrigues in opposite senses—seeking out and applying t h e m s e l v es to the places a nd p e r s o ns formerly k n o wn for their a t t a c h m e nt to the banished family of t he Obrenovich—speaking to some of the y o u ng P r i n ce Michael—to o t h e rs of his old father Milosh—now making t h em h o p e, t h r o u gh t he protection of Russia, for t he extension of the limits [of] Servia—the f o r m a t i on of a n ew kingdom of Illyria, which would unite all those w ho speak t he Servian language n ow u n d er t he domination of T u r k ey a nd Austria—and n ow announcing to t h e m, in c a se of resistance, innumerable armies and u t t er subjugation. Y ou are a w a re t h at Prince Milosh, residing at Vienna, is t he old protégé of Metternich, 32 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 The Fighting in the East—Finances of Austria and France while Michael, his son, is a m e re c r e a t u re of Russia, w ho in 1842 r e n d e r ed t he princedom v a c a nt by flying from Servia. T he R u s s i an defeat at Kalefat will, at the same time, relieve A u s t r ia from the fear of a R u s s i an a r my appearing b e f o re Belgrade a nd evoking a m o ng t he subjects of Austria, of c o m m on origin a nd faith w i th herself, t he c o n s c i o u s n e ss of their o wn strength a nd of t he degradation t h ey e n d u re in t he domination of t he Ger m a n s. As to Austria, I m ay state en passant, t h at she h as at last, r e n o u n c ed t he long-cherished h o pe of raising a n ew loan. T he state of her E x c h e q u er m ay be inferred from t he e x p e d i e nt h er G o v e r n m e nt h as recently r e s o r t ed to, of exacting a discount of 15 per cent, u p on its o wn p a p er money—a financial m a n e u v er only to be c o m p a r ed with t he devises of the swindling ingenuity of t he F r e n ch Rois Faux Monnayeurs, w ho a p p r e c i a t ed t he coin w h en t h ey h ad to pay, and depreciated it w h en t h ey h ad to receive m o n e y. A c c o r d i ng to t he G e r m an p a p e r s, the Austrian b u d g et for 1854 will show a deficit of 45,000,000 florins on t he ordinary service, and 50,000,000 florins on t he extraordinary. W h e n e v er n e ws of warlike c h a r a c t er r e a c h es Vienna, p e o p le t h r o ng to the banking-houses, in o r d er to c h a n ge p a p er currency for silver coin. it t o o, F r a n c e, is k n o w n, has long b e en moving for a loan of 200,000,000 francs, (£8,000,000 sterling), b ut t he dearth of food, t he failure of the wine and silk c r o p s, the prevailing c o m m e r c i al a nd industrial distress, t he great a p p r e h e n s i o ns entertained a b o ut t he p a y m e n ts to be m a de at t he end of F e b r u a r y, the d o w n w a rd t e n d e n cy of t he public funds and railway s h a r e s, all t h e se c i r c u m s t a n c es h a ve by no m e a ns t e n d ed to facilitate such a transaction. B o n a p a r te could not s u c c e ed in finding t a k e rs at the B o u r s e, for t he n ew loan. T h e re r e m a i n ed no r e s o u r ce s a ve t h at r e c u r r ed to on t he e ve of the c o up d'état—the sending Persigny to t he B a nk of F r a n c e, forcing out of it 50,000,000 francs, ($10,000,000), and leaving in their place t h at a m o u nt of treasury b o n d s, u n d er the head of " s e c u r i t i e s ." This was actually d o ne on N e w - Y e a r 's day. T he fall of t he funds to 69 hailed this financial c o up d'état. T he G o v e r n m e nt will, as we are n ow officially informed, obtain a l o an from t he B a nk of F r a n ce of 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 francs, against t r e a s u ry b o n d s. T h o se not acquainted w i th w h at p a s s ed on N e w - Y e a r 's d ay in the parlor of t he B a nk of F r a n c e, will be at a loss to u n d e r s t a nd h ow t he b a nk has b e en prevailed u p on to a c c e pt a loan rejected at the B o u r s e. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 As to Persia the n e ws continues to be contradictory. According to o ne r e p o rt t he Persian a r my is marching u p on E r z e r um and Bagdad ; according to another t he Russian intrigue h as b e en baffled by t he British Chargé d'Af- 40 f aires, M r. T h o m p s o n, w ho m e n a c ed w i t h d r a w al from T e h e r a n, by t he d r e ad of an immediate explosion of t he dislike of t he Persian people for Russia, 33 Karl Marx a nd by the arrival of an Affghan E m b a s s y, threatening, if Persia f o r m ed an alliance with Russia, an invasion of the P e r s i an territory by t he Affghans. A c c o r d i ng to private c o r r e s p o n d e n ce from Constantinople, published in t he Patrie, the D i v an has resolved to f ortity Constantinople on t he land side. A mixed commission, consisting of E u r o p e an a nd O t t o m an officers, is said to h a ve already c o m m e n c ed the p r e p a r a t o ry s u r v ey of the localities. T he fortification of Constantinople would altogether c h a n ge the c h a r a c t er of R u s s o - T u r k i sh warfare, a nd p r o ve t he heaviest b l ow e v er dealt to t he eternal d r e a ms of t he self-styled heir of t he B y z a n t i ne E m p e r o r s. 5 T he r u m or of Austria's concentrating a c o r ps d'armée in t he B a n a t, to be placed u n d er t he c o m m a nd of General C o u nt Schlick, is contradicted by t he G e r m an P r e s s. 10 T he Correspondenz, of Berlin, states t h at general o r d e rs h a ve b e en given to t he authorities to hold t h e m s e l v es p r e p a r e d, in c a se of a mobilization of the L a n d w e h r. 15 O v e r t u r es have b e en m a de from St. P e t e r s b u rg to the Cabinet of C o p e n h a g en for t he cession of t he Island of B o r n h o lm to Russia. " B o r n h o l m ," as it is justly r e m a r k ed by The Daily News, " m i g ht be a M a l ta or Gibraltar of t he Baltic. It is within a d a y 's sail of the S u nd and C o p e n h a g e n, a nd placed by n a t u re at t he v e ry throat of the Baltic." In t he m e s s a ge sent by L o rd Redclif f e to the G o v e r n or of S e v a s t o p o l, and intimating to h im t he a p p e a r a n ce of t he united s q u a d r on in t he Black Sea, the only object of the m o v e m e nt is stated to be " t he protection of t he Ottoman territoryîrom all aggression or hostile a c t s ," no mention being m a de of t he p r o t e c t i on of t he Ottoman flag. 20 25 As all the a c c o u n ts received from P a r i s, V i e n n a, Berlin, Constantinople a nd St. Petersburg, indicate t he p r o s p e ct of war, prices h a ve generally de clined in all stock m a r k e ts on b o th sides of the C h a n n e l. K a rl M a r x. 34 Karl Marx The Czar's Views—Prince Albert F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4000, 11. Februar 1854 L o n d o n, T u e s d a y, Jan. 24, 1854. 5 io T he a t t e m p ts of the R u s s i an a r my to c r o ss t he D a n u be simultaneously on t he whole line of operations—at Matshin, Giurgevo and Kalefat—are to be considered as reconnoitering m a n e u v e rs rather t h an as serious a t t a c k s, w h i ch c an hardly be v e n t u r ed u p on w i th t he p r e s e nt forces General G o r c h a- koff h as to dispose of. L a st S a t u r d a y 's Press—the Disraeli paper—published a n o te of a con versation v e ry recently held at G a t c h i na b e t w e en t he Czar a nd a " d i s tinguished" Englishman. A l m o st t he w h o le of t he daily L o n d on p r e ss h as reprinted this n o t e, which, besides t he k n o wn a nd worn-out c o m m o n - p l a c es of R u s s i an diplomacy, contains s o me interesting statements. T he C z ar "distinctly stated t h at t he u l t i m a t um of Menchikoff h ad not b e en dis a p p r o v ed of in L o n d o n, b ut t h at t he English Ministry, having been informed 15 that it would probably be accepted by the Porte, h ad recognized it as a satisfactory settlement." This would only p r o ve t h at p o or J o hn Russell w as falsely informed by B a r on de B r u n n ow as to t he " p r o b a b l e" intentions of t he Sublime P o r t e, a nd t h at t he P o r t e 's refusing to yield to t he Menchikoff ultimatum at o n c e, w as by no m e a ns t he fault of the Coalition Cabinet. T he 20 C z ar goes on informing " t he individual of distinction" that " w h en t he n e ws of t he victory of Sinope arrived, General Castelbajac (the F r e n ch E m b a s s a d o r) a d d r e s s ed him a letter beginning something in this w a y: ' As a Christian and as a soldier, p e r m it me to congratulate your Imperial Majesty on the glorious victory obtained by y o ur M a j e s t y 's fleet.' " L et me r e m a rk t h at General Castelbajac, an old Legitimist a nd a relative of L a r o c h e j a c- quelein's, gained his generalship, n ot by services in the c a m p, b ut by less dangerous service in t he a n t e - c h a m b e rs of t he Court, and t he a r d e nt con fession of exalted royalist principles. B o n a p a r te appointed him as E m b a s s a d or to the C o u rt of St. P e t e r s b u r g, with a view to give t he Czar a proof 25 35 Karl Marx of deference to his personal w i s h e s, although he w as fully a w a re that Castel- bajac w as to conspire with t he Czar for t he restoration of t he B o u r b o ns r a t h er t h an further the interests of his nominal m a s t e r. This Castelbajac, t h e n, is t he v e ry m an to h a ve congratulated t he Czar " as a soldier and a Christian" on the resultless b u t c h e ry of Sinope. " He did n ot b e l i e v e ," t he C z ar is stated to h a ve said, " t h at England, with a Bourgeois Parliament, could c a r ry on a w ar with glory." T h e re is no d o u bt that the C z ar k n o ws his C o b d e ns a nd his Brights, and estimates at its just value the m e an a nd abject spirit of t he E u r o p e an middle classes. Finally, the Czar is quite right in stating that, on t he o ne hand, he h ad not b e en p r e p a r ed for war—fully c o n v i n c ed as he w as that he should obtain all he cared for by t he simple act of bullying—and t h a t, on t he other hand, if war w e re brought about, it would be t he " w ar of in c a p a c i t i e s ," making it inevitable by their anxious efforts to p r e v e nt it, and plunging into it finally in order to cover their b l u n d e rs a nd save their places. "Public opinion is half inclined to sacrifice Prince Albert at t he shrine of r u m o r. A whisper, which w as first insinuated for party u s e s, h as g r o wn into a roar, and a constructive hint h as swelled into a positive and m o n s t r o us fiction. T h at t h o se w ho seek t he p r e s e n ce of t he Q u e en should find Prince Albert with her Majesty, is a fact w h i ch r a t h er w on the s y m p a t hy and e s t e em of the English public; b ut t h en it w as said t h at he a t t e n d ed meetings of t he Q u e en with h er Ministers; next, that Ministers w e re m a de a w a re of his presence—that, h o w e v er reluctant to p r o c e ed w i th business b e f o re a third p a r t y, t h ey found it n e c e s s a ry to do so—that it e v en b e c a me n e c e s s a ry to defend their opinions before t he Prince—that t he Prince, in fact, interfered with their counsel to their Sovereign—that he n ot only influenced the R o y al mind, b ut possessing the p o w er of free c o m m u n i c a t i on w i th foreign C o u r t s, he constituted an unlicensed channel for information b e t w e en the con fidential council of t he Q u e en and t he Cabinets of foreign p o t e n t a t e s, p e r h a ps of the enemies of England—that in short, Prince Albert w as a traitor to his Q u e e n, that he had b e en i m p e a c h ed for high t r e a s o n, a nd finally, t h at on a charge of high treason he had b e en arrested and c o m m i t t ed to the T o w e r. This w as t he story n ot only told in all parts of E n g l a nd a day or t wo b a c k, b ut by some b e l i e v e d ." I q u o te the a b o ve passage from The Spectator, in o r d er to show your r e a d e rs h ow public r u m or has b e en induced by t he Palmerstonian p r e ss to m a ke a poor stupid young m an the scapegoat of the responsible Ministers. Prince Albert is a G e r m an Prince, c o n n e c t ed with most of t he absolute and despotic G o v e r n m e n ts of the Continent. Raised to the r a nk of Prince-Consort in G r e at Britain, he has devoted his time partly to fattening pigs, to inventing ridiculous hats for the army, to planning m o d el lodging h o u s es of a peculiarly t r a n s p a r e nt a nd uncomfortable kind, to the H y de Park Exhibition, and to 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 36 The Czar's Views—Prince Albert 20 15 10 a m a t e ur soldiery. He h as b e en considered amiable and harmless, in point of intellect b e l ow the general average of h u m an beings, a prolific father a nd an obsequious h u s b a n d. Of late, h o w e v e r, he has b e en deliberately magnified into the most influential m an a nd t he m o st dangerous c h a r a c t er of t he U n i t ed 5 Kingdom, said to dispose of the w h o le State machinery at the secret dictation of Russia. N ow t h e re c an exist b ut little d o u bt that t he Prince exercises a direct influence in Court affairs, and, of c o u r s e, in the interest of d e s p o t i s m. T he Prince c a n n ot b ut act a Prince's p a r t, a nd w ho was ever silly e n o u gh to suppose he w o u ld n o t? B ut I need n ot inform your r e a d e rs of the utter i m p o t e n cy to which British Royalty itself has b e en r e d u c ed by t he British oligarchy, so that, for instance, K i ng William I V, a decided foe to Russia, w as forced by his Foreign Minister—a m e m b er of t he Whig oligarchy—to act as a foe to T u r k e y. H ow p r e p o s t e r o u s, t h e n, to s u p p o se Prince Albert to be able to c a r ry o ne single point in defiance of t he Ministry, e x c e pt so far as little C o u rt affairs, a dirty riband, or a tinsel star, are c o n c e r n e d! U se is m a de of his absolutist penchants to blind t he p e o p l e 's e y es as to the plots and treacheries of the responsible Ministers. If the o u t c ry and attack m e a ns anything it m e a ns an a t t a ck on royalist institutions. If t h e re w e re no Q u e en t h e re would be no Prince—if there w e re no t h r o ne there would be no C o u rt influences. Princes would lose their p o w er if t h r o n es w e re n ot t h e re to b a ck t h e m, and for them to lean u p o n. But, n ow m a r k! the p a p e rs w h i ch go the farthest in their "fearful b o l d n e s s ," w h i ch cry t he loudest and try to m a ke a sort of political capital o ut of Prince Albert, are t he m o st eager in their assertions of loyalty to the t h r o ne and in fulsome adulation of t he Q u e e n. 25 As to the T o ry p a p e rs this proposition is self-evident. As to the radical Morning Advertiser, it is t he s a me j o u r n al w h i ch hailed B o n a p a r t e 's c o up d'état, and recently attacked an Irish p a p er for having d a r ed to find fault w i th t he Q u e e n, on the occasion of her p r e s e n ce at Dublin, which r e p r o a c h es t he F r e n ch Revolutionists with professing Republicanism, and continues designate L o rd P a l m e r s t on as t he savior of England. T he whole is a Palmer- stonian trick. P a l m e r s t o n, by the revelations of his Russianism and his opposition to the n ew R e f o rm Bill, has b e c o me unpopular. T he latter act h as t a k en t he liberal gilding off his m u s ty gingerbread. N e v e r t h e l e s s, he w a n ts popularity in order to b e c o me Premier, or at least Foreign Minister. W h at an admirable opportunity to stamp himself a Liberal again a nd to play the part of B r u t u s, p e r s e c u t ed by secret C o u rt influences. A t t a ck a Prince- Consort—how taking for the p e o p l e. He'll be the m o st popular s t a t e s m an of t he age. W h at an admirable opportunity of casting obloquy on his p r e s e nt colleagues, of stigmatizing t h em as the tools of Prince Albert, and of con- vincing t he Court that P a l m e r s t on must be a c c e p t ed on his o wn t e r m s. T he T o r i e s, of c o u r s e, join in t he cry, for c h u r ch and c r o wn are little to t h em 40 35 30 to 37 Karl Marx c o m p a r ed with p o u n ds and a c r e s, and t h e se t he cotton-lords are winning from t h em fast. A nd if the T a r i e s, in the n a me of " c o n s t i t u t i o n" a nd " l i b e r t y" t a lk daggers against a Prince, w h at enlightened Liberal would n ot t h r ow himself worshiping at their feet! At t he annual meeting of the M a n c h e s t er C o m m e r c i al Association the President, Mr. Aspinall T u r n e r, declared with regard to t he strikes and look o u ts a nd the general agitation of t he w o r k i n g m e n, w h i ch he justly described as " t he civil w ar going on b e t w e en m a s t e rs a nd operatives in L a n c a shire"—that, " as M a n c h e s t er h ad p ut d o wn r o y al t y r a n ny and aristocratic t y r a n n y, so it w o u ld also deal with t he t y r a n ny of D e m o c r a c y ." 5 10 " H e re we h a v e ," exclaims The Press, " an involuntary avowal of the policy of t he M a n c h e s t er school. T he c r o wn is in E n g l a nd supreme—then diminish t he royal p o w e r. T he aristocracy stands before us—sweep it from our p a t h. W o r k i n g m en agitate—crush t h em to t he e a r t h ." K a rl M a r x. 15 38 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Fortification of Constantinople—Denmark's Neutrality- Composition of British Parliament- Crop Failure in Europe F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4004, 16. Februar 1854 L o n d o n, F r i d a y, Jan. 27, 1854. T he fortification of Constantinople w o u ld b e, as I stated in my last letter, t he m o st important step t he T u r ks could t a k e. Constantinople o n ce fortified, 5 with suitable strengthening of t he forts on t he B o s p h o r us and Dardanelles, the i n d e p e n d e n ce of T u r k e y, or of a ny p o w er holding t h at capital, w o u ld require no foreign g u a r a n t e e. T h e re is no t o wn m o re e a sy to be fortified t h an Constantinople. O ne single side of t he triangle only—the o ne t o w a rd t he land—would require a c o n t i n u o us r a m p a r t; the s e c o n d, t o w a rd t he S ea of 10 M a r m o r a, a nd t he third, t o w a rd t he G o l d en H o r n, require no fortifications. A line of d e t a c h ed forts, at a c o n v e n i e nt distance from the enceinte, a nd continued e a s t w a rd so as to p r o t e ct Pera, Galata a nd t he n o r t h - e a s t e rn b a nk of t he G o l d en H o r n, w o u ld b o th strengthen t he enceinte and p r e v e nt an e n e my from turning it and carrying on w o r ks of siege on t he hills c o m m a n d i ng the t o wn from behind P e ra and Galata. 15 20 25 S u ch a fortress w o u ld be almost impregnable. Its c o m m u n i c a t i o ns c a n n ot be c ut off, unless t he Dardanelles or t he B o s p h o r us is forced, and if t h at w e re t he c a se t he City w o u ld be at o n ce lost. B ut t wo s u ch n a r r ow passages m ay easily be fortified so strongly t h at no hostile fleet c an p a ss through. A R u s s i an a r my coming from the land side w o u ld h a ve to rely u p on perilous sea c o m munication with S e v a s t o p ol a nd O d e s s a, a nd could hardly hold o ut for t he time required to t a ke t he t o w n, while its c o n t i n u o us falling off in n u m b e rs w o u ld e x p o se it to defeats from t he garrison of t he t o wn a nd t he r e s e r v es arriving from Asia. T he reply of R u s s ia to t he declaration of neutrality on the p a rt of D e n m a rk arrived at C o p e n h a g en on t he 20th inst. R u s s ia is stated to refuse to c o n s e nt to t he neutrality, calling on D e n m a rk to t a ke o ne side or t he other. Im mediately after this notification, t he E m b a s s a d o rs of F r a n c e, England and Prussia, are said to h a ve h ad a c o n f e r e n ce w i th t he D a n i sh Ministers. N o w, I 39 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels am informed from a v e ry t r u s t w o r t hy source, although I c a n, of c o u r s e, n ot v o u ch for the correctness of the information, t h at t he p r o t e st is b ut a feint on t he part of t he Cabinet of St. P e t e r s b u rg calculated to drive t he other p o w e rs the faster into a formal a c k n o w l e d g m e nt of the t e r ms on w h i ch the D a n i sh neutrality is p r o p o s e d. I am a s s u r ed t h at r e c e nt negotiations w e re going on b e t w e en D e n m a rk on the o ne side, and F r a n ce and England on the other, according to which, in the c a se of war, England w as to o c c u py t he S o u nd with her men-of-war, and F r a n ce the D u c hy of Schleswig, w i th a corps d ' a r m é e. To t h w a rt this combination, c o m m u n i c a t ed to N e s s e l r o de by t he Minister Oerstedt, Russia is said to h a ve intimated to the C o p e n h a g en Cabinet to p r o p o se t he declaration of neutrality. He n ow feigns to o p p o s e, a nd w h i c h, if adhered to by F r a n ce and England, Will n ot only b r e ak up their original plan, b ut also, by exempting from t he l a ws of war, goods carried in neutral vessels, will secure the e x p o rt of R u s s i an m e r c h a n d i se by the Bal tic. T he C z a r 's p r o t e st against the p u r c h a s e, on t he p a rt of Prussia, of an O l d e n b u rg p o rt in t he N o r th Sea, is a bona fide p r o t e s t, a s t o n i s h ed as t he Berlin public is said to h a ve b e en at this other s y m p t om of the ubiquitous intermeddling of Timour T a m e r l a n e 's successor. 5 10 15 T he great " M a n c h e s t er R e f o rm m e e t i n g" h as " c o me off, a nd a great piece of h u m b ug it w a s ," as The Englishman justly r e m a r k s. T he A b e r d e en policy extolled, T u r k ey insulted, Russia glorified, all interference b e t w e en foreign states disclaimed—these few topics which, as far as foreign policy is con c e r n e d, form the regular stock-in-trade of the M a n c h e s t er school—have again b e en expatiated on by Messrs. C o b d e n, Bright and t he other " 'umble and 'omely m e n ," w ho w a nt to h a ve a " m an of p e a c e" at the " H o r se G u a r d s ," a nd a " l o ok o u t" at t he H o u se of L o r ds to sell t he English and to undersell all o t h er nations. 20 25 Mr. C o b d e n 's s p e e ch w as a m e re repetition, a nd a disingenuous one t o o, of t he s p e e ch he m a de at t he closing of Parliament. T he only luxury of novelty he indulged in consisted of t wo arguments—the o ne directed against F r a n c e, t he o t h er against America. It looks rather suspicious t h at the same m an w ho t o ok so p r o m i n e nt a p a rt in bringing a b o ut t he alliance with F r a n ce at the t i me w h en t he exploits of t he D e c e m b r i s ts had a r o u s ed a cry of indignation in E n g l a n d, is n ow busied in undoing his o wn w o rk by sneering at t h at al- liance, a nd denouncing it as " i n c o n s i d e r a t e" and " u n t i m e l y ." As to America, M r. C o b d en declares that it is from the g r o w th of its m a n u f a c t u r es and c o m m e r c e, and n ot from the warlike policy of Russia, t h at England m ay fear to see e n d a n g e r ed t he g r a n d e ur of h er commercial a nd national prosperity. H ow d o es this tally with his professional free t r a de c a n t, according to which t he commercial prosperity of o ne people d e p e n ds on t he growth of t he 30 35 40 40 Fortification of Constantinople—Denmark's Neutrality—Composition of British Parliament 5 10 c o m m e r ce and industry of all other p e o p l e s, t he notion of any d a n g e r o us rivalry b e t w e en t wo industrial p e o p l es being disclaimed as a fallacy of protectionist " q u a c k s ?" H ow d o es this tally with " E n g l a n d ' s, by t he magic of her machinery, having united forever two r e m o te h e m i s p h e r es in t he b o n ds of p e a c e, by placing E u r o pe a nd A m e r i ca in absolute and inextricable dependence on each other?" It is n ot t he first t i me t h at M r. C o b d e n, in o r d er to divert from Russia the suspicions and t he animosity of t he English people, is anxious to turn t h em against the U n i t ed States of A m e r i c a. In 1836, t he seizure of an English vessel on t he Circassian c o a st by a R u s s i an man-of-war, and the fiscal regulations of the St. P e t e r s b u rg Cabinet with regard to t he navigation of the D a n u b e, together with t he revelations published in The Portfolio, having e v o k ed t he w r a th of t he English p e o p l e, and, a b o ve all, t he commercial classes, against Russia,—Mr. C o b d e n, at t h at e p o ch y et " an infant in literary life a nd unlearned in public s p e a k i n g ," published a small 25 15 a n o n y m o us p a m p h l e t, entitled "Russia: A Cure for Russophobia. By a Manchester Manufacturer. " In this p a m p h l et it is argued t h at "in less t h an t w e n ty y e a rs t h i s" ( n a m e l y, t he fear of t he g r o w th of American p r o s p e r i t y, a nd not of Russian aggrandizement, ) "will be the sentiment of the people of E n g l a nd generally; a nd t he s a me c o n v i c t i o ns will be forced upon the 20 Government of the country." In t he s a me p a m p h l et he professed that, "in examining the various g r o u n ds u p on which t h o se w ho discuss t he subject t a ke up their hostile attitude t o w a rd the R u s s i an nation, we h a ve d i s c o v e r e d, with infinite surprise a nd a d e ep conviction of t he t r u t h, t h at a c e n t u ry of aristocratic G o v e r n m e nt in E n g l a nd h as impregnated all classes with the haughty and arrogant spirit of their r u l e r s ;" (against m e ek Russia!) that "if the G o v e r n m e nt of St. P e t e r s b u rg w e re transferred to the shores of t he B o s p h o r u s, a splendid a nd substantial E u r o p e an city would, in less t h an t w e n ty y e a r s, spring up in the place of t h o se h u ts which n ow constitute t he capital of T u r k e y; noble buildings would arise, learned societies flourish, a nd the arts p r o s p e r. If R u s s i a 's G o v e r n m e nt should attain to t h at actual p o w e r, she w o u ld cease the w a rs of t he s w o rd and begin t he battle with t he wilder n e s s, by constructing railroads, building bridges, by fostering the a c c u m u l a t i on of capital, the growth of cities, and the increase of civilization and freedom... T he slavery w h i ch pollutes Constantinople w o u ld instantly disappear, and c o m m e r ce and laws protecting life and property"—(as n ow exemplified in Moldo-Wallachia)—"take its p l a c e ." " As a proof of R u s s i a 's civilization and c o n s e q u e n t ly her right to appropri ate T u r k e y, Mr. C o b d en told his astonished r e a d e rs that t he Russian mer c h a nt possessed of 10-15,000 r o u b l e s, n ot only engages in foreign c o m m e r c e, 35 30 40 b ut is "exempt from corporal punishment, and qualified to drive about in a carriage and pair. " A re we t h en to be a s t o n i s h ed at t he R u s s i an E m p e r o r 's 41 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels r e c e n t ly e x p r e s s ed conviction that " E n g l a n d, with a Bourgeois Parliament could n ot c a r ry on a w ar with g l o r y ?" So deeply i m b u ed w as Mr. C o b d en in 1836, with t he " w i c k e d n e ss of the public writers and s p e a k e r s ," w ho v e n t u r ed to find fault with the A u t o c r at of all t he R u s s i a s, t h at he w o u nd up his p a m p h l et with t he question: " A nd w ho a nd w h at are t h o se writers a nd s p e a k e r s? H ow long shall political q u a c ks be permitted, without fear of p u n i s h m e n t, to inflame the minds a nd disorder t he u n d e r s t a n d i n gs of a w h o le n a t i o n ?" T h o se "public writers and s p e a k e r s ," we p r e s u m e, w ho p o s s e ss 10,000 to 15,000 roubles and are able to drive a b o ut in a carriage a nd pair, to be e x e m p t ed at least from " c o r p o r al punishment." Till n o w, M r. C o b d e n 's Philo-Russian m a n ia h ad b e en considered, by s o m e, as o ne of t he multifar ious c r o t c h e ts he u s es to t r a de in, by o t h e rs as the n e c e s s a ry offspring of his p e a ce doctrine. Of late, h o w e v e r, t he public h as b e en informed by o ne w ho justly describes himself as the "literary h o r s e, or ass if y ou l i k e ," of t he late Anti-Corn L aw L e a g u e, that, w h en Mr. C o b d en w r o te his first p a m p h l e t, " he h ad b e en to Russia on a commercial e r r a nd of his o w n, in 1834-35, and w as successful," t h at his " h e a rt and calico w e re b o th in R u s s ia in 1836;" a nd that his anger at t he " E n g l i sh w r i t e r s, s p e a k e r s, a u t h o rs and r e v i e w e r s ," originated from their criticising his n ew c u s t o m e r, Nicholas of Russia. As t he H o u se of C o m m o ns is to r e a s s e m b le in a few d a y s, it seems p r o p er to give, in a c o n d e n s ed form, the statistics of British representation: The relations of Peers possess Irish Peers The country gentlemen Men of letters and science The army and navy The commercial and moneyed interest The lawyers The workingmen's interest Total seats occupied Percentage of the actual Representation. 17,0 17,0 41,3 3,0 4,6 17,1 17,0 Seats. 103 -1 266 20 30 109 107 None. 641 5 10 15 20 25 30 T he ttsh Peers in t he H o u se of C o m m o ns a r e: V i s c o u nt P a l m e r s t o n, for 35 T i v e r t o n; V i s c o u nt Barrington, for B e r k s h i r e; E a rl A n n e s l e y, for G r i m s b y; V i s c o u nt M o n c k, for P o r t s m o u t h; V i s c o u nt G a l w a y, for R e t f o r d; a nd L o rd H o t h a m, for E a st Y o r k s h i r e. T he m en of literature and science a r e: Benjamin Disraeli, for B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e; T h o m as M a c a u l a y, t he historian, for E d i n b u r g h; M a c G r e g o r, t he commercial statist, for Glasgow; William Stirling, a u t h or of Annals of the Artists of Spain, e t c ., for P e r t h s h i re ; W m. G l a d s t o n e, a u t h or of The State in its Relation to the Church, a nd o t h er w o r k s, for Oxford 40 42 Fortification of Constantinople—Denmark's Neutrality—Composition of British Parliament 5 U n i v e r s i t y; Dr. A u s t en H. L a y a r d, a u t h or of Nineveh and its Remains, e t c ., for A y l e s b u r y; J a m es Wilson, t he E d i t or of The Economist, for W e s t b u r y; Sir William M o l e s w o r t h, the E d i t or of H o b b e s' w o r k s, etc., for S o u t h w a r k; Sir E. L. Bulwer L y t t o n, poet, dramatist, novelist, for H e r t f o r d s h i r e; William J o h n s on F o x, A n t i - C o r n - L aw L e a g ue writer, for Oldham ; W. A. M a c k i n n o n, a u t h or of a (very pitiful) History of Civilization, etc., for R y e; R. M o n c k t on M i l n e s, a u t h or of Memorials of Travel, e t c ., a nd Benjamin Oliveira, a u t h or of a Tour in the East, b o th for P o n t e f r a c t; E d w a rd Miall, a u t h or of several theological and political w o r k s, for R o c h d a l e; William M u r e, a u t h or of a 10 History of Grecian Literature, for R e n f r e w s h i r e, Scotland; W. P. U r q u h a r t, a u t h or of The Life of Francisco Sforza, for W e s t m e a th C o u n t y, I r e l a n d; R o b e rt S t e p h e n s o n, t he celebrated railway engineer, for W h i t b y; William Micheli, physician, for B o d m i n; J o hn B r a d y, surgeon, for Leitrim. W h e t h er L o rd J o hn Russell m ay be safely classed u n d er t he h e ad of literary gentlemen I d a re n ot decide. 15 20 T h e re a r e, at least, 100 s e a t s, the r e p r e s e n t a t i v es of w h i ch are nominally elected by t he constituencies, b ut really appointed by D u k e s, E a r l s, M a r q u i s e s, ladies and other p e r s o n s, w ho t u rn their local influence to political account. T he Marquis of W e s t m i n s t e r, for instance, disposes of t wo seats for C h e s t e r, a t o wn mustering 2,524 e l e c t o r s; the D u ke of N o r f o lk of o ne seat for Arundel; the D u ke of S u t h e r l a nd of t wo seats for Newcastle-under- L y ne ; t he Marquis of L a n s d o w ne of o ne seat for Calne ; the E a rl Fitz-William of t wo seats for M a l t ó n; t he D u ke of R i c h m o nd of t wo seats for Chichester; Miss Pierse of o ne seat for N o r t h a l l e r t o n, e t c. 25 T he disproportion on o ne side of t he electoral b o d y, a nd on the other of t he r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s, w h en c o m p a r ed with t he entire population, m ay be s h o wn by s o me few i n s t a n c e s: In B e r k s h i re t he entire population a m o u n ts to 170,065, and the n u m b er of electors to 7,980. It c h o o s es nine r e p r e s e n t a t i v es for the H o u s e, while 30 L e i c e s t e r s h i r e, w i th an entire population of 230,308, and a constituency of 13,081 disposes of six seats only; Lincolnshire, with a population of 407,222, a nd 24,782 electors, disposes of thirteen seats in t he H o u s e, while Middle sex, with an entire population of 1,886,576, a nd a constituency of 113,490 elects only f o u r t e en m e m b e r s. L a n c a s h i r e, w i th a population of 2,031,236, h as a c o n s t i t u e n cy of only 81,786 electors, a nd disposes of b ut twenty-six seats in the H o u s e, while B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e, with an entire popula tion of 163,723, a nd with 8,125 electors, is r e p r e s e n t ed by eleven m e m b e r s. S u s s e x, with an entire population of 336,844, a nd with 18,054 electors, elects eighteen m e m b e r s, while Staffordshire, w i th a population of 678,716, a nd 35 40 w i th 29,667 electors, elects only s e v e n t e e n. T he relation of t he Electoral b o dy to t he population is: 43 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels In England o ne C o u n ty Elector r e p r e s e n ts 20,7 p e r s o ns of the C o u n ty population. In W a l es o ne C o u n ty Elector r e p r e s e n ts 20,0 p e r s o ns of the C o u n ty population. In Scotland o ne C o u n ty Elector r e p r e s e n ts 34,4 p e r s o ns of the C o u n ty 5 population. In E n g l a nd o ne B o r o u gh Elector r e p r e s e n ts 18,0 p e r s o ns of t he b o r o u gh population. In W a l es o ne B o r o u gh Elector r e p r e s e n ts 24,4 p e r s o ns of the b o r o u gh population. In Scotland o ne B o r o u gh Elector r e p r e s e n ts 23,8 p e r s o ns of the b o r o u gh population. T he d a ta for Ireland are not so c o m p l e te as for E n g l a nd and Scotland; b ut t he following m ay be t a k en as a fair a p p r o x i m a t i on for t he same period, 1851-52. O ne Elector in an Irish C o u n ty r e p r e s e n ts 36 p e r s o ns of the C o u n ty population. O ne Elector in an Irish b o r o u gh r e p r e s e n ts 23 p e r s o ns of the b o r o u gh population. 10 15 20 T he general deficiency of the E u r o p e an Grain m a r k e ts m ay be stated as follows: t he deficiency of grain in F r a n ce in place of being t en millions of hectolitres, as stated by the Moniteur, to calm t he alarm, greatly e x c e e ds t w e n ty millions, t h at is, more t h an eight million q u a r t e rs of English m e a s u r e; and the deficiency of p o t a t o es is not less t h an one-fourth of the average of t he last five y e a r s, while t he deficiency in w i n e, oil a nd c h e s t n u ts is yet 25 greater. T he deficiency in the p r o d u ce of c o rn in Belgium and Holland is a b o ut four millions of hectolitres; that of t he R h i ne P r o v i n c e s, Prussia a nd Switzerland, at a m o d e r a te estimate, is t a k en to e x c e ed ten million hectoli t r e s. T he estimated deficiency in Italy is k n o wn to be v e ry great, b ut t h e re is greater difficulty in arriving at e v en a p r o x i m a te result. T he lowest esti- m a t e, h o w e v e r, gives t en millions of hectolitres of grain, or a deficiency t h r o u g h o ut the great grain producing districts of W e s t e rn E u r o pe of n ot less t h an forty-four millions of hectolitres, ( s e v e n t e en million quarters.) T he deficiency in England is k n o wn to e x c e ed five million q u a r t e rs of grain, and calculations w o r t hy of grave consideration give t h at a m o u nt as the deficiency in w h e at alone. T h us there is a fatal deficiency in t he last h a r v e st in W e s t e rn E u r o pe alone of no less t h an t w e n t y - t wo million q u a r t e r s, without taking into a c c o u nt t he great inferiority a nd short-coming of other cereals, and t he general p r e v a l e n ce of the potato-rot—a deficiency w h i c h, if valued in w h e a t, m u st be equal to at least five million q u a r t e r s, or a grand total of t w e n t y - s e v en million q u a r t e rs of grain. 40 30 35 44 Fortification of Constantinople—Denmark's Neutrality—Composition of British Parliament As to the supplies that m ay be e x p e c t ed from foreign m a r k e t s, it is asserted by v e ry c o m p e t e nt commercial authority: " In Poland the c r o ps h a ve b e en v e ry short; in R u s s i a, deficient, as seen by t he high prices a s k ed for grain at t he Baltic p o r ts before our deficiencies 5 w e re k n o w n. A nd t h o u gh in the D a n u b i an p r o v i n c es the h a r v e st has n ot failed, yet t he stocks t h e r e, as well as at O d e s s a, are greatly lessened by t he i m m e n se exportations to t he M e d i t e r a n e an a nd to F r a n c e. As to A m e r i c a, it is unable to supply t wo million of q u a r t e r s. All t he ships of t he world are inadequate to the supply of a quantity n e a r, or e v en approaching a m o i e ty of t he deficiency, w h i ch at p r e s e nt is k n o wn to all E n g l a nd to exist." 10 Karl Marx. 45 Karl Marx Count Orlov's Mission—Russian Finances during the War F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4007, 20. Februar 1854 L o n d o n, F r i d a y, F e b. 3, 1854. I w as able to see the State procession of the Q u e en to o p en Parliament, as it p a s s ed t he H o r se G u a r d s. T he T u r k i sh E m b a s s a d or w as r e c e i v ed with loud c h e e rs and h u r r a h s. Prince Albert, w h o se c o u n t e n a n ce w as deadly pale, w as furiously hissed by t he c r o w ds on b o th sides of t he streets, while t he Q u e en w as sparing of her usual salutes and morbidly smiled at the u n w o n t ed manifestations of popular discontent. In a previous letter I h a ve r e d u c ed t he anti-Albert m o v e m e nt to its true dimensions, proving it to be a m e re p a r ty trick. T he public d e m o n s t r a t i on is, n e v e r t h e l e s s, of a v e ry grave character, as it p r o v es the ostensible loyalty of t he British p e o p le to be a m e re con ventional formality, a c e r e m o n i o us affectation w h i ch c a n n ot withstand the slightest shock. Probably it m ay induce t he C r o wn to dismiss a Ministry, the anti-national policy of w h i ch t h r e a t e ns to e n d a n g er its o wn security. W h en t he r e c e nt mission of C o u nt Orloff to t he V i e n na Cabinet b e c a me k n o wn The Times informed its credulous r e a d e rs t h at Orloff w as the v e ry m an t he C z ar used to employ on pacific e r r a n d s. N ow I n e ed not inform you t h at this same Orloff a p p e a r ed in the spring of 1833 at Constantinople to s q u e e ze o ut of the Porte the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. W h at he n ow asks from t he Cabinet at V i e n na is the permission to send a R u s s i an c o r ps from W a r s a w, by w ay of H u n g a r y, to t he D a n u b i an seat of w a r. It m ay be con sidered as t he first result of his p r e s e n ce at Vienna, t h at A u s t r ia n ow insists u p on t he P o r t e 's dismissing its p r e s e nt c o m m a n d e rs on t he Danube—Selim P a s h a, Ismail P a s ha and O m er Pasha—on t he plea t h at t h ey are r e n e g a d es a nd revolutionists. E v e ry o ne acquainted w i th t he pasjt history of T u r k ey k n o ws t h at from t he beginning of t he O s m an p o w er all h er great generals, admirals, diplomatists and ministers h a ve always b e en Christian r e n e g a d e s, S e r b s, G r e e k s, Albanians, e t c. W hy not ask R u s s ia to dismiss t he forty or fifty m en she has bought from all parts of E u r o p e, a nd w ho constitute her 5 10 15 20 25 46 Count Orlov's Mission—Russian Finances during the War w h o le stock of diplomatic ingenuity, political intelligence a nd military ability? In t he m e a n t i me A u s t r ia h as c o n c e n t r a t ed 80,000 m en on t he T u r k i sh frontiers in Transylvania a nd H u n g a r y, a nd o r d e r ed a B o h e m i an c o r ps mustering some 30,000 m en to join t h e m. T he P r u s s i an G o v e r n m e nt on its part is stated to h a ve declined to c o m p ly with t he c o m m a nd of t he C z ar ordering F r e d e r i ck William IV to send a c o r ps of 100,000 m en to o c c u py Poland in t he n a me a nd interest of Russia, a nd t h us set t he garrisons t h e re at liberty to m a r ch to t he s o u th for t he p r o s e c u t i on of t he c a m p a i gn in t he Principalities. In a previous letter I called y o ur attention to t he r e c e nt financial e x p e d i e nt r e s o r t ed to by t he Austrian G o v e r n m e nt of exacting a discount of 15 p er cent, u p on their o wn p a p er m o n e y, w h en paid for t a x e s. This ingenious " t ax u p on t he p a y m e nt of t a x e s" is n ow e x t e n d ed to Italy also. T he Milan Gazette of t he 22d inst. publishes a d e c r ee from t he A u s t r i an Minister of F i n a n c e, a n n o u n c- ing that " in c o n s e q u e n ce of t he fall in t he value of p a p er m o n ey it will n ot be received at the C u s t om H o u se unless at a discount of 17 per c e n t ." As to the Russian E x c h e q u e r, I h ad on a previous occasion, at the b e ginning of w h at is called t he E a s t e rn complication, to w a rn y o ur r e a d e rs against t he industriously circulated s t a t e m e nt of the " h i d d e n" t r e a s u r es slumbering in t he vaults of t he B a nk of St. P e t e r s b u r g, and the ridiculous exaggeration of t he v a st m o n e t a ry p o w er t h at R u s s ia c an wield at a given m o m e n t. My views are fully confirmed by w h at h as h a p p e n ed since. N ot only h as the Czar b e en forced to w i t h d r aw his metallic deposits from t he b a n ks of E n g l a nd a nd F r a n c e, b u t, m o r e o v e r, to c o m m it an act of fraudulent confiscation. Prince P a s h k e w i t ch h as informed the W a r s aw mortgage or discount B a nk t h at its capital will be t a k en as a forced loan, although t he statutes of that b a nk forbid its advancing m o n ey u p on a ny security b ut landed property. We are also informed t h at t he R u s s i an G o v e r n m e nt i n t e n ds issuing a sum of 60,000,000 r o u b l es in inconvertible p a p e r, to defray the e x p e n s es of t he war. This c o n t r i v a n ce is no n ew o ne on t he p a rt of t he P e t e r s b u rg Cabinet. At the close of 1768, C a t h e r i ne II, in o r d er to m e et the e x p e n s es of t he w ar with T u r k e y, f o u n d ed a b a nk of assignats, ostensibly instituted on t he principle of issuing convertible n o t es p a y a b le to t he b e a r e r. B ut by a well-managed oversight, she forgot to tell t he public in w h at sort of m o n ey t h e se n o t es w e re to be p a y a b l e, a nd s o me m o n t hs later t he p a y m e n ts w e re only m a de in c o p p er coin. By a n o t h er u n t o w a rd " a c c i d e n t" it h a p p e n ed t h at t h e se c o p p er coins w e re o v e r v a l u ed by 50 p er cent, w h en c o m p a r ed with t he u n c o i n ed metal, a nd only circulated at their nominal value in c o n s e q u e nc of their great scarcity a nd t he w a nt of small m o n ey for retail p u r p o s e s. T he convertibility of the n o t es w a s, t h e r e f o r e, a m e re trick. In t he first instance Catherine limited t he w h o le issue to 40,000,000 roubles, 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 47 Karl Marx 5 10 15 t a k en place, issues having in 25 rouble n o t e s, the rouble representing a silver coin varying from 38 to 40 d. British m o n e y, according to t he rate of e x c h a n g e, being equivalent to s o m e w h at a b o ve 100 c o p p er c o p e k s. At t he d e a th of Catherine, in 1796, t he m a ss of this p a p er m o n ey h ad risen to 157,000,000, nearly four times its original a m o u n t. T he e x c h a n ge on L o n d on h ad c o me d o wn from 4 I d. in 1787 to 31d. in 1796. During the t wo s u b s e q u e nt g o v e r n m e n t s, a rapid increase the p a p er circulation r e a c h ed in 1810 of 577,000,000, and t he p a p er rouble w as only w o r th 2 52/5 c o p e k s, i.e., o n e- q u a r t er of its value in 1788; a nd e x c h a n ge on L o n d o n, in t he a u t u mn of 1810, sunk to 1 lVzd. the rouble, instead of representing 38-40d. In 1817 the a m o u nt of n o t es in circulation w as 836,000,000, according to t he s t a t e m e nt of C o u nt Gurieff ..As the c u s t o m - h o u se duties and other t a x es w e re calculated in silver r o u b l e s, t he G o v e r n m e nt n ow declared t h e se assignats to be receivable in t he p r o p o r t i on of 4 to 1, thus avowing a depreciation of 75 p er cent. During the p r o g r e ss of the depreciation, t he prices of c o m m o d i t i es r o se proportionably, subject to v e ry great fluctuations, which c o m m e n c ed troubling the Cabinet itself, a nd forced it to c o n t r a ct foreign loans in order to w i t h d r aw from circulation a portion of the n o t e s. On the 1st of J a n u a r y, 1821, their a m o u nt w as a n n o u n c ed to h a ve b e en r e d u c ed to 640,000,000. T he s u b s e q u e nt wars w i th T u r k e y, Persia, Poland, Chiva, etc., again swelled t he m a ss of the b a nk assignats, lowered the e x c h a n g es a n e w, and subjected all commodities to e x t e n s i ve and irregular oscillations of prices. It w as n ot till the 1st July, 1839, t h at t he r a te of e x c h a n g e, being ameliorated in c o n s e q u e n ce of an e n o r m o us e x p o rt of grain to England, t he Czar issued a m a n i f e s t o, according to w h i c h, from t he 1st of July, 1840, t he huge m a ss of b a nk assignats w as to be con- v e r t ed into b a nk n o t es payable on d e m a nd in silver r o u b l es at t he full a m o u nt of 38d. T he Czar Alexander h ad declared t he assignats to be receivable, on t he p a rt of the tax-gatherer, at the p r o p o r t i on of 4 to 1 ; b ut the C z ar Nicholas is said to h a ve restored t h e m, by his c o n v e r s i o n, to their full original value again. T h e re w a s, h o w e v e r, a curious little clause a n n e x e d, ordering t h at for e v e ry one of such n ew n o t es t h r ee a nd a half of t he old o n es should be delivered u p. T he old note w as not declared to be d e p r e c i a t ed to 28 p er cent, of its original a m o u n t, b ut 3 V2 of the old n o t es w e re declared to be equivalent to a full new n o t e. H e n ce we may infer, on t he o ne h a n d, t h at t he Russian Cabinet is as conscientious and punctilious in financial as in diplomatic 35 distinctions; and on t he other, t h at t he m e re danger of an approaching w ar suffices to throw it b a ck into all the m o n e t a ry difficulties w h i ch N i c h o l as h as tried for about t w e n ty y e a rs to emerge from. 20 25 30 O ne of t he E u r o p e an G o v e r n m e n ts after the o t h er c o m es f o r w a rd appeal ing to t he p o c k e ts of its b e l o v ed subjects. E v en t he King of sober-minded 40 H o l l a nd d e m a n ds of the States General 600,000 rix-dollars for w o r ks of AL Count Orlov's Mission—Russian Finances during the War fortification a nd defense, adding " t h at c i r c u m s t a n c es may d e t e r m i ne him to mobilize a portion of the a r my and to send o ut his fleets." If it w e re possible to m e et real w a n ts and to fill the general v a c u um of m o n ey chests by any ingenious art of book-keeping, the contriver of t he F r e n ch budget, as published s o me d a ys ago in t he Moniteur, w o u ld h a ve d o ne the thing; b ut t h e re is n ot t he smallest s h o p k e e p er at Paris u n a w a re of t he fact that, by t he m o st skilfull grouping of figures, o ne c a n n ot get o ut of t he b o o ks of his creditor, and t h at the h e ro of t he 2d of D e c e m b e r, deeming t he public p o c k et to be inexhaustible, has recklessly run into the nation's debt. T h e re c an be imagined nothing m o re naif t h an t he a n n o u n c e m e nt of t he D a n i sh Ministry at the sitting of the Folkething, on the 17th inst., that the G o v e r n m e nt intended postponing to a m o re expedient season t he proposition to change the fundamental institutions of D e n m a r k, and introduce their m u ch cherished Whole State Constitution. (Gesammtstaatsverfassung.) K a rl M a r x. 5 10 15 49 Karl Marx Blue Books—Parliamentary Debates on February 6— Count Orlov's Mission—Operations of the Allied Fleet- The Irish Brigade—Concerning the Convocation of the Labour Parliament F r om Our O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4008, 21. Februar 1854 L o n d o n, T u e s d a y, F e b. 7, 1854. T he "Rights and Privileges of the G r e ek a nd L a t in C h u r c h e s ," as the minister ial b l u e - b o ok on t he E a s t e rn Question h as b e en ingeniously baptized, h a ve b e en subjected by m e, to a scrutinizing perusal, and I intend shortly to give y o ur r e a d e rs a c o n d e n s ed survey of this diplomatic labyrinth. F or t he p r e s e n t, I c o n t e nt myself with the simple a s s u r a n ce t h at a m o re m o n s t r o us m o n u m e nt of G o v e r n m e n t al infamies and imbecility h a s, p e r h a p s, n e v er b e en b e q u e a t h ed to history. A n d, let us r e m e m b e r, w h at M r. Baülie said in t he H o u se of C o m m o ns on t he value of t h e se b l u e - b o o k s: " As for in formation, t h ey h ad quite as m u ch on this subject as t h ey required—not, he admitted, official information—but quite as m u ch as t h ey w e re likely to r e c e i ve from a blue-book t h at had b e en carefully prepared, and had con cealed all that a Government might desire. He s p o ke f r om e x p e r i e n c e, ('hear, h e a r ,' a nd laughter from the ministerial b e n c h e s ,) from a knowledge of h ow b l u e - b o o ks relating to Foreign Affairs h ad b e en p r e p a r ed for this H o u s e ." I k n ow v e ry well t h at L o rd P a l m e r s t o n, w h en o n ce a c c u s ed of having per v e r t ed t he d o c u m e n ts relating to t he Af f g h an war, of having s u p p r e s s ed m o st i m p o r t a nt passages in d i s p a t c h e s, and e v en of having deliberately falsified o t h e r s, m a de t he following ingenious reply: "Sir, if a ny such thing h ad b e en d o n e, w h at w as to p r e v e nt the two a d v e r se G o v e r n m e n t s, w ho succeeded us in p o w e r, o ne of w h i ch e n d u r ed for five years—from proclaiming t he fact a nd p r o d u c i ng t he real d o c u m e n t s ?" B ut I k n ow equally well t h at the secret of t h e se b l u e - b o ok dodges is t he v e ry secret of t he alternate Whig a nd T o ry succession in g o v e r n m e n t, e a ch p a r ty having a greater interest to maintain t he capability of its o p p o n e nt for succession, t h an by ruining their mutual political " h o n o r" to c o m p r o m i se the g o v e r n m e nt of t he ruling classes alto gether. This is w h at t he British are pleased to call t he o p e r a t i on of their glorious constitution. 50 Blue Books—Parliamentary Debates on February 6—Count Orlov's Mission L o rd Clanricarde h ad given notice that he w o u ld m o ve a discussion of t he E a s t e rn question in t he H o u se of L o r d s, y e s t e r d a y. Consequently, great expectations w e re entertained, and t he H o u se almost c r o w d e d. Mr. U r q u h a rt did n ot hesitate e v en to designate, in y e s t e r d a y 's Morning Advertiser, L o rd 5 Clanricarde as t he future leader of t he national p a r t y, r e m e m b e r i ng t h at he w as the only m an w ho o p p o s e d, in 1829, t he Russians in crossing t he Balkan, b ut forgetting, no doubt, t h at t he same noble Marquis w a s, during the m o m e n t o us e p o ch of 1839-40, L o rd P a l m e r s t o n 's E m b a s s a d or at t he C o u rt of St. Petersburg, and his chief i n s t r u m e nt in bringing a b o ut t he separate t r e a ty of 1840 a nd the r u p t u re w i th F r a n c e. 10 20 15 T he public has b e en decidedly disappointed by the d e b a t e s, as t he Marquis of Clanricarde, inferring from t he r e p o r ts in t he public p a p e r s, t h at " t h e re a p p e a r ed to be something of t he s e m b l a n ce of negotiations still going on at Vienna, w as extremely sorry to occasion a ny discussion which might p r e v e nt a peaceful termination to t h o se n e g o t i a t i o n s ." Accordingly, he g a ve notice of his intention to bring f o r w a rd a m o t i on on t he s a me subject this d ay w e e k. T he noble Marquis c o n t e n t ed himself w i th asking L o rd Clarendon " w h e t h er any a n s w er h ad y et b e en received from t he E m p e r or of R u s s ia to t he V i e n na p r o p o s a l s ?" and " w h at instructions h ad b e en given to the British Minister at St. P e t e r s b u r g ?" L o rd C l a r e n d o n 's reply w a s, " t h at he h ad only received this afternoon an official s t a t e m e nt of the facts from V i e n n a ." T he E m p e r or of R u s s ia h ad rejected t he V i e n na n o t e, a nd offered, in its stead, a c o u n t er project. On t he 2d inst. t he C o n f e r e n ce h ad b e en called together, and h ad rejected on its p a rt the c o u n t er project. " T he n ew proposals put f o r w a rd by 25 R u s s ia w e re wholly unacceptable—they could n ot be transmitted to C o n stantinople, and, therefore, t h e re w as an e nd of t h e m. He h ad no r e a s on to think t h at fresh negotiations on t he subject w o u ld be r e n e w e d. As to t he p r e s e r v a t i on of p e a c e, he held out no s u ch e x p e c t a t i on at all." W i th regard to t he other question p ut by L o rd Clanricarde, he stated t h at " on S a t u r d ay evening B a r on B r u n n ow called on him at t he Foreign Office and placed in his h a n ds a n o t e, in w h i ch he a n n o u n c ed t h at t he a n s w er he h ad received from h im to t he inquiry he w as instructed to m a ke by his G o v e r n m e n t, w as not of a kind that permitted him to continue diplomatic relations, and that, therefore, diplomatic relations b e t w e en R u s s ia a nd England w e re suspended. 30 35 B a r on B r u n n ow h ad t a k en l e a ve of h im on S a t u r d ay evening, b ut it w as t h en t oo late to depart from L o n d o n, a nd he u n d e r s t o od t h at he w as to leave early this m o r n i n g ." M. de Kisseleff, we are informed by telegraph, left Paris y e s t e r d ay a nd is g o ne to Brussels. T he official or G o v e r n m e nt journals state t h at all t he E m b a s sy at L o n d on w o u ld be b r o k en u p, a nd e v e ry R u s s i an leave England. B ut I h a p p en to k n o w, from an excellent s o u r c e, t h a t, on t he contrary, t he 40 51 Karl Marx n u m b er of Russians in England will only be diminished by the p e r s on of the E m b a s s a d o r, and t h at t he whole personnel remains at L o n d on u n d er t he s u p e r i n t e n d e n ce of M. de Berg, First S e c r e t a ry of t he E m b a s s y. As to t he position of the British E m b a s s a d or at t he C o u rt of St. Petersburg, L o rd Clarendon declared that " as it w as half past 6 o'clock on S a t u r d ay w h en 5 B a r on B r u n n ow called u p on him, a nd as it w as n e c e s s a ry to h a ve previous c o m m u n i c a t i on with t he F r e n ch G o v e r n m e n t, it w as n ot possible at the m o m e nt to send instructions to t he British Minister at St. P e t e r s b u r g, b ut t h ey had already held communication with the F r e n ch E m b a s s a d or on the subject, and instructions w o u ld be sent to Sir G. S e y m o ur a nd General de Çastelbajac 10 t o m o r r o w, w h i ch w o u ld place t h em on exactly t he same footing as t he R u s s i an E m b a s s a d or h e r e, and diplomatic relations b e t w e en the t wo c o u n tries and Russia would be s u s p e n d e d ." L o rd J o hn Russell r e p e a t ed in the H o u se of C o m m o ns the declaration of L o rd C l a r e n d on in t he U p p er H o u s e, and L o rd P a l m e r s t on a n n o u n c ed t h at " he would bring forward a m e a s u re to consolidate t he militia laws, in w h i ch it w as his intention that a militia force should be organized for Scotland a nd Ireland, the period of enrollment depending u p on t he v o t es of the H o u s e ." T he English a r my is to be a u g m e n t ed immediately by 11,000 m e n; 1,500 c o a st guards are also to be e m b a r k ed forthwith, intended to form a stock for t he c r e ws of t he newly commissioned ships. A royal proclamation has b e en issued forbidding the exportation of any vessels of w a r, military stores and a m m u n i t i on to Russia. E m b a r go has b e en laid by t he naval authorities visiting t he private dock-yards on the T h a m es on t wo vessels in c o u r se of con struction for Russian account. A contract, on behalf of t he British G o v e r n- the aggregate a m o u nt of m e n t, 11,000 h o r s e - p o w e r, has b e en concluded at C o p e n h a g e n. Admiral Sir Charles N a p i er is to h a ve c o m m a nd of t he Baltic fleet a b o ut to be formed. for coal sufficient for steamers of 15 20 25 T he official Wiener Zeitung a n n o u n c es t h at " t he G o v e r n m e nt h as received notice t h at Russia has expressly declared to t he F o ur P o w e rs that she regards herself as released from the promise m a de at O l m ü tz to remain on t he defensive in t he Principalities." 30 Concerning t he object of the mission of C o u nt Orloff at V i e n na a n u m b er of conflicting r u m o rs are afloat; t he m o st credible of w h i ch a p p e a rs to be contained in t he Berlin c o r r e s p o n d e n ce of to-day's Times. " R u s s i a ," says this c o r r e s p o n d e n t, "invites Austria and Prussia to enter with her into a t r e a ty of neutrality for all contingencies; suggests to t h em to m a ke the declaration of their neutrality the c o m m on expression of t he neutrality of t he G e r m an B u n d; u n d e r t a k es to c o me to the assistance of t he B u nd should any of its m e m b e rs be a t t a c k e d; and binds herself, in t he c a se of a ny territorial changes having to be arranged at the end of the w a r, to conclude no p e a ce without 35 40 52 Blue Books—Parliamentary Debates on February 6—Count Orlov's Mission having d ue consideration for t he interests of t he G e r m an P o w e rs in s u ch t r e a ty of neutrality distinct territorial changes. In reference is m a de to t he principles a nd provisions of the Holy Alliance of 1815." this p r o p o s al for a 5 10 As to the decision p r o b a b ly c o me to by A u s t r ia and Prussia, I can only r e p e at t he convictions already r e c o r d ed by me on this question. Austria will e n d e a v or by e v e ry m e a ns to maintain her position of neutrality as long as she will be permitted to do so, a nd will declare for Russia w h en t he p r o p er time has arrived. Prussia, on t he other h a n d, is likely again to miss t he p r o p er t i me for abandoning her neutrality a nd will e nd by calling u p on herself t he fate of another J e n a. We learn from Constantinople t h at the combined fleet h a ve r e t u r n ed to their anchorage at Beicos, notwithstanding t he following order, sent out to t h e m, on behalf of the E m b a s s a d o r s, by t he S a m s o n: " T he E m b a s s a d o rs are surprised at t he s u d d en resolution of t he Admirals, m o re particularly at the p r e s e nt m o m e n t, w h en a T u r k i sh steam-flotilla is on t he point of starting with ammunition and other stores for t he a r my of Anatolia. T he orders of t he F r e n ch and British G o v e r n m e n ts w e re formal and precise, ( t h ey w e re in deed, b ut not t he original o r d e rs with which t he Admirals w e re dispatched, b ut only those just r e c e i v e d ,) respecting the protection to be afforded by t he combined fleets to t he O t t o m an flag and territory, and t he attention of b o th Admirals is again called to the stringent n a t u re of t h e se instructions which h ad b e en duly notified to t h e m. T he Admirals, it would appear, con sider that the m e a s u r es entrusted to their e x e c u t i on m ay be equally well effected, w h e t h er the force u n d er their c o m m a nd be stationed at Beicos or Sinope, ( in this c a s e, it w o u ld a p p e ar to o t h e r s, that the same instructions might h a ve b e en carried out by t he fleets quietly remaining at Malta a nd T o u l o n .) This is a m a t t er which m u st entirely depend u p on their judgment, and on t h em t he responsibility will r e s t ." T he Russian fleet is k n o wn to be at Kaffa near the Strait of Yenikale, w h e n ce t he distance to B a t um is only o ne third of the distance b e t w e en B a t um a nd Beicos. Will the admirals be able to p r e v e nt a Sinope at B a t u m, " w h e t h er they be stationed at Beicos or e l s e w h e r e ?" Y ou will r e m e m b er t h at t he C z a r 's first proclamation a c c u s ed t he Sultan of enlisting u n d er his b a n n er the revolutionary dregs of. all E u r o p e. N o w, while L o rd Stratford de Redcliffe declares to L o rd D u d l ey Stuart that he could n ot assist him in organizing a ny of t h o se dregs as a voluntary legion, t he Czar has himself b e en t he first to establish a revolutionary c o r p s, the so- called Greco-Slavonian L e g i on w i th t he direct intention of provoking t he Sul- t a n 's subjects to revolt. T he c o r ps is being organized in Wallachia a nd n u m b e rs already, according to R u s s i an s t a t e m e n t s, a b o ve 3,000 m e n, n ot to be 15 20 25 30 35 40 53 Karl Marx paid in bons à perpétuité, as t he Wallachians t h e m s e l v e s, colonels b e i ng p r o m i s ed 5 ducats p er d a y; majors 3 d u c a t s; captains 2; subaltern officers 1, a nd soldiers 2 zwanzigers, t he a r ms to be supplied by Russia. M e a n w h i le the a r m a m e n ts of F r a n ce seem no longer to be intended to r e m a in on paper. As you k n o w, the r e s e r v es of 1851 h a ve b e en called out and in t he last few d a ys i m m e n se military stores h a ve b e en sent from A r r as to M e tz a nd Strasburg. General Pélissier h as left for Algiers with o r d e rs to select t he different corps w h i ch are to form the expedition to Constantinople, for w h i ch Sir J . B u r g o y ne and Colonel A r d a nt h a ve g o ne to p r e p a re q u a r t e r s. T he r u m o r ed p a s s a ge of O m er P a s ha at the head of a large a r m y, t h o u gh if a t t e m p t ed it could hardly be e x e c u t ed at a m o re o p p o r t u ne m o m e n t, since t he R u s s i a ns are k n o wn to be c o n c e n t r a t ed at K r a j o v a, b e t w e en B u c h a r e st and Kalafat, yet n e e ds confirmation. To r e t u rn to the doings of t he British Parliament, t h e re is, of c o u r s e, n ot m u ch to be mentioned, with the exception of t he proposition of a bill for throwing o p en the coast-trade to foreign vessels, a proposition which has n ot met with a single protest. Protestation m u st be decidedly dead, since it s h o ws no capacity to m a ke the slightest stand against the universal invasion of t he m o d e rn principle of c o m m e r c e: to b uy in t he c h e a p e st m a r k et what e v er y ou require. H ow far t he c h e a p e st c r ew is qualified to p r o t e ct life and p r o p e r t y, t he late c a t a s t r o p he of t he " T a y l e u r" h as shown. M r. I. Butt, in y e s t e r d a y 's sitting of t he C o m m o n s, gave notice " t h at t o - m o r r ow he should m o ve t h at t h e re should be r e ad by the Clerk, at the table of the H o u s e, an article published in The Times of to-day, and t he previous s t a t e m e n ts of The Dublin Freeman's Journal, i m p u t i ng to t he (Irish) m e m b e rs of the H o u se a trafficking in places for m o n e y. He should also m o ve for a Select C o m m i t t ee to inquire into t he allegations of s u ch trafficking as con tained in t h e se p u b l i c a t i o n s ." W hy Mr. B u tt is indignant only at t he traffick ing for m o n ey will be u n d e r s t o od by t h o se w ho r e m e m b er t h at t he legality of a ny other m o de of trafficking w as settled during last session. Since 1830 Downing-st. has b e en placed at t he mercy of t he Irish Brigade. It is t he Irish m e m b e rs w ho h a ve created and k e pt in place the Ministers to their mind. In 1834 t h ey d r o ve from t he Cabinet Sir J. G r a h am and L o rd Stanley. In 1835 t h ey compelled William TV to dismiss the Peel Ministry and to r e s t o re the M e l b o u r ne Administration. F r om the general election of 1837 d o wn to that of 1841, while t h e re w as a British majority in t he L o w er H o u se o p p o s ed to t h at Administration, t he votes of t he Irish Brigade w e re strong e n o u gh to t u rn t he scale and k e ep it in office. It w as t he Irish Brigade again w ho installed t he Coalition Cabinet. With all this p o w er of Cabinet-making, t he Brigade h a ve n e v er p r e v e n t ed any infamies against their o wn c o u n t ry nor any in- 54 Ï 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 I I \ 40 \ 1 I) Blue Books—Parliamentary Debates on February 6—Count Orlov's Mission justice to t he English people. T he period of their greatest p o w er w as at t he time of O'Connell, from 1834—1841. To w h at a c c o u nt w as it t u r n e d? T he Irish agitation w as n e v er anything b ut a c ry for t he Whigs against the Tories, in order to extort places from the W h i g s. N o b o dy w ho k n o ws anything a b o ut t he so-called Lichfield-house c o n t r a c t, will differ from this opinion—that contract by w h i ch O'Connell w as to v o te for, b ut licensed to s p o ut against, t he Whigs on condition t h at he should n o m i n a te his o wn Magistrates in Ireland. It is time for the Irish Brigade to p ut off their patriotic airs. It is time for t he Irish people to p ut off their d u mb h a t r ed of the English a nd call their o wn representatives to an a c c o u nt for their w r o n g s. T he " S o c i e ty of A r ts a nd T r i c k s" h a ve lately v e n t u r ed on an e s c a m o t a ge of the L a b or Parliament by a c o u n t e r m o ve i n t e n d ed to " s e t t l e" the still enduring struggle b e t w e en t he capitalists a nd w o r k i n g m en of England. T he meeting w as presided over by a noble L o r d, and delegates from b o th parties h ad b e en invited to discuss their grievances after the fashion of t he L u x e m b o u rg c o n f e r e n c es of M. Louis Blanc. T he h u m b ug w as protested against by Mr. E r n e st J o n e s, in the n a me of the w o r k i ng classes, and old R o b e rt O w en told t h e se enlightened gentlemen t h at no arbitration n or device, nor art of any kind, could ever fill the gulf dividing the t wo great fundamental classes of this or any country. It is superfluous to a dd t h at t he meeting dissolved u n d er an ample cover of ridicule. T he Chartists of L o n d on a nd the Provincial Delegates held a public meeting on t he following day, w h en t he p r o p o s al of the L a b or Parliament w as u n a n i m o u s ly a p p r o v e d, and t he 11th M a r ch n a m ed for its opening at Manchester. Karl M a r x. 5 io 15 20 25 55 Karl Marx Russian Diplomacy—The Blue Book on the Eastern Question—Montenegro New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4013, 27. Februar 1854 F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. L o n d o n, F r i d a y, F e b. 10, 1854. At t he time w h en the treaty of neutrality w as c o n c l u d ed b e t w e en D e n m a rk and S w e d e n, I stated my conviction, c o n t r a ry to t he c u r r e nt opinion in E n g l a nd and F r a n c e, that it w as not by a ny m e a ns to be looked u p on as a t r i u m ph of t he W e s t e rn P o w e r s, and t h at t he p r e t e n d ed p r o t e st of R u s s ia against t h at treaty w as nothing b ut a feint. T he Scandinavian p a p e r s, and The T i m e s ' c o r r e s p o n d e n t, quoting from t h e m, are n ow u n a n i m o us in recording the s a me opinion, declaring the whole t r e a ty to be t he w o rk of Russia. T he propositions submitted by C o u nt Orloff to the V i e n na C o n f e r e n c e, a nd rejected by t h e m, w e re as follows: 1. R e n e w al of the old treaties. 2. P r o t e c t o r a te of R u s s ia over t he G r e ek Christians of T u r k e y. 3. Expulsion of all political refugees from the O t t o m an E m p i r e. 4. Refusal to admit the mediation of any o t h er P o w e r, and to negotiate o t h e r w i se t h an directly with a T u r k i sh E n v o y, to be sent to St. P e t e r s burg. On t he latter point C o u nt Orloff declared his r e a d i n e ss to c o m p r o m i s e, b ut t he Conference refused. W hy did the Conference refuse? Or w hy did the E m p e r or of R u s s ia refuse the last t e r ms of t he C o n f e r e n c e? T he propositions are the same on b o th sides. T he r e n e w al of t he old treaties h ad b e en stipulat ed, t he R u s s i an P r o t e c t o r a te admitted with only a modification in t he f o r m; and, as t he last point h ad b e en a b a n d o n ed by R u s s ia herself, t he Austrian d e m a nd for the expulsion of the refugees could n ot h a ve b e en t he c a u se of a r u p t u re b e t w e en Russia and the West. It is evident, t h e n, that t he position of the E m p e r or of Russia is n ow such as to p r e v e nt him from accepting any t e r ms at t he h a n ds of E n g l a nd a nd F r a n c e, and t h at he m u sí bring T u r k ey to his feet either with or without the c h a n ce of a E u r o p e an w a r. In military circles the latter is n ow regarded as inevitable, and the p r e p a r a- 56 ir Russian Diplomacy—The Blue Book on the Eastern Question—Montenegro 5 tions for it are going on in e v e ry quarter. Admiral B r u at h as already left Brest for Algiers, w h e re he is to e m b a rk 10,000 m en a nd sixteen English Regiments stationed in Ireland are o r d e r ed to hold t h e m s e l v es r e a dy to go to Con stantinople. T he expedition c an only h a ve a twofold object: either to c o e r ce t he T u r ks into submission to Russia, as Mr. U r q u h a rt a n n o u n c e s, or to c a r ry on the w ar against Russia in real earnest. In b o th c a s es the fate of the T u r ks is equally certain. O n ce more h a n d ed over to Russia, not indeed directly, b ut to her dissolving agencies, the p o w er of the O t t o m an E m p i re w o u ld s o on be r e d u c e d, like t h at of the L o w er E m p i r e, to t he precincts of the capital. 10 T a k en u n d er the absolute tutorship of F r a n ce a nd England the sovereignty of t he O t t o m a ns over their E u r o p e an e s t a t es would be no less at an end. If we are to take the w ar into our h a n d s, o b s e r v es The Times,v/e m u st h a ve t he control over all the operations. In this c a se t h e n, t he T u r k i sh Ministry would be placed under the direct administration of the W e s t e rn E m b a s s a d o r s, t he 15 T u r k i sh W ar Office u n d er t he W ar Offices of England and F r a n c e, and t he Turkish armies under the c o m m a nd of F r e n ch and English G e n e r a l s. T he T u r k i sh E m p i r e, in its ancient conditions of existence, has c e a s ed to b e. After his complete " f a i l u r e" at V i e n n a, C o u nt Orloff is n ow gone b a ck to St. Petersburg—"with t he a s s u r a n ce of t he A u s t r i an a nd Prussian neutrality, u n d er all c i r c u m s t a n c e s ." On the other h a n d, the telegraph r e p o r ts from V i e n na that a change has t a k en place in t he T u r k i sh Ministry, the Seraskier and K a p u d an P a s ha having resigned. The Times c a n n ot u n d e r s t a nd how the w ar p a r ty could h a ve b e en defeated at the v e ry t i me t h at F r a n ce and England w e re going to w a r. F or my p a r t, if the n e ws be t r u e, I c an v e ry well u n d e r s t a nd the " g o d - s e n t" o c c u r r e n ce as t he w o rk of t he English Coalition r e p r e s e n t a tive at Constantinople, w h om we find so repeatedly regretting, in his b l u e- b o ok dispatches, t h at " he could hardly yet go so far in his p r e s s u re on t he T u r k i sh Cabinet as it might be d e s i r a b l e ." T he blue b o o ks begin with d i s p a t c h es relating to the d e m a n ds put forward on t he part of F r a n ce with r e s p e ct to t he H o ly Shrines—demands n ot wholly b o r ne out by the ancient capitulations, and ostensibly m a de with t he view to enforce t he s u p r e m a cy of t he L a t in over the G r e ek C h u r c h. I am far from participating in t he opinion of Mr. U r q u h a r t, according to w h i ch the Czar h a d, by secret influences at Paris, seduced B o n a p a r te to r u sh into this quarrel in o r d er to afford Russia a p r e t e xt for interfering herself in behalf of the privi leges of t he G r e ek Catholics. It is well k n o wn t h at B o n a p a r te wanted to b u y, coûte que coûte, t he s u p p o rt of t he Catholic p a r t y, w h i ch he regarded from t he v e ry first as t he main condition for t he s u c c e ss of his usurpation. Bona p a r te w as fully a w a re of t he a s c e n d a n cy of the Catholic C h u r ch over t he p e a s a nt population of F r a n c e, and t he p e a s a n t ry w e re to m a ke him E m p e r or in spite of the bourgeoisie and in spite of the proletariat. M. de Falloux, t he 20 25 30 35 40 57 Karl Marx 5 Jesuit, w as the most influential m e m b er of t he first ministry he formed, and of w h i ch Odilon Barrot, the soi-disant Voltairian, w as t he nominal head. T he first resolution a d o p t ed by this ministry, on t he v e ry day after t he in auguration of B o n a p a r te as President, w as the f a m o us expedition against the R o m an Republic. M. de Montalembert, the chief of the Jesuit p a r t y, w as his m o st active tool in preparing the o v e r t h r ow of t he parliamentary régime and t he coup d'état of t he 2d D e c e m b e r. In 1850, t he Univers, t he official o r g an of the Jesuit p a r t y, called day after day on the F r e n ch G o v e r n m e nt to t a ke active steps for t he protection of t he interests of t he L a t in C h u r ch in t he East. Anxious to cajole and win over the P o p e, and to be c r o w n ed by him, B o n a- p a r te h ad r e a s o ns to a c c e pt the challenge a nd m a ke himself a p p e ar t he " m o st C a t h o l i c" E m p e r or of F r a n c e. The Bonapartist usurpation, therefore, is the true origin of the present Eastern complication. It is t r ue t h at B o n a p a r te wisely w i t h d r ew his prentensions as s o on as he p e r c e i v ed the E m p e r or Nicholas r e a dy to m a ke t h em t he p r e t e xt for excluding h im from t he con- clave of E u r o p e, and Russia w a s, as usual, eager to utilise the e v e n ts w h i ch she h ad n ot t he p o w er to create, as Mr. U r q u h a rt imagines. B ut it r e m a i ns a m o st curious p h e n o m e n on in history, that t he p r e s e nt crisis of the O t t o m an E m p i re h as b e en p r o d u c ed by t he same conflict b e t w e en t he L a t in and G r e ek C h u r c h es w h i ch o n ce gave rise to the foundation of t h at E m p i re in E u r o p e. 10 15 20 It is not my intention to investigate the whole c o n t e n ts of t he "Rights and Privileges of the L a t in and G r e ek C h u r c h e s ," b e f o re having considered a most important incident entirely s u p p r e s s ed in t h e se blue b o o k s, viz: T he A u s t r o - T u r k i sh quarrel about M o n t e n e g r o. T he necessity to previously treat this affair is t he m o re urgent, as it will establish t he existence of a c o n c e r t ed plan b e t w e en Russia and Austria for the subversion and division of the T u r k i sh E m p i r e, a nd as t he very fact of E n g l a n d 's putting t he s u b s e q u e nt negotiations b e t w e en the Court of St. P e t e r s b u rg and the P o r te into t he h a n ds of Austria, c a n n ot fail to t h r ow a m o st curious light on t he c o n d u ct of t he English Cabinet throughout this E a s t e rn question. In the a b s e n ce of a ny official d o c u m e n ts on t he Montenegro affair, I refer to a b o o k, which has only j u st b e en published, on this subject, and is entitled the " H a n d b o ok of t he E a s t e rn Q u e s t i o n ," by L. F. Simpson. 25 30 T he T u r k i sh fortress of Zabliak (on t he frontiers of M o n t e n e g ro and Albania) w as stormed by a band of Montenegrins in D e c e m b e r, 1852. It is r e m e m b e r ed t h at O m er P a s ha w as o r d e r ed by t he P o r te to repel t he ag g r e s s o r s. T he Sublime Porte declared t he w h o le c o a st of Albania in a state of b l o c k a d e, a m e a s u re which apparently could be directed only against Austria a nd her navy, and which indicated t he conviction of t he T u r k i sh Ministry t h at Austria had p r o v o k ed the Montenegrin revolt. 35 40 58 Russian Diplomacy—The Blue Book on the Eastern Question—Montenegro T he following article, u n d er date of Vienna, D e c e m b er 29,1852, a p p e a r ed t h en in the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung; 5 10 15 "If Austria wished to assist the M o n t e n e g r i n s, t he blockade could n ot p r e v e nt it. If t he Montenegrins d e s c e n d ed from their m o u n t a i n s, Austria could provide t h em w i th a r ms and a m m u n i t i on by C a t t a r o, in spite of t he p r e s e n ce of the T u r k i sh fleet in t he Adriatic. Austria d o es n ot a p p r o ve either of t he p r e s e nt incursion of t he M o n t e n e g r i n s, nor of the revolution which is on the eve of breaking out in Herzegovina and Bosnia among the Chris tians. She h as constantly p r o t e s t ed against t he p e r s e c u t i o ns of the Christians, and that in t he n a me of h u m a n i t y; A u s t r ia is obliged to o b s e r ve neutrality t o w a rd t he E a s t e rn C h u r c h. T he last n e ws from Jerusalem will h a ve s h o wn h ow fiercely religious h a t r ed b u r n ed t h e r e. T he agents of A u s t r ia must, therefore, e x e rt all their efforts to maintain p e a ce b e t w e en the G r e ek Chris tians and t he Latin Christians of t he E m p i r e ." F r om this article we glean, firstly, that coming revolutions of the T u r k i sh Christians w e re anticipated as certain, t h at t he w ay for t he R u s s i an c o m plaints concerning the oppression of the G r e ek C h u r ch w as paved by Austria, a nd that t he religious complication about the H o ly Shrines w as e x p e c t ed to give occasion for A u s t r i a 's " n e u t r a l i t y ." 20 In the same m o n th a n o te w as a d d r e s s ed to the P o r te by Russia, w ho offered her mediation in M o n t e n e g r o, w h i ch w as declined on t he g r o u nd t h at t he Sultan w as able himself to uphold his o wn rights. H e re we see R u s s ia operating exactly as she did at t he t i me of t he G r e ek revolution—first offering to p r o t e ct the Sultan against his subjects, with t he view of protecting after- 25 w a rd his subjects against t he Sultan, if h er assistance should not be ac cepted. T he fact that t h e re existed a c o n c e rt b e t w e en R u s s ia and Austria for the o c c u p a t i on of t he Principalities, e v en at this early time, m ay be gleaned from a n o t h er e x t r a ct from t he Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, of 30th D e c e m b e r, 30 1852: "Russia, w h i ch has only recently a c k n o w l e d g ed the i n d e p e n d e n ce of M o n t e n e g r o, c an scarcely r e m a in an idle spectator of e v e n t s. M o r e o v e r, commercial letters and travelers, from M o l d a v ia a nd Wallachia, m e n t i on t h at from Wolhynia d o wn to the m o u th of t he P r a t h, t he c o u n t ry s w a r ms with 35 R u s s i an t r o o p s, and t h at r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts are continually arriving." Simultaneously the V i e n na journals a n n o u n c ed t h at an A u s t r i an a r my of observation w as assembling on t he A u s t r o - T u r k i sh frontiers. On D e c e m b er 6 , 1 8 5 2, L o rd Stanley interpellated L o rd M a l m e s b u ry w i th r e s p e ct to t he affairs of M o n t e n e g r o, and B o n a p a r t e 's noble friend m a de t he following declaration: 40 " T he noble lord intimated his desire to ask w h e t h er a ny change had r e- 59 Karl Marx cently t a k en place in the political relations of t h at wild c o u n t ry bordering on Albania, called M o n t e n e g r o. I believe t h at no c h a n ge w h a t e v er has t a k en place with r e s p e ct to its political relations. T he chief of that c o u n t ry b e a rs a double title; he is head of the G r e ek C h u r ch in that c o u n t r y, and he is also t he t e m p o r al sovereign. B ut with r e s p e ct to his ecclesiastical position he is under the jurisdiction of the Emperor of Russia, who is considered to be the head of the whole Greek Church. T he chief of M o n t e n e g ro h as b e e n" (as I believe all his ancestors w e re before him) " a c c u s t o m ed to r e c e i ve from the sanction and recognition of the E m p e r or his Episcopal jurisdiction and titles. W i th r e s p e ct to the i n d e p e n d e n ce of t h at c o u n t r y, w h a t e v er t he opinion of different p e r s o ns m ay be as to t he advantage of s u ch a position, t he fact is that Montenegro has been an 150 years, a nd t h o u gh various attempts h a ve b e en m a de by t he P o r te to bring it into subjection, t h o se attempts h a ve failed o ne after another, and the c o u n t ry is in the same position n ow t h at it w as s o me 200 y e a rs a g o ." independent country for something like 10 15 5 In this s p e e ch L o rd M a l m e s b u r y, the t h en T o ry S e c r e t a ry for Foreign Affairs, quietly dissects t he O t t o m an E m p i re by separating from it a c o u n t ry t h at had e v er belonged to it, recognising at the s a me time the E m p e r or of R u s s i a 's spiritual pretensions over subjects of t he P o r t e. W h at are we to say of t h e se two sets of Oligarchs, e x c e pt that t h ey rival e a ch o t h er in imbe- cility? 20 T he P o r te w a s, of c o u r se seriously alarmed at this s p e e ch of a British Minister, a nd t h e re a p p e a r e d, shortly afterward, in an English n e w s p a p er t he following letter from Constantinople, dated J a n u a ry 5, 1853: 25 " T he P o r te has experienced the greatest irritation owing to L o rd M a l m e s- b u r y 's declaration in the H o u se of L o r ds t h at M o n t e n e g ro w as i n d e p e n d e n t. He t h us played into the h a n ds of R u s s ia and Austria, by w h i ch E n g l a nd will lose t h at influence and confidence which she has h i t h e r to enjoyed. In the first article of the t r e a ty of Sistow, concluded b e t w e en the P o r te and A u s t r ia in 1791, (to which treaty England, Holland a nd P r u s s ia w e re mediating 30 parties) it is expressly stipulated t h at an a m n e s ty should be granted to the subjects of b o th P o w e rs w ho h ad t a k en p a rt against their rightful sovereigns, viz: the Servians, Montenegrins, Moldavians and Wallachians, n a m ed as rebel subjects of t he Porte. T he Montenegrins w ho reside in Constantinople, of w h om t h e re are 2,000 to 3,000, p ay t he haratch or capitation-tax, and in judicial p r o c e d u re with subjects of o t h er P o w e rs at Constantinople, the M o n t e n e g r i ns are always considered and t r e a t ed as T u r k i sh subjects w i t h o ut o b j e c t i o n ." 35 In the beginning of J a n u a r y, 1853, the A u s t r i an G o v e r n m e nt sent B a r on Kellner v on Köllenstein, an aide-de-camp of t he E m p e r o r, to C a t t a ro to w a t ch t he c o u r se of e v e n t s, while M r. d'Ozeroff, t he R u s s i an E n v oy at C o n- 40 60 Russian Diplomacy—The Blue Book on the Eastern Question—Montenegro stantinople h a n d ed in a p r o t e st to t he D i v an against t he c o n c e s s i o ns m a de to t he L a t i ns in t he question of the H o ly Shrines. At t he e nd of J a n u a r y, C o u nt Leiningen arrived at Constantinople, a nd was admitted on t he 3d F e b r u a r y, to a private audience with the Sultan, to w h om he delivered a letter from t he Austrian E m p e r o r. T he P o r te refused to c o m p ly with his d e m a n d s, a nd C o u nt Leiningen t h e r e u p on g a ve in an ultimatum, allowing the Porte four d a ys to answer. T he P o r te immediately placed itself u n d er t he protection of England a nd F r a n c e, which did n ot p r o t e ct her, while C o u nt Leiningen refused their mediation. On F e b r u a ry 15, he had obtained everything he h ad asked for (with t he e x c e p t i on of A r t. I l l) and his ultimatum w as a c c e p t e d. It contained the following articles: " I. I m m e d i a te evacuation of M o n t e n e g ro and the establishment of the 5 10 status quo ante bellum. 15 II. A declaration by w h i ch the P o r te is to engage herself to maintain the status quo of t he territories of K l e ck a nd Sutorina, and to recognize t he mare clausum in favor of Austria. III. A strict inquiry to t a ke p l a ce concerning t he acts of M u s s u l m an fanati cism c o m m i t t ed against t he Christians of B o s n ia and Herzegovina. I V. Removal of all the political refugees and r e n e g a d es at p r e s e nt in the 20 provinces adjoining t he Austrian frontiers. V. Indemnity of 200,000 florins to certain A u s t r i an m e r c h a n t s, w h o se c o n t r a c ts h ad b e en arbitrarily annulled, a nd t he m a i n t e n a n ce of t h o se con tracts for all the time t h ey w e re agreed on. V I. Indemnity of 56,000 florins to a m e r c h a nt w h o se ship and cargo had 25 b e en unjustly confiscated. V I I. E s t a b l i s h m e nt of n u m e r o us consulates in Bosnia, Servia, H e r z e g o v i na and all over Roumelia. V I I I. Disavowal of t he c o n d u ct maintained in 1850, in the affair of t he r e f u g e e s ." 30 Before acceding to this ultimatum, t he O t t o m an P o r t e, as Mr. S i m p s on s t a t e s, a d d r e s s ed a n o te to t he E m b a s s a d o rs of England a nd F r a n c e, demanding a promise from t h em of positive assistance in t he e v e nt of a w ar with Austria. " T he t wo Ministers n ot being able to pledge t h e m s e l v es in a definite m a n n e r ," t he T u r k i sh G o v e r n m e nt yielded to the energetic 35 proceedings of C o u nt Leiningen. On F e b r u a ry 28th, C o u nt L e i n i n g en arrived at V i e n n a, and Prince M e n c h i koff at Constantinople. On t he 3d of M a r c h, L o rd J o hn Russell h ad t he i m p u d e n ce to declare, in a n s w er to an interpellation of L o rd D u d l ey Stuart, t h at 40 " In answer to representations m a de to the Austrian G o v e r n m e n t, assur a n ce h ad b e en given t h at t he latter held t he s a me views as the English 61 Karl Marx G o v e r n m e nt on the subject; and, t h o u gh he could n ot state the precise t e r ms of the arrangement that had b en m a d e, the intervention of F r a n ce and E n g l a nd h ad b e en successful, and he t r u s t ed t he late differences w e re n ow over. T he c o u r se a d o p t ed by England h ad b e en to give T u r k ey s u ch advice as w o u ld maintain her h o n or and her i n d e p e n d e n c e. ***. F or his o wn part, he thought t h at on grounds of right, of international l a w, of faith t o w a rd o ur ally, a nd also on grounds of general policy a nd e x p e d i e n c y, the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Turkey was a great and ruling point of the foreign policy of England." K a rl M a r x. 62 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels The War Question in Europe The War Question in Europe. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4019, 6. März 1854 5 10 T h o u gh the arrival of the Nashville p u ts us in p o s s e s s i on of no decisive n e ws from the seat of w a r, it p u ts us in p o s s e s s i on of a fact of great significance in the p r e s e nt state of affairs. This is t h at n o w, at the eleventh hour, w h en t he Russian E m b a s s a d o rs at Paris and L o n d on h a ve left, w h en t he British and F r e n ch E m b a s s a d o rs at St. P e t e r s b u rg are recalled, w h en the naval a nd military strength of F r a n ce a nd E n g l a nd is being already c o n c e n t r a t ed for immediate action—at this v e ry last m o m e n t, t he t wo W e s t e rn G o v e r n m e n ts are making fresh proposals to negotiate by w h i ch they c o n c e de almost everything that R u s s ia w a n t s. It will be r e m e m b e r ed that the m a in point claimed by Russia w as h er right of settling directly with t he P o r t e, a nd w i t h o ut t he interference of the o t h er P o w e r s, a quarrel which, it w as p r e t e n d e d, c o n c e r n ed R u s s ia a nd T u r k ey only. This point has n ow b e en con c e d ed to Russia. T he p r o p o s a ls are contained in t he letter of N a p o l e o n, w h i ch 15 we c o py in another place, a nd are to the effect t h at R u s s ia shall t r e at with T u r k ey direct, while the t r e a ty to be c o n c l u d ed b e t w e en the t wo parties shall be g u a r a n t e ed by the four P o w e r s. This g u a r a n t ee is a d r a w b a ck u p on t he concession, as it gives the W e s t e rn P o w e rs a r e a dy p r e t e xt to interfere in any future quarrel of t he kind. B ut it d o es n ot m a ke matters w o r se for R u s s ia t h an t h ey are n o w, w h en the E m p e r or N i c h o l as m u st see that any a t t e m pt of his at a d i s m e m b e r m e nt of T u r k ey c a n n ot be carried out without the risk of a w ar with England and F r a n c e. A nd t h e n, t he actual gain to R u s s ia will d e p e nd u p on the n a t u re of the t r e a ty w h i ch is n ot y et c o n c l u d e d; and Russia, having seen in how cowardly a m a n n er the W e s t e rn P o w e rs n ow shrink from t he necessity of war, will b ut h a ve to k e ep h er armies c o n c e n t r a t e d, and to continue her system of intimidation in o r d er to gain e v e ry point during t he negotiations. Besides, R u s s i an diplomacy n e ed hardly be afraid of a c o n t e st w i th those egregious E m b a s s a d o rs w ho m a n u f a c t u r ed the f a m o u s, blunder ing first V i e n na n o t e. 20 25 63 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels W h e t h e r, h o w e v e r, the Czar will a c c e pt this p r o p o s a l, or t r u st to his army, r e m a i ns to be seen. He c a n n ot afford to go t h r o u gh s u ch a r m a m e n ts and dislocations of troops over his v a st E m p i re o n ce in e v e ry five y e a r s. T he p r e p a r a t i o ns h a ve b e en m a de on such a scale, t h at a v e ry great material gain only c an r e p ay their cost. T he Russian population are thoroughly r o u s ed to warlike enthusiasm. We h a ve seen a c o py of a letter from a Russian mer chant—not o ne of the m a ny G e r m a n, English, or F r e n ch t r a d e r s, w ho h a ve settled in Moscow—but a real old M u s c o v i t e, a genuine son of Sviatala Russ, w ho holds s o me goods on consignment for English a c c o u n t, a nd h ad b e en a s k ed w h e t h er in case of w ar t h e se goods would r un t he risk of confiscation. T he old R u s s, quite indignant at the imputation thus cast u p on his G o v e r n m e n t, and perfectly well acquainted with the official phraseology, according to w h i ch R u s s ia is the great c h a m p i on of " o r d e r, p r o p e r t y, family, and religion," in contrast to t he revolutionary and socialist countries of t he W e s t, retorts that " H e re in Russia, God be praised, the distinction b e t w e en mine a nd thine is yet in full force, and your p r o p e r ty h e re is as safe as a n y w h e r e. I w o u ld even advise y ou to send over as m u ch of your p r o p e r ty as y ou can, for it will p e r h a ps be safer here t h an w h e re it is n o w. As to your countrymen, you may perhaps have reason to fear, as to y o ur p r o p e r t y, n ot at all." In the m e a n t i m e, the a r m a m e n ts p r e p a r ed in England and F r a n ce are u p on a m o st extensive scale. T he F r e n ch o c e an s q u a d r on h as b e en ordered from B r e st to T o u l on in order to t r a n s p o rt t r o o ps to the L e v a n t. F o r ty or sixty t h o u s a n d, according to different s t a t e m e n t s, are to be sent, a large portion of t h em to be drafted from the African a r m y; the expedition will be v e ry strong in riflemen, a nd be c o m m a n d ed either by B a r a g u ay d'Hilliers or by St. A r n a u d. T he British G o v e r n m e nt will send a b o ut 18,000 m e n, (22 regi m e n ts of 850 each.) and, at the date of our last advices, a portion of t h em h ad already e m b a r k ed for Malta, w h e re the general r e n d e z v o us is to b e. T he infantry go in s t e a m e r s, and sailing vessels are e m p l o y ed for t he c o n v e y a n ce of cavalry. T he Baltic fleet, w h i ch is to be c o n c e n t r a t ed off S h e e r n e s s, in the T h a m e s, by the 6th of March, will consist of fifteen ships of t he line, eight frigates, and s e v e n t e en smaller vessels. It is t he largest fleet t he British h a ve got together since t he last w a r; a nd as o ne half of it will consist of paddle or screw s t e a m e r s, and as the rating and weight of metal is at p r e s e nt about 50 per cent, higher t h an fifty y e a rs ago, this Baltic fleet m ay prove to be t he strongest a r m a m e nt ever turned out by any c o u n t r y. Sir Charles N a p i er is to c o m m a nd it; if t h e re is to be war, he is t he m an to bring his guns to b e ar at o n ce u p on the decisive point. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 On t he D a n u b e, the battle of T s h e t a te has evidently had the effect of delaying t he R u s s i an attack u p on Kalafat. T he R u s s i a ns h a ve b e en convinced by t h at five d a y s' struggle that it will be no e a sy m a t t er to t a ke an intrenched 40 64 The War Question in Europe c a mp w h i ch c an send o ut s u ch sallies. It s e e ms t h at e v en the positive c o m m a nd of the A u t o c r at himself is n ot sufficient, after s u ch a foretaste, to drive his t r o o ps to a r a sh attempt. T he p r e s e n ce of General Schilder, Chief of t he E n g i n e e r s, w ho w as sent from W a r s aw on p u r p o s e, seems e v en to h a ve h ad a result contrary to the Imperial o r d e r, for i n s t e ad of hurrying on t he attack, an inspection of the fortifications from a distance w as sufficient to c o n v i n ce him t h at m o re t r o o ps a nd m o re h e a vy guns w e re n e e d ed t h an could at o n ce be brought u p. Accordingly the R u s s i a ns h a ve b e en concentrating w h a t e v er forces t h ey could a r o u nd Kalaf at, a nd bringing up their siege guns, of which, it s e e m s, t h ey b r o u g ht s e v e n t y - t wo into Wallachia. The London Times estimates their forces at 65,000 m e n, which is r a t h er high, if we consider t he strength of the w h o le R u s s i an a r my in t he Principalities. This a r my n ow consists of six divisions of infantry, t h r ee divisions of cavalry, a nd a b o ut t h r ee h u n d r ed field-guns, besides C o s s a c k s, riflemen, and other special c o r p s, of a total nominal strength b e f o re t he beginning of the war, of 120,000 m e n. A s s u m i ng their l o s s e s, by sickness and on t he batüe-f ield, to be 30,000 m e n, t h e re remain a b o ut 90,000 c o m b a t a n t s. Of t h e s e, at least 35,000 are required to guard the line of the D a n u b e, to garrison the principal t o w n s, and to maintain t he c o m m u n i c a t i o n s. T h e re would remain, t h e n, at t he v e ry outside, 55,000 m en for an a t t a ck u p on Kalafat. 5 10 15 20 25 N ow look at t he r e s p e c t i ve positions of the t wo armies. T he R u s s i a ns neglecting t he w h o le line of t he D a n u b e, disregarding t he position of O m er P a s ha at Shumla, direct their m a in b o d y, a nd e v en their h e a vy artillery, to a point on their e x t r e me right, w h e re t h ey are further from B u c h a r e s t, their immediate b a se of o p e r a t i o n s, than the T u r ks are. Their r e ar is therefore as m u ch e x p o s ed as it possibly c an b e. W h at is w o r se still is that, in order to get some slight p r o t e c t i on for their rear, t h ey are obliged to divide their forces, a nd to a p p e ar b e f o re Kalafat with a force which by no m e a ns has that evident superiority w h i c h, by insuring s u c c e s s, might justify s u ch a 30 m a n e u v e r. T h ey leave from thirty to forty per cent, of their a r my scattered behind the main b o d y, and t h e se t r o o ps are certainly n ot capable of repelling a resolute attack. T h u s, neither is t he c o n q u e st of Kalafat a s s u r e d, nor t he c o m m u n i c a t i o ns of the besieging a r my placed o ut of the r e a ch of danger. T he blunder is so evident, so colossal, t h at nothing short of absolute certainty of the fact can m a ke a military m an believe t h at it has b e en committed. 35 If O m er P a s h a, w ho still h as a superior force disposable, p a s s es the D a n u be at any point b e t w e en R u s t c h uk and Hir sova, with say s e v e n ty t h o u s a nd m e n, the Russian a r my m u st either be annihilated to t he last m an or t a ke refuge in Austria. He h as h ad a full m o n th for c o n c e n t r a t i ng such a m a s s. W hy d o es he not cross a river w h i ch is n ow no longer o b s t r u c t ed by floating ice? W hy does he n ot e v en r e t a ke his tête-de-pont at Oltenitza, in order to be able to 40 65 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels m o ve at a ny m o m e n t? T h at O m er P a s ha is ignorant of the c h a n c es t he R u s s i a ns h a ve given h im by their unheard-of blunder is impossible. He m u s t, it w o u ld seem, be tied by diplomatic action. H is inactivity m u st be i n t e n d ed to f o rm an offset against t he naval p r o m e n a de of t he c o m b i n ed fleets in t he B l a ck Sea. T he Russian a r my m u st n ot be annihilated or driven to t a ke refuge in Austria, b e c a u se t h en p e a ce w o u ld be e n d a n g e r ed by fresh complications. A nd in order to suit the intrigues and the sham-action of diplomatic j o b b e r s, O m er P a s ha m u st allow t he Russians to b o m b a rd Kalafat, to place their w h o le a r m y, all their siege artillery at his m e r c y, w i t h o ut his being allowed to profit by t he occasion. It would indeed s e em t h at if t he R u s s i an c o m- m a n d er h ad n ot h ad a material, positive g u a r a n t ee t h at his flanks and r e ar w o u ld n ot be attacked, he w o u ld n e v er h a ve a t t e m p t ed to m a r ch u p on Kalafat. O t h e r w i s e, in spite of all stringent instructions, he would d e s e r ve to be tried at t he d r u m h e ad a nd shot. A nd u n l e s s, by t he steamer n ow d ue h e r e, or at furthest within a few d a y s, we h e ar t h at O m er P a s ha h as c r o s s ed t he D a n u be a nd m a r c h ed u p on Bucharest, it will be scarcely possible to avoid t he conclusion t h at a formal agreement of t he W e s t e rn P o w e rs has b e en m a de to t he effect t h at in order to satisfy t he military point of h o n or of Russia, Kalafat is to be sacrificed without the T u r ks being allowed to defend it by t he only w ay it c an be effectually defended—by an offensive m o v e m e nt lower d o wn the D a n u b e. O ur L o n d on c o r r e s p o n d e nt in a n o t h er column intimates his unwillingness to believe in such t r e a c h e r y, b ut facts are s t u b b o rn things, a nd t he mind m u st at last be affected by their f o r c e. After having g o ne the d e s p e r a te lengths t h ey h a ve a v o w e d ly d o ne to avoid w a r, it is h a rd to think of anything t h ey w o u ld shrink from. 5 10 15 20 25 66 Karl Marx Declaration of the Prussian Cabinet—Napoleon's Plans- Prussia's Policy New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4022, 9. März 1854 T he following information, which, if t r u e, is of t he highest i m p o r t a n c e, a nd a p o r t i on only of w h i ch h as a p p e a r ed in t he E u r o p e an j o u r n a l s, a nd t h at in a partial and disguised form, we h a ve r e c e i v ed from a m o st t r u s t w o r t hy s o u r ce at L o n d o n: 5 I. On the 3d of F e b r u a ry the following declaration on the p a rt of t he Prussian Cabinet w as dispatched to Paris a nd L o n d o n: " 1. T he explanations of C o u nt Orloff leaving no d o u bt w h a t e v er as to t he u s e l e s s n e ss of a ny further a t t e m pt at mediation w i th t he St. P e t e r s b u rg Cabinet, Prussia h e r e by w i t h d r a ws h er mediation, the opportunity for w h i ch c an no longer be said to exist. 10 2. C o u nt Orloff's p r o p o s a ls of a formal a nd binding treaty of neutrality, h a ve met with an absolute refusal, c o m m u n i c a t ed to him in a n o t e, P r u s s ia being decided u p on observing e v en w i t h o ut t he c o n c u r r e n ce of Austria, t he m o st strict neutrality on h er part, w h i ch she is determined to enforce by 15 suitable armaments, as s o on as t he p r o p er m o m e nt shall h a ve arrived. 3. W h e t h er Prussia shall p r o p o s e, in c o m m on w i th Austria, a general arming of t he G e r m an Confederation, will d e p e nd on t he c o n d u ct of t he maritime p o w e rs t o w a rd G e r m a n y ." II. L o u is N a p o l e on h as sent a confidential agent (Mr. Brennier) to Turin, 20 with t he following m e s s a ge for t he K i ng of P i e d m o nt and Mr. C a v o u r: At a given time insurrectionary m o v e m e n ts are to b r e ak o ut in P a r m a, P i a c e n z a, Guastalla, a nd M o d e n a. Sardinia m u st t h en o c c u py t h o se countries, from w h i ch t he n ow reigning princes are to be expelled. N a p o l e on is to g u a r a n t ee to the King the incorporation with Sardinia of t he t h r ee f o r m er principalities, a nd p e r h a ps of M o d e n a, also, in c o m p e n s a t i on for w h i ch territories t he C o u n ty of Savoy is to be c e d ed to F r a n c e. This a r r a n g e m e nt E n g l a nd m ay be said to h a ve as good as agreed t o, although reluctantly and with v e ry b ad grace. Mr. Brennier t h en p r o c e e d ed further on his t o ur t h r o u gh Italy till he r e a c h ed N a p l e s, w h e re his arrival e v o k ed t he " m o st painful sensation." H is 30 mission is t h at of preparing an Italian insurrection, as N a p o l e on is seriously 25 67 Karl Marx 5 c o n v i n c ed that he is the m a n, n ot only to set Italy on fire, b ut also to d r aw the e x a ct line which the flame shall be forbidden to cross. He p r o p o s es to c o n c e n t r a te the following armies: 80,000 m en at Strasburg. 1 — 100,000 m en on the frontier of S a v o y. 2 - 60,000 m en at M e t z. 3 - III. Prussia d o es not object to the assembling of a F r e n ch a r my of 100,000 m en on t he frontier of S a v o y, b ut she considers t he concentration of an a r my at M e t z, and of another at Strasburg, to be a direct m e n a ce against herself. She already fancies B a d e n, H e s s e, W u r t e m b e r g, etc., in full in- surrection a nd s o me 100,000 p e a s a n ts marching from t he south of G e r m a ny on her o wn frontiers. She h a s, therefore, p r o t e s t ed against t h e se t wo m e a s u r e s, and it is this eventuality w h i ch is alluded to in section 3 of the P r u s s i an declaration. At all e v e n t s, Prussia will put h er a r my on a w ar footing by, a nd p e r h a ps before, the end of M a r c h. She intends calling o ut a force of 200,000 to 300,000 m e n, according to c i r c u m s t a n c e s. B ut if N a p o l e on insists on concentrating the two armies at M e tz and Strasburg, t he Prussian G o v e r n m e nt has already resolved to augment its force to 500,000 men. In the Berlin Cabinet, w h e re the King, with the great majority of his Ministers, h ad c h o s en to side with Russia, and Manteuffel alone, b a c k ed by t he Prince of Prussia, carried the declaration of neutrality, (Manteuffel originally p r o p o s ed a for mal alliance with England,) fear and confusion are a s s e r t ed to reign s u p r e m e. T h e re exists already a formal resolution of t he Cabinet (Cabinets-Beschluss) according to which, u n d er certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s, all t he m o re notorious d e m o c r a ts of the m o n a r c h y, and, a b o ve all, of R h e n i sh Prussia, are to be arrested on t he same night, and to be t r a n s p o r t ed to t he e a s t e rn fortresses, in o r d er to p r e v e nt t h em from favoring t he subversive p l a ns of N a p o l e o n, (die Umsturzpläne Napoleons!!) or from getting up p o p u l ar m o v e m e n ts generally. This m e a s u r e, it is p r o p o s e d, shall be e x e c u t ed instantly in the c a se of Italian disorders breaking out, or if N a p o l e on c o n c e n t r a t es t he t wo armies at M e tz and Strasburg. This resolution, we are a s s u r e d, has b e en t a k en unanimously, although all t he eventualities are n ot p r o v i d ed for, u n d er w h i ch the Cabinet might think fit to p ut it into execution. io 15 20 25 30 68 Karl Marx Debates in Parliament New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4022, 9. März 1854 Debates in Parliament. F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. L o n d o n, T u e s d a y, F e b. 2 1, 1854. 5 T he military and naval estimates h a ve b e en laid before Parliament. In t he a r m y, the total n u m b er of m en a s k ed for t he c u r r e nt y e ar is 112,977, an increase u p on last year of 10,694. T he total cost of t he land forces for service at h o me and abroad, for t he y e ar ending on t he 31st of M a r c h, 1855, e x clusively of the Australian Colonies, and of the charge transferred to the E a st India C o m p a n y, is £3,923,288. T he gross total a m o u nt is £4,877,925, w h i ch for 5,719 officers, 9,956 non-commissioned officers, 10 will provide 126,925 r a nk and file. T he naval estimates for t he y e ar ending M a r ch 31,1855, show a total for the effective service, of £5,979,866, an increase u p on last y e ar of £1,172,446. T he charge for t he c o n v e y a n ce of t r o o ps and o r d n a n ce stands £225,050, an increase of £72,100. T he grand total for the y e ar a m o u n ts to £7,487,948. T he force will consist of 41,000 s e a m e n, 2,000 b o y s, 15,500 m a r i n e s; t he total, including 116 m en in t he p a c k et service, 58,616. Mr. L a y a rd h ad given notice t h at he should call attention to t he E a s t e rn question on last F r i d ay evening, a nd he seized u p on t he v e ry m o m e nt w h en t he S p e a k er w as to leave t he Chair, in o r d er t h at t he H o u se might consider the n a vy e s t i m a t e s. Shortly after 4 o'clock all the galleries w e re o v e r c r o w d e d, a nd at 5 o'clock t he H o u se w as full. T wo long h o u r s, to the visible morti fication of t he m e m b e rs a nd t he public, w e re killed w i th indifferent con versation on minor topics. So intensely excited w as the curiosity of t he honorables themselves t h at they delayed dinner till 8 o'clock, to assist at t he opening of t he great debate—a r a re o c c u r r e n ce this in t he parliamentary Ufe of the C o m m o n e r s. Mr. L a y a r d, w h o se s p e e ch w as continually interrupted by c h e e r s, began 15 20 25 69 Karl Marx by stating that t he g o v e r n m e nt h ad placed t h em in so extraordinary a position t h at t h ey w e re at a loss to k n ow h ow they really stood. Before t h ey could v o te t he d e m a n d ed a d v a n c e s, it w as t he duty of t he g o v e r n m e nt to state what their intentions were. B ut b e f o re asking [the] g o v e r n m e nt w h at t h ey w e re a b o ut to d o, he wished to k n o wn what they had already done. He h ad said last year t h at if the g o v e r n m e nt h ad a d o p t ed a t o ne m o re w o r t hy of this c o u n t r y, t h ey w o u ld n ot h a ve b e en plunged into w a r; n o r, after a careful p e r u s al of the voluminous blue b o o ks lately issued, h ad he found c a u se to c h a n ge his opinions. Comparing t he c o n t e n ts of v a r i o us dispatches on var ious sides, he argued that the Ministry h ad overlooked the m o st o b v i o us facts, h ad misunderstood t he m o st u n m i s t a k e a b le t e n d e n c i e s, a nd t r u s t ed to t he m o st evidently fallacious a s s u r a n c e s. Declaring t h at the tragedy of S i n o pe i m p e a c h ed t he h o n or of England, a nd r e q u i r ed ample explanation, he d r ew evidence from the published d o c u m e n ts to show that t he Admirals of the united fleets might h a ve p r e v e n t ed the c a t a s t r o p h e, or that t he T u r ks by t h em selves h a ve averted it, if it had not b e en for t he timorous a nd vacillat ing instructions sent out by t he British g o v e r n m e n t. He inferred from their r e c e nt language t h at t h ey w o u ld still treat on t he basis of the status quo ante bellum, w h i ch p r e s u m ed step he c o n d e m n e d. He called u p on the g o v e r n m e nt to do their d u t y, in the certainty t h at the people of England would do theirs. Sir J a m es G r a h a m, with his notorious effrontery, a n s w e r ed him t h at t h ey m u st either p ut their confidence in Ministers or t u rn t h em out. B ut " m e a n while d o n 't let us potter over blue b o o k s ." T h ey h ad b e en deceived by Russia, w ho w as an old and faithful ally of G r e at Britain, b ut " d a r k, malignant suspicions did n ot easily t a ke r o ot in g e n e r o us m i n d s ." This old fox, Sir R o b e rt Peel's " d i r ty little b o y ," the m u r d e r er of t he B a n d i e r a s, w as quite c h a r m i ng with his " g e n e r o us m i n d" and his " s l o w n e ss to s u s p e c t ." T h en c a me L o rd Jocelyn a nd L o rd D u d l ey Stuart, w h o se s p e e c h es filled t he p a p e rs t he n e xt day, b ut emptied the h o u se on this evening. Mr. R o e b u ck n e xt c o m m e n c ed by defending t he ministers for their c o n d u ct in a delicate situation, b ut e n d ed by declaring t h at it w as n ow time for t he ministry to declare clearly what they intended to do. L o rd J o hn R u s s e l l, on t he p l ea of a n s w e r i ng this question, r o s e, gave an apologetic recapitulation of the history of t he late differences, and w h en he h ad c o n v i n c ed himself t h at this w o u ld n ot d o, feigned to be willing to tell t h em " w h at t h ey intended to d o ;" a thing he himself m ay n ot h a ve b e en quite sure of. A c c o r d i ng to his s t a t e m e nt t h ey h ad entered into s o me vague sort of alliance w i th F r a n c e, n ot by m e a ns of a t r e a ty concluded, b ut of n o t es interchanged. E n g l a nd and F r a n ce w e re n ow proposing to T u r k ey also a sort of t r e a t y, by virtue of w h i ch t he P o r te should n ot sue for p e a ce w i t h o ut their c o n s e n t. T h ey h ad b e en cruelly o v e r c o me by the incredible perfidy of the C z a r. He (Russell) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 70 Debates in Parliament 5 despaired of p e a ce being p r e s e r v e d. T h ey w e re likely to enter on war. He c o n s e q u e n t ly w a n t ed s o me £3,000,000 m o re t h an last year. S e c r e cy w as t he condition of s u c c e ss in w ar a nd t h e r e f o re he could n ot tell t h em j u st n ow w h at t h ey w e re to do in t h at w a r. As t he latter, or theatrical p a rt of his s p e e ch w as p e r f o r m ed w i th g r e at f o r ce a nd w i th m u ch m o r al indignation at t he Czar " t he b u t c h e r ," the applause w as i m m e n s e, a nd t he H o u s e, in then- enthusiasm, w e re on t he point of voting t he estimates, w h en Mr. Disraeli interceded and s u c c e e d ed in adjourning t he discussion to M o n d ay evening. T he d e b a t es w e re r e s u m ed y e s t e r d ay evening a nd only c o n c l u d ed at 10 2 o'clock, A . M. First r o se M r. C o b d e n, promising to confine himself strictly to the practical question in hajid. He t o ok great pains to p r o ve from t he blue b o o k s, w h at w as denied by n o b o d y, that t he F r e n ch G o v e r n m e nt h ad originated "this melancholy d i s p u t e ," by t he mission of Mr. L a v a l e t te respecting t he H o ly Places a nd the c o n c e s s i o ns it w r u ng from the P o r t e. T he F r e n ch President, w h o, at that time, h ad s o me e x p e c t a t i on of b e c o m i ng E m p e r o r, might h a ve h ad some wish to m a ke a little political capital by m a k i ng t h e se d e m a n ds u p on T u r k ey on behalf of t he L a t in Christians. T he first m o v e m e nt of Russia, t h e r e f o r e, w as traceable to t he proceedings of F r a n c e, in this matter. T he non-signature of t he V i e n na n o te h ad b e en t he fault of t he allies, n ot of t he T u r k i sh G o v e r n m e n t, b e c a u s e, if it h ad b e en t h r e a t e n ed w i th the w i t h d r a w al of t he fleet from B e s i ka B a y, t he P o r te w o u ld immediately h a ve signed it. We w e re going to w ar b e c a u se we insisted u p on T u r k ey refusing to do t h at by a n o te to R u s s ia w h i ch we i n t e n d ed to a sk h er to do for ourselves, viz.: to give us a guarantee for the b e t t er t r e a t m e nt of the Christians. T he v a st majority of t he population in t he O t t o m an E m p i re w as looking with e a g e r n e ss to the s u c c e ss of t h at v e ry policy w h i ch R u s s ia w as n ow prosecuting, (as n ow exemplified in Moldo-Wallachia). F r om t he blue b o o ks t h e m s e l v es he could show t h at the evils and o p p r e s s i o ns u n d er w h i ch t h at Christian p o p u l a- tion lived, could n ot be tolerated—referring principally to dispatches of L o rd Clarendon, ostensibly w r i t t en with t he view to m a ke o ut a c a se for the Czar. In o ne of t h e se dispatches L o rd C l a r e n d on w r i t e s: " T he P o r te m u st decide b e t w e en t he m a i n t e n a n ce of an e r r o n e o us religious principle and t he loss of t he s y m p a t hy a nd support of its allies." Mr. C o b d en w as t h e r e f o re enabled to a s k: " W h e t h er the H o u se did think it possible that a population like t he fanatical M u s s u l m an population of T u r k ey w o u ld a b a n d on its religion? A nd w i t h o ut total a b a n d o n m e nt of the law of t he Koran, it w as absolutely impossible to put t he Christians of T u r k ey u p on an equality with t he T u r k s ." We m ay as well a sk M r. C o b d e n, w h e t h er w i th t he existing State C h u r ch a nd laws of England, it is possible to p ut h er w o r k i n g - m en u p on equality w i th the C o b d e ns and the Brights? M r. C o b d en p r o c e e d ed t h en with a view to 15 20 25 30 35 40 71 Karl Marx s h ow from t he letters of L o rd Stratford de Redcliff e a nd t he British Consular agents, t h at t h e re reigns a general dissatisfaction t h r o u gh the Christian population in T u r k ey threatening to e nd in a general insurrection. N o w, let us again a sk Mr. C o b d en w h e t h er t h e re d o es n ot exist a general dis satisfaction with their g o v e r n m e n ts and their ruling classes, a m o ng all p e o- pies of E u r o p e, w h i ch discontent s o on t h r e a t e ns to t e r m i n a te with a general revolution? If G e r m a n y, Italy, F r a n ce or e v en G r e at Britain h ad b e en in v a d e d, like T u r k e y, by a foreign army, hostile to their G o v e r n m e n ts and appealing to their insurrectionary p a s s i o n s, w o u ld a ny of t h e se countries h a ve as long r e m a i n ed quiet, as the Christian population of T u r k ey h a ve d o n e? In entering u p on a w ar in defense of T u r k e y, M r. C o b d en c o n c l u d e s, E n g l a nd w o u ld be fighting for t he domination of t he O t t o m an population of T u r k ey and against t he interest of the great b o dy of t he people of that c o u n t r y. This is merely a religious question b e t w e en t he R u s s i an a r my on t he o ne side and the T u r k i sh on t he other. T he British interests w e re all on t he side of Russia. T he extent pf their t r a de with R u s s ia w as e n o r m o u s. If t he e x p o rt trade to R u s s ia a m o u n t ed to only £2,000,000, this w as b ut the transitory result from Russia still laboring u n d er t he Protectionist delusion. H o w e v er their imports from R u s s ia a m o u n t ed to £13,000,000. With the e x c e p t i on of the U n i t ed States, t h e re w as no o ne foreign c o u n t ry with which their t r a de w as so important as w i th Russia. If E n g l a nd w as going to w a r, w hy w e re t h ey sending land forces to T u r k e y, i n s t e ad of exclusively using their n a v y? If the time had c o me for the c o n t e st b e t w e en C o s s a c k i sm and Republicanism, w hy w e re Prussia, Austria, t he rest of t he G e r m an S t a t e s, Belgium, Holland, S w e d e n, and D e n m a rk remaining neutral, while F r a n ce a nd England h ad to fight single h a n d e d? If this w e re a question of E u r o p e an i m p o r t a n c e, w as it n ot to be supposed that t h o se w ho w e re n e a r e st to t he danger w o u ld be t he first to fight? Mr. C o b d en c o n c l u d ed by declaring t h at " he w as o p p o s ed to the w ar with R u s s i a ." He t h o u g ht " t he b e st thing w as to fall b a ck u p on the V i e n na n o t e ." L o rd J o hn M a n n e rs considered t h at t he G o v e r n m e nt w e re to b l a me for their supineness a nd false security. T he c o m m u n i c a t i o ns originally m a de by L o rd C l a r e n d on to t he G o v e r n m e n ts of Russia, F r a n ce and T u r k e y, in which, i n s t e ad of acting in a c c o r d a n ce with F r a n c e, L o rd C l a r e n d on persisted in refusing so to c o o p e r a t e, a nd m a de k n o wn to the G o v e r n m e nt of R u s s ia that E n g l a nd would not c o o p e r a te with F r a n c e, h ad i n d u c ed t he E m p e r or of t he o r d e rs w h i ch led to t he w h o le R u s s ia to give Prince Menchikoff c a t a s t r o p h e. It w as no w o n d er t h at w h en E n g l a nd at last a n n o u n c ed her intention to interfere actually at Constantinople, t he G o v e r n m e nt of F r a n ce should entertain s o me d o u bt as to t he sincerity of h er M a j e s t y 's G o v e r n m e n t. 72 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Debates in Parliament 5 It w as n ot England t h at advised t he P o r te to reject Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, but, on the c o n t r a r y, t he Ministers of the Sultan acted u p on their o wn responsibility, and w i t h o ut any h o pe of the assistance of England. After t he occupation of the Principalities by t he R u s s i a n s, t he prolonged diplomatic negotiations of the British G o v e r n m e nt h ad b e en v e ry prejudicial to t he interests of T u r k e y, and v e ry serviceable to t h o se of Russia. R u s s ia h ad t a k en possession of the Principalities without a declaration of w a r, in order to p r e v e nt t h o se treaties w h i ch w e re h er real i n s t r u m e n ts of oppression t o w a rd T u r k ey from falling to t he ground. C o n s e q u e n t l y, after T u r k ey h ad declared 10 war, it w as n ot wise to insist u p on t he r e n e w al of t h e se treaties as a basis of negotiation. T he m a in question really in h a nd n ow w a s, w h at w e re t he objects w h i ch t he G o v e r n m e nt c o n t e m p l a t ed in entering u p on this t r e m e n d o us struggle? It w as generally a n n o u n c ed t h at t he h o n or and the i n d e p e n d e n ce of T u r k ey w e re to be m a i n t a i n e d; b ut it w as essential t h at t h e re should be some u n d e r s t a n d i ng of a far m o re specific n a t u re as to w h at w as m e a nt by this a n n o u n c e m e n t. e n d e a v o r ed the 15 to M r. H o r s m an fallacies p r o p o u n d ed by refute Mr. C o b d e n. T he real question w as n ot w h at T u r k ey is, b ut w h at R u s s ia w o u ld b e c o me w i th T u r k ey a b s o r b ed in h er dominions—a question w h e t h er t he E m p e r or w as to be E m p e r or also of T u r k e y? With R u s s ia t h e re w as b ut o ne object recognized, t he a d v a n c e m e nt of t he political p o w er by w a r. H er aim w as territorial aggrandizement. F r om t he m o n s t r o us mendacity of t he first step t a k en in this m a t t er by t he R u s s i an A u t o c r a t, d o wn to the atrocious m a s s a c re of Sinope, his c o u r se h ad b e en o ne of ferocity and fraud, of crimes t h at w o u ld be c o n s p i c u o us e v en in t he annals of Russia, a c o u n t ry w h o se history w as all crime, and w h i ch w e re r e n d e r ed still m o re fearful by t h at b l a s p h e my w h i ch dared to i n v o ke t he Christianity w h o se laws it so flagrantly violated. On the other h a n d, the c o n d u ct of the intended victim h ad b e en admirable. Mr. H o r s m an t h en t o ok great pains to e x c u se t he oscillating c o u r se of the G o v e r n m e nt by t he difficulties w h i ch t h ey found their position s u r r o u n d ed with. H e n ce their diplomatic hesitation. If all the Cabinets of E u r o p e, if t he m o st e x p e r i e n c ed diplomatists h ad b e en engaged in opposition to the A u t o c r a t, it w o u ld h a ve b e en impossible to place him in a position of greater difficulty a nd e m b a r r a s s m e nt a nd from which he could n ot ex- trícate himself w i t h o ut difficulty a nd loss, t h an t h at in w h i ch either by t he blunders of our o wn Ministers or t he adroitness of his o w n, he w as n ow placed. Six m o n t hs ago the E m p e r or N i c h o l as w as t he chief supporter of t he order a nd legitimacy of E u r o p e; n ow he stood forward, u n m a s k ed as t he greatest revolutionist. Foiled in his political intrigues, unsuccessful in the w ar in Asia, a nd well t h r a s h ed by t he T u r ks on t he D a n u b e, t he Czar h ad really s h o wn an alacrity in sinking w h i ch w as quite refreshing. It w as n ow the d u ty 20 25 30 35 40 73 Karl Marx of t he G o v e r n m e n t, if hostilities should c o m m e n c e, to t a ke c a re n ot to secure p e a ce e x c e pt u p on s u ch t e r ms as w o u ld involve ample and certain security against a ny future repetition of similar aggression. He t r u s t ed t h at o ne of the conditions for t he restoration of p e a ce w o u ld be t h at R u s s ia should indemnify T u r k ey for t he e x p e n s es to w h i ch she h ad b e en put, a nd t h at T u r k ey should r e c e i v e, as a material g u a r a n t e e, t he r e s t o r a t i on of territories of w h i ch she h ad b e en deprived. Mr. D r u m m o nd believed that we are going to engage in a religious w a r, a nd are a b o ut to enter into another c r u s a de for t he t o mb of Geoffrey de Bouillon, w h i ch is already so b r o k en t h at it c a n n ot be sat u p o n. It a p p e a rs t h at t he a u t h or of t he mischief from t he v e ry beginning h as b e en t he P o p e. E n g l a nd h ad n ot the least interest in t he T u r k i sh question, a nd a w ar b e t w e en this c o u n t ry a nd R u s s ia could n ot be b r o u g ht to a successful termination, b e c a u se t h ey will fight e a ch other for e v er and n e v er do e a ch other any h a r m. "All t h at y ou will gain in t he p r e s e nt w ar will be h a rd k n o c k s ." Mr. C o b d en h ad s o me time ago offered to c r u m p le R u s s ia u p, a nd if he w o u ld do so n ow it w o u ld s a ve t h em a world of trouble. In fact, t he p r e s e nt dispute w a s, w h e t h er t he milliners should c o me from Paris or from St. P e t e r s b u rg to dress t he idols of t he H o ly Sepulchre. T h ey h ad n ow found o ut t h at T u r k ey w as their ancient ally, a nd quite n e c e s s a ry to the b a l a n ce of p o w er of E u r o p e. H ow in t he w o r ld did it h a p p en t h at t h ey n e v er found t h at out b e f o re t h ey t o ok t he w h o le kingdom of G r e e ce from her, and b e f o re t h ey fought t he battle of N a v a r i n o, which he r e m e m b e r ed L o rd St. H e l e ns having described as a capital battle, only t h at t h ey k n o c k ed d o wn the w r o ng m e n. H ow c a me t h ey n ot to think of this w h en the Russians p a s s ed t he B a l k an a nd w h en t h ey might h a ve given T u r k ey effectual aid by their fleet? B ut n o w, after t h ey h ad r e d u c ed t he O t t o m an E m p i re to t he last stage of d e c r e p i t u d e, t h ey thought to be able to uphold this tottering p o w er on the p r e t e n se of t he b a l a n ce of p o w e r. After s o me sarcastic r e m a r ks on t he s u d d en e n t h u s i a sm for Bona p a r t e, M r. D r u m m o nd asked w ho w as to be Minister of W a r? All of t h em h ad s e en e n o u gh to show t h em t h at t h e re w as a feeble h a nd at t he helm. He did n ot believe t h at the character of a ny general or of a ny admiral w as safe in t he h a n ds of t he p r e s e nt Administration. T h ey w e re capable of sacrificing either to please any faction in the H o u s e. If t h ey w e re d e t e r m i n ed to go to war, t h ey m u st strike their blow at the h e a rt of Russia, a nd n ot go wasting their shots in t he Black Sea. T h ey m u st begin by proclaiming the reëstablish- m e nt of t he kingdom of Poland. A b o ve all, he w a n t ed to be informed w h at the G o v e r n m e nt w as about. " T he h e ad of the G o v e r n m e n t ," said M r. D r u m m o n d, " p r i d es himself on his p o w e rs of c o n c e a l m e n t, a nd stated in another p l a ce t h at he should like to see any o ne e x t r a ct information from him w h i ch he w as n ot inclined to afford. T h at s t a t e m e nt r e m i n d ed h im of a s t o ry which 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 74 Debates in Parliament he h e a rd o n ce in Scotland—a H i g h l a n d m an h ad gone to India, a nd on his r e t u rn to England b r o u g ht h o me a p a r r ot as a p r e s e nt to his wife, w h i ch talked r e m a r k a b ly well. A neighbor, n ot wishing to be o u t d o n e, w e nt to E d i n b u r gh a nd b r o u g ht his wife h o me a large owl. On its being r e m a r k ed to h im t h at the owl could n e v er be taught to s p e a k: ' V e ry t r u e ,' he replied; ' b ut consider the p o w er o' t h o c ht he has in him.' " 5 10 Mr. B u tt stated that this w as the first time since the revolution t h at a Ministry h ad c o me d o wn to t he H o u se a nd a s k ed for a w ar supply without stating distinctly a nd fully t he grounds for such a proposition. In the legal sense of t he w o r d, t h ey w e re not y et at w a r, a nd t he H o u se h ad a right to k n o w, on voting t h e se supplies, w h at w as delaying t he declaration of w ar against Russia? In w h at an equivocal position w as their fleet at t he B l a ck S ea p u t! Admiral D u n d as h ad o r d e rs to send b a ck R u s s i an vessels to a R u s s i an port, and if, in t he e x e c u t i on of t h e se o r d e r s, he d e s t r o y ed a 15 R u s s i an ship, while being at p e a ce w i th Russia, w e re Ministers p r e p a r ed to justify such a state of things? He h o p ed it w o u ld be explained w h e t h er assistance w as to be given u p on t h o se humiliating terms—that T u r k ey w as to place herself in the h a n ds of E n g l a nd a nd F r a n ce in making p e a ce w i th R u s s i a? If that w as to be t he policy of E n g l a n d, t h en Parliament w as n ow called u p on to v o te an additional force, n ot for t he i n d e p e n d e n ce of T u r k e y, b ut for h er subjugation. M r. B u tt b e t r a y ed s o me d o u bt w h e t h er Ministers w e re not merely making a p a r a de of t h o se military p r e p a r a t i o ns for t he p u r p o se of arriving at a dishonorable p e a c e. 20 25 Mr. S. H e r b e r t, the Minister of W a r, m a de t he m o st vulgar and silly s p e e ch t h at could possibly be e x p e c t ed e v en f r om a Coalition Minister at s u ch a m o m e n t o us crisis. T he G o v e r n m e nt w as p l a c ed b e t w e en t wo fires, a nd t h ey could not find any m e a ns of ascertaining w h at opinion t he H o u se itself really entertained u p on the question. T he h o n o r a b le gentlemen opposite had t he advantage of coming to facts; t h ey w e re criticising t he p a s t; b ut t he G o v e r n- 30 m e nt h ad no facts to deal with—they h ad only to speculate as to t he future. T h ey w e re inclined to e m b a rk in this w ar n ot so m u ch for t he p u r p o se of defending T u r k ey as of opposing Russia. This w as all the information t he H o u se could get from p o or Mr. H e r b e r t, " as to t he f u t u r e ." B ut n o; he told t h em something v e ry n e w. " M r. C o b d en i s ," according to Mr. H e r b e r t, " t he representative of t he feeling of t he largest class of t he people of this c o u n t r y ." This assertion being d e n i ed in all p a r ts of t he H o u s e, M r. H e r b e rt p r o c e e ds to state: "If n ot t he largest class, the honorable m e m b er w as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e, at a ny r a t e, of a great portion of the working classes of this c o u n t r y ." P o or Mr. H e r b e r t. It w as quite refreshing to see Mr. Disraeli rise after him, and t h us to h a ve t he b a b b l er supplanted by a real d e b a t e r. 35 40 Mr. Disraeli, alluding to the theatrical declamations with w h i ch L o rd J o hn 75 Karl Marx 5 15 10 Russell h ad terminated his speech on Friday evening, c o m m e n c ed with this s t a t e m e n t: "I h a ve always b e en of opinion t h at any nation, and this o ne in particular, would be m u ch m o re p r e p a r ed and m u ch m o re willing to b e ar the b u r d e ns which a state of warfare m u st induce a nd occasion, if t h ey really k n ew for w h at t h ey w e re going to war, t h an if t h ey should be h u r r i ed into a c o n t e st by inflammatory appeals to t he p a s s i o n s, a nd be carried a w ay by an e x c i t e m e nt w h i ch at t he first m o m e nt might be c o n v e n i e nt to a Minister, b ut w h i ch in a few m o n t hs after would be followed by the inevitable reaction of ignorance, or p e r h a ps ignorance and disaster c o m b i n e d ." T h us it h ad b e en with t he w ar of 1828—29, w h en t h ey t o ok p a rt on t he side of R u s s ia a nd not on t h at of T u r k e y. T he p r e s e nt perplexed position a nd the r e c e nt p r o s t r a te condition of T u r k e y, w e re entirely to be ascribed to the e v e n ts of that w a r, in w h i ch England and F r a n ce w e re united against T u r k e y. At that time t h e re w as n ot a m e m b er of the H o u se w ho really h ad a ny idea w hy t h ey w e nt to w a r, or w h at w as t he object t h ey intended to accomplish, w h en t h ey leveled a blow at the p o w er of T u r k e y. Therefore they m u st clearly c o m p r e h e nd the c a u se and t he object of t he p r e s e nt war. This k n o w l e d ge w as only to be obtained from the blue b o o k s. W h at had b e en the origin of the p r e s e nt state of affairs t h ey must learn from t he w o r ds written in t h e se v e ry dispatches lying on the table. T he policy t h e re developed w as preparing t h at future w h i c h, according to Ministers, alone w as to a b s o rb their attention. He p r o t e s t e d, therefore against the doctrine of Sir J a m es G r a h a m. M r. H e r b e rt h ad j u st p r o t e s t ed against t he reading of isolated pages from t h o se dis p a t c h e s. He h o w e v er could n ot p r o m i se to r e ad t h e se blue b o o ks through to t he H o u s e; yet if t h ey admitted the validity of the right h o n o r a b le gentle- m a n 's objection, this would seem to be the only c o u r se o p en to him. It w as t he received opinion of all t h at w e re well acquainted with t he E a s t e rn q u e s tion, a nd his o wn opinion, that R u s s ia h ad no intention w h a t e v er of forcibly c o n q u e r i ng t he O t t o m an E m p i r e; b ut that, by adroit policy a nd by i m p r o v ed m e a n s, she intended to obtain and to exercise s u ch an influence over the 30 Christian population of the T u r k i sh E m p i r e, t h at she w o u ld obtain all that authority which would h a ve b e en the result of her possessing, p e r h a p s, t he seat of t he Sultan's empire. At the outset of t h e se negotiations C o u nt Nessel r o de himself, in his dispatches dated J a n u a r y, 1853, a nd J u n e, 1853, distinctly a nd explicitly described t he policy of Russia. A s c e n d a n cy to be obtained over t he T u r k i sh E m p i re by exercising a peculiar influence o v er 12,000,000, w ho c o m p o se t he large majority of t he Sultan's subjects. By t he R u s s i an dis p a t c h es a d d r e s s ed to t he British G o v e r n m e n t, n ot merely is t h at policy de fined, b ut the British G o v e r n m e nt is no less candidly informed of t he m o de by w h i ch it is to be accomplished—not by c o n q u e s t, b ut by maintaining treaties t h at exist, a nd by extending t he spirit of t h o se treaties. T h u s, from t he v e ry 25 35 20 40 76 Debates in Parliament 5 10 beginning of this i m p o r t a nt c o n t r o v e r s y, t he b a se of the diplomatic c a m p a i gn w as found in a treaty—the t r e a ty of Kainardji. By t h at t r e a ty t he Christian subjects of the P o r te are p l a c ed u n d er t he especial protection of t he Sultan; a nd Russia, in interpreting t h at treaty, states t h at t he Christian subjects of t he Sultan are placed specially u n d er t he p r o t e c t i on of t he Czar. U n d er t he s a me t r e a ty representations m ay be m a de by R u s s ia in favor of her n ew church—a building in t he street called B ey Oglu—the R u s s i an interpretation of t h at article of t he t r e a ty is, t h at R u s s ia h as the p o w er of interfering in favor of e v e ry c h u r ch of the G r e ek d e n o m i n a t i o n, a n d, of c o u r s e, in favor of all the communities of t h at faith in t he Sultan's dominions, w ho h a p p en to be the large majority of his subjects. This w as t he a v o w ed Russian interpre tation of t he treaty of Kainardji. On t he other hand t h ey might s e e, from a dispatch of the 8th of J a n u a r y, 1853, from Sir H a m i l t on S e y m o u r, t h at C o u nt N e s s e l r o de informed Sir Hamilton, w ho informed L o rd Clarendon, " t h at it 15 w as n e c e s s a ry t h at t he diplomacy of R u s s ia should be supported by a d e m o n stration of f o r c e ." According to this s a me dispatch, C o u nt N e s s e l r o d e 's belief that this question w o u ld be b r o u g ht to a satisfactory conclusion, r e s t ed u p on the " e x e r t i o ns w h i ch w e re to be m a de by H er M a j e s t y 's Ministers at Paris and C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ." Russia, t h e n, at o n ce declared that t he d e m o n- stration of force w as only a d e m o n s t r a t i o n; b ut t h at t he object w as to be peaceably attained by t he exertions of the English Ministers at Paris and Constantinople. " N o w, Sir," continued Mr. Disraeli, "I w a nt to k n o w, with that object e x p r e s s e d, with those m e a ns detailed, and w i th t h at diplomacy to deal with, h ow t he Ministers e n c o u n t e r ed s u ch a c o m b i n a t i o n ?" It w as u n n e c e s s a ry to t o u ch on the question of t he H o ly P l a c e s. T h at w a s, in fact, soon settled at Constantinople. E v en C o u nt N e s s e l r o d e, at a v e ry early period of t h e se negotiations, e x p r e s s ed his surprise and satisfaction, and stated his a c k n o w l e d g m e nt of t he conciliatory spirit of F r a n c e. B ut all t h at time the forces of Russia w e re accumulating on the T u r k i sh frontiers, a nd all that time C o u nt N e s s e l r o de w as telling L o rd Clarendon t h at his G o v e r n m e nt would ask an equivalent for the privileges w h i ch t he G r e ek C h u r ch h ad lost at Jerusalem, b ut in t he settlement of which his G o v e r n m e nt h ad not b e en disturbed. E v en the mission of Prince Menchikoff w as mentioned at t h at time, as p r o v ed by various d i s p a t c h es from Sir Hamilton S e y m o u r. L o rd J o hn Russell had told t h em t he other night t h at t he c o n d u ct of C o u nt N e s s e l r o de w as fraudulent. On t he other h a nd L o rd J o hn Russell confessed himself that C o u nt N e s s e l r o de k e pt saying t h at his Imperial m a s t er w o u ld ask an equivalent for t he G r e ek C h u r c h; b ut on t he other he complained t h at C o u nt N e s s e l r o de never told t h em w h at he w a n t e d. " W i c k ed C o u nt N e s s e l r o de ! ( L a u g t h e r .) F r a u d u l e nt duplicity of R u s s i an s t a t e s m e n! ( L a u g h t e r .) W hy could the noble L o rd n ot find the information he w a n t e d? W hy is Sir Hamil- 20 25 30 35 40 77 Karl Marx t on S e y m o ur at St. Petersburg, if he is n ot to a sk for t he information t h at is d e s i r e d ?" If C o u nt N e s s e l r o de n e v er told Mm w h at he w a n t e d, it w as b e c a u se t he noble L o rd n e v er dared to ask. At this stage of t he proceedings it w as t he d u ty of the Ministers to p ut categorical q u e s t i o ns to t he Cabinet of St. Petersburg. If t h ey could n ot define w h at t h ey w a n t e d, t h en it w as time to declare that the friendly offices of t he British G o v e r n m e nt at Paris a nd Constantinople w e re to cease. W h en L o rd J o hn Russell h ad relinquished t he seals of office, and w as followed by L o rd C l a r e n d o n, t h e re w as a different c h a r a c t er in t he diplomatic proceedings—a bias in favor of Russia. W h en L o rd C l a r e n d on w as m a de Minister of Foreign Affairs he h ad to d r aw up instructions for L o rd Stratford de Redcliffe, t he Q u e e n 's E m b a s s a d o r, r e pairing to the seat of action. N ow w h at w e re t h e se instructions? At the m o m e nt of her u t m o st need and her u t m o st exigency, T u r k ey is lectured a b o ut internal reform and commercial reform. It is intimated to her t h at the c o n d u ct of t he P o r te must be distinguished by t he u t m o st m o d e r a t i on a nd p r u d e n c e, viz: that it m u st comply with the d e m a n ds of Russia. M e a n w h i le t he G o v e r n m e nt continued not to d e m a nd an explicit explanation of w h at w as m e a nt on t he p a rt of Russia. Prince Menchikoff arrived at C o n stantinople. After having received m o st agitating missives from Col. R o s e, a nd w a r n i ng dispatches from Sir H a m i l t on S e y m o u r, L o rd C l a r e n d on in a letter to L o rd Cowley, t he British E m b a s s a d or at P a r i s, d e n o u n c ed Colonel R o s e 's order in calling up t he British fleet, regretted t he order given to t he F r e n ch Admiral to sail to t he G r e ek w a t e r s, favoring F r a n ce with c o n t e m p t u o us d o g m a, " t h at a policy of suspicion is neither wise nor s a f e ," a nd declared he placed full reliance on t he E m p e r or of R u s s i a 's solemn a s s u r a n c es t h at he w o u ld uphold t he T u r k i sh E m p i r e. T h en L o rd C l a r e n d on writes to his E m b a s s a d or at Constantinople, t h at he feels quite sure t h at t he objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, " w h a t e v er t h ey m ay b e, do n ot e x p o se to danger t he authority of t he Sultan, or t he integrity of his domin i o n s ." A y e! L o rd Clarendon w e nt o ut of his w ay to a c c u se their solitary ally in E u r o p e, a nd stated t h at their only g r o u n ds for n ow a p p r e h e n d i ng e m b a r r a s s m e nt in t he E a s t, w as the position for s o me time o c c u p i ed by F r a n ce with r e s p e ct to t he H o ly Places. Accordingly C o u nt N e s s e h o de c o m plimented L o rd A b e r d e en u p on t he b e au rôle (translated in t he blue b o ok "important role, ") t h at he h ad played, by h a v i ng left F r a n ce "isolée. " On t he 1 st of April, Colonel R o se informed this c o u n t ry of the secret convention w h i ch R u s s ia d e m a n d ed from T u r k e y. Only t en d a ys after L o rd Stratford arrived at Constantinople and confirmed e v e ry thing that Colonel R o se h ad stated. After all this, on the 16th of May, L o rd C l a r e n d on writes to Sir H . S e y m o u r, " t h at the explanations offered by t he E m p e r or of R u s s i a ," explanations n ot contained in t he blue b o o k s, " h ad e n a b l ed t h em to disre- 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 78 Debates in Parliament gard, instead of sharing in t he a p p r e h e n s i o ns w h i ch t he proceedings of Prince Menchikoff coupled with t he military p r e p a r a t i o ns in t he s o u th of R u s s ia h ad n ot unnaturally p r o d u c ed t h r o u g h o ut E u r o p e ." After this C o u nt N e s s e l r o de felt free to a n n o u n ce to L o rd C l a r e n d o n, on t he 20th of J u n e, t h at t h ey h ad occupied the Principalities. In t h at d o c u m e nt C o u nt N e s s e l r o de states " t h at t he E m p e r or will o c c u py t he P r o v i n c es as a deposit until satisfaction; t h at in acting as he h as d o n e, he h as r e m a i n ed faithful to his declarations to t he English G o v e r n m e n t; t h at in c o m m u n i c a t i ng w i th t he Cabinet of L o n d on as to t he military p r e p a r a t i o ns coincident w i th the opening of negotiations, he did n ot c o n c e al from it t h at t he t i me might y et c o me w h en he should be obliged to h a ve r e c o u r se to t h e m, complimenting the English G o v e r n m e nt on t he friendly intentions it h ad s h o w n; contrasting its c o n d u ct with t h at of F r a n c e, and laying all the b l a me of P r i n ce Menchikoff's s u b s e q u e nt failures on L o rd S t r a t f o r d ." After all this, on t he 4th of July, L o rd C l a r e n d on writes a circular, in w h i ch he still h o p es in t he justice and m o d e r a t i on of t he E m p e r o r, referring to t he E m p e r o r 's r e p e a t ed declaration t h at he w o u ld r e s p e ct the integrity of t he T u r k i sh E m p i r e. On t he 28th of July he writes to L o rd Stratford, t h at " F r a n ce a nd E n g l a n d, if t h ey set to w o rk in earnest, might certainly cripple Russia, b ut T u r k ey m e a n w h i le might be irretrievably ruined, a nd peaceful negotiations are t he only c o u r se to p u r s u e ." W h y? If t h at w as a good a r g u m e nt t h e n, it is a good a r g u m e nt n o w. E i t h er t he G o v e r n m e nt w e re influenced by a degree of confidence w h i ch a s s u m ed a morbid character of credulity, or t h ey w e re influenced by c o n n i v a n c e. T he c a u se of t he w ar h ad b e en t he c o n d u ct of t he negotiations during t he last seven m o n t hs u p on the p a rt of h er M a j e s t y 's G o v e r n m e n t. If t h ey h ad b e en influenced by credulity, Russia, by h er perfidious c o n d u c t, m ay h a ve p r e cipitated a struggle which, p e r h a p s, will be inevitable, a nd a struggle w h i ch might secure t he i n d e p e n d e n ce of E u r o p e, t he safety of England, and t he safety of civilization. If their c o n d u ct h ad b e en suggested by c o n n i v a n c e, a t i m o r o us war, a vacillating w a r, a w ar w i th no results, or rather with t he e x a ct results w h i ch w e re originally intended. On t he 25th of April L o rd C l a r e n d on h ad m a de t he false s t a t e m e nt in t he H o u se of L o r ds t h at t he Menchikoff mission w as to arrange d i s p u t es w i th r e s p e ct to t he H o ly Places, although he k n ew t he c o n t r a ry to be t r u e. Mr. Disraeli n e xt briefly t r a c ed t he history of the V i e n na n o te to show the u t t er imbecility of the Ministry or their c o n n i v a n ce with t he C o u rt of St. P e t e r s b u r g. He c a me t h en to t he third period, t he period of t he interval t h at t o ok p l a ce b e t w e en t he failure of t he V i e n na n o te a nd t he battle of S i n o p e. At t h at t i me Mr. Gladstone, t he Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r, s p o ke in a public a s s e m b ly in t he m o st d e p r e ciating t o ne with r e s p e ct to T u r k e y. A nd so did t he semi-official p a p e r s. W h at c h a n g ed t he a s p e ct a nd fortunes of T u r k e y, a nd gave a n ew t o ne to the 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 co 79 Karl Marx Cabinet, w as t he energies of t he T u r ks t h e m s e l v e s. B ut no sooner w as t he battle of Oltenitza fought t h an the policy of credulity, or the policy of c o n n i v a n c e, w as at its dirty w o rk again. H o w e v e r, t he slaughter of Sinope o p e r a t ed again in t he favor of the T u r k s. T he fleets w e re o r d e r ed to enter t he B l a ck Sea. B ut w h at did t h ey d o? R e t u rn to t he B o s p h o r u s! As to the future, L o rd J o hn Russell h ad b e en v e ry v a g ue in t he description of t he conditions of their alliance with F r a n c e. Mr. Disraeli disclaimed confounding t he m a i n t e n a n ce of the b a l a n ce of p o w er with t he m a i n t e n a n ce of the p r e s e nt territorial distribution of E u r o p e. T he future of Italy mainly d e p e n d ed u p on t he appreciation of that truth. After M r. Disraeli's splendid speech, of w h i ch I h a v e, of c o u r s e, only given t he outlines, L o rd Palmerston rose and m a de a c o m p l e te failure. He r e p e a t ed p a rt of t he s p e e ch he had m a de at the close of the last session, defended in a v e ry inconclusive m a n n er the ministerial policy, and w as anxiously cau tious n ot to d r op o ne w o rd of n ew information. On the motion of Sir J. G r a h am certain v o t es for the N a vy estimates w e re t h en agreed to without discussion. After all, the m o st curious feature of t h e se agitated d e b a t es is, t h at the H o u se completely failed in wresting from t he Ministers either a formal declaration of w ar with Russia, or a description of the objects for which t h ey are to plunge into war. T he H o u se and the public k n ow no m o re t h an t h ey k n ew already. T h ey h a ve got no n ew information at all. 5 10 15 20 Karl M a r x. 80 Karl Marx Parliamentary Debates of February 22— Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch— The Policy of the Western Powers New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4025, 13. März 1854 L o n d o n, F r i d a y, F e b. 24, 1854. A good deal of idle talk a b o ut K o s s u t h 's "warlike p r e p a r a t i o n s" and p r o b a b le " m o v e m e n t s" has infested t he public p r e s s. N ow I h a p p en to k n ow from a Polish officer, w ho is setting o ut for Constantinople, and consulted t he e x - G o v e r n or about t he c o u r se he should t a k e, t h at K o s s u th dissuaded h im from leaving L o n d o n, and e x p r e s s ed himself by no m e a ns favorable to t he participation of Hungarian a nd Polish officers in t he p r e s e nt T u r k i sh war, b e c a u se they m u st either enlist t h e m s e l v es u n d er t he b a n n er of C z a r t o r y s ky or abjure their Christian faith, the o ne step being contradictory to his policy and the other to his principles. 5 10 15 So d e ep w as the impression p r o d u c ed by M r. Disraeli's masterly e x p o s u re of the Ministerial policy t h at t he Cabinet of all t he talents thought fit to m a ke a p o s t h u m o us attempt to b u r ke him in a little c o m e dy arranged b e t w e en t h e m s e l v es a nd Mr. H u m e, a nd p e r f o r m ed in W e d n e s d ay morning's sitting of the C o m m o n s. L o rd P a l m e r s t on h ad c o n c l u d ed his l a me reply to M r. D i s raeli's epigrammatic alternative of a morbid " c r e d u l i t y" or a t r e a c h e r o us " c o n n i v a n c e" by appealing from faction to the impartial j u d g m e nt of t he country, a nd Mr. H u me w as t he m an c h o s en to a n s w er in t he n a me of t he country, just as Snug, the joiner, w as c h o s en to play the lion's part in " T he 20 most cruel d e a th of P y r a m us a nd T h i s b e ." Mr. H u m e 's whole Parliamentary life has b e en spent in making opposition pleasant, moving a m e n d m e n t s, in order to withdraw t h em afterward—constituting, in fact, t he so-called inde p e n d e nt opposition, the rear-guard of e v e ry W h ig Ministry, sure of coming forward to r e s c ue it from danger w h e n e v er its o wn registered partisans m ay show any signs of vacillation. He is t he great P a r l i a m e n t a ry " e x t i n g u i s h e r" p ar excellence. He is not only t he oldest m e m b er of Parliament, b ut an i n d e p e n d e nt m e m b e r; and n ot only an i n d e p e n d e n t, b ut a radical; and n ot only a radical, b ut t he pedantic a nd n o t o r i o us C e r b e r us of t he public p u r s e, with the mission of making p o u n ds slip unnoticed by while picking quarrels a b o ut t he fractional part of a farthing. F or t he first time in his Parliamentary life, as he himself emphatically stated, M r. H u me r o se n ot to c o n d e m n, b ut 25 30 81 Karl Marx 1 to e x p r e ss his approval of t he " E s t i m a t e s ." This e x t r a o r d i n a ry e v e n t, as he did n ot fail to r e m a rk himself, w as t he m o st incontestable proof t h at t he Mi nistry h ad n ot in vain appealed to the s o u nd j u d g m e nt of the c o u n t ry from t he u n m e r i t ed slanders of faction, b ut h ad received a s o l e mn acquittal from the c h a r ge of credulity a nd c o n n i v a n c e. His a r g u m e n ts w e re characteristic. In o r d er to r e s c ue the Ministers from the alternative of credulity or c o n n i v a n c e, he p r o v ed t he credulity of t he Ministers in their t r a n s a c t i o ns with Russia. He h a d, t h e n, u n d e r s t o od the t r ue sense of L o rd P a l m e r s t o n 's appeal. All t he Ministry a s k ed for w as t he discharge from intentional t r e a s o n. As to credulity, h ad n ot that excellent Sir J a m es G r a h am already declared that "a g e n e r o us mind is slow to s u s p e c t ?" B e c a u se t he impending w ar w as brought a b o ut by the Ministry's o wn diplomatic m i s m a n a g e m e n t, certainly it w as a w ar of their o w n, a nd they, therefore, w e r e, of all m e n, as Mr. H u me thought, the v e ry m en to c a r ry it curiningly. T he relative littleness of t he p r o p o s ed w ar estimates w a s, in M r. H u m e 's opinion, t he m o st convincing proof of t he greatness of t h a n k ed Mr. H u me for t he sentence Mr. H u me h ad p r o n o u n c ed in t he n a me of t he c o u n t r y, a n d, in c o m p e n s a t i o n, f a v o r ed h is a u d i e n ce w i th his o wn doctrine of state p a p e r s, which p a p e r s, according to him, m u st n e v er be laid before t he H o u se a nd the c o u n t r y, until m a t t e rs are sufficiently embroiled to deprive their publication of any u se w h a t e v e r. S u ch w as all t he after-wit t he coalition h ad to dispose of after d ue deliberation. L o rd P a l m e r s t o n, their m a n a g e r, h ad n ot only to w e a k en t he impression of their antagonist's s p e e c h, b ut to annihilate also his o wn theatrical appeal from the H o u se to t he c o u n t r y. intended. L o rd P a l m e r s t o n, of c o u r s e, t he w ar On T u e s d ay night, Mr. Horsfall, t he M e m b er for L i v e r p o o l, a s k ed t he q u e s t i o n: " W h e t h er the treaties with foreign nations or the steps w h i ch h er M a j e s t y 's G o v e r n m e nt w e re p r e p a r ed to t a ke in t he e v e nt of w ar w e re s u ch as w o u ld effectually p r e v e nt privateers being fitted o ut in neutral p o r ts to interfere with British shipping?" T he a n s w er given by L o rd P a l m e r s t on w a s: " T h at the honorable gentleman and t he H o u se m u st feel t h at this w as a q u e s t i on to which, in the p r e s e nt state of things, no e x p l a n a t o ry a n s w er could be g i v e n ." In quoting this a n s w er of its m a s t e r, The Morning Post, P a l m e r s t o n 's private Moniteur, r e m a r k s: " T he noble lord could h a ve given no o t h er a n s w er (whatever knowledge the G o v e r n m e nt m ay p o s s e ss on t he subject) w i t h o ut entering u p on t he discussion of a m o st delicate a nd difficult topic, w h i ch m a y, at the p r e s e nt m o m e n t, form t he subject of negotiations, a nd w h i c h, to be b r o u g ht to a satisfactory issue, should be left to t he s p o n t a n e o us sense of justice of t h o se p o w e rs w ho h a ve no desire to r e v i ve in this civilized age a s y s t em of legalized p i r a c y ." 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 On the o ne h a n d, the P a l m e r s t on o r g an d e c l a r es the "difficult t o p i c" to form t he subject of pending negotiations, a nd on t he other, t he necessity of 40 82 Parliamentary Debates of February 22—Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch 5 10 15 20 leaving it to the " s p o n t a n e o us sense of j u s t i c e" of t he interested p o w e r s. If t he m u ch b o a s t ed t r e a ty of neutrality with D e n m a rk and S w e d en w as n ot dictated by the St. P e t e r s b u rg Cabinet, it m u s t, of c o u r s e, h a ve forbidden privateers being fitted out in their p o r t s; but, in fact, t he whole question c an only be u n d e r s t o od to refer to t he U n i t ed States of A m e r i c a, as the Baltic is to be occupied by English line-of-battle ships, a nd Holland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and t he Italian p o r ts on t he M e d i t e r r a n e a n, are completely in t he h a n ds of England a nd F r a n c e. N o w, w h at is in t he opinion of t he St. P e t e r s b u rg Cabinet as to the p a rt to be p e r f o r m ed by t he U n i t ed States in t he case t he T u r k i sh w ar should lead to a w ar b e t w e en E n g l a nd a nd R u s s i a? We m ay answer this q u e s t i on authentically from a dispatch a d d r e s s ed by P o z zo di Borgo to C o u nt N e s s e l r o de in t he a u t u mn of 1825. At that time R u s s ia had resolved u p on invading T u r k e y. As n ow she p r o p o s ed to begin by a pacific o c c u p a t i on of t he Principalities. " In supposing t he a d o p t i on of this p l a n ," says P o z zo di B o r g o, " it w o u ld be requisite to enter into e x planations with t he P o r te in t he m o st m e a s u r ed t e r m s, and to a s s u re it t h at if it did n ot wish to precipitate itself into a w a r, t he E m p e r or w as willing to t e r m i n a te t h e se differences by conciliation." After having e n u m e r a t ed all t he steps they would be obliged to t a k e, P o z zo di Borgo continues as follows: "It would be advisable to communicate all these acts to the United States of America as an evidence of the regard of the Imperial Cabinet, and of the importance which it attaches to enlightening its opinion and even obtaining its suffrage. " In case of E n g l a n d 's siding w i th T u r k ey and undertaking a w ar with Russia, P o z zo di B o r go r e m a r ks that, " in blockading o ur p o r ts t h ey 25 (England) w o u ld e x e r c i se their pretended maritime rights in respect to neutrals. This the United States would not suffer! thence would arìse bitter dissensions and dangerous situations." N o w, as the R u s s i an historian K a r a m s in justly r e m a r ks that " n o t h i ng changes in our (Russian) external p o l i c y ," we are justified in presuming t h a t, at the p r e s e nt m o m e n t, and p e r h a ps as long ago as F e b r u a r y, 1853, R u s s ia h as " c o m m u n i c a t ed all h er a c ts to t he U n i t ed S t a t e s ," a nd d o ne h er b e st to cajole the W a s h i n g t on Cabinet into at least a n e u t r al attitude. At the s a me time, in t he c a se of a w ar with E n g l a n d, she b a s es her h o p es u p on e v e n t u al quarrels a b o ut the " m a r i t i me rights of t he n e u t r a l s" producing "bitter dis- sensions a nd d a n g e r o us situations," a nd involving t he U n i t ed States in a m o re or less a v o w ed alliance w i th St. P e t e r s b u r g. As I am quoting t he m o st celebrated of P o z zo di B o r g o 's d i s p a t c h e s, I m ay as well cite t he passage respecting Austria, t he c o n t e n ts of which h a ve certainly lost nothing of their actuality by t he e v e n ts t h at h a ve p a s s ed since 1825, in Galicia, Italy, a nd H u n g a r y. 30 35 40 " O ur p o l i c y ," says P o z z o, " c o m m a n ds t h at we shall show ourselves to this 83 Karl Marx State u n d er a terrible aspect, a nd by our p r e p a r a t i o ns to p e r s u a de it t h a t, if it m a k es m o v e m e n ts against u s, the fiercest of storms that it has yet to bear, will burst upon its head. E i t h er Prince M e t t e r n i ch will declare to t he T u r ks t h at o ur e n t ry into the Principalities is a resolution that t h ey themselves h a ve p r o v o k e d, or he will t h r ow himself on other provinces of the Ottoman Empire 5 m o re to his c o n v e n i e n c e. In the first c a se we will be agreed, in the second we will become so. T he only c h a n ce t h at we h a ve to r un is t h at of an o p en declaration against u s. If Prince Metternich is wise he will avoid w a r; if he is violent, he will be punished. W i th a ministry p l a c ed in a situation s u ch as his, a cabinet such as o u r s, will find in e v e n ts a t h o u s a nd w a ys of terminating differences." 10 L o rd J o h n 's stump-oratory, the beating of big d r u ms a b o ut English honor, t he show of great moral indignation at R u s s i an perfidy, t he vision of Eng l a n d 's floating batteries defiling along the walls of Sevastopol a nd C r o n s t a d t, t he t u m u lt of a r ms and the ostentatious e m b a r k a t i on of t r o o p s, all t h e se d r a m a t ic incidents quite bewilder the public u n d e r s t a n d i n g, a nd raise a mist b e f o re its e y e s, w h i ch allowed it to see nothing save its o wn delusions. C an t h e re exist a greater delusion t h an believing this Ministry, after t he revela tions m a de by the blue b o o k s, to h a ve b e en all at o n ce t r a n s f o r m ed n ot only into a warlike Ministry, b ut into a Ministry t h at could u n d e r t a ke any w ar against R u s s ia e x c e pt a simulated o n e, or o ne carried on in the v e ry interest of t he e n e my against w h om it is ostensibly directed? L et us look at the c i r c u m s t a n c es u n d er which the warlike p r e p a r a t i o ns are m a d e. No formal declaration of w ar is m a de against Russia. T he v e ry object of t he w ar t he Ministry is n ot able to a v o w. T r o o ps a re e m b a r k ed without t he place of their destination being distinctly described. T he estimates asked for are t oo small for a great w ar and too great for a small o n e. T he coalition, w ho h a ve g r o wn notorious for ingenuity displayed in hatching p r e t e x ts for not keeping their most solemn promises a nd r e a s o ns for delaying t he m o st urgent r e f o r m s, all at o n ce feel t h e m s e l v es b o u nd by o v e r s c r u p u l o us adher- e n ee to pledges rashly given to complicate this m o m e n t o us crisis by surpris ing the c o u n t ry with a n ew reform bill, d e e m ed i n o p p o r t u ne by the m o st a r d e nt r e f o r m e r s, imposed by no p r e s s u re from without, and received on all sides w i th the u t m o st indifference and suspicion. W h at t h en can be their plan b ut to divert public attention from their external policy by getting up a subject of overwhelming domestic interest? T r a n s p a r e nt efforts are n ow m a de to misguide the public as to t he situation of E n g l a nd in r e s p e ct to foreign States. No binding t r e a ty h as y et b e en c o n c l u d ed with F r a n c e, b ut a substitute has b e en p r o v i d ed by " n o t es ex c h a n g e d ." N o w, such n o t es w e re e x c h a n g ed in 1839, with t he cabinet of L o u is Philippe, by virtue of w h i ch the allied fleets w e re to enter the D a r d a- 15 20 25 30 35 40 84 Parliamentary Debates of February 22—Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch 5 10 nelles, and to arrest t he intervention of R u s s ia in t he affairs of t he E a s t, either singly or collectively w i th o t h er p o w e r s, a nd we all k n ow w h at c a me o ut of the n o t es e x c h a n g ed then—a H o ly Alliance against F r a n ce and t he T r e a ty of the Dardanelles. T he sincerity a nd the e a r n e s t n e ss of the A n g l o - F r e n ch alliance may be inferred from a Parliamentary incident in y e s t e r d a y 's sitting of the C o m m o n s. B o n a p a r t e, as y ou h a ve s e en in t he Moniteur, t h r e a t e ns the G r e ek insurrectionists, a nd h as sent a similar r e m o n s t r a n ce to t he G o v e r n m e nt of King O t h o. Sir J. W a l sh having interrogated the Ministry on this point, L o rd J o hn Russell declared t h at " he w as a w a re of no u n d e r s t a n d- ing b e t w e en the F r e n ch and English G o v e r n m e n ts in t he matter alluded t o, and h ad n ot b e en able to see t he Minister of Foreign Affairs on t he subject. His impression w a s, h o w e v e r, t h at no such r e m o n s t r a n ce had b e en sent by t he G o v e r n m e nt of F r a n c e, a nd certainly n ot with t he c o n s e nt of, or in c o n c e rt with, the G o v e r n m e nt of this c o u n t r y ." 15 If t he British G o v e r n m e nt intend a real w ar with R u s s ia w hy do t h ey anxiously e s c h ew the international f o r ms of declaring w a r? If t h ey intend a real alliance with F r a n c e, w hy do t h ey studiously s h un the legalized f o r ms of international alliances? As to t he G e r m an p o w e r s, Sir J a m es G r a h am declares t h at t h ey h a ve entered an alliance w i th E n g l a n d, and L o rd J o hn 20 Russell on t he same evening contradicts him, stating that t he relations with t h o se p o w e rs are in fact t he same as at t he beginning of the E a s t e rn c o m plication. According to t he v e ry s t a t e m e nt of the ministers, t h ey are just n ow a b o ut coming to t e r ms with T u r k ey and proposing a t r e a ty w i th her. T h ey are embarking t r o o p s, with a view to occupying Constantinople, without having b e f o r e h a nd concluded a t r e a ty w i th T u r k e y. We a r e, t h e n, n ot to be surprised at learning from a Constantinople letter t h at a secret agent of t he Porte h as b e en sent from V i e n na to St. P e t e r s b u rg to p r o p o se to the Czar a private settlement. " It would be rational," says t he c o r r e s p o n d e n t, " t h at t he T u r k s, after discovering t he t r e a c h e ry a nd folly of their p r e t e n d ed friends should seek to avenge t h e m s e l v es by contracting an alliance with a wise e n e m y. T he t e r ms of settlement, t he former are e n d e a v o r i ng to settle on T u r k e y, are t en times m o re ruinous t h an t he Menchikoff c l a i m s ." T he p r o s p e ct of w h at the e m b a r k ed t r o o ps a re intended to d o, at least in t he opinion of t he English Ministry, m ay be justly inferred from w h at t he united s q u a d r o ns h a ve d o ne and are doing at the p r e s e nt m o m e n t. T w e n ty d a ys after having e n t e r ed t he B l a ck S ea t h ey r e t u rn to t he B o s p h o r u s. A f ew d a ys previous, we are informed, " t he Ministers of the P o r t e, o ut of deference for t he r e m o n s t r a n c es of t he British E m b a s s a d o r, h ad to put in prison t he editor of the G r e ek j o u r n a l, The Telegraph of the Bosphorus, for having said in his paper that b o th t he English a nd F r e n ch fleets w o u ld shortly r e t u rn from t he E u x i ne to t he B o s p h o r u s. T he E d i t or of t he Journal of Constantinople 25 30 35 40 85 Karl Marx w as authorized to declare t h at b o th f l e e ts w e re to c o n t i n ue their stay in t he E u x i n e ." In order to show his deference for t he intimation received from t he British a nd F r e n ch Admirals, t he R u s s i an Admiral, on t he 19th ult., sent o ut t wo steamers to b o m b a rd the T u r ks at Shefketil, and R u s s i an s t e a m e rs cruise in sight of Trebizond, while no vessels belonging to t he united squad- r o ns are in the Black Sea, e x c e pt an English a nd a F r e n ch steamer, off S e v a s t o p o l; Sinope, t h e n, and t he b o m b a r d m e nt of Shefketil by R u s s i an s t e a m e r s, are the only feats the united s q u a d r o ns h a ve to b o a st of. T he q u a r r el b e t w e en t he E m b a s s a d o rs a nd t he Admirals all relations b e t w e en w h om h a ve c o me to a dead stand—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe refusing to r e c e i ve Admiral D u n d as and Baraguay d'Hilliers excluding from a state ball t he F r e n ch Admiral and his officers—this quarrel is of minor i m p o r t a n c e, as t he diplomatic triflers being c o m p r o m i s ed by t he publication of their dis p a t c h es at L o n d on and Paris, m ay strive to r e s c u e, at a ny risk of ships and c r e w s, their lost reputation. 5 10 15 B ut t he serious side of the question is, t h at t he public instructions given to t he E m b a s s a d o rs w e re c o u n t e r m a n d ed by a set of secret instructions f o r w a r d ed to the Admirals, and t h at the latter are really incapable of execut ing instructions which are self-contradictory—and h ow could t h ey be other w i s e, no declaration of w ar having p r e c e d ed t h e m? On t he o ne h a nd t h ey are o r d e r ed to attack Russian ships in order to enforce their withdrawal from the E u x i ne to Sevastopol, and on the other, n ot to s w e r ve from t he m e re if a serious w ar be intended, h ow could t he British defensive. Lastly, E m b a s s a d or at Constantinople h a ve regarded it as an important t r i u m ph to h a ve got t he leader of t he w ar p a r ty in t he T u r k i sh ministry—Mehemed Ali Pasha—turned o ut of his office as W ar Minister, having him replaced by t he peace-mongering R i za P a s h a, while he intrusted M e h e m et P a s h a, a c r e a t u re of Reshid P a s h a, with the office of G r a nd A d m i r a l? N ow look at another m o st important point. T he e m b a r k a t i on of the British a nd F r e n ch t r o o ps is only p r o c e e d ed with after t he n e ws of a G r e ek in- surrection having b r o k en out in Albania, and being spread over T h e s s a ly and M a c e d o n i a, h as r e a c h ed L o n d on and Paris. This insurrection w as from the first anxiously waited for on the p a rt of the English Cabinet, as is p r o v ed by t he dispatches of Russell, Clarendon and L o rd Stratford de Redcliffe. It gives t h em the b e st occasion to interfere b e t w e en the Sultan a nd his o wn Christian subjects on t he plea of interfering b e t w e en t he Russians a nd the T u r k s. F r om the m o m e nt that the Latins interfere w i th the G r e e ks (I u se this w o rd h e re only in t he religious sense) y ou m ay be sure of a c o n c e rt b e c o m i ng established b e t w e en 11,000,000 inhabitants of E u r o p e an T u r k ey and the Czar, w ho will t h en really a p p e ar as their religious protector. T h e re exists no polemical schism b e t w e en the M u s u l m a ns and their G r e ek subjects, b ut 20 25 30 35 40 86 Parliamentary Debates of February 22—Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch 5 10 15 t he religious animosity against t he Latins m ay be said to form t he only c o m m on b o nd b e t w e en the different r a c es inhabiting T u r k ey a nd professing t he G r e ek creed. In this r e s p e ct things h a ve n ot c h a n g ed since t he period w h en M o h a m ed II. laid siege to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e, w h en t he G r e ek A d m i r al L u c as N o t a r a s, t he m o st influential m an in t he Byzantine E m p i r e, publicly declared that he w o u ld prefer seeing t he T u r k i sh t u r b an t r i u m p h a nt in t he capital r a t h er t h an t he L a t in h a t, while on t he other h a nd t h e re w as a H u n g a r ian p r o p h e cy afloat t h at t he Christians w o u ld n e v er be f o r t u n a te till t he d a m n ed heretical G r e e ks should be extirpated and Constantinople d e s t r o y ed by t he T u r k s. A ny interference, t h e n, on t he p a rt of t he W e s t e rn P o w e r s, b e t w e en t he Sultan and his G r e ek subjects, m u st f a v or the plans of the C z a r. A similar result will be b r o u g ht a b o ut should Austria, as she did in 1791, u n d e r t a ke to o c c u py Servia on t he p r e t e xt of thwarting t he t r e a s o n a b le designs of t he R u s s i an p a r ty in t h at Principality. L et me add t h at it is r u m o r ed at L o n d on that t he insurged E p i r a t es w e re s u p p o r t ed a nd joined by G r e e ks from t he Ionian Islands, w ho h ad n ot b e en c h e c k ed by t he English author ities, a nd that the n e ws of t he G r e ek insurrection w as a n n o u n c ed by The Times, t he coalition organ, in S a t u r d a y 's n u m b e r, as a m o st o p p o r t u ne e v e n t. 20 I, for my part, h a ve no d o u bt at all that t r e a c h e ry lurks b e h i nd t he clamor o us w ar preparations of t he coalition. B o n a p a r te is of c o u r se in good e a r n e st in embarking in t he w a r. He has no alternative left b ut revolution at h o me or w ar abroad. He c a n n ot a ny longer c o n t i n u e, as he d o e s, to couple t he cruel despotism of N a p o l e on I w i th t he c o r r u pt p e a ce policy of L o u is Philippe. 25 He m u st stop sending n ew b a t c h es of prisoners to C a y e n ne if he dare n ot simultaneously send F r e n ch armies b e y o nd t he frontiers. B ut t he conflict b e t w e en t he a v o w ed intentions of B o n a p a r te a nd t he secret plans of t he coalition c an only c o n t r i b u te to further embroil m a t t e r s. W h at I c o n c l u de from all this is, n ot t h at t h e re will be no w a r, b u t, on t he contrary, t h at it will a s s u me such terrible and revolutionary dimensions as are n ot e v en suspected by t he little m en of t he coalition. Their v e ry perfidy is t he m e a ns of t r a n s forming a local conflict into an E u r o p e an conflagration. 30 E v en if the British Ministry w e re as sincere as t h ey are false, their inter v e n t i on could not b ut accelerate t he downfall of t he O t t o m an E m p i r e. T h ey c a n n ot interfere w i t h o ut d e m a n d i ng pledges for the Christian subjects of t he P o r t e, a nd t h e se pledges t h ey c a n n ot w r e st from it without dooming it to ruin. E v en t he Constantinople c o r r e s p o n d e nt I q u o t ed b e f o r e, a nd w ho is an a v o w ed Turkophile, c a n n ot b ut o wn t h at " t he p r o p o s al of t he W e s t e rn P o w e rs to p ut all t he subjects of t he P o r te on a perfect footing of civil a nd religious equality, will lead at o n ce to a n a r c h y, intestine w a r f a r e, a nd a final a nd s p e e dy o v e r t h r ow of t he e m p i r e ." 35 40 K a rl M a r x. 87 Karl Marx English and French War Plans- Greek Insurrection—Spain—China F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4030, 18. März 1854 L o n d o n, F r i d a y, M a r ch 3, 1854. In my last letter I mentioned that Sir Charles N a p i er o w ed his a p p o i n t m e nt as Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic fleet to his public expression of mistrust in the F r e n ch alliance; to his accusing F r a n ce of having b e t r a y ed England in 1840, while in fact t he English G o v e r n m e nt at t h at time conspired with N i c h o l as against Louis Philippe. I ought to h a ve a d d ed that the second Adrniral in t he Black Sea, Sir E d m u nd L y o n s, during his stay in G r e e ce as English Minister, s h o w ed himself the a v o w ed e n e my of F r a n c e, a nd w as r e m o v ed from t h at office on the representations of L o rd Stratford de R e d- cliff e. T h us in t he ministerial appointments t he greatest possible c a re is t a k en to i n s u re a c r op of misintelligence, not only b e t w e en t he F r e n ch a nd English c o m m a n d e r s, b ut also b e t w e en the Admirals a nd the English E m b a s s a d or at Constantinople. T h e se facts are n ot denied and certainly n ot refuted by B o n a p a r t e 's con- gratulating himself, in t he opening s p e e ch he a d d r e s s ed to his o wn repre s e n t a t i v e s, u p on his close alliance w i th E n g l a n d. T he entente cordiale is certainly s o m e w h at older t h an the restoration of t he Imperial etiquette. T he m o st r e m a r k a b le passage in B o n a p a r t e 's speech is neither this reminiscence from L o u is Philippe's h a r a n g u e s, nor his denunciation of t he C z a r 's ambi- tious p l a n s, b ut rather his proclaiming liimself the p r o t e c t or of G e r m a n y, and especially of Austria, against t he foe from without a nd the e n e my from within. T he ratifications of the treaty entered into by the Porte with the W e s t e rn P o w e r s, containing t he clause that it w as n ot to c o n c l u de p e a ce with Russia w i t h o ut their c o n c u r r e n c e, had hardly b e en e x c h a n g ed at Constantinople on t he 5th inst., w h en negotiations relative to t he future position of t he Chris tians in T u r k ey w e re also o p e n ed b e t w e en the r e p r e s e n t a t i v es of the four P o w e rs a nd t he P o r t e. T he real e nd aimed at in t h e se negotiations is b e t r a y ed in the following passage from W e d n e s d a y 's Times : 5 10 15 20 25 30 88 F"" · English and French War Plans—Greek Insurrection—Spain—China " T he condition of several p a r ts of t he T u r k i sh E m p i re w h i ch h a ve already obtained by firmans and treaties t he c o m p l e te internal administration of their affairs, while t h ey continue to recognize t he sovereignty of the P o r t e, is a p r e c e d e nt w h i ch m ay be e x t e n d ed w i t h o ut prejudice to either side, a nd w h i ch 5 w o u ld p e r h a ps afford the b e st m e a ns of providing for the P r o v i n c es in their p r e s e nt s t a t e ." In other w o r ds t he Coalition Cabinet i n t e n ds securing t he integrity of t he T u r k i sh E m p i re in E u r o pe by t he t r a n s f o r m a t i on of Bosnia, Croatia, H e r z e gowina, Bulgaria, Albania, R u m e l ia a nd T h e s s a ly into so m a ny D a n u b i an 10 Principalities. T he a c c e p t a n ce on t he p a rt of t he P o r te of t h e se conditions m u st infallibly lead, if the T u r k i sh armies p r o ve victorious, to a civil w ar a m o ng the T u r ks t h e m s e l v e s. 15 20 25 30 It is n ow ascertained t h at the d i s c o v e ry of t he conspiracy at Widdin only h a s t e n ed t he G r e ek explosion, w h i ch at B u c h a r e st w as considered as an accomplished fact before it h ad b r o k en out. T he P a s ha of Scutari is con centrating all his t r o o ps with a v i ew to p r e v e nt t he Montenegrins from joining the insurgent G r e e k s. T he A n g l o - F r e n ch expedition m ay be set d o w n, as far as t he present intentions of the British G o v e r n m e nt go, as a n o t h er piece of h u m b u g. T he landing places are fixed for the F r e n c h, at R o d o s t o, for the British at E n o s. T h is latter t o wn lies on a small peninsula at t he e n t r a n ce of a m a r s hy b a y, at the rear of which the extensive m a r s h es of the valley of the Maritza, will no doubt greatly contribute to t he salubrity of t he c a m p. It lies outside n ot only of the B o s p h o r u s, b ut of the Dardanelles also, and the t r o o p s, in o r d er to get to t he Black Sea, would h a ve either to r e ë m b a rk a nd enjoy 250 miles r o u n d - a b o ut sail against the c u r r e n ts of the Straits, or to m a r ch t h r o u gh a r o a d l e ss c o u n t ry for t he distance of 160 miles, a m a r ch which no d o u bt could be completed in a fortnight. T he F r e n ch are at R o d o s t o, at least on the sea of M a r m o r a, a nd only a w e e k 's m a r ch from Constantinople. B ut w h at are the t r o o ps to do in this inexplicable position? W h y, t h ey are either to m a r ch u p on Adrianople, t h e re to c o v er t he capital, or in t he w o r st c a s e, to unite at the n e ck of the T h r a c i an C h e r s o n e s u s, to defend the D a r d a nelles. So says The Times, " by a u t h o r i t y ," a nd e v en q u o t es Marshal Mar m o n t 's strategic o b s e r v a t i o ns in s u p p o rt of t he w i s d om of the plan. 35 O ne h u n d r ed t h o u s a nd F r e n ch a nd English t r o o ps to defend a capital w h i ch is n ot m e n a c e d, which c a n n ot possibly be m e n a c ed for the n e xt t w e l v e m o n t h! W h y, t h ey might as well h a ve s t o p p ed at h o m e. This plan, if it is to be carried out, is decidedly the w o r st t h at can be devised. It is b a s ed u p on t he v e ry w o r st sort of defensive warfare, viz: t h at 40 w h i ch seeks strength in absolute inactivity. Supposing the expedition w as to be of a mainly defensive character, it is evident t h at this object w o u ld be 89 Karl Marx b e st obtained by enabling the T u r k s, b a s ed u p on s u ch a r e s e r v e, to p a ss into t he offensive, or else, by taking up a position in w h i ch a casual a nd partial offensive, w h e re opportunities offer, could be t a k e n. B ut at E n os a nd R o d o s to t he F r e n ch a nd British t r o o ps are entirely u s e l e s s. T he w o r st of it is, t h at an a r my of 100,000 m e n, with plenty of steam t r a n s p o r t s, a nd supported by a fleet of t w e n ty sail of t he line, is in itself a force c o m p e t e nt to take the m o st decided offensive action in any p a rt of the B l a ck Sea. S u ch a force must either t a ke t he C r i m ea a nd S e v a s t o p o l, O d e s sa a nd C h e r s o n, close the S ea of Azof, d e s t r oy t he R u s s i an forts on the C a u c a sian c o a s t s, and bring the R u s s i an fleet safe into t he B o s p h o r u s, or it h as no idea of its strength and its d u ty as an active a r m y. It is affirmed on t he p a rt of t he Ministerial partisans, t h at w h en t he 100,000 m en are o n ce con c e n t r a t ed in T u r k e y, such operations m ay be u n d e r t a k e n, a nd that t he landing of t he first divisions at E n os and R o d o s to is merely c o n t r i v ed to deceive the e n e m y. B ut e v en in this c a se it is an u n n e c e s s a ry loss of time and e x p e n se n ot to land t he t r o o ps at o n ce on s o me point on t he Black Sea. T he e n e my c a n n ot be misled. As s o on as the E m p e r or N i c h o l as h e a rs of this p o m p o u s ly a n n o u n c ed expedition of 100,000 m e n, he is b o u nd to send every soldier he c an s p a re to Sevastopol, Kaffa, P e r e k op and Y e n i k a l e. Y ou c a n n ot first frighten y o ur e n e my by e n o r m o us a r m a m e n t s, a nd t h en t ry to m a ke h im believe t h at t h ey are n ot intended to do a ny h a r m. T he trick w o u ld be too shallow; and if it is e x p e c t ed to mislead t he R u s s i a ns by s u ch paltry p r e t e x t s, British diplomacy h as m a de another egregious blunder. 5 10 15 20 I, t h e r e f o r e, believe that those w ho h a ve p l a n n ed the expedition intend betraying t he Sultan directly, and, on t he plea of frightening R u s s ia as m u ch as possible, will take good care to do her by all m e a ns t he least possible h a r m. 25 E n g l a nd a nd F r a n ce occupying Constantinople a nd p a rt of Rumelia; A u s t r ia occupying Servia, and p e r h a ps B o s n ia and M o n t e n e g r o, and R u s s ia being allowed to reënforce herself in Moldo-Wallachia,—this looks like an e v e n t u al partition of T u r k ey in E u r o pe rather t h an anything else. T u r k ey is placed in w o r se circumstances t h an in 1772, w h en t he K i ng of Prussia, in o r d er to i n d u ce t he E m p r e ss Catherine to retire from t he D a n u b i an Princi palities, the o c c u p a t i on of w h i ch t h r e a t e n ed to lead to a E u r o p e an conflict, p r o p o s ed t he first partition of Poland, w h i ch w as to defray t he e x p e n s es of t he R u s s o - T u r k i sh war. Be it r e m e m b e r ed that, at t h at time, the Porte origi nally r u s h ed into t he w ar with Catherine with t he v i ew of defending Poland from Prussian aggression, and that, at the e n d, Poland w as sacrificed at the shrine of t he " i n d e p e n d e n ce and integrity" of t he O t t o m an E m p i r e. 30 35 T he t r e a c h e r o us policy of procrastination p u r s u ed by the Coalition Cabi- net, h as given t he Muscovite emissaries t he o p p o r t u n i ty for planning and 40 90 English and French War Plans—Greek Insurrection—Spain—China maturing t he G r e ek insurrection, so anxiously e x p e c t ed by L o rd C l a r e n d o n. T he insurrection h ad c o m m e n c ed on t he 28th J a n u a ry and according to t he last dispatches from V i e n na a s s u m ed m o re threatening dimensions on t he 13th inst. T he districts of A c a r n a n ia a nd Aetolia, and circles of Ilussa a nd 5 Delonia are said to be in a state of revolt. An insurrection is stated to h a ve b r o k en out at Egrippo the capital of E u b ö a, equal in gravity to that in Albania. T he fact of the t o w ns of A r ta and J a n i na being quitted by t he T u r ks a nd occupied by the G r e e ks is of smaller i m p o r t a n c e, as the domineering citadels remain in the h a n ds of O t t o m an t r o o ps and as we k n o w, from the n u m e r o us 1 o w a rs carried on b e t w e en t he Christians a nd t he T u r ks in Albania t h at t he final possession of t h e se t o w ns d e p e n d ed always on t he p o s s e s s i on of the citadels. T he Gulfs of C o n t e s sa and Salónica a nd t he c o a s ts of Albania will be declared in a state of siege. I stated in my last letter that o ne of the results of the G r e ek insurrection t he m o st to be a p p r e h e n d ed on t he p a rt of t he P o r t e, would be the opportunity it afforded t he W e s t e rn P o w e rs for interfering b e t w e en t he Sultan and his subjects, instead of fighting t he R u s s i a n s, a nd t h us driving t he G r e ek Christians into alliance with the C z a r. H ow eager t h e se P o w e rs are to grasp at this opportunity m ay be inferred from t he fact of t he s a me p o st bringing the n e ws of the P o r te having a c c e p t ed the convention p r o p o s ed by England and F r a n c e, a nd of t he F r e n ch a nd English E m b a s s a d o rs having sent t wo s t e a m e rs to the assistance of t he T u r k s, while t he British minister at A t h e ns h ad informed t he Cabinet of King O t to t h at E n g l a nd w o u ld interfere in the insurged districts. T he immediate result of t he insurrection, from a military point of view, is clearly described by t he V i e n na cor- 20 15 25 r e s p o n d e nt of to-day's Times, as follows: " D u r i ng the last few d a ys a certain d i s c o u r a g e m e nt h as b e en observable in h e a d q u a r t e rs at Widdin, t he reënf o r c e m e n ts which h ad b e en a n n o u n c ed having received c o u n t er o r d e rs and being on their w ay to the south-western districts of T u r k e y. T he n e ws of t he insurrection of t he Christians in E p i r us h ad p r o d u c ed an alarming effect on t he A r n a u ts and Albanians on t he D a n u b e, w ho loudly d e m a n d ed permission to r e t u rn h o m e. T he Generals of Brigade, H u s s e in B ey a nd Soliman P a s h a, h ad lost all their influence o v er their wild t r o o p s, a nd it w as feared t h at if an a t t e m pt w as m a de to detain t h em by force there w o u ld be an o p en m u t i n y; while if they w e re permitted to r e t u r n, t h ey would ravage t he Christian districts on their w ay h o m e. If t he hostile m o v e m e nt of the Christian population in t he W e st should a s s u me m o re formidable dimensions, the w e st wing of t he T u r k i sh a r my would be obliged to m a ke a retrograde m o v e m e n t, w h i ch w o u ld m o re t h an counter b a l a n ce t he c h e ck which t he R u s s i a ns h ad r e c e i v ed by t he e n t ry of t he allied fleets into the Black S e a ." T h e se are some of the first results of t h at policy of procrastination so 30 35 40 91 Karl Marx rhetorically praised by G r a h a m, Russell, C l a r e n d on a nd P a l m e r s t on in vindi cation of the ministerial m a n a g e m e nt of E a s t e rn affairs. As t h ey w e re in f o r m e d, late on last Friday night, t h at t he Czar, w i t h o ut having waited for the recall of Sir H a m i l t on S e y m o u r, from England, h ad o r d e r ed him off, in t he m o st a b r u pt a nd u n c e r e m o n i o us m a n n e r, t h ey held t wo Cabinet Councils, o ne on S a t u r d ay and the other on S u n d ay afternoon—the result of their consultations being to allow t he Czar o n ce m o re a delay of t h r ee or four w e e k s, w h i ch delay is to be granted u n d er t he form of a s u m m o n s, "calling u p on t he Czar to give within six d a ys from t he receipt of t h at c o m m u n i c a t i on a solemn pledge a nd engagement that he will c a u se his t r o o ps to e v a c u a te t he Principalities of the D a n u be on or b e f o re t he 30th of April." B ut m a rk t h at this s u m m o ns is n oi followed w i th t he m e n a ce of a declara tion of war in c a se of a refusal on t he part of t he Czar. It may be said, and it is said, by The Times, t h at notwithstanding this n ew delay granted, w ar p r e p a r a t i o ns are actively p u r s u e d; b ut y ou will o b s e r ve t h at on t he o ne h a nd all decisive action of the Porte on the D a n u be is p r e v e n t ed by t he p r o s p e ct held o ut of t he W e s t e rn P o w e rs being resolved u p on directly participating in t he war—and e v e ry d ay of delay in t h at q u a r t er p u ts the T u r ks in a w o r se position, as it allows t he Russians to reënforce t h e m s e l v es in t he front, and t he G r e ek rebels to grow m o re d a n g e r o us in t he rear of the D a n u b i an a r m y; while, on t he other hand, t he e m b a r k a t i on of t r o o ps for E n os and R o d o s to m ay e m b a r r a ss the Sultan b ut will certainly n ot stop t he R u s s i a n s. 5 10 15 20 It h as b e en settled that t he British expeditionary force shall consist of a b o ut 30,000 and t he F r e n ch of a b o ut 80,000 men. Should it h a p p en to a p p e a r, in t he c o u r se of .events, that Austria, while apparently joining t he W e s t e rn 25 P o w e r s, only p r o p o s ed to m a sk h er u n d e r s t a n d i ng with Russia, B o n a p a r te w o u ld h a ve m u ch to regret this m o st injudicious dispersion of his t r o o p s. T h e re is another insurrection which m ay be c o n s i d e r ed as a diversion m a de in favor of Russia—the insurrection in Spain. A ny m o v e m e nt in Spain is sure to p r o d u ce dissension b e t w e en F r a n ce and England. In 1823, the F r e n ch 30 intervention in Spain w a s, as we know from C h a t e a u b r i a n d 's " C o n g r e ss of V e r o n a ," instigated by Russia. T h at t he A n g l o - F r e n ch intervention in 1834, w h i ch finally b r o ke up t he entente cordiale b e t w e en t he t wo s t a t e s, p r o c e e d ed from t he s a me source, we m ay infer from P a l m e r s t on having b e en its a u t h o r. T he " S p a n i sh m a r r i a g e s" p r e p a r ed the w ay for the downfall of t he Orleans dynasty. At t he p r e s e nt m o m e n t, a d e t h r o n e m e nt of t he " i n n o c e n t" Isabella would allow a son of Louis Philippe, t he D u ke of Montpensier, to bring f o r w a rd his claims on t he t h r o ne of Spain; while, on t he other h a n d, B o n a p a r te w o u ld be r e m i n d ed of o ne of his u n c l es having o n ce resided at M a d r i d. T he Orleans w o u ld be supported by t he C o b u r g s, and resisted by t he B o n a p a r t e s. A Spanish insurrection, t h e n, w h i ch is far from meaning 40 35 92 English and French War Plans—Greek Insurrection—Spain—China a popular revolution, m u st p r o ve a m o st powerful agency in dissolving so superficial a combination as w h at is t e r m ed t he A n g l o - F r e n ch alliance. A t r e a ty of alliance is said to h a ve b e en c o n c l u d ed b e t w e en Russia, K h i v a, B o k h a ra a nd Cabul. 5 As to D o st M a h o m e d, the A m e er of Cabul, it w o u ld be quite natural t h at after having p r o p o s ed in 1838 to E n g l a nd to place forever a feud of blood b e t w e en himself a nd Russia, if t he English G o v e r n m e nt required it, by causing t he agent dispatched to h im by t he C z ar to be killed, a nd being r e n e w ed in 1839 on the p a rt of England by t he Affghan expedition, by his expulsion from t he t h r o ne a nd by t he most cruel and u n s c r u p u l o us devasta tion of his country—that D o st M a h o m ed should n ow e n d e a v or to avenge himself u p on his faithless ally. H o w e v e r, as t he population of K h i v a, B o k h a ra and Cabul, belong to t he o r t h o d ox M u s u l m an faith of the Sunni, while t he Persians a d h e re to t he schismatic t e n e ts of t he Schii, it is n ot to be supposed t h at t h ey will ally t h e m s e l v es w i th Russia, being t he ally of t he Persians, w h om t h ey detest and h a t e, against England, the ostensible ally of the P a d i s h a h, w h om t h ey regard as the s u p r e me c o m m a n d er of the faithful. 10 15 20 T h e re is s o me probability of R u s s ia having an ally in T h i b et and t he T a r t ar E m p e r or of China, if t he latter be forced to retire into M a n c h o u r ia and to resign the sceptre of C h i na proper. T he C h i n e se rebels, as y ou k n o w, h a ve u n d e r t a k en a regular c r u s a de against B u d d h i s m, destroying its temples and slaying its B o n z e s. B ut t he religion of t he T a r t a rs is B u d d h i sm a nd Thibet, the seat of the great L a m a, a nd recognizing the suzeranité of China, is the sanctuary of t he B u d d h i st faith. Tae-ping-wang, if he s u c c e ed in driving t he 25 M a n d s hu d y n a s ty o ut of China, will, t h e r e f o r e, h a ve to enter a religious w ar with t he B u d d h i st p o w e rs of T a r t a r y. N o w, as on b o th sides of the H i m a l a y as B u d d h i sm is confessed and as England c a n n ot b ut support t he n ew Chinese dynasty, t he Czar is sure to side w i th t he T a r t ar tribes, p ut t h em in motion against England and a w a ke religious revolts in N e p a ul itself. By the last 30 Oriental mails we are informed that " t he E m p e r or of China, in anticipation of t he loss of Pekin, h ad directed t he G o v e r n o rs of t he various p r o v i n c es to send t he Imperial r e v e n ue to Getol, their old family seat and p r e s e nt s u m m er residence in M a n c h o u r i a, a b o ut 80 miles north-east of the G r e at Wall." T he great religious war b e t w e en t he C h i n e se a nd the T a r t a r s, which 35 will spread over t he Indian frontiers, m ay c o n s e q u e n t ly be regarded as n e ar at h a n d. Karl M a r x. 93 Karl Marx Austrian Bankruptcy Austrian Bankruptcy. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4033, 22. März 1854 N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng the imminence of w ar and their pressing n e e d s, t he F r e n ch a nd t he Austrian G o v e r n m e n ts h a ve not y et s u c c e e d ed in strengthening t he nervus belli, n a m e l y, t he m o n e y - p o w e r. N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng t he Lucullian magnificence displayed in t he dinners given by t he F r e n ch Minister of Fi- n a n ce to t he R e c e i v e r s - G e n e r a l, t he Crédit Mobilier, and t he principal b a n k e rs of Paris, t h o se capitalists p r o ve s t u b b o rn a nd cling to t h at discreet sort of patriotism, which, by exacting t he greatest possible interest from the State, is w o nt to indemnify its private interests with t he public o n e s. T h us t he t e r ms of the p r o p o s ed F r e n ch loan of t wo h u n d r ed million francs r e m a i ns still unsettled. As to Austria t h e re c an exist no d o u bt t h at o ne of [the] principal m o t i v es w h i ch i n d u ce h er to profess friendly feelings t o w a rd t he W e s t e rn P o w e rs is the h o pe of t h us reviving the confidence of m o n e y ed m en a nd getting o ut of h er financial difficulties. Indeed, the official gazette at V i e n na h ad hardly u t t e r ed a few w o r ds a b o ut Austrian neutrality a nd good u n d e r s t a n d i ng w i th F r a n c e, w h en it surprised the public with t he a n n o u n c e m e nt of an intended sale of a considerable portion of t he six million a c r es of C r o wn L a n d s, and with a financial rescript, dated F e b. 2 3, 1854, to t he effect t h at t he whole of t he State p a p er m o n e y, 150,000,000 florins, n ow in circulation, a nd of c o m- pulsory c u r r e n c y, w as to be transferred to t he N a t i o n al B a n k, a nd suc cessively c o n v e r t ed into b a nk n o t e s, at the expiration of w h i ch change all t he p a p er issued by t he t r e a s u ry will be w i t h d r a wn f r om circulation, a nd no m o re State p a p er m o n ey of a forced c u r r e n cy be issued. In m a k i ng this c h a n ge t he Imperial G o v e r n m e nt is g u a r a n t ee to t he B a nk for t he p a p er m o n ey transferred to it, a nd pledges itself to indemnify it for t he e x p e n s es c o n n e c t ed with t h at c o n v e r s i o n; to pay, in extinction of t he d e bt t h us created, a yearly installment of at least 10,000,000 florins; to mortgage t he c u s t o m s' r e v e n ue as security for t he regular p a y m e nt of t h e se installments, a nd to p ay 5 10 15 20 25 94 Austrian Bankruptcy the b a nk in specie in p r o p o r t i on as t h o se duties are received. At the s a me time t he G o v e r n m e nt is b o u nd to do its b e st to enable t he B a nk to fulfill its obligations and r e s u me specie p a y m e n t s. M e a n w h i l e, in order to give t he holders of b a nk n o t es t he m e a ns of changing their n o t es at pleasure into a d e bt bearing interest, p a y a b le in specie, t he B a nk u n d e r t a k es to issue b o n ds bearing interest, to be in all r e s p e c ts on t he s a me footing as State b o n ds or obligations. T he G o v e r n m e nt will also call in w h at are k n o wn as R e d e m p t i on n o t es and Anticipation n o t e s, a nd p ut t h em entirely o ut of circulation. 5 10 15 T he conversion of State p a p er of a forced c o u r se into inconvertible b a nk n o t es will n ot r e d u ce t he a m o u nt n or ameliorate t he quality, b ut only simplify t he denominations of t he p a p er m o n ey issued. As t he State is in the p o s s e s sion of t he same m e a ns w h i ch it grants t he B a nk for t he r e d e m p t i on of t he p a p er m o n e y, it would itself h a ve m a de u se of them if not fully a w a re t h at t he w a nt of confidence in itself w as s u ch as n ot to allow credit to be r e s t o r ed save by the help of a B a n k, w h i ch is n ot the p r o p e r ty of t he State. T h us t he d e p e n d e n ce of t he E m p e r or on t he J e ws of t he V i e n na B a nk g r o ws at t he s a me p a ce as the military c h a r a c t er of his G o v e r n m e n t. In J a n u a ry 1852, he mortgaged to t h em t he salt-works of G m u n d e n, A u s s ee a nd Hallein. In F e b r u a ry 1854, t h ey obtain a lien on the c u s t o m s' r e v e n ue of t he w h o le 20 m o n a r c h y. S t ep by step t he B a nk b e c o m es t he real a nd t he G o v e r n m e nt m e r e ly the nominal o w n er of the E m p i r e. T he m o re A u s t r ia h as resisted t he d e m a n ds of participation in political p o w er on t he p a rt of t he middle classes, t he m o re she is forced to u n d e r go t he unmitigated d e s p o t i sm of o ne fraction of t h o se classes—the m o n ey l e n d e r s. 25 30 35 40 T he d e c r e e, of w h i ch we h a ve a b o ve given t he s u b s t a n c e, disguises an a t t e m pt at a n ew loan u n d er t he f o rm of aid t e n d e r ed to t he holders of b a nk n o t e s, in changing t h em into a d e bt bearing interest; t he latter to be p a id in specie. In 1852 t he G o v e r n m e nt also pledged itself to m e et in specie various m i n or p a y m e n ts and obligations, b ut as it received t he t a x es only in S t a te p a p er m o n ey or in b a nk n o t es t he Administration w as forced to c o n t r a ct a l o an of thirty-five million florins at L o n d on a nd F r a n k f o r t. T he n ew l o a n s, of c o u r s e, a u g m e nt t he old deficits a nd t he a u g m e n t ed deficits lead to n ew issues of p a p er m o n e y, t he s u p e r a b u n d a n ce a nd c o n s e q u e nt depreciation of w h i ch t h ey w e re i n t e n d ed to p r e v e n t. T he b r o ad distinction d r a wn on t he p a rt of the G o v e r n m e nt b e t w e en p a y m e n ts in specie a nd p a y m e n ts in b a nk n o t es is as good a m e a ns of rescuing t he n o t es from their discredit as t he augmentation of t he circulating m e d i um of t he b a nk by 150 millions is a m e a ns of enabling it to fulfill its e n g a g e m e n ts a nd r e s u me c a sh p a y m e n t s. T he G o v e r n m e nt will p ay t he b a nk in specie in p r o p o r t i on as the c u s t o ms duties are paid in t he s a m e, b ut it is well k n o wn t h at n ot only t he Austrian p e a s a n ts b ut e v en t he citizens in t he larger t o w ns are as fond of hoarding 95 Karl Marx as t he Chinese a nd t he I n d i a n s; that in 1850 s u ms w e re h o a r d ed e v en in c o p p e r, and t h at in 1854 t h ey are paying all t a x es in p a p e r, although it is only a c c e p t ed with a discount of full s e v e n t e en per cent. T h o se c o n v e r s a nt with the p a st history of t he Austrian E x c h e q u er will fail in discovering any novelty either in r e s p e ct to t he p r o m i s es held out in t he n ew d e c r e e, or the financial devices resorted t o. T he first issue of Austrian p a p er m o n ey t o ok place u n d er the E m p r e ss Maria T h e r e s a, t o w a rd t he end of the S e v en Y e a r s' War. It consists originally of B a nk bills exchangeable by t he State authorities for silver. In 1797, in c o n s e q u e n ce of t he pecuniary difficulties of the G o v e r n m e nt in the w a rs against F r a n c e, the convertibility into silver w as abolished. T he first issue u n d er t he E m p r e ss Maria T h e r e sa having a m o u n t ed to twelve million florins, t he total sum of B a nk bills issued in 1809, a m o u n t ed to 1,060,793,653 florins, their r e d u c t i on in value having at t he s a me time r e a c h ed its m a x i m u m. On t he 20th of F e b r u a r y, 1811, the G o v e r n m e nt published a p a t e nt by which t he B a nk bills w e re altogether w i t h d r a wn from circulation a nd r e d e e m e d, (hence t he n a me R e d e m p t i on notes) at t he r a te of 20 for 100 for a n ew p a p er called Wiener Währung. T he G o v e r n m e nt declared this to be t he real m o n ey of t he c o u n t r y, a nd promised t h at this n ew p a p er should n e v er be increased b e y o nd the a m o u nt n e c e s s a ry for exchanging t he B a nk bills. In M ay 1811 t he Wiener Währung w as already at a discount of 8 per cent., and Anticipation n o t es w e re issued, so called b e c a u se the p r o c e e ds of a p a rt of the taxes for twelve years w e re anticipated by t h e m. T he first issue of Anticipation n o t es really a m o u n t ed to only forty- five million florins, and for their redemption within t w e l ve y e a rs an annual s um of 3,750,000 florins w as destined to be t a k en from t he land t a x e s. B ut in c o n s e q u e n ce of the war, new issues of Anticipation n o t es quietly followed e a ch other, e a ch n ew issue being a t t e n d ed by a r e d u c t i on of their value. In 1815 t he premium for silver r e a c h ed the hight of 400 per cent, against t he Wiener Währung. On t he first of J u n e, 1816, an imperial p a t e nt a p p e a r ed declaring that t he State w o u ld in future n e v er again h a ve r e c o u r se to an inconvertible p a p er c u r r e n c y; that the paper m o n ey in circulation should be gradually w i t h d r a wn and specie be restored as t he standard medium of circulation. In order to fulfill t h e se p r o m i s e s, t he privileged National B a nk w as constituted definitively, J a n u a ry 18th, 1818, t he State having m a de an a r r a n g e m e nt with the B a nk by which it pledged itself to r e d e em the incon- vertible p a p er m o n e y. As late as J u n e, 1852, h o w e v e r, we find again the F i n a n ce Minister announcing in the official g a z e t te that, in future, c o m pulsory loans, extraordinary taxation, depreciation of the value of m o n e y, w o u ld be absolutely excluded; if not exactly at p r e s e n t, y et in future, A u s trian p a p er would be converted into coin w i t h o ut l o s s, a nd t h at t he loan n ow c o n t e m p l a t ed would be applied to w i t h d r aw t he state p a p er m o n ey a nd for 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 96 Austrian Bankruptcy the p a y m e nt of the state d e b ts to t he B a n k. T h e re c an be no b e t t er proof of the hollowness of s u ch promises t h an their periodical o c c u r r e n c e. At the time of M a r ia T h e r e sa the A u s t r i an G o v e r n m e nt w as powerful e n o u gh to issue its o wn b a nk bills, e x c h a n g e a b le for specie, and e v en at a p r e m i um o v er silver. In 1818 t he S t a t e, in o r d er to r e d e em its p a p er m o n e y, w as obliged to recur to t he establishment of a privileged b a n k, t he p r o p e r ty of private capitalists, w ho received a d v a n t a g es v e ry b u r d e n s o me to t he S t a t e, b ut w ho w e re pledged to t he issue of convertible n o t e s. In 1854 t he G o v e r n m e nt appeals to the help of a b a n k, w h o se o wn p a p er has b e c o me as d e p r e- ciated and inconvertible as t h at of t he S t a te itself. Although from 1815 to 1846 A u s t r ia enjoyed a period of almost u n interrupted p e a ce and internal tranquility, t he first s h o ck after t h at long period found her altogether u n p r e p a r e d. T he insurrection at C r a c o w, and t he disturbances in Galicia, at t he e nd of F e b r u a r y, 1846, a u g m e n t ed t he public e x p e n d i t u r es by m o re t h an 10,000,000 c o m p a r ed with 1845. T he a r my e x p e n s es w e re t he principal c a u se of this i n c r e a s ed outlay. T h ey a m o u n t ed to 50,624,120 florins, in 1845, b ut in 1846 r o se 7,000,000 m o r e, while the ad ministrative e x p e n s es of the P r o v i n c es r o se 2,000,000. In 1847 t he c o m mercial crisis and the b ad h a r v e st p r o d u c ed a great diminution in t he excise r e v e n u e, while the a r my r o se to 64,000,000, chiefly in c o n s e q u e n ce of t r o u b les in Italy. T he deficit of t h at y e ar w as 7,000,000. In 1848-49 t he r e v e n ue of whole provinces w as lost, besides t he w ar e x p e n s es in Italy and H u n g a r y. In 1848 the deficit w as 45,000,000florins and in 1849,121,000,000. State p a p er of c o m p u l s o ry c u r r e n c y, to t he s um of 76,000,000, Three-per-Cents, w as issued in 1849. L o ng before this, the B a nk had stopped specie p a y m e n t s, a nd its issues w e re declared by t he G o v e r n m e nt to be inconvertible. In 1850 t h e re w as a deficit of 54,000,000, and the c h a n c es of a w ar w i th P r u s s ia b r o u g ht d o wn t he p a p er m o n ey to a discount of 60 p er cent. T he total a m o u nt of State p a p er m o n ey issued in the years 1849, '50, a nd '51 w as 219,000,000. In 1852 t he deficit w as 8,000,000 m o re t h an in '48, a nd 46,000,000 m o re t h an in '47. In 1851 the w ar b u d g et w as 126,000,000, fully d o u b le w h at it w as in '47. In '52 t he police e x p e n s es w e re 9,000,000, fourfold greater t h an t h o se of '48. B o th police and w ar e x p e n s es also increased in 1853. T he real question, h o w e v e r, is n ot h ow A u s t r ia got into her financial cul-de-sac, b ut h o w, w h en t h us i m m e r s ed in b a nk p a p er a nd d e bt she has avoided o p en b a n k r u p t c y. In 1850 h er r e v e n ue a m o u n t ed to one h u n d r ed arid ninety-six millions [, s e v e n t y - f o ur m i l l i o n s] m o re t h an in 1848; and to forty-two millions m o re t h an in 1849. In 1851 t he receipts w e re t wo hun dred a nd nineteen millions[, t w e n t y - t h r ee millions] over t h o se of 1850. In 1852 t h ey r e a c h ed t wo h u n d r ed and twenty-six millions, an increase of six millions over t h o se of 1851. T h us t h e re h as b e en a continual increase of 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 97 Karl Marx r e v e n ue although n ot in the same p r o p o r t i on in 1852 as in 1851, a nd in 1851 n ot in t he s a me proportion as in 1850. indemnity a nd t he Sardinian w ar W h e n ce this increase of r e v e n u e? Putting aside t he extraordinary receipts t he L o m b a r d o - V e n e t i an con from fiscations, the transformation of the Austrian p e a s a nt into a landholder h as of c o u r se increased the tax-paying p o w er of t he c o u n t ry a nd t he r e v e n ue derived from the land t a x. At the same time the abolition of the patrimonial c o u r ts brought the income, which the aristocracy h ad formerly enjoyed from their private administration of justice, into t he coffers of the State, a nd this b r a n ch of r e v e n ue has b e en constantly increasing since 1849. T h en a con- siderable increase a r o se from the income-tax, introduced by the p a t e nt of O c t o b er 29, 1849. This t ax has p r o v ed particularly p r o d u c t i ve in t he Italian p r o v i n c es of Austria. In 1852, for instance, t he increase of the income-tax in t he G e r m an a nd Slavonic provinces, together a m o u n t ed to six h u n d r ed and o ne t h o u s a nd florins, while in the Italian p r o v i n c es alone it w as six h u n d r ed and thirty-nine. T he principal c a u s e, h o w e v e r, which h as saved the Austrian E m p i re from a formal b a n k r u p t c y, is the subjugation of H u n g a ry a nd h er assimilation with t he other provinces in r e s p e ct to taxation. 5 10 15 20 25 T he basis of t he w h o le Austrian system of taxation m ay be said to be the land-tax. On the 1st April 1812, a p p e a r ed an imperial p a t e n t, in w h i ch the E m p e r or F r a n c is a n n o u n c ed his resolution to establish uniformity in the land-tax s y s t em all over his G e r m a n, Slavonic a nd Italian provinces. In o ne p a r a g r a ph of this patent it is ordered t h at no e x e m p t i o ns from the land-tax should in future " be m a de according to t he p e r s o n al quality of t he p o s s e s s o rs of e s t a t es or h o u s e s ," and as a w h o le this view w as acted u p o n. In t he A r c h d u c hy of Austria, the n ew survey w as introduced in 1834, a nd this w as the first hereditary domain in w h i ch the n ew system w as b r o u g ht into o p e r a tion. A u s t r i a n - L o m b a r dy p o s s e s s ed an excellent s u r v ey from t he t i me of C h a r l es V I, t he Censimento Milanese. H u n g a ry a nd T r a n s y l v a n i a, h o w e v e r, by no m e a ns contributed to the land-tax and other t a x e s, in t he s a me degree with the other provinces of the E m p i r e. A c c o r d i ng to t he Hungarian Con stitution, t he Hungarian p o s s e s s o rs of by far the greatest p a rt of all t he land, w e re subject to no kind of direct tax, and e v en several of t he indirect t a x es i m p o s ed u p on t he other provinces, p r e s s ed neither u p on H u n g a ry nor u p on Transylvania. T he population of H u n g a r y, T r a n s y l v a n ia and the Military Frontier, together a m o u n t e d, in 1846, to 14,541,958; t h o se of t he other p r o v i n c es of the M o n a r c h y, to 22,901,675, so that t he former should h a ve c o n t r i b u t ed seven-eighteenths of t he whole r e v e n u e. B ut H u n g a ry and T r a n s y l v a n ia in 1846 only contributed t w e n t y - t h r ee millions, w h i c h, as the w h o le r e v e n ue in t h at y e ar a m o u n t ed to o ne h u n d r ed and sixty-f our millions 40 w as only s o m e w h at less t h an o n e - s e v e n th of the r e v e n u e. T he Hungarian 30 35 98 Austrian Bankruptcy provinces o c c u py 5,855 of the 12,123 G e r m an s q u a re miles, w h i ch form t he a r ea of the Austrian M o n a r c h y, c o n s e q u e n t ly one-half of its superficial extent. T he E m p e r or J o s e ph II, w h o se great aim w as the centralization a nd c o m- plete Germanization of t he Austrian M o n a r c h y, h ad arbitrarily introduced innovations in H u n g a ry intended to place her on the same footing with t he other Provinces. B ut this p r o d u c ed s u ch an effect on t he public mind in t h at c o u n t ry that J o s e ph II, at t he close of his life feared that the H u n g a r i a ns w o u ld rebel as t he N e t h e r l a n ds h ad d o n e. T he E m p e r o rs L e o p o ld I I, F r a n- eis I, and F e r d i n a nd I, did n ot d a re to r e p e at t he h a z a r d o us experiment. This cause—the impediments to an equalization of t a x es existing in t he H u n g a r i an Constitution—ceased to w o rk after the H u n g a r i an revolution w as quelled by R u s s i an assistance. T he E m p e r or F r a n c is J o s e ph having never s w o rn to t he Hungarian Constitution, and being m a de E m p e r or in t he place of F e r d i n a nd b e c a u se he h ad never s w o rn to it, at o n ce i n t r o d u c ed t he land-tax on t he s a me footing with the o t h er crown-lands. B e s i d e s, by the abolition of the frontier of H u n g a ry on t he 1st of O c t o b e r, 1850, the Austrian M o n a r c hy c a me to form o ne single territory with r e s p e ct to c u s t o ms as well as t a x e s. T he E x c i se a nd t he t o b a c co monopoly w e re also i n t r o d u c ed t h e re on M a r ch 1, 1851. T he increase of the direct t a x es alone in the H u n g a r i an P r o v i n c es a m o u n t ed to 11,500,000 florins in 1851, and to a b o ut 8,000,000 florins in 1852. We arrive then at the irrefragable conclusion, t h at on the possession of H u n g a ry and L o m b a r dy d e p e n ds n ot only t he political b ut t he e c o n o m i c al existence of the Austrian E m p i r e, and t h at with their loss t he long-delayed b a n k r u p t cy of t h at State b e c o m es inevitable. 5 10 15 20 25 99 Karl Marx Opening of the Labour Parliament- English War Budget F r om Our Own C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4035, 24. März 1854 L o n d o n, T u e s d a y, M a r ch 7, 1854. T he delegates to the L a b or Parliament m et y e s t e r d ay at the P e o p l e 's In stitution, M a n c h e s t e r, at 10 o'clock in t he f o r e n o o n. T he first sitting w a s, of c o u r s e, applied to preliminary business. It w as m o v ed by J a m es Williams of S t o c k p o r t, s e c o n d ed by J a m es Bligh of L o n d o n, a nd s u p p o r t ed by E r n e st J o n e s, t h at Dr. M a rx be invited to sit as h o n o r a ry delegate at the L a b or Parliament, which motion w as carried unanimously. Similar resolutions w e re p a s s ed w i th r e s p e ct to M e s s r s. Blanc a nd N a d a u d. W h a t e v er m ay be its immediate results, t he m e re assembling of such a Parliament m a r ks a n ew e p o ch in the history of labor. T he meeting at t he Palais du L u x e m b o u rg at P a r i s, after the revolution of F e b r u a r y, might p e r h a ps be considered a p r e c e d e nt in a similar direction, but at first sight t h e re a p p e a rs this great dif f e r e n c e, t h at t he L u x e m b o u rg w as initiated by t he G o v e r n m e n t, while t he L a b or Parliament is initiated by the people t h e m s e l v es ; t h at the L u x e m b o u rg w as i n v e n t ed with a view to removing t he Socialist m e m b e rs of the Provi sional G o v e r n m e nt from the center of action and a ny serious participation in t he real business of t he c o u n t r y; and lastly, t h at the delegates to t he L u x e m b o u rg only consisted of m e m b e rs of t he various so-called corps d'états, corporations m o re or less corresponding to t he medieval guilds and the p r e s e nt trades-unions, while the L a b or Parliament is a true r e p r e s e n t a t i on of all b r a n c h es and divisions of labor on a national scale. T he s u c c e ss of t he L a b or Parliament will principally, if n ot exclusively, d e p e nd on its acting u p on t he principle t h at it is not t he so-called organization of labor, b ut the organization of the laboring classes t h ey h a ve at p r e s e nt to deal with. T he privileges of the n ow governing classes, a nd t he slavery of the working classes, are equally b a s ed on t he existing organization of labor, which, of c o u r s e, will be defended and maintained on t he p a rt of the f o r m er by all m e a ns in their h a n d s, one of t h e se m e a ns being t he p r e s e nt State machinery. To alter then, the existing organization of labor, a nd to supplant it by a n ew 5 10 15 20 25 30 100 Wäscher UhllmLiHi, "•"WW Opening of the Labour Parliament—English War Budget o n e, y ou w a nt power—social and political power—power not only of resisting, b ut also of attacking; and to acquire that p o w er y ou w a nt to organize your selves as an a r my p o s s e s s ed of t h at m o r al a nd physical strength w h i ch will enable it to m e et t he fiendly h o s t s. If t he L a b or Parliament allows its time to be absorbed by mere theoretical propositions, instead of preparing t he w ay for the actual formation of a national p a r t y, it will p r o ve a failure as the L u x e m b o u rg did. 5 A new election of the Chartist E x e c u t i ve having t a k en place, according to the statutes of the National Charter Association, E r n e st J o n e s, J a m es 10 Finlen, ( L o n d o n ), and J o hn S h a w, ( L e e d s ), w e re declared duly elected to serve on t he E x e c u t i ve of the N . C . A. for t he n e xt six m o n t h s. 20 As B o n a p a r t e 's intention of contracting a l o an at t he B o u r se w as frustrated by t he passive resistance of t he Paris capitalists, his Minister of F i n a n ce h as p r e s e n t ed to the Senate a B u d g et containing the following article: " T he 15 Minister of F i n a n ce is authorized to c r e a t e, for t he service of t he T r e a s u ry and the negotiations with t he B a nk of F r a n c e, T r e a s u ry b o n d s, bearing interest a nd payable at fixed periods. T he T r e a s u ry b o n ds circulation shall n ot e x c e ed 250,000,000 francs, (£10,000,000;) b ut the b o n ds delivered to the sinking fund are n ot included within this limit, by virtue of t he law of J u ne 10, 1833, nor are the b o n ds deposited as a g u a r a n t ee at the B a nk of F r a n ce and t he discount e s t a b l i s h m e n t s ." In an additional clause it is provided t h at " t he E m p e r or r e s e r v es to himself the right of issuing supplementary emissions by virtue of m e re d e c r e e s ," to be registered afterward by t he Senate. I am informed by a Paris letter that this p r o p o s al has struck with horror the whole of t he middle classes, as on t he o ne h a nd t he t r e a s u ry b o n ds shall n ot e x c e ed the sum of 250,000,000 and on the o t h er e x c e ed that identical sum by w h a t e v er a m o u nt t he E m p e r or m ay t h i n kf it to d e c r e e, the b o n ds t h us issued being n ot e v en to be d e p o s ed as a g u a r a n t ee at the B a nk of F r a n ce and the other discount establishments. Y ou k n ow t h at on t he like a m o u nt t a k en from t he 25 30 Caisses des dépôts et consignations 60,000,000 h a ve b e en already a d v a n c ed by t he b a nk on t r e a s u ry b o n d s. T he m e re a p p e a r a n ce of war is eagerly grasped at by the D e c e m b r i s ts to r e m o ve t he last w e ak barriers yet standing b e t w e en t h e m s e l v es and t he national t r e a s u r y. While this p r o s p e ct of an imminent disorganization of the public credit, already m u ch shaken, per- plexes t he middle classes, t he bulk of t he p e o p le will be e x a s p e r a t ed at t he p r o p o s ed increase of the salt t ax a nd similar m o st u n p o p u l ar imposts. T h u s, this w ar which is sure to gain for B o n a p a r te a sort of popularity in foreign countries, m a y, n e v e r t h e l e s s, accelerate his downfall in F r a n c e. 35 40 T h at I w as right in p r e s u m i ng t he p r e s e nt Spanish troubles as likely to afford t he occasion for serious misunderstandings b e t w e en F r a n ce a nd England, o ne m ay infer from the following intelligence of a L o n d on p a p e r: 101 Karl Marx " T he F r e n ch E m p e r or has m a de inquiries of L o rd Clarendon, t h r o u gh M r. W a l e w s k i, w h e t h er the British G o v e r n m e nt w o u ld be disposed to aid him in placing t he Carlist Pretender to t he C r o wn of Spain u p on t he t h r o n e, in the e v e nt of Q u e en Isabella being d e t h r o n e d. L o rd C l a r e n d on is said to h a ve declared that, happily, Q u e en Isabella w as firmly seated on her t h r o n e, a nd t h at a revolution w as b ut a r e m o te contingency in a c o u n t ry so d e v o t ed to monarchial institutions; but that e v en if a revolution should b r e ak out in Spain a nd the Q u e en be d e t h r o n e d, the British C a b i n et m u st decline to enter into a ny engagements. T he E m p e r o r 's p r o p o s al to place t he C o m te de M o n t e m o ün u p on t he t h r o ne is inspired by his v e ry natural desire to p r e v e nt the D u c h e ss of M o n t p e n s i er from inheriting her sister's d i a d e m; for he thinks it would be inconvenient that he should h a ve for a neighbor a son of L o u is Philippe as h u s b a nd of t he Q u e en of S p a i n ." 5 10 15 In F r i d a y 's sitting of the C o m m o ns L o rd J o hn Russell stated that he w as forced to w i t h d r aw his R e f o rm bill for t he m o m e n t, w h i c h, h o w e v e r, would be p r o c e e d ed with on the 27th of April if, in the m e a n t i m e, in c o n s e q u e n ce of t he n ew proposal m a de to t he E m p e r or of R u s s ia being a c c e p t e d, t he E a s t e rn Q u e s t i on w as settled. It is true that after t he publication of the C z a r 's manifesto to his subjects and his letter a d d r e s s ed to B o n a p a r t e, s u ch a 20 settlement has b e c o me m o re improbable t h an e v er b e f o r e, b u t, n e v e r t h e l e s s, t he ministerial declaration p r o v es the R e f o rm bill to h a ve b e en brought f o r w a rd only w i th a view to a b s o rb and a p p e a se public opinion in c a se t he coalition diplomacy should succeed in reestablishing t he Russian status quo ante bellum. T he e m i n e nt p a rt t a k en by L o rd P a l m e r s t on in his 25 ministerial intrigue is t h us described by The Morning Advertiser, o ne of his m o st a r d e nt p a r t i s a n s: " L o rd A b e r d e en is t he nominal, b ut not t he real P r i me Minister. L o rd P a l m e r s t on is practically the first Minister of the C r o w n. He is the m a s t e r spirit of the Cabinet. E v er since his return to office, his colleagues h a ve b e en in c o n s t a nt fear of his again flying off from t h em at a tangent, and are c o n s e q u e n t ly afraid to t h w a rt any of those views to w h i ch he is k n o wn to a t t a ch i m p o r t a n c e. He has consequently everything his o wn w a y. A striking instance of his L o r d s h i p 's a s c e n d e n cy in her M a j e s t y 's Councils w as af forded last w e e k. T he n ew R e f o rm bill w as t h en b r o u g ht formally u n d er t he consideration of the Cabinet, and the question c a me to be w h e t h er it should be p r o c e e d ed with this session or a b a n d o n e d. L o rd A b e r d e e n, L o rd J o hn Russell, Sir J a m es G r a h a m, and Sir William M o l e s w o r t h, w e re for proceeding with t he m e a s u r e. L o rd Palmerston p r o p o s ed t h at it should be a b a n d o n e d, and intimated, in plain terms—as we stated some d a ys ago, t h at he would vote for its a b a n d o n m e nt in t he H o u se should he be defeated in t he Cabinet. T he 30 35 40 102 Opening of the Labour Parliament—English War Budget result of the discussion or conversation, w h i ch t o ok p l a c e, w a s, t h at L o rd P a l m e r s t on carried his point. T h o se o p p o s ed to him—among w h om w e re t he ministerial leader in the L o r ds and t he ministerial leader in the Commons— eventually s u c c u m b e d. A n o t h er triumph of L o rd P a l m e r s t o n, within t he last eight d a y s, has b e en the a p p o i n t m e nt of Sir Charles N a p i er to the c o m m a nd of t he Baltic fleet. It is no secret t h at b o th L o rd J o hn Russell and Sir J a m es G r a h am w e re o p p o s ed to that a p p o i n t m e n t; b ut L o rd P a l m e r s t on w as for it a nd therefore it t o ok place. N o t h i n g, t h e r e f o r e, could be m o re appropriate t h an that the noble L o rd should this evening o c c u py t he chair at t he b a n q u et to be given in the R e f o rm Club to t he gallant A d m i r a l ." Mr. Gladstone p r e s e n t ed last night to t he H o u se a novelty u n k n o wn to the present generation—a w ar budget. It w as evident from his s p e e ch that the r e a s on w hy t he G o v e r n m e nt t o ok this early opportunity of submitting his financial m e a s u r es to the H o u se w as t h at of giving a preliminary r e c o rd of the m o st disagreeable effects p r o d u c ed by w ar on private p u r s e s, t h us to cool d o wn the warlike energies of t he c o u n t r y. A n o t h er main feature of his s p e e ch w as his only asking for the sum w h i ch w o u ld be required to bring back t he 25,000 m en about to leave t he British s h o r e s, should t he w ar n ow be brought to a close. He c o m m e n c ed by explaining t he actual state of the income and ex penditure of the last financial year. This not having y et closed, he o b s e r v ed that o ne m o n th of the a m o u nt of the r e v e n ue could be only an estimate. T he total estimate of t he i n c o me of t he y e ar on t he 18th of April last h ad b e en £52,990,000, while the actual receipts of t he y e ar had r e a c h ed to no less a sum t h an £54,025,000; t h us showing an increase in t he actual i n c o me over the p r e s u m ed expenditure of £1,035,000. On t he other h a nd there h ad b e en a saving in t he expenditure b e y o nd t he estimate of £1,012,000. He t h e r e f o re calculated, that b ut for t he peculiar c i r c u m s t a n c es in w h i ch the c o u n t ry w as at p r e s e nt placed, t h e re w o u ld this y e ar be a surplus over t he e x p e n d i t u re amounting to £2,854,000. 5 10 15 20 25 30 M r. G l a d s t o ne t h en a d v e r t ed to t he results of the reductions of duty in t r o d u c ed by him. T he receipts of t he C u s t om duties, notwithstanding t h e se r e d u c t i o n s, h ad b e en £20,600,000 in 1853-'54, while in 1852-'53 they h ad only realized £20,396,000, showing an increase in t he C u s t om duties of £204,000. 35 T he reduction m a de in the d u ty u p on t ea h ad p r o d u c ed a loss of only £375,000. T he reduction of t he S t a mp duties from t h r e e p e n ce up to t en shillings to o ne uniform d u ty of o n e p e n c e, h ad increased their i n c o m e, instead of the anticipated loss taking place, to t he a m o u nt of £36,000. Mr. Gladstone p r o c e e d e d, t h en showing the result of the m e a s u r es of last Session for t he augmentation of the taxes. T he collection of t he I n c o me t ax in Ireland h ad b e en delayed by v a r i o us c i r c u m s t a n c e s, b ut it w o u ld yield 40 103 irr' Karl Marx £20,000 m o re t h an calculated u p o n. T he e x t e n s i on of the t ax u p on i n c o m e s, from £150 to £100, in G r e at Britain would p r o d u ce £100,000 b e y o nd this estimate, viz., £250,000. T he r e v e n ue from t he additional duty of o ne shilling a gallon on spirits in Scotland had p r o d u c ed an increase of only £209,000, he having estimated it at £278,000. On t he other h a n d, t he Spirit duty in Ireland h ad realized an increase of £213,000, while he h ad calculated u p on an increase of £198,000 only. T he operation of t he S u c c e s s i on duty on t he financial y e ar would p r o d u ce only half a million. So far the s t a t e m e nt of Mr. G l a d s t o ne on t he finances of Great Britain during t he last twelve m o n t h s, expiring on the 5th April. T he p r o b a b le estimate of the r e v e n ue for the y e ar 1854-'55 will b e: 5 10 I n c o m e. C u s t o ms E x c i se S t a m ps T a x es I n c o m e - t ax Post-tax C r o wn lands Old stores Miscellaneous Total income £20,175,000 14,595,000 7,090,000 3,015,000 6,275,000 1,200,000 259,000 420,000 320,000 £53,349,000 T he probable estimate of e x p e n d i t u re on the other h a nd is given as F u n d ed debt U n f u n d ed d e bt Consolidated fund A r my N a vy O r d n a n ce Commissariat Miscellaneous estimates Militia P a c k et service E a s t e rn service Total expenditure Causing a deficit of £27,000,000 546,000 2,460,000 6,857,000 7,488,000 3,846,000 645,000 4,775,000 530,000 792,000 1,250,000 £56,189,000 2,840,000 15 20 25 30 35 Before adverting to the m e a ns by w h i ch this deficiency w as to be m a de u p, M r. G l a d s t o ne e n u m e r a t ed the m e a s u r es w h i ch G o v e r n m e nt w o u ld n ot r e c o m m e nd t he H o u se to adopt. He should n ot r e t u rn to t he re'imposition of 104 Opening of the Labour Parliament—English War Budget 5 any of t h o se reductions of duties he h ad p r o p o s ed last year, which h ad already acquired t he force of law. He w o u ld n ot assent to t he re'imposition of t h e se t a x es unnecessarily w h i ch f o r m er G o v e r n m e n ts h ad released. If h o w e v e r, t he struggle t h ey w e re n ow entering u p on should be prolonged for a year, it w o u ld hardly be in their p o w er to maintain a p e r m a n e nt c o n t i n u a n ce of t h o se r e d u c t i o n s. In general, he w o u ld n ot p r o p o se a ny addition to indirect taxation. He should n ot r e s o rt to state-loans, t h e re being no c o u n t ry w h o se m e a ns w e re already so heavily mortgaged as t h o se of England. At length, after all t h e se p r e a m b l e s, Mr. G l a d s t o ne c a me to t he a n n o u n c e m e nt w h at t he 15 10 G o v e r n m e nt intended to p r o p o s e. This w as to double t he I n c o m e - t ax for six m o n t h s, and to abolish altogether t he existing distinction b e t w e en h o m e- d r a wn and foreign-drawn bills. T he average r a te of duty on p r e s e nt bills of e x c h a n g e, although unequally distributed, w as I s. 6d. p er cent.; he p r o p o s ed to equalize it to I s. per cent. This c h a n g e, he calculated, w o u ld p r o d u ce an increase of r e v e n ue of £60,000. With regard to t he income-tax, t he i n c r e a se would be from 7 to 1072d. in t he p o u nd on i n c o m es of £150 and u p w a r d, a nd from 5 to 7V2d. on i n c o m es b e t w e en £100 a nd £150. Simultaneously he p r o p o s ed that t he H o u se should m a ke a proposition to enable him, before t he t ax w as levied, to issue £1,750,000 e x c h e q u er bills to be paid o ut of t he accruing p r o d u ce of t he income-tax. In conclusion, M r. G l a d s t o ne e n d e a v ored, not v e ry successfully, to vindicate his late m e a s u r es for t he reduction of t he public debt, m e a s u r es w h i ch resulted, as y ou k n o w, in a lamentable failure. 20 30 25 In the discussion following u p on this s t a t e m e nt several m e m b e rs p a r t o o k, b ut t he only s p e e ch w o r th mentioning w as t h at of Mr. Disraeli. He declared t h at he should m a ke no opposition to a ny v o te w h i ch G o v e r n m e n t, on their o wn responsibility, t h o u g ht n e c e s s a ry to submit to t he H o u se for t he p u r p o se of conducting the impending w ar w i th vigor, a nd he h o p ed w i th success. B ut he protested, in c a se of t he w ar being prolonged, against direct taxation being exclusively h ad r e c o u r se to for carrying on t he w a r. As to t he second p a rt of Mr. G l a d s t o n e 's statement, t h at w h i ch related to t he actual state of t he finances of t he c o u n t r y, and as to t he m o n ey in h a n d, it s e e m ed to him involved in an obscurity which did n ot b e c o me a financial statement, and certainly n ot o ne delivered u n d er such c i r c u m s t a n c es as t he p r e s e nt o n e. T he p r e s e nt state of t he b a l a n ce in t he E x c h e q u er w as n ot sufficient or satis factory. W h en the p r e s e nt G o v e r n m e nt t o ok office, t h e re had b e e n, on t he 3d J a n u a r y, 1853, b a l a n c es in t he E x c h e q u er amounting to £9,000,000, b ut a y e ar after, in J a n u a r y, 1854, t h ey w e re r e d u c ed by one-half. He estimated t h at t he b a l a n c es in t he E x c h e q u er on April 5th n e xt would be £3,000,000, 40 while the e x p e n d i t u r e, consisting of t he dividends for t he p a y m e nt of t he public creditors a nd t he e x e c u t i on of his c o n v e r s i on s c h e me would altogether 35 105 Karl Marx require from £9,000,000 to £10,000,000. T he right honorable gentlemen said t h e re w as no u se of meeting this with b a l a n c es in t he E x c h e q u e r, but that he would m a ke up the sum w a n t ed by deficiency bills. He maintained that it w as of great importance t h ey should h a ve had at this m o m e nt an ample b a l a n ce b ut instead of its being a question w h e t h er t h ey w e re to h a ve a b a l a n c e, or an excess of b a l a n c e s, it w as n ow a question w h e t h er t h ey w e re to h a ve a balance at all, or a large deficiency, and in fact, instead of having any balance, t h ey had an e n o r m o us deficiency, which h ad b e en c a u s ed in t wo w a ys by the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r. First, by having r e d u c ed the interest on E x c h e q u er bills to IV2 per cent, w h en t he value of m o n ey w as rising, a nd secondly by his ill-devised c o n v e r s i on of t he S o u th S ea stocks, a m e a s u re which h ad not only e a t en up his balances b ut left him in a p r e s e nt deficiency of £2,000,000. 5 10 S o me further r e m a r ks of an indifferent c h a r a c t er having b e en m a de by other m e m b e r s, the R e p o rt on Supply w as brought up and t he resolution agreed t o. 15 Karl M a r x. 106 Karl Marx Letter to the Labour Parliament The People's Paper. Nr. 98, 18. März 1854 28, D e an Street, S o h o, L o n d o n. 9th M a r c h, 1854. 5 10 15 20 25 30 I regret deeply to be unable, for the m o m e nt at least, to leave L o n d o n, a nd t h us to be p r e v e n t ed from expressing verbally my feelings of pride a nd gratitude on receiving the invitation to sit as H o n o r a ry Delegate at t he L a b o ur Parliament. T he m e re assembling of such a Parliament m a r ks a n ew e p o ch in the history of the world. T he n e ws of this great fact will arouse the h o p es of t he working classes t h r o u g h o ut E u r o pe and America. G r e at Britain, of all other countries, has s e en developed on the greatest scale, the d e s p o t i sm of Capital a nd t he slavery of L a b o u r. In no other c o u n t ry h a ve the intermediate stations b e t w e en t he millionaire c o m m a n d i ng w h o le industrial armies and t he wages-slave living only from h a nd to m o u th so gradually b e en s w e pt a w ay from t he soil. T h e re exist h e re no longer, as in continental countries, large classes of p e a s a n ts a nd artisans almost equally d e p e n d e nt on their o wn p r o p e r ty a nd their o wn labour. A complete divorce of p r o p e r ty from labour has b e en effected in G r e at Britain. In no other c o u n t r y, therefore, the w ar b e t w e en t he t wo classes t h at constitute m o d e rn society h as a s s u m ed so colossal dimensions a nd features so distinct a nd palpable. B ut it is precisely from t h e se facts t h at the w o r k i ng classes of G r e at Britain, before all o t h e r s, are c o m p e t e nt a nd called for to act as leaders in the great m o v e m e nt that m u st finally result in t he absolute emancipation of L a b o u r. S u ch t h ey are from t he c o n s c i o us clearness of their position, t he v a st superiority of their n u m b e r s, t he disastrous struggles of their past, and t he moral strength of their present. It is t he working millions of G r e at Britain w ho first h a ve laid d o wn t he real basis of a n ew society—modern industry, w h i ch transformed t he destructive agencies of n a t u re into t he p r o d u c t i ve p o w er of m a n. T he English working classes, with invincible energies, by t he s w e at of their b r o ws a nd b r a i n s, h a ve called into life the material m e a ns of ennobling labour itself, a nd of multiplying its fruits to such a degree as to m a ke general a b u n d a n ce possible. 107 Karl Marx By creating the inexhaustible productive p o w e rs of m o d e rn industry t h ey h a ve fulfilled t he first condition of t he e m a n c i p a t i on of labour. T h ey h a ve n ow to realise its other condition. T h ey h a ve to free t h o se wealth-producing p o w e rs from the infamous shackles of m o n o p o l y, a nd subject t h em to the joint control of the p r o d u c e r s, w h o, till n o w, allowed t he v e ry p r o d u c ts of their h a n ds to t u rn against t h em and be t r a n s f o r m ed into as m a ny i n s t r u m e n ts of their o wn subjugation. T he labouring classes h a ve c o n q u e r ed n a t u r e; t h ey h a ve n ow to c o n q u er m e n. To s u c c e ed in this a t t e m pt t h ey do n ot w a nt strength, b ut t he organisa tion of their c o m m on strength, organisation of the labouring classes on a national scale—such, I suppose, is t he great and glorious e nd aimed at by the L a b o ur Parliament. If the L a b o ur Parliament p r o v es true to the idea t h at called it into life, s o me future historian will h a ve to r e c o rd t h at t h e re existed in t he y e ar 1854 t wo Parliaments in E n g l a n d, a Parliament at L o n d o n, and a Parliament at M a n- Chester—a Parliament of the rich, a nd a Parliament of t he poor—but that m en sat only in the Parliament of the m en and n ot in t he Parliament of the m a s t e r s. 5 10 15 Y o u rs truly, K a rl M a r x. 20 108 T he P e o p l e 's Paper. London. N r . 9 8, 1 8 . M ä rz 1854. Titelseite (Ausschnitt) mit Marx' „ L e t t er to t he Labour P a r l i a m e n t" Karl Marx The Labour Parliament New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4039, 29. März 1854 The Labor Parliament. F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. L o n d o n, F r i d a y, M a r ch 10, 1854. 5 10 15 20 25 Of all countries G r e at Britain has seen d e v e l o p ed on the grandest scale the d e s p o t i sm of capital a nd t he slavery of labor. In no other c o u n t ry h a ve t he intermediate degrees b e t w e en the millionaire, c o m m a n d i ng whole industrial armies, and t he wages-slave living only from h a nd to m o u t h, so radically b e en s w e pt a w ay from t he soil. T h e re exist no longer, as in continental countries, large classes of p e a s a n ts a nd artizans almost equally d e p e n d e nt on their o wn p r o p e r ty and their o wn labor. A c o m p l e te divorce of p r o p e r ty from labor h as b e en effected in Great Britain. In no other c o u n t r y, therefore, has t he w ar b e t w e en the t wo classes t h at constitute m o d e rn society, assumed so colossal dimensions and features so distinct and palpable. B ut it is precisely from t h e se facts t h at the w o r k i ng classes of Britain, b e f o re all o t h e r s, are c o m p e t e nt a nd called u p on to act as leaders in t he great m o v e m e nt t h at m u st finally result in the absolute emancipation of labor. S u ch they are from the c o n s c i o us clearness of their position, the v a st superi ority of their n u m b e r s, the disastrous struggles of their p a st and the moral strength of their present. T he L o n d on daily p a p e rs o b s e r ve the "policy of a b s t e n t i o n" with r e s p e ct to t he proceedings of t he L a b or Parliament. T h ey h o pe to kill it by a v a st "conspiration de silence. " H a v i ng for w h o le m o n t hs fatigued t he public with interminable articles on t he probable c h a n c es of realization for the s c h e me of s u ch a Parliament, n ow they purposely avoid e v er mentioning that it h as actually sprung into life and already b e g un to work. This w i s d om of t he ostrich, that imagines it avoids dangers by feigning n ot to see t h e m, will n ot do now-a-days. T h ey will be forced to notice t he L a b or Parliament, and, notwithstanding their simulated indifference, s o me future historian will 111 Karl Marx r e c o rd t h at t h e re existed in the y e ar 1854 t wo Parliaments in England, a Parliament in L o n d on and a Parliament in M a n c h e s t e r, a Parliament of t he rich a nd a Parliament of the poor, but that m en sat only in the Parliament of the m e n, a nd n ot in the Parliament of the m a s t e r s. T he following is the r e p o rt of t he C o m m i t t ee appointed to d r aw up a plan of action for t he L a b or Parliament: " Y o ur C o m m i t t ee believe the duty of this P a r l i a m e nt to be the r e n d e r ing of t he existing turn-outs a nd lockouts victorious for the operatives, a nd t he adoption of m e a ns w h e r e by b o th should be p r e v e n t ed for the f u t u r e; t he securing for t he working classes fair t r e a t m e nt during w o r k; t he rescuing of w o m en and children from the factory; the m e a ns of education, a nd the abolition of stoppages and u n d e r h a nd a b a t e m e n ts of w a g e s. Believing further t h at it is their d u ty to e n d e a v or to secure to t h o se w ho labor a fair participa tion in t he profits of their w o r k; and a b o ve all this, to obtain for t h em t he m e a ns of i n d e p e n d e nt self-employment, w i th a view to their, emancipation from wages slavery altogether; and, being c o n v i n c ed t h at t he final step t h e r e to is the obtaining the pecuniary leverage for action, r e c o m m e nd for y o ur consideration: 1. T he organization of a system for the collection of a national r e v e n ue 5 10 15 for labor. 2. A plan for t he security of the funds t h us raised. 3. T he application of t he same and the securing of t he rights of t he w o r k i ng classes. 4. T he constitution of the M a ss M o v e m e n t. I. The Raising of a National Labor Revenue. a. A w e e k ly levy on the w a g e s, graduated according to the price of labor, 20 25 as follows: Up to 4 s. p er w e ek Up to 8s. per w e ek Up to 12s. per w e ek Up to 15s. per w e ek Up to 20s. per w e ek Up to 30s. per w e ek Up to 40s. per w e ek il2d. 3Uá. I d. llh' s h o o k t he Peninsula from o ne e nd to the o t h e r; a m o v e m e nt to be c o m p a r ed only, from the rapidity of its spreading, to t he p r e s e nt o n e. M o d e r a d os a nd Progresistas c o m b i n ed for the one object of getting rid of the R e g e n t. T he crisis took him quite unawares—the fatal hour found h im u n p r e p a r e d. N a r v a e z, a c c o m p a n i ed by O'Donnell, C o n c ha a nd Pezuela, l a n d ed w i th a handful of m en at Valencia. On their side all w as rapidity and action, considerate audacity, energetic decision. On t he side of E s p a r t e ro all w as helpless hesitation, deadly delay, apathetic irresolution, indolent w e a k n e s s. While N a r v a ez raised the siege of Teruel, and m a r c h ed into Aragon, E s p a r t e ro retired from Madrid, and c o n s u m ed w h o le w e e ks in u n a c c o u n t a b le inactivity at Albacete. W h en N a r v a ez h ad w on o v er the corps of S e o a ne and Z u r b a no at Torrejon, a nd w as marching on Madrid, E s p a r t e ro at length effected a junction with V an H a l e n, for the useless and odious b o m b a r d m e nt of Seville. He t h en fled from station to station, at e v e ry step of his retreat deserted by his t r o o p s, till at last he r e a c h ed the coast. W h en he e m b a r k ed at Cadiz, t h at town, the last w h e re he retained a p a r t y, b a de its h e ro farewell by also p r o n o u n c i ng against him. An E n g l i s h m an w ho resided in Spain during the c a t a s t r o p h e, gives a graphic description of t he sliding-scale of E s p a r t e r o 's greatness : " It w as n ot t he t r e m e n d o us c r a sh of an instant, after a well-fought field, but a little and bit by bit descent, after no fighting at all, from Madrid to Ciudad Real, from Ciudad Real to A l b a c e t e, from Albacete to C o r d o v a, from C o r d o va to Seville, from Seville to P o rt St. Mary, a nd t h e n ce to t he w i de o c e a n. He fell from idolatry to e n t h u s i a s m, from enthusiasm to attach ment, from a t t a c h m e nt to respect, from r e s p e ct to indifference, from indif ference to c o n t e m p t, from c o n t e m pt to h a t r e d, and from hatred he fell into t he s e a ." H ow could E s p a r t e ro h a ve n ow again b e c o me the savior of the c o u n t r y, 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 377 Karl Marx a nd " s w o rd of t he revolution," as he is called? This e v e nt w o u ld be quite incomprehensible w e re it not for the ten y e a rs of r e a c t i on Spain h as suffered u n d er t he brutal dictatorship of N a r v a e z, and t he b r o o d i ng y o ke of t he Q u e e n 's m i n i o n s, w ho supplanted him. E x t e n s i ve a nd violent e p o c hs of r e a c t i on are wonderfully fitted for reestablishing t he fallen m en of révolu- tionary miscarriages. T he greater the imaginative p o w e rs of a people—and w h e re is imagination greater t h an in t he s o u th of Europe?—the m o re irre sistible their impulse to o p p o se to individual incarnations of despotism individual incarnations of t he revolution. As t h ey c a n n ot improvise t h em at o n c e, t h ey e x c a v a te the dead m en of their previous m o v e m e n t s. W as n ot N a r v a ez himself on t he point of growing popular at t he e x p e n se of Sartorius? T he E s p a r t e ro w h o, on the 29th of July, held his t r i u m p h a nt e n t r a n ce into Madrid, was no real m a n; he was a ghost, a n a m e, a r e m i n i s c e n c e. It is b ut d ue to justice to r e c o rd that E s p a r t e ro n e v er professed to be anything b ut a constitutional monarchist; a nd if t h e re h ad e v er existed any d o u bt u p on t h at point, it m u st h a ve disappeared before the enthusiastic r e c e p t i on he m et with during his exile, at W i n d s or Castle a nd from the governing classes of England. W h en he arrived in L o n d on t he w h o le aristoc r a cy flocked to his a b o d e, the D u ke of Wellington a nd P a l m e r s t on at their h e a d. A b e r d e e n, in his quality of Foreign Minister, sent him an invitation to be p r e s e n t ed to t he Q u e e n; the L o rd Mayor a nd the A l d e r m en of t he city entertained him w i th gastronomic h o m a g es at the M a n s i on H o u s e; a nd w h en it b e c a me k n o wn t h at the Spanish Cincinnatus p a s s ed his leisure h o u rs in gardening, t h e re w as no Botanical, or Horticultural, or Agricultural Society w h i ch w as not eager to p r e s e nt him with m e m b e r s h i p. He w as quite t he lion of that metropolis. At the e nd of 1847 an a m n e s ty recalled t he Spanish exiles, a nd t he d e c r ee of Q u e en Isabella appointed h im a S e n a t o r. He w a s, h o w e v e r, n ot allowed to leave England before Q u e en Victoria had invited him and his D u c h e ss to h er table, adding the extraordinary h o n or of offering t h em a night's lodging at W i n d s or Castle. It is t r u e, we believe, t h at this halo t h r o wn r o u nd his p e r s on w as s o m e w h at c o n n e c t ed with t he supposition t h at E s p a r tero had b e en and still w as the representative of British interests in Spain. It is no less t r ue that the E s p a r t e ro d e m o n s t r a t i on l o o k ed something like a d e m o n s t r a t i on against L o u is Philippe. 5 10 15 20 25 30 On his r e t u rn to Spain he received deputation u p on d e p u t a t i o n, gratula- tions u p on g r a d u a t i o n s, and t he city of Barcelona d i s p a t c h ed an e x p r e ss m e s s e n g er to apologize for its bad behaviour in 1843. B ut has a n y b o dy e v er h e a rd his n a me mentioned during the fatal period from J a n u a r y, 1846, till t he late e v e n t s? H as he ever raised his voice during t h at dead silence of degraded Spain? Is t h e re r e c o r d ed one single act of patriotic r e s i s t a n ce on his p a r t? He quietly retires to his estate at L o g r o ñ o, cultivating his c a b b a g es a nd flow- 35 40 378 Espartero e r s, waiting his time. He did not go e v en to t he revolution till t he revolution c a me for him. He did m o re t h an M a h o m e t. He e x p e c t ed the m o u n t a in to c o me to him, and t he m o u n t a in c a m e. Still t h e re is o ne exception to be m e n t i o n e d. W h en the revolution of F e b r u a ry b u r st out, followed by the general E u r o p e an e a r t h q u a k e, he c a u s ed to be published by Señor de Prin cipe, and s o me other friends, a little p a m p h l et entitled "Espartero, his Past, his Present, his Future, " to r e m i nd Spain t h at it still h a r b o r ed t he m an of the past, the present, and the future. T he revolutionary m o v e m e nt s o on subsiding in F r a n c e, t he m an of t he past, of t he p r e s e n t, and of t he future o n ce m o re sank into oblivion. E s p a r t e ro w as b o rn at Granátula, in La M a n c h a, and like his famous fellow-countryman, he also has his fixed idea—the Constitution; a nd his Dulcinea del Toboso—Queen Isabella. On J a n u a ry 8,1848, w h en he r e t u r n ed from his English exile to Madrid, he w as r e c e i v ed by t he Q u e en a nd t o ok leave of her with t he following w o r d s: "I p r ay your Majesty to call me w h e n e v er y ou w a nt an a rm to defend, or a h e a rt to love y o u ." H er Majesty h as n ow called and her knight-érrant a p p e a r s, smoothing the revolutionary w a v e s, enervating t he m a s s es by a delusive calm, allowing Christina, San L u is and the rest to hide t h e m s e l v es in t he p a l a c e, a nd loudly professing his u n b r o k en faith in t he w o r ds of t he innocent Isabella. 5 10 15 20 It is k n o wn that this v e ry t r u s t w o r t hy Q u e e n, w h o se features are said to a s s u me y e ar after y e ar a m o re striking r e s e m b l a n ce to t h o se of Fer dinand V I I, of infamous m e m o r y, h ad her majority proclaimed on N o v. 15, 1843. She w as t h en only 13 years old on N o v. 21 of t he s a me year. Olozaga, 25 w h om L o p ez h ad constituted her tutor for t h r ee m o n t h s, formed a Ministry o b n o x i o us to the Camarilla and t he C o r t es newly elected u n d er t he im pression of the first success of N a r v a e z. He w a n t ed to dissolve the C o r t e s, a nd obtained a royal d e c r ee signed by t he Q u e en giving him p o w er to do so, b ut leaving the date of its promulgation blank. On the evening of the 28th, 30 Olozaga h ad the d e c r ee delivered to him from t he h a n ds of the Queen. On the evening of the 29th he had a n o t h er interview with her; b ut he had hardly left her w h en an U n d e r - S e c r e t a ry of State c a me to his h o u s e, and informed him that he w as dismissed, and d e m a n d ed b a ck the d e c r ee w h i ch he h ad forced t he Q u e en to sign. Olozaga, a l a w y er by profession, w as t oo sharp a m an to be e n s n a r ed in this w a y. He did n ot r e t u rn the d o c u m e nt till the following day, after having s h o wn it to at least o ne h u n d r ed deputies, in proof t h at the signature of the Q u e en w as in her usual, regular handwriting. On D e c. 13, G o n z a l ez B r a v o, appointed as P r e m i e r, s u m m o n ed the Presidents of the C h a m b e r s, the principal Madrid notables, N a r v a e z, the Marquis de la Santa C r u z, and o t h e r s, to the Q u e en t h at she might m a ke a declaration to t h em concerning w h at had p a s s ed b e t w e en h er and Olozaga on the evening 40 35 379 Karl Marx of N o v. 28. T he innocent little Q u e en led t h em into t he r o om w h e re she h ad received Olozaga, and enacted in a v e ry lively, b ut r a t h er o v e r d o ne m a n n e r, a little d r a ma for their instruction. T h us h ad Olozaga b o l t ed t he door, t h us seized h er d r e s s, thus obliged her to sit d o w n, t h us c o n d u c t ed her h a n d, t h us forced h er signature to t he d e c r e e, in o ne w o r d, t h us h ad he violated h er royal dignity. During this scene Gonzalez B r a vo t o ok n o te of t h e se declarations, while t he p e r s o ns p r e s e nt saw t he alleged d e c r ee w h i ch a p p e a r ed to be signed in a blotted a nd tremulous h a n d. T h u s, on the solemn declaration of t he Q u e e n, Olozaga w as to be c o n d e m n ed for t he c r i me of laesa majestas, to be t o rn in pieces by four h o r s e s, or at the b e s t, to be b a n i s h ed for life to the Philippines. But, as we h a ve seen, he h ad t a k en his m e a s u r es of precaution. T h en followed s e v e n t e en d a y s' d e b a te in the C o r t e s, creating a sensation greater e v en t h an that p r o d u c ed by t he f a m o us trial of Q u e en Caroline in England. Olozaga's defense in the Cortes contained a m o ng other things this p a s s a g e: "If t h ey tell us t h at t he w o rd of t he Q u e en is to be believed without question, I a n s w e r, N o! T h e re is either a c h a r g e, or t h e re is n o n e. If t h e re b e, t h at w o rd is a testimony, like any other, and to t h at t e s t i m o ny I o p p o se m i n e ." In t he b a l a n ce of the C o r t es the w o rd of Olozaga w as found to be heavier t h an t h at of t he Queen. Afterward he fled to Portugal to e s c a pe t he assassins sent against him. This w as Isabella's first entrechaton t he political stage of Spain, and t he first proof of her h o n e s t y. A nd this is the s a me little Q u e en w h o se w o r ds E s p a r t e ro n ow e x h o r ts the p e o p le to t r u st in, and to w h om is offered, after eleven y e a r s' school for scandal, t he " d e f e n d i ng a r m ," a nd the "loving h e a r t" of the " S w o rd of the R e v o l u t i o n ." O ur r e a d e rs c an judge w h e t h er t he Spanish Revolution is likely to h a ve any useful result or not. 5 10 15 20 25 380 τ L Friedrich Engels The Attack on the Russian Forts The Attack on the Russian Forts. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4162, 21. August 1854 At last it s e e ms t h at t he allied F r e n ch a nd English a re to m a ke a genuine a t t a ck on Russia. T he o u t m o st fortifications of t he E m p i r e, on t he Aland Isles a nd at S e v a s t o p ol in t he Black Sea, a re successively, if n ot simultaneously, 5 to be assailed. I n d e e d, it is r u m o r ed in w e s t e rn E u r o pe t h at t he former point h as already b e en t a k en after a brief b o m b a r d m e n t, b ut t he r e p o rt w a n ts confirmation, a nd is p r o b a b ly p r e m a t u r e. As for t he a t t e m pt u p on S e v a s t o p ol we h a ve no official information t h at it is to be m a d e, b ut it is positively a s s e r t ed by The London Times a nd generally b e l i e v ed in t h at city. So far 10 o n ly a couple of divisions of F r e n ch a nd English t r o o ps h a ve b e en e m b a r k ed at Varna, a nd t h o u gh it is s u p p o s ed t h ey f o rm p a rt of t he e x p e d i t i on to t he C r i m e a, it is possible, on t he o t h er h a n d, t h at t h ey a re destined to besiege t he R u s s i an fortress of A n a pa in Asia. On this p o i nt all d o u bt will p r o b a b ly be r e m o v ed by t he arrival of t he n e xt s t e a m e r. 15 T he a t t a ck u p on B o m a r s u nd will be an e v e nt of great military interest. It will be t he first t i me t h at M o n t a l e m b e r t 's c a s e m a t ed town-fortifications a re p ut to t he proof. To judge from views a nd p l a ns of t he p l a c e, t he forts t h e r e, although on a far smaller scale t h an t h o se of Helsingfors, C r o n s t a d t, or S e v a s t o p o l, a re d e f e n d ed against a land a t t a ck as m u ch as against a b o m b a r d- 20 m e nt by ships, a nd are exclusively c o n s t r u c t ed u p on M o n t a l e m b e r t 's princi­ ples. A long bomb-proof fort, w i th a b o ut o ne h u n d r ed guns flanked by t e m p o r a ry e a r th w o r k s, f o r ms t he m a in d e f e n se against ships, while it is c o m m a n d ed a nd p r o t e c t ed in t he r e ar by large t o w e r s, m o u n t i ng o ne thirty, a nd o ne t en guns. While t he m a in fort would chiefly engage t he ships, t he 25 a t t a ck on t he t o w e rs w o u ld o c c u py t he land f o r c e s. A c c o r d i ng to o ur last a c c o u n ts t he garrison is v e ry m u ch w e a k er t h an we h ad s u p p o s e d; it consists of b ut little m o re t h an t h r ee t h o u s a nd m e n. It is n ot quite clear, from t he i n f o r m a t i on attainable, h ow far t he sea-attack a nd t he land-attack c a n, n ot m e r e ly c o i n c i d e, b ut actually c o o p e r a te a nd s u p p o rt e a ch o t h e r; for a sea- 30 a t t a ck is necessarily an a t t a ck de vive force, w h i ch m u st be d e c i d ed in a v e ry 381 Friedrich Engels short time, while any land-attack against m a s o n ry p r e s u p p o s es p r e p a r a t o ry o p e r a t i o n s, with at least o ne parallel and b a t t e r i e s, a nd t h e r e f o re is a matter of s o me duration. This kind of questions, h o w e v e r, c an only be decided on t he spot. At all events the taking of B o m a r s u nd will h a v e, in a military point of v i e w, a far higher interest t h an e v en the c a p t u re of S e v a s t o p o l, i n a s m u ch as it contributes to t he solution of a much-discussed question, while t he latter feat w o u ld merely be the successful carrying o ut of old-established military rules. T he p r o p o s ed attack u p on Sevastopol is to be mainly e x e c u t ed by land f o r c e s; while t he action of t he fleets must be almost entirely confined to t he close b l o c k a de of the harbor. It thus a m o u n ts to a land a nd sea blockade of a sea-port incompletely fortified on t he land side. We h a ve no m e a ns of knowing w h at fortifications m ay h a ve b e en raised by t he R u s s i a ns on the s o u th of t he t o wn and bay; but that they h a ve established r e d o u b ts and lines w h i ch m ay necessitate a regular siege, unless great sacrifices are submitted t o, t h e re c an hardly be a question. At all e v e n t s, we k n ow t h at a p e r m a n e nt and to all a p p e a r a n ce well-constructed fort—a large square with ample ditch- defenses on e a ch of its sides, and mortar-batteries in e a ch of its salient angles—crowns the hill on the north of the b a y, just opposite the town. T h at hill is t he only position near the t o wn which a p p e a rs n ot to be c o m m a n d ed within gun-range by other hights, and which itself c o m m a n ds the b ay and its opposite slope. H e r e, then, at all e v e n t s, will be the chief r e s i s t a n c e; b ut it m ay be doubted if the possession of the t o wn and h a r b or c an be maintained, e v en if all coast-forts on t he southern shore are t a k e n, unless this fort is r e d u c e d. T h e re will be some regular siege w o r k, t h e r e, at least. N o w, the e x t e nt of the b ay from C a pe Constantine to its h e ad is a b o ut eight miles; and allowing a m o d e r a te range to the t o wn and forts, t he allied forces w o u ld h a ve to e x t e nd on a semi-circle of t w e n t y - t wo or twenty-four miles a r o u nd t h e m, in order to insure the blockade on land. T h ey m u st be strong e n o u gh on all points to resist t he sallies of the garrison, and t he a t t a c ks of a ny t r o o ps w h i ch might be collected in their rear. Although we h a ve no m e a ns of knowing t he forces which R u s s ia c an bring directly or indirectly to t he defense of her Black S ea stronghold, yet t h e se details show that no inconsiderable b o dy of t r o o ps is required for its capture. T h e re is, b e s i d e s, a d a n g e r o us e n e my to be e n c o u n t e r ed in the deadly climate of the L o w er C r i m e a. As in this a t t a ck t he strand-batteries c an be hardly of any utility to t he R u s s i a n s, the a t t e m pt m u st lose a great deal of its military interest, r e d u c i ng itself to a siege of v e ry large, b ut by no m e a ns u n p r e c e d e n t e d, proportions. T he force destined for the m o v e m e nt is n o w h e re stated at a b o ve 100,000 m e n, including a de t a c h m e nt of T u r k s. Taking all the circumstances into a c c o u n t, this a r my d o es n ot seem sufficient for the p u r p o s e. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 382 F Karl Marx Evacuation of the Danubian Principalities— The Events in Spain— A New Danish Constitution—The Chartists F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4162, 21. August 1854 L o n d o n, T u e s d a y, Aug. 8, 1854. 5 io 15 On t he 28th ult. Prince Gorchakof f p a s s ed with t he c e n t er of his a r my t h r o u gh Shlawa, a village a b o ut six miles from Kalugereni; leaving it again on t he 29th en route for F o k s h a n i. T he vanguard, c o m m a n d ed by Gen. Soimonoff, consists of eight battalions of the 10th division of infantry, of t he regiments of chasseurs of T o m sk and Koliwan, and of t he regiment of h u s s a rs of t he G r a nd D u k e, Heir of the E m p i r e. This v a n g u a rd w as to p a ss the Jalomnitza on t he 1st inst. at U r e s h ti and K e r e s z a n i, w h e re bridges h ad b e en con structed. It would be e x p e c t ed to arrive at F o k s h a ni a b o ut the middle of t he month. T he T u r k i sh a r my a d v a n c es in t h r ee c o l u m n s. T he center w a s, on July 29, at Kalugereni, on t he 30th skirmishers of its v a n g u a rd w e re seen at Glina, t wo miles from B u c h a r e s t, w h e re O m er P a s h a 's h e a d q u a r t e rs w e re e x p e c t ed to be established on t he 1st. T he right wing m a r c h ed along the Argish, in t he direction from Oltenitza on B u c h a r e s t. T he left w h i c h, on t he 28th, w as at Mogina, is to t a ke t he r o ad from Slatina to B u c h a r e s t. " T he retrograde m o v e m e nt of t he R u s s i an a r m y ," says t he Moniteur de l'Armée, " s e e ms to p a r t a ke more of a strategic t h an of a political character. 20 T he M u s c o v i te General finds in it the advantage of concentrating his troops in a good position w h e re they c an draw b r e a th from t he sufferings u n d e r g o ne in the Dobrodja, and inflicted u p on t h e m, on the left b a nk of the D a n u be by t he T u r k s. He will be n e a r er to his basis of approvisionnement, while continuing to o c c u py an important p o r t i on of the territory invaded last year. Finally he gets a position that is formidable, e v en in t he p r e s e n ce of superior f o r c e s ." 25 On the 26th of July B a r on B u d b e rg a d d r e s s ed the following proclamation to t he Wallachians: " H is Majesty the E m p e r or of all the R u s s i a s, K i ng of Poland, and P r o t e c t or of t he Principalities of Moldavia a nd Wallachia, a nd P r o t e c t or of all t h o se 30 383 Karl Marx w ho profess the o r t h o d ox G r e ek faith, has d e t e r m i n ed to w i t h d r aw the imperial t r o o ps for a v e ry short period from the insalubrious countries of the D a n u b e, in order to quarter them on the m o re healthy hills. T he e n e m y, in t he short-sightedness of his v i e w s, imagined t h at we retired from fear of him, and consequently he attempted to attack our t r o o ps during their retreat. B ut Prince Gorchakoff, the Commander-in-Chief, h ad hardly o r d e r ed his t r o o ps to repulse t h em w h en they fled ignominiously, abandoning their a r ms a nd ammunition, w h i ch our gallant soldiers carried a w a y. W h en t he s e a s on shall be m o re favorable we shall return to y ou in a r m s, to deliver y ou forever from the b a r b a r o us Turk. O ur retreat will be effected with caution, and w i t h o ut hurry, so t h at t he e n e my m ay not imagine that we are flying before h i m ." It is curious that in 1853, in the very same m o n th of July, the Russians found t he s e a s on n ot at all unfavorable to t he o c c u p a t i on of Wallachia. " T he emigration of the Bulgarian families from the D o b r o d j a ," says a letter from G a l a t ch published in a G e r m an paper, "is c o n s t a n t ly going on. A b o ut 1,000 families, w i th 150,000 head of cattle, h a ve c r o s s ed n e ar R e n i ." This " v o l u n t a ry emigration," to which t he inhabitants w e re invited by the R u s sians, on the p l ea of the dangers from Turkish v e n g e a n c e, is v e ry similar in c h a r a c t er to t he " v o l u n t a r y" Austrian loan. T he V i e n na c o r r e s p o n d e nt of The Morning Chronicle relates that the same families, " on learning t h at t h ey w e re to be e m p l o y ed on the fortifications in Moldavia, wished to r e t u rn to their h o m e s; but t h ey w e re forced by the C o s s a c ks to p r o c e ed to F o k s h a n i, w h e re t h ey are n ow at w o rk at the t r e n c h e s ." 5 10 15 20 T he b a r r i c a d es w e re scarcely r e m o v ed at M a d r i d, at the r e q u e st of E s p a r- t e r o, b e f o re the counter-revolution w as b u sy at w o r k. T he first counter revolutionary step w as the impunity allowed to Q u e en Christina, Sartorius, and their associates. T h en followed the formation of t he Ministry, with t he M o d e r a do O'Donnell as Minister of W a r, and the w h o le a r my placed at the disposal of this old friend of N a r v a e z. T h e re are in t he list t he n a m es of P a c h e c o, Lujan, D on Francisco S a n ta C r u z, all of t h em notorious partisans of N a r v a e z, a nd t he first a m e m b er of the infamous Ministry of 1847. A n o t h e r, Salazar, h as b e en appointed on t he sole merit of being a playfellow of E s p a r t e r o. In r e m u n e r a t i on for t he bloody sacrifices of t he p e o p l e, on t he b a r r i c a d es and in the public p l a c e, numberless d e c o r a t i o ns h a ve b e en show- e r ed u p on the E s p a r t e ro Generals on t he one h a n d, a nd on t he M o d e r a do friends of O'Donnell on the other hand. In o r d er to p a ve the w ay for an ultimate silencing of the press, the press law of 1837 has b e en reestablished. I n s t e ad of convoking a general constituent C o r t e s, E s p a r t e ro is said to intend c o n v o k i ng only t he C h a m b e rs after t he Constitution of 1837, a n d, as s o me say, e v en as modified by N a r v a e z. To secure as far as possible the success 25 30 35 40 384 ί Evacuation of the Danubian Principalities—The Events in Spain of all t h e se m e a s u r es a nd o t h e rs t h at a re to follow, large m a s s es of t r o o ps are being c o n c e n t r a t ed n e ar M a d r i d. If any c o n s i d e r a t i on p r e ss itself espe­ cially on o ur a t t e n t i on in this affair, it is t he s u d d e n n e ss w i th w h i ch t he r e a c t i on h as set in. 5 On t he first instant t he chiefs of t he b a r r i c a d es called u p on E s p a r t e r o, in o r d er to m a ke to h im s o me o b s e r v a t i o ns on t he c h o i ce of his Ministry. He e n t e r ed into a long e x p l a n a t i on on t he difficulties w i th w h i ch he w as beset, a nd e n d e a v o r ed to defend his n o m i n a t i o n s. B ut t he d e p u t i es of t he p e o p le seem to h a ve b e en little satisfied w i th his e x p l a n a t i o n. " V e ry a l a r m i n g" n e ws 10 arrives at t he s a me t i m e, a b o ut t he m o v e m e n ts of t he r e p u b l i c a ns in Valencia, Catalonia, a nd Andalusia. T he e m b a r r a s s m e nt of E s p a r t e ro is visible from his d e c r ee sanctioning t he c o n t i n u ed activity of t he provincial j u n t a s. N or h as he y et d a r ed to dissolve t he J u n ta of M a d r i d, t h o u gh his Ministry is c o m p l e te a nd installed in office. 15 20 25 On t he d e m a nd of N a p o l e on t he Little, Col. C h a r r as h as b e en expelled f r om Belgium. T he P a r is c o r r e s p o n d e nt of t he Indépendance Belge s p e a ks of a p a m p h l e t, w r i t t en a nd published by P r i n ce M u r a t, w h i ch claims t he c r o wn of K i ng B o m ba as t he legitimate inheritance of t he M u r a t s. T he p a m p h l et h ad b e en translated into Italian. T he D a n i sh Ministry obstinately persists in refusing to a c c o rd to t he w e s t e rn p o w e rs t he h a r b o rs and landing-places w h i ch w o u ld enable t h em to k e ep their forces in the Baltic during t he w i n t e r. This is, h o w e v e r, n ot t he only m a n n er in which t h at G o v e r n m e nt manifests its c o n t e m pt for t he p o w e rs a r r a y ed against its p a t r o n, t he E m p e r or of Russia. It h as n ot hesitated to m a ke its l o ng m e d i t a t ed coup d'état, o ne entirely in t he i n t e r e st of R u s s i a, in t he very face of t he fleets a nd armies of the occidental p o w e r s. On July 26 a state p a p er w as published at C o p e n h a g e n, h e a d e d: " C o n s t i t u t i on of t he D a n i sh M o n a r c hy for its c o m m on affairs." Strange to say, t he English p r e ss h as scarcely t a k en a ny notice at all of this m e a s u r e. I give you, t h e r e f o r e, t he 30 m o re i m p o r t a nt points of this n ew D a n i sh Constitution: "Section 1. T he succession of t he D a n i sh m o n a r c hy is settled by t he law of 31st July, 1853. Sec. 5. C o m m on affairs of the m o n a r c hy a re all t h o se w h i ch are n ot e x p r e s s ly stated to refer to a ny particular p a rt of it. 35 Sec. 6. T he c o m m on e x p e n s es of t he m o n a r c hy in e x c e ss of its r e c e i p ts a re to be b o r ne in t he following p r o p o r t i o n, v i z: D e n m a rk 60 p er cent.; Schleswig 17 per cent.; H o l s t e in 23 p er cent. .Sec. 7. T he c o m m on affairs of t he m o n a r c hy a re to be in charge of a Rigsrad. 40 Sec. 8. T he p r e s e nt Rigsrad will be c o m p o s ed only of m e m b e rs n o m i n a t ed by t he King. F u t u re Rigsrads a re to be partly elected. 385 Karl Marx Sec. 10. T he Rigsrad will t h en be c o m p o s ed of fifty m e m b e r s, t he King nominating t w e n t y, and the other thirty m e m b e rs will be elected in the following p r o p o r t i o n, viz: T he Diet of D e n m a rk will elect 18, the Provincial States of Schleswig 5, those of Holstein 6, a nd t he Ritterschaft of L a u e n- b u rg 1. Sec. 11. T he fundamental law of the Kingdom of D e n m a rk of 5th J u n e, 5 1849, is to be restricted to the affairs of t h at kingdom. Sec. 15. T he m e m b e rs of the Rigsrad receive an a n n u al p ay of 500 thal- e r s. Sec. 16. T he Rigsrad is to be c o n v o k ed at least o n ce within e v e ry t wo 10 y e a r s, for a t e rm as shall be decreed by t he King. Sec. 17. Its sittings are to be at C o p e n h a g e n; b ut the K i ng m ay r e m o ve t h em to any other place. Sec. 18. Its deliberations will be guided by a President, n o m i n a t ed by the King. T he d e b a t es m ay be either in the G e r m an or t he D a n i sh languages, b ut t he resolutions m u st be put in the latter. 15 Sec. 19. T he deliberations of t he Rigsrad are secret. Sec. 21. No t ax c o m m on to the w h o le M o n a r c hy c an be levied, altered, or s u p p r e s s e d, n or any loan contracted for t he w h o le M o n a r c hy without the c o n s e nt of the Rigsrad. 20 Sec. 22. T he Rigsrad has only a consultative voice in all other e x c e pt t he m o n ey affairs of the c o m m on M o n a r c h y ." A d e c r ee of t he same date c o n v o k es t he Rigsrad for Sept. 1st, 1854, and a n o t h er d e c r ee publishes the nominations of the King, the nominees being all courtiers, high functionaries, and knights of t he D a n e b r o g. 25 T he principal points gained by this n ew coup d'état a re t he s u p p r e s s i on of t he fundamental law, of t he representative institutions of D e n m a r k, a nd t he creation of an e a sy machine for the supply of as m u ch m o n ey as the C o u rt and t he G o v e r n m e nt may w a n t. E r n e st J o n es h as started on another tour t h r o u gh the manufacturing 30 districts, in o r d er to agitate t h em in favor of t he C h a r t e r. At Halifax, B a c u p, and the other localities he h as already visited, t he following petition to the Parliament w as a d o p t e d: " To the Honorable the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland in Parlia ment assembled.—The humble Petition of the Inhabitants of Bacup, in public meeting assembled, on Sunday, the 30th day of July, 1854, sheweth: T h at y o ur petitioners h a ve long and closely o b s e r v ed t he c o n d u ct of the p r e s e nt Ministers of the C r o wn in their h o me a nd foreign policy, a nd are c o n v i n c ed from calm observation t h at in b o th t h ey are utterly undeserving t he confidence of the country. 35 40 T h at y o ur petitioners feel convinced no d o m e s t ic amelioration will t a ke 386 Evacuation of the Danubian Principalities—The Events in Spain p l a c e, and no external vigor be displayed so long as such m en r e m a in at t he helm of national affairs. Y o ur petitioners therefore p r ay your honorable H o u se to p r e s e nt an a d d r e ss to the t h r o ne to the effect that her Majesty may be pleased to discard her p r e s e nt advisers, and call to h er assistance m en m o re in har m o ny with t he progressive spirit of t he age, a nd better suited to t he require m e n ts of the times. A nd your petitioners will ever p r a y ." On S u n d ay a large meeting assembled at Dirpley M o o r, B a c u p; w h e re t he agitator delivered o ne of the m o st powerful s p e e c h es e v er m a de by him, s o me e x t r a c ts from w h i ch d e s e r ve a p l a ce in y o ur j o u r n a l: " T he t i me for action has at last arrived, a nd we are c o m m e n c i ng n ow such a revival of Chartism in England as n e v er y et succeeded on a p a u se of a p a t h y. At last t he hour is drawing nigh w h en we shall h a ve the Char- ter Against the fall of wages y ou h a ve struggled a nd struggled vainly; hunger led y ou to the b r e a c h; b ut p o v e r ty w as your t e a c h e r, e v en as hunger w as y o ur drill-sergeant; a nd after e v e ry fresh fall y ou r o se in intelligence and knowledge. At first combinations a nd strikes w e re your r e m e d y. Y ou sought to c o n q u er by them—forgetting that, n ot having the m e a ns of working for y o u r s e l v e s, y ou had n ot the m e a ns of resisting the capitalist—whose p u r se sat very comfortably watching y o ur belly—seeing which could stand out longest. Y ou thought short time would do it, and w e re told that if e a ch m an w o r k ed t wo h o u rs less, t h e re would be t wo h o u r s' w o rk for t h o se who h ad not w o r k ed at all. B ut y ou forgot t h at while y ou shortened the h o u rs of labor one per cent, m o n o p o ly i n c r e a s ed m a c h i n e ry o ne h u n d r e d. 5 10 15 20 25 30 Y ou t h en flew to co-operation. Y ou c o m p a s s ed a great truth—the salva tion of labor m u st d e p e nd on co-operation—but y ou o v e r l o o k ed t he m e a ns of insuring that salvation. If y ou m a n u f a c t u r e, y ou require a market—if y ou h a ve something to sell, y ou require s o m e b o dy w ho w a n ts to b uy it—and y ou forgot that t h at s o m e b o dy w as not at h a n d. Co-operative m a n u f a c t u re starts—but w h e r e 's t he m a r k e t? W h e re t h en are y ou to get t he m a r k e t? H ow can y ou m a ke the poor rich, w h i ch alone c an enable t h em to b e c o me p u r c h a s e rs of w h at co-operation m a n u f a c t u r e s? By t h o se British Califor- nians, w h o se gold is on the surface of the soil, and tints t he waving w h e a t- field of the harvest. L o ok at your feet!—there, on the grassy b a n ks w h e r e on you sit—there, on the broad field w h e r e on y ou stand—there lies l i b e r t y- lies co-operation—there lies high wages—there lies prosperity and t h e re p e a c e! In the fifteen millions of our public lands—the t w e n t y - s e v en millions 40 of o ur uncultivated British prairies h e re at h o m e. A G r e ek fable says H e r c u l es wrestled with the giant Antaeus, w h o se m o t h er w as the E a r t h, 35 387 Karl Marx and t h r ew h im often—but every time he fell u p on his m o t h e r 's b r e a st he gained fresh force, and b o u n d ed up m o re strong. H e r c u l es discovering this, lifted him u p, and held him in t he air till he h ad c o n q u e r ed him. T h us d o es t he H e r c u l es m o n o p o ly tear giant labor from its p a r e nt soil, and hold it by t he grasp of competition, w e a k, p o w e r l e s s, and s u s p e n d e d, like Ma- hornet's t o m b, 'twixt h e a v en and h e l l - o n ly m u ch n e a r er to t he latter place! B ut h ow get to t he land? T h e re are some m en w ho tell y ou t h at political p o w er is not n e e d ed for t he p u r p o s e. W ho are t h ey w ho tell y ou so? Is it the l e a d e rs of ten p er cent, m o v e m e n t s, and ten h o u r s' m o v e m e n t s, and short t i me m o v e m e n t s, a nd restriction on machinery m o v e m e n t s, and burial club m o v e m e n t s, and partnership m o v e m e n t s, and benefit society m o v e m e n t s, a nd c h u r ch separation m o v e m e n t s, and education m o v e m e n t s, and municipal m o v e m e n t s, and all the other m o v e m e n ts b e s i d e s? W h at a lot of ' m o v e m e n t s ,' a nd yet we h a ve not moved. N ot w a nt political p o w e r? W h y, t h e se are the very m en w ho go dancing a r o u nd a political Tidd Pratt,—or send whining deputations to a political Palmerston,—or petition a political parlia m e n t, or w h e e d le a r o u nd a political t h r o n e! W h y, t h en it is political p o w er we must go to after all, by their o wn showing. Only t h o se m en tell y ou to go to the political p o w er of your enemies, and I tell y ou to go to a political p o w er of y o ur own. I lay d o wn this sovereign t r u t h: 5 10 15 20 25 The charter is the universal remedy. W h at h a ve we o p p o s ed to u s? First, a coalition ministry. W h at d o es it m e a n? T he leaders of factions, not one of which c an stand alone. S o me d o z en m e n, too w e ak to stand on their o wn legs, and so they lean against e a ch other, a nd t he whole lot of t h em c a n 't m a ke o ne p r o p er m an at last. T h at is a coalition. W h at h a ve we besides? A T o ry opposition that w o u ld kick t h em o ut b ut d a re not; for it k n o ws that it would be k i c k ed out in t u r n; and t h en c o m es the deluge, in which N o ah himself could n ot save class g o v e r n m e n t. W h at h a ve we else? A landed aristocracy, three-fourths of w h o se estates are mortgaged for a b o ve two-thirds of their value—a glorious p o w er t h at to c r u sh a p e o p l e! 38,000 b a n k r u pt landlords, with 300,000 f a r m e r s, w ho groan b e n e a th high r e n t s, game laws and landlord t y r a n n y. W h at h a ve we m o r e? A millocracy becoming b a n k r u pt b e n e a th t he working of their o wn vile r a ce of competition—who soon will not be able to k e ep their mills over their o wn h e a d s. A precious p o w er t h at to strike t he pedestal of f r e e d om from y o ur feet! W h at r e m a i n s? T he working m an and the s h o p k e e p e r. Often h as it b e en e n d e a v o r ed to unite t he t wo on the basis of a c o m p r o m i s e. I for one h a ve always o p p o s ed it, b e c a u se a c o m p r o m i se of the franchise w o u ld only h a ve strengthened the m o n e y ed interest, and perfected class legislation. B ut t he time for that union h as n ow c o me at last—and c o me w i t h o ut the need of 40 c o m p r o m i se or treason. T he retail s h o p k e e p e rs are fast b e c o m i ng d e m o- 35 30 388 Evacuation of the Danubian Principalities—The Events in Spain c r a t i c. It is said t he w ay to a w o r k i ng m a n 's b r a in is t h r o u gh his belly. A y e! a nd t he w ay to a s h o p k e e p e r 's h e a rt is t h r o u gh his p o c k e t? F or every shilling less he t a k es he gets a n ew idea. I n s o l v e n cy is t e a c h i ng him t he t r u th T h us t he moral force of o ur e n e m i es is annihilated—and n ew allies a re joining 5 u s. T h e ir physical force is gone as well. T he C z a r 's d o ne t h a t! In Ireland t h e re are s c a r ce 1,000 m e n! In E n g l a nd t h e re is n ow no standing a r m y. B ut t h e r e 's t he militia! A h, t he militia! of w h i ch t he d e s e r t i o ns are so i m m e n s e ly n u m e r­ o u s, says The London Times, t h at t he ' H ue a nd c r y' is no longer e n o u g h, b ut special circulars are sent to every p a r i s h, to e v e ry place w h e re t he 1 o d e s e r t er ever lived, if b ut a week, to see if f o r ce a nd t e r r or c an drag h im back. I w i sh t he G o v e r n m e nt j oy of their n ew f o r c e. T h us t he field is clear—the p e o p l e 's o p p o r t u n i ty h as c o m e. Do n ot s u p p o se f r om this I m e an violence. N o! F ar f r om i t! We mean a great peaceable moral movement. B ut b e c a u se we m e an moral force, it d o es n ot follow o ur enemies should m e an it too. 15 E n g l a nd h as b e g un to think, and [is] listening. As y et she is listening for t he d r u ms of P o l a nd a nd t he t r a mp of H u n g a r y. As y et she is listening for t he cries of Milan a nd t he s h o u ts of P a r i s! B ut amid t he passing p a u se she is beginning to h e ar t he b e a t i ng of h er o wn p r o ud heart—and cries Ί also h a ve a w o rk to do—a foe to v a n q u i s h, a nd a field to c o n q u e r . '" 20 T he C h a i r m an of t he m e e t i ng a d v e r t ed to t he p r e s e n ce of t he Superin­ t e n d e nt a nd o t h er m en of t he police—trusting t h at no m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o ns of w h at w as said w o u ld be r e p o r t ed by t h o se e m p l o y ed by G o v e r n m e n t. R e­ ferring to this warning E r n e st J o n es said: " F or my p a r t, I d o n 't c a re w h at t h ey say—they m ay say w h at t h ey c h o o s e. 25 I go into agitation like a soldier into battle—taking my c h a n ce amid t he balls t h at fly—to fall and perish, or to live a nd c o n q u e r; for I'm a soldier of D e m o c r a c y ." K a rl M a r x. 389 Karl Marx Evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia—Poland- Demands of the Spanish People F r om Our O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4166, 25. August 1854 L o n d o n, F r i d a y, Aug. 11, 1854. Y e s t e r d a y 's Moniteur states that " t he R u s s i an E n v oy at V i e n na has an n o u n c ed to t he Austrian Cabinet that t he E m p e r or Nicholas h as ordered t he c o m p l e te evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia. N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng this declaration, C o u nt Buoi exchanged n o t es on t he 8th inst. with B a r on de B o u r q u e n ey and L o rd W e s t m o r e l a n d, from w h i ch it results t h at Austria, like F r a n ce and England, is of opinion that guarantees m u st be e x a c t ed from R u s s ia to p r e v e nt a r e t u rn of complications w h i ch disturb t he quiet of E u r o p e, and engages itself until the reëstablishment of general p e a ce not to enter into any t r e a ty with the Cabinet of St. P e t e r s b u rg unless those guaran tees are o b t a i n e d ." Of w h at sort t h e se guarantees are to b e, m ay be seen from The Times of this morning. Firstly, the e v a c u a t i on of the Principalities; secondly, t he substitution of a c o m m on E u r o p e an p r o t e c t o r a te in lieu of the R u s s i an p r o t e c t o r a t e; thirdly, the "revision of the C o n v e n t i on of t he Straits, a nd the adoption of such measures as are n e c e s s a ry to r e d u ce the naval a s c e n d a n cy of R u s s ia within limits less formidable to the e x i s t e n ce of T u r k ey a nd t he i n d e p e n d e n ce of navigation b o th on t he w a t e rs of t he E u x i ne and at the m o u t hs of the D a n u b e ." T he s t a t e m e nt of the Moniteur is on the w h o le confirmed by the declara- tions of L o rd Clarendon in y e s t e r d a y 's sitting of t he H o u se of L o r d s. We k n ow also, from other sources, that the Russian h e a d q u a r t e rs are r e m o v ed to B u z e o; t h at four Russian regiments h a ve c r o s s ed t he P r u t h, and t h at t he A u s t r i an G o v e r n m e n t, on its part, has c o u n t e r m a n d ed the o r d er given to several c o r ps of troops to reënforce the armies d r a wn up en échelon on the frontiers of Galicia and Transylvania. T h e re w as scarcely e v er a m o re curious o p e r a t i on in the history of w a rs t h an this evacuation of t he Principalities by the armies of Russia. T he fact is that it c a n n ot be a c c o u n t ed for from a ny strategical, b ut only from a 5 10 15 20 25 390 Evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia—Poland—Demands of the Spanish People 5 10 diplomatic point of view. As has b e en explained in The Tribune, a plan h ad b e en arranged b e t w e en A u s t r ia and Russia, according to w h i ch the Austrians w e re to o c c u py t he Principalities as s o on as t he h o n or of t he Czar should be satisfied by the capture of Silistria; the c h a n ce of a R u s s i an defeat being p r o v i d ed for by a clause, according to w h i ch t he Austrian o c c u p a t i on w as to t a ke place in t h at c a s e, t o o. Accordingly, o ne d ay before the R u s s i a ns raised the siege of Silistria, a t r e a ty w as c o n c l u d ed b e t w e en T u r k ey and Austria, giving the latter p o w er the right to enter Wallachia. T he t r e a ty aimed at t h r ee purposes—to withhold the Principalities from T u r k e y; to " r a i se a c o r d on against the plague of revolution a r o u nd the Austrian f r o n t i e r s ;" lastly, to secure t he safe retreat of t he Russian a r m y. This treaty, as we m ay safely infer from the confessions of L o rd C l a r e n d o n, w as forced u p on t he P o r te by L o rd Stratford de Redcliffe, t he English E m b a s s a d or at Con stantinople—the Divan simultaneously issuing an order for allowing t he 25 20 15 R u s s i a ns to retire without being molested by pursuit. T he precipitate with drawal of the Russians from the D a n u be is therefore w i t h o ut an explanation, unless it entered into R u s s i a 's a g r e e m e n ts with Austria. T he Austrians h ad fixed t he 3d of July for the e n t r a n ce of their t r o o ps into Wallachia. W h e n ce their procrastination? T h ey w e re securing c o n c e s s i on u p on c o n c e s s i on from the P o r t e: firstly, in r e s p e ct of the form of g o v e r n m e nt to be established in Wallachia; secondly, in r e s p e ct to t he exclusion of t he T u r ks from their o wn p r o v i n c e. Subsequently t h ey m a de k n o wn t h at their o c c u p a t i on of Wallachia w o u ld n ot include a declaration of war. " T he Austrian G o v e r n m e n t ," says L o rd Clarendon, " at t he end of J u n e, w h en t he R u s s i a ns w e re a b o ut to e v a c u a te Wallachia, sent an officer from t he staff of General H e ss to inform t he allied C o m m a n d e rs t h at t he A u s t r i an G o v e r n m e nt intended to o c c u py a portion of Wallachia, in the n a me of t he Sultan, a nd for t he p u r p o se of restoring his authority t h e r e; b ut t h at t h ey w o u ld n ot enter as belligerents, because t h ey w e re not at w ar with Russia, a nd h ad n ot received an a n s w er to the d e m a n ds w h i ch t h ey h ad a d d r e s s ed to h e r ." This imbecile sincerity of Austria c a u s ed e m b a r r a s s m e n t, a nd a n ew delay w as necessitated. T h en c a me the p r o t e st of Prussia, jealous of the aggrandizement of Austrian p o w er on t he D a n u b e. T he fact of b o th t h e se p o w e rs being t he tools of R u s s ia d o es n ot exclude their remaining jealous of e a ch o t h e r, as w as sufficiently e x e m- plified by t he " p o t a t o - w a r" of 1850. If Mr. U r q u h a rt h ad p e r u s ed the W a r s aw protocol of that year, he would not h a ve t u m b l ed into the Quixotic idea of suddenly propping up P r u s s ia as t he E u r o p e an b u l w a rk against Russia. 35 30 Seeing Austria losing her opportunity, the R u s s i a ns already in r e t r e at t u r n ed r o u nd a nd a d v a n c ed o n ce m o re to t he D a n u b e, for, if t he evacuation of Wallachia w as complete before A u s t r ia h ad m o v e d, their s u b s e q u e nt e n t r a n ce into that Principality w o u ld h a ve b e en deprived of any pretext. 40 391 Karl Marx M e a n w h i l e, h o w e v e r, the Turkish General at Rustshuk—to u se t he phraseol ogy of The Times—"imagining" the Russians in full retreat, w e nt over to Giurgevo, and b e at t h em so soundly as to render impossible any attempt at retaking possession of the line of the D a n u b e. In c o n s e q u e n ce of this defeat t he Russians w e re obliged to think seriously of retreat, a resolution to w h i ch they w e re p r o m p t ed by t he discovery that t he ostensible allies of T u r k ey would no longer be able to remain inactive, and t h at the English G o v e r n m e nt would be forced, in deference to their a r my as well as to t he public, to u n d e r t a ke something against t h e m. By retiring from t he Principalities they i n c r e a s ed their defensive force in Bessarabia a nd t he Crimea. T h us we learn by a telegraphic dispatch that the Russian regiments in Bessarabia and K h e r s on are to m o ve in all possible haste to t he Crimea, while t h o se in Moldavia m a r ch to o c c u py their places. It w as to be p r e s u m ed that t he T u r ks would n ot be slow in improving their opportunity. Their vanguard, u n d er I s k a n d er B e y, e n t e r ed B u c h a r e st on the 6th inst., and their General received a deputation from t he Wallachian Capital on t he anniversary of t he day on which, in 1853, their e n e m i es h ad entered it. T h us the Austrians h a ve again lost their opportunity and are deprived of their false p r e t e n s es for entering Wallachia. An o c c u p a t i on at this m o m e nt would bring t h em infallibly into collision with t he T u r k s. While, therefore, t he Austrian p a p e rs d e n o u n ce the a d v a n ce of t he T u r ks u p on B u c h a r e st as a b r e a ch of contract, the Austrians themselves are d e n o u n c ed by t he English ministerial press for their slowness and stupidity, in having set at nought the fine spun plot. In The Times of T h u r s d ay we r e ad for i n s t a n c e: " T he Austri- ans h a ve lost by their procrastination the effect of t he position t h ey might h a ve a s s u m ed in the Principalities. O m er P a s ha has t a k en advantage of this opportunity and closed up on t he heels of t he retreating e n e m y. Wallachia is n ow in a great degree occupied by the troops of the Sultan. T he D a n u be from O r s o va to Galatch is in their possession and t h e re is no r e a s on to s u p p o se that any claim c an be urged by a foreign p o w er to induce t he Turkish C o m m a n d er to r e c e de from a province which he holds by t he right of the m a s t er and by the valor of his a r m y ." All that is left for the Austrians to do n ow is t he occupation of Moldavia. 5 10 15 20 25 30 T he dispatches from Constantinople dated July 30, almost exclusively allude to the projected expedition against the Crimea. T he division of twenty ships w h i ch started from Baltshik on the 21st of July, a c c o m p a n i ed by Generals B r o wn and Canrobert, and c o m m a n d ed by Admiral Bruat, in order to reconnoitre t he coast from A n a pa to Sevastopol, r e t u r n ed on the 27th. After their return Canrobert and B r o wn immediately p r o c e e d ed to V a r na to c o m m u n i c a te the results of their mission to St. A r n a ud and L o rd Raglan. T he 35 40 392 Evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia—Poland—Demands of the Spanish People 5 Anglo-French t r o o ps w e re d r a wn up from V a r na to K u s t e n d j e, in order to facilitate their e m b a r k a t i on at the different p o r t s. This e m b a r k a t i on m u st h a ve t a k en place on t he 29th or 30th of July. T he T u r k i sh fleet h ad entered the Black S e a, and all the Anglo-French naval forces m u st h a ve b e en assem- bled in t he latitude of V a r na as on t he 1st inst., n u m e r o us t r a n s p o r ts w e re a c c u m u l a t ed t h e r e. On t he destination of t h e se f o r c es the Gazette du Midi has the following: " S o me speak of A n a p a, a nd t he neighboring fortress which contain together a b o ut 20,000 m e n, and the c a p t u re of w h i ch would at o n ce establish c o m m u n i c a t i o ns b e t w e en Abassia, Circassia, and t he Crimea, so that the Circassians could easily t a ke p a rt in a ny attack directed against the Crimea. According to others t he a t t a ck is to be directed against Odessa, w h i c h, at this m o m e n t, m u s t e rs a garrison of a b o ut 40,000 m e n, and w h i ch would be fortified by t he allied t r o o p s, in order to stay t h e re during t he winter, and to t h r e a t en Bessarabia on o ne side a nd the C r i m ea on the other side. A 15 third v e r s i on points to Nicolaief f as t he point to be attacked, t h e re being t h e re the arsenals of the Russian army, and this place occupying the triangle f o r m ed by t he Dnieper in the east, a nd the Bug in t he w e s t ." 10 T he D o b r o d ja has b e en entirely a b a n d o n ed by the R u s s i a n s, and is n ow occupied by 36,000 T u r ks and F r e n c h. T he T u r ks are at Babadagh and are said to be u n d er orders to attack Tultsha, while the F r e n ch are to attack Galatch. On the 16th of July, the little t o wn established by t he R u s s i a ns at the Sulina m o u t h, which was already partly dismantled, is said to h a ve b e en completely d e s t r o y ed by the English steamers Spitfire and V e s u v i u s, no buildings having b e en spared e x c e pt t he lighthouse and t he c h u r c h. 20 25 In the White Sea the English h a ve effected a landing on s o me point on t he C o a st of Onega and d e s t r o y ed a village. T he Vladimir affair in the Black S ea has called forth a violent a t t a ck from The Times against Admiral D u n d a s, to w h i ch The Herald a n s w e rs as fol- l o w s: 30 "Sir Charles Napier in the Baltic could p e r m it the S w e a b o rg fleet to p a ss u n m o l e s t ed to their anchorage—could allow H a n go U dd to be well fortified, and t h en m o st ineffectively bombarded—could permit the b u o ys to be r e m o v ed and the ships to r un aground in c o n s e q u e n c e, and n ot one w o rd of reflection would The Times cast u p on him ; b ut w i th Admiral D u n d as the case 35 is altogether different." By letters from Paris of the 9th inst. we learn that 50,000 F r e n ch t r o o ps are to be a d d ed to t he Oriental a r m y. If t he w ar p r o d u ce no other good, it has at least the merit of ridding F r a n ce of her D e c e m b r i st army. 40 It m ay h a ve o c c u r r ed to your notice t h at the E m p e r or of Russia, since his discomfiture in T u r k e y, has r e c o m m e n c ed using the title of King of Poland, 393 Karl Marx w h i ch he h ad resigned as superfluous after his victory in H u n g a r y, the a b s o r p t i on of t h at c o u n t ry being considered to h a ve b e en effected. In a letter published by t he Vienna Presse, dated W a r s a w, 1st A u g ., we r e a d: " T he approaching arrival of the Czar at W a r s aw will be m a r k e d, it is said, by certain c o n c e s s i o ns to t he Poles in t he point of v i ew of their nationality. It is said that t he assembly of notables mentioned in the organic statute for t he K i n g d om of Poland of 1832 is to be c o n v o k e d. T he establishments of public instruction a r e, it is said, to be r e o p e n e d, and the e m p l o y m e nt of the Polish language in official acts, t he publication of t he annual e x p e n s es a nd r e c e i p t s, and t he right to c o n s e nt to direct t a x es o r d e r e d. T he Polish a r my is also, as t he r e p o rt goes, to be reestablished, b ut u n d er c o m m a nd of R u s s i an officers. T he fourth r e c r u i t m e nt is finished. N e v er had t he population b e en subjected to contributions to s u ch an e x t e n t ." 5 10 We r e ad also in t he Düsseldorfer Zeitung u n d er d a te of 7 th A u g u s t: " A c c o r d i ng to r e p o r ts from W a r s a w, Gen. Rüdiger, t he stadtholder of the K i n g d om of Poland, has s u m m o n ed the marshals of the Polish nobility to petition t he C r o wn for the restoration of an i n d e p e n d e nt Polish K i n g d o m ." 15 M a ny solutions of t he Polish question h a ve b e en offered by diverse parties, b ut n e v er did any o ne imagine such a solution as that p r o p o s ed and ordered by t he R u s s i an general. 20 I am informed from C o p e n h a g en t h at t he idiot king of D e n m a r k, a c c o m p a n i ed by t he Minister of the Interior, M. de TüTisch, h as e m b a r k ed to m e et t he king of S w e d en at K a r l s k r o n a. Tillisch is o ne of the m o st fanatical partisans of Russia, and it is generally supposed t h at t he meeting of the t wo kings is destined to r e n ew the b o nd of R u s s i an partisanship called the N o r t h e rn a r m ed neutrality. If D e n m a rk and S w e d en m e an neutrality t o w a rd Russia, it d o es not follow that t h ey m e an the same t o w a rd E n g l a nd and F r a n c e, as t he following circumstance sets forth. S o me d a ys ago General M e s a, Commander-in-chief of the Danish Artillery, p a s s ed in review the Artillery of t he National G u a rd and addressed to t h em an unusually a r d e nt allocution, hinting t h at the day a p p r o a c h ed p e r h a ps w h en the National Artillery, united to t h at of t he a r m y, would be appealed to by t he king for t he c o m m on defense of the Scandinavian fatherland. 25 30 Parliament will be prorogued t o - m o r r o w. " T he session is r e m a r k a b le for its a b a n d o n ed m e a s u r e s , ' as the campaign, for its p o s t p o n e m e nt of warlike o p e r a t i o n s ." 35 S o me d a ys ago the Charivari published a caricature exhibiting t he Spanish people engaged in battle and t he t wo sabres—Espartero a nd O'Donnell— e m b r a c i ng e a ch other over their h e a d s. T he Charivari m i s t o ok for the end of t he revolution, what is only its c o m m e n c e m e n t. T he struggle h as already 40 c o m m e n c ed b e t w e en O'Donnell and E s p a r t e r o, a nd n ot only b e t w e en t h e m, 394 Evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia—Poland—Demands of the Spanish People b ut also b e t w e en t he military chiefs and t he p e o p l e. It h as b e en of little avail to t he G o v e r n m e nt to h a ve appointed the t o r e a d or P u c h e ra as Superintendent of the slaughter-houses, to h a ve n o m i n a t ed a c o m m i t t ee for t he r e w a rd of the b a r r i c a d e - c o m b a t a n t s, and finally to h a ve appointed t wo F r e n c h m e n, 5 Pujol and D e l m a s, as historiographers of t he revolution. O'Donnell w a n ts the Cortes to be elected according to the law of 1845, E s p a r t e ro according to the Constitution of 1837, and t he people by universal suffrage. T he people refuse to lay d o wn their a r ms before the publication of a G o v e r n m e nt p r o g r a m m e, t he p r o g r a m me of M a n z a n a r es no longer satisfying their views. T he people d e m a nd the a n n u l m e nt of the C o n c o r d at of 1851, confiscation of the estates of the counter-revolutionists, an e x p o sé of t he finances, cancelling of all c o n t r a c ts for railways and other swindling c o n t r a c ts for public w o r k s, a nd lastly t he j u d g m e nt of Christina by a special C o u r t. T wo a t t e m p ts at flight on the p a rt of the latter h a ve b e en foiled by t he a r m ed resistance of the people. El Tribuno m a k es the following a c c o u nt of restitutions to be m a de by Christina to the National E x c h e q u e r: T w e n t y - f o ur millions illegally r e ceived as Regent from 1834 to 1840; twelve millions received on h er return from F r a n ce after an a b s e n ce of t h r ee years ; and thirty-five millions received of the T r e a s u ry of C u b a. This a c c o u nt e v en is a g e n e r o us o n e. W h en Chris- tina left Spain in 1840, she carried off large s u ms and nearly all the jewels of t he Spanish C r o w n. 10 15 20 Karl M a r x. 395 Karl Marx The Eastern Question—The Revolution in Spain— The Madrid Press F r om Our O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4172, I.September 1854 L o n d o n, T u e s d a y, Aug. 15, 1854. It is stated in t he Cologne Gazette t h at "after m a ny y e a rs negotiations the A m e r i c an G o v e r n m e nt has declared its refusal to r e n ew t he existing t r e a ty w i th D e n m a r k, unless article V. be replaced by a stipulation according a free p a s s a ge t h r o u gh t he Sound to all American vessels. At t he s a me time the U n i t ed States G o v e r n m e nt has declined to offer a ny c o m p e n s a t i o n. D e n m a r k, m e n a c ed by t h e se A m e r i c an m e a s u r e s, has a p p e a l ed to the other p o w e r s, and t he Prussian G o v e r n m e nt is said to be willing to send 20,000 m en for t he protection of the S o u n d ." Since the S o u nd duties weigh on no one m o re oppressively t h an on Prussia herself, the m e a s u re attributed to her w o u ld marvellously suit t he genius of Prussian policy. Altogether—se non è vero, è ben trovato. T he F r a n k f o rt Diet has published the n ew law on t he p r e ss a nd association w h i ch h as occupied its deliberations for a long time. T he law affecting public associations simply prohibits every sort of political meetings or r e u n i o n s, a nd t he law on t he p r e ss imposes heavy s u ms of cautionnement, m a k es the issue of all publications d e p e n d e nt on G o v e r n m e nt permission, and with d r a ws offenses of t he p r e ss from the jurisdiction of t he jury trial. T he long-pending affair of the Berlin revolutionist c o n s p i r a cy has b e en a b a n d o n ed by t he Prussian G o v e r n m e n t, the chief w i t n e ss against t he ac c u s ed parties, M r. H e n t z e, being declared " s u s p e c t" by the public p r o s e c u tor. This H e n t ze is the same p e r s on on w h o se e v i d e n c e, at t he Cologne trial, a n u m b er of my friends w e re c o n d e m n ed to i m p r i s o n m e nt in 1852. B ut we a re no longer in 1852, and the Prussian G o v e r n m e nt p e r h a ps did n ot like to r un the risk of seeing all its police agents b r a n d ed a s e c o nd time, reviving t he souvenirs of Cologne in t he very Capital, and at a time w h en t he terreur of counter-revolution no longer imposes on the p e o p l e. On the 1 st of August the Servian G o v e r n m e nt sent a courier to B r e s t o v a s y, 5 10 15 20 25 396 The Eastern Question—The Revolution in Spain—The Madrid Press w h e re Prince Alexander is using t he w a t e r s, w i th t he answer p r o p o s ed to be m a de to t he injunctions of t he Sublime P o r t e. T he a n s w er w as signed by t he Prince a nd immediately forwarded to Constantinople. It alleges t he impossibility of a d i s a r m a m e n t, on a c c o u nt of t he m a ny dangers that would s u r r o u nd it, b ut states t h at in deference to t he w i s h es of Austria and t he o r d e rs of the P o r te the military exercises had b e en s u s p e n d e d. Izzet P a s h a, t he G o v e r n or of Belgrade, h as b e en recalled, at his o wn request. H is suc cessor is not y et k n o w n. 5 T en t h o u s a nd Turks are said to o c c u py B u c h a r e s t; b ut at the same time 10 we r e ad in to-day's Moniteur t h at Austria is only waiting for the reply of O m er P a s ha to the last c o m m u n i c a t i on of Colonel Kalik, in o r d er to c o m m a nd t he e n t r a n ce of an Austrian corps into the Principalities. W h en C o u nt Buoi received the notification from Prince Gorchakoff, announcing t he d e p a r t u re of the Russians from the Principalities, he a n s w e r ed that " t he Austrian troops 15 w o u ld o c c u py the Principalities, b ut t h at s u ch o c c u p a t i on had nothing hostile to R u s s i a ." 20 25 By the prorogation of Parliament in 1854 t he E a s t e rn Question is b r o u g ht b a ck to the stage it occupied at t he prorogation of Parliament in 1853. T he V i e n na Conference is o n ce m o re to set to w o r k, to p a r a l y ze active operations, to bewilder public opinion, and to offer a n ew o c c a s i on to Sir J a m es G r a h a m, at the reopening of Parliament, to say t h at a noble mind is slow to suspect. It is w o r t hy of observation t h at t he dodge originates this time n ot with Austria, but w i th England itself, as you will see from The Times V i e n na c o r r e s p o n d e n c e: " T he English and F r e n ch Ministers h a ve informed C o u nt Buoi t h at they h a ve b e en to propose that t he V i e n na their G o v e r n m e n ts C o n f e r e n ce should m e e t. T he reply is said to h a ve b e en t h at nothing could be m o re agreeable to the Imperial C o u r t ." instructed by T he basis of the new deliberations of the C o n f e r e n ce is a sort of revived 30 V i e n na n o t e, furnished by the a n s w er of M. D r o u yn de L h u ys to the last c o m m u n i c a t i on of M. de N e s s e l r o d e, t he cardinal points of which differ v e ry little from w h at I e x p e c t ed t h ey would b e, after t he analysis I gave y ou in my last letter of t he t e r ms n a m ed by The Times. T h e re is n ot a w o rd a b o ut an indemnity to t he T u r k s, n or e v en to t he allies. T he u s u r p ed Russian p r o t e c t o r a te over Moldavia, Wallachia and Servia, is to be transformed into E u r o p e an usurpation; t he same is to be d o ne with t he " p r o t e c t o r a t e" over the Christians in T u r k e y; t he fruits of the T u r k i sh victories to be restricted to a free navigation of the D a n u be for Austria, a nd a c h a n ge of t he t r e a ty of 1841 in favor, n ot of the P o r t e, b ut of t he P o w e r s. 35 40 T he s p e e ch of L o rd C l a r e n d on on T h u r s d a y, the m a in points of which I h a ve already reported, contained a m o st i m p o r t a nt revelation on t he policy 397 Karl Marx o b s e r v ed by the English Ministry in t he Oriental question. He stated in plain w o r d s: "I b eg y ou will recollect t h at it w as on t he 29th of M a r ch t h at war w as declared—a little m o re than four m o n t hs ago—and it w as t h en universally believed—and, w h en I say universally believed, I do n ot s p e ak of her Ma- j e s t y 's G o v e r n m e n t, b ut of the m o st able a nd e x p e r i e n c ed officers b o th of England and France—that at that time R u s s ia m e d i t a t ed a w ar of further aggression. N o b o dy believed that, with t he great forces she h ad c o n c e n t r a t ed on the n o r th of the D a n u b e, with all the efforts she h ad m a d e, and w i th all t he v a st supplies she had accumulated, she did not intend—on t he c o n t r a ry t h at she did intend—a m a r ch southward. Although we did not d o u bt the k n o wn b r a v e ry of t he T u r k s, we could n ot bring o u r s e l v es to believe t h at t h ey w o u ld be able to resist the well-disciplined and numerically superior R u s s i an t r o o p s, acting u n d er t he most e x p e r i e n c ed generals, while t he only T u r k i sh general w h om we k n ow e v en by n a me w as O m er P a s h a, w ho h ad n ot t h en h ad t he opportunity, which he h as since so nobly profited b y, to establish for himself a lasting fame and r e n o w n. So m u ch w e re the F r e n ch G o v e r n m e nt a nd we convinced of this t h at Sir J. B u r g o y ne a nd an ex p e r i e n c ed F r e n ch officer of engineers w e re sent to Constantinople in o r d er to devise m e a ns to defend that capital and t he strait of t he Dardanelles, and so m u ch i m p o r t a n ce w as attached to their mission, a nd so entirely w as the w h o le plan of t he campaign supposed to be c o n n e c t ed with it, t h at L o rd Raglan and M a r s h al St. A r n a ud w e re delayed in o r d er that t h ey might h a ve p e r s o n al c o m m u n i c a t i o ns with t he officers sent o ut on t h at service. T he united armies of the Allies t h en w e nt to Gallipoli w h e re great w o r ks w e re t h r o wn u p. T h ey w e nt to Constantinople, always having the necessity of defending t he Dardanelles in v i e w ." T he w h o le plan, t h e n, of the Allied P o w e r s, w as that R u s s ia should a d v a n ce into a nd o c c u py the provinces, and the allied forces t he capital of t he O t t o m an E m p i re and the Dardanelles. H e n ce the delays and all the m i s u n d e r s t o od m o v e m e n ts of the Anglo-French forces. T he b r a v e ry of the T u r k i sh t r o o ps w h i ch baffled trick w as of c o u r s e, " u n e x p e c t e d ." this Russo-Anglo-French S o me m o n t hs before the o u t b r e ak of the p r e s e nt Spanish revolution, I told y o ur r e a d e rs t h at R u s s i an influences w e re at w o rk in bringing a b o ut a Pen- insular c o m m o t i o n. F or that R u s s ia w a n t ed no direct a g e n t s. T h e re w as The Times, t he a d v o c a te a nd friend of King B o m b a, of t he " y o u ng h o p e" of Austria, of N i c h o l a s, of George IV., suddenly t u r n ed indignant at t he gross immoralities of Q u e en Isabella and t he Spanish C o u r t. T h e re w e r e, besides, t he diplomatic agents of the English Ministry, w h om t he R u s s i an Minister P a l m e r s t on had no difficulty in bamboozling with visions of a peninsular 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 398 The Eastern Question—The Revolution in Spain—The Madrid Press C o b u rg kingdom. It is n ow ascertained that it w as the British E m b a s s a d or w ho concealed O'Donnell at his palace, a nd i n d u c ed the b a n k er Collado, t he p r e s e nt Minister of F i n a n c e, to a d v a n ce t he m o n ey required by O'Donnell a nd Dulce, to start their p r o n u n c i a m e n t o. Should a n y b o dy d o u bt t h at R u s s ia really h ad a h a nd in Peninsular affairs, let me remind him of the affair of t he Isla de Leon. Considerable bodies of t r o o ps w e re assembled at Cadiz, in 1820, destined for the S o u t h - A m e r i c an colonies. All at o n ce t he a r my stationed on the isle declared for t he Constitution of 1812, and its example w as followed by troops elsewhere. N o w, we k n ow from Chateaubriand, the F r e n ch E m b a s s a d or at t he Congress of V e r o n a, t h at Russia stimulated Spain to u n d e r t a ke the expedition into South-America, and forced F r a n ce to u n d e r t a ke t he expedition into Spain. We k n o w, on t he other hand, from t he m e s s a ge of the United States President, t h at R u s s ia promised him to p r e v e nt t he expedition against South America. It r e q u i r e s, t h e n, b ut little j u d g m e nt to infer as to the authorship of the insurrection of the Isla de L e o n. B ut I will give y ou another instance of the t e n d er interest t a k en by Russia in t he c o m m o t i o ns of the Spanish peninsula. In his "Historia politica de la España moderna, " Barcelona, 1849, Señor de Marliani, in order to p r o ve t h at Russia h ad no r e a s on to o p p o se the constitutional m o v e m e nt of Spain, m a k es the following statement: " T h e re w e re seen on the N e va Spanish soldiers swearing to t he Con stitution (of 1812) and receiving their b a n n e rs from imperial h a n d s. In his e x t r a o r d i n a ry expedition against R u s s ia N a p o l e on f o r m ed from the Spanish prisoners in F r a n ce a special legion, w h o, after t he defeat of t he F r e n ch f o r c e s, d e s e r t ed to the Russian c a m p. A l e x a n d er received t h em with m a r k ed c o n d e s c e n s i o n, a nd q u a r t e r ed t h em at Peterhoff, w h e re t he E m p r e ss fre quently w e nt to visit t h e m. On a given d ay A l e x a n d er ordered t h em to a s s e m b le on t he frozen N e v a, a nd m a de t h em t a ke t he o a th for t he Spanish Constitution, presenting t h em at the s a me time w i th b a n n e rs e m b r o i d e r ed by t he E m p r e ss herself. This c o r p s, t h e n c e f o r th n a m ed 'Imperial A l e x a n d e r ,' e m b a r k ed at C r o n s t a d t, and w as landed at Cadiz. It p r o v ed true to the o a th t a k en on t he N e v a, by rising, in 1821, at O c a ña for t he reëstablishment of t he Constitution." 5 10 15 20 25 30 While R u s s ia is n ow intriguing in the Peninsula t h r o u gh the h a n ds of 35 E n g l a n d, it, at the same time, d e n o u n c es E n g l a nd to F r a n c e. T h us we r e ad in t he New Prussian Gazette t h at E n g l a nd h as m a de t he S p a n i sh r e v o l u t i on b e h i nd t he b a ck of F r a n c e. W h at interest h as R u s s ia in fomenting c o m m o t i o ns in Spain? To c r e a te a diversion in t he W e s t, to p r o v o ke dissensions b e t w e en F r a n ce and E n g l a n d, a nd lastly to seduce F r a n ce into an intervention. A l r e a dy we are told by t he Anglo-Russian p a p e rs t h at F r e n ch insurrectionists of J u ne c o n s t r u c t ed t he 40 399 Karl Marx b a r r i c a d es at Madrid. T he same w as said to Charles X. at t he C o n g r e ss of V e r o n a. " T he p r e c e d e nt set by the Spanish a r my h ad b e en followed by Portugal, s p r e ad to N a p l e s, e x t e n d ed to Piedmont, and exhibited e v e r y w h e re t he d a n g e r o us e x a m p le of armies meddling in m e a s u r es of r e f o r m, and by force of a r ms dictating laws to their country. Immediately after t he insurrection h ad t a k en place in Piedmont, m o v e m e n ts h ad o c c u r r ed in F r a n ce at L y o ns and in other p l a c e s, directed to t he same end. T h e re w as B e r t o n 's conspiracy at Rochelle in w h i ch 25 soldiers of the 45th regiment h ad t a k en part. Revolu tionary Spain retransfused its h i d e o us elements of discord into F r a n c e, and b o th leagued their democratic factions against the m o n a r c h i c al s y s t e m ." Do we say that t he Spanish Revolution h as b e en m a de by t he Anglo-Rus sians? By no m e a n s. Russia only supports factious m o v e m e n ts at m o m e n ts w h en it k n o ws revolutionary crises to be at h a n d. T he real popular m o v e m e n t, h o w e v e r, w h i ch then begins, is always found to be as m u ch o p p o s ed to to the o p p r e s s i ve a g e n cy of the govern m e n t. S u ch w as t he fact in Wallachia in 1848—such is t he fact in Spain in 1854. the intrigues of Russia as T he perfidious c o n d u ct of England is exhibited at full length by t he c o n d u ct of its E m b a s s a d or at Madrid, L o rd H o w d e n. Before setting o ut from England to return to his post, he assembled the Spanish b o n d h o l d e r s, calling u p on t h em to p r e ss the p a y m e nt of their claims on the G o v e r n m e n t, a nd in case of refusal, to declare that t h ey would refuse all credit to Spanish m e r c h a n t s. T h us he p r e p a r ed difficulties for the new G o v e r n m e n t. As s o on as he arrived at Madrid, he subscribed for the victims fallen at the b a r r i c a d e s. T h us he p r o v o k es ovations from the Spanish people. the Madrid The Times charges M r. Soulé with having p r o d u c ed in surrection in the interest of the p r e s e nt A m e r i c an Administration. At all e v e n t s, M r. Soulé h as n ot written The Times's articles against Isabella II, nor h as t he p a r ty inclined to C u b an annexation gained any benefit from t he revolution. W i th regard to this question, t he nomination of G e n. de la C o n c ha as Captain-General of t he Island of C u ba is characteristic, he having b e en o ne of the seconds of the D u ke of Alba in his duel with the son of Mr. Soulé. It would be a mistake to suppose that t he Spanish Liberals in any w ay p a r t a ke in t he v i e ws of t he English Liberal, Mr. C o b d e n, in r e f e r e n ce to t he a b a n d o n- m e nt of t he colonies. O ne great object of t he Constitution of 1812 w as to retain the empire over the Spanish colonies by t he introduction of a united s y s t em of representation into the n ew c o d e. In 1811 the Spaniards e v en e q u i p p ed a large a r m e m e n t, consisting of several regiments from Galicia, t he only province in Spain then not occupied by the F r e n c h, in order to c o m b i ne c o e r c i on w i th their S o u th A m e r i c an policy. It w as almost t he chief principle 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 400 The Eastern Question—The Revolution in Spain—The Madrid Press of t h at Constitution n ot to a b a n d on a ny of the colonies belonging to Spain, a nd the revolutionists of to-day s h a re the same opinion. 10 15 No revolution has ever exhibited a m o re scandalous spectacle in t he c o n d u ct of its public m en t h an this u n d e r t a k en in t he interest of " m o r a l i t y ." 5 T he coalition of the old parties forming t he p r e s e nt G o v e r n m e nt of Spain (the partisans of E s p a r t e ro and the partisans of N a r v a e z) has b e en o c c u p i ed w i th nothing so m u ch as the division of t he spoils of office, of p l a c e s, of salaries, of titles, and of decorations. D u l ce a nd E c h a g ue h a ve arrived at Madrid, and S e r r a no has solicited permission to c o m e, in o r d er to secure their shares in t he plunder. T h e re is a great q u a r r el b e t w e en M o d e r a d os a nd Progresistas, the former being charged w i th having n a m ed all the generals, a nd t he latter with having appointed all t he Political Chiefs. To a p p e a se t he jealousies of the " r a b b l e ," P u c h e ta the t o r e a d or has b e en p r o m o t ed from a director of the slaughter-houses to a director of police. E v en t he Clamor Público, a very m o d e r a te p a p e r, gives v e nt to feelings of disappointment. " T he c o n d u ct of the generals and chiefs w o u ld h a ve b e en m o re dignified if t h ey h ad resigned p r o m o t i o n, giving a noble e x a m p le of disinterestedness, and conforming t h e m s e l v es to t he principles of morality proclaimed by t he r e v o l u t i o n ." T he shamelessness of the distribution of the spoils is m a r k ed by t he division of t he e m b a s s a d o r s' places. I do n ot s p e ak of t he a p p o i n t m e nt of Señor Olozaga for Paris, although being the E m b a s s a d or of E s p a r t e ro at t he same C o u rt in 1843, he conspired with L o u is Philippe, Christina a nd N a r v a e z; nor of the a p p o i n t m e nt for V i e n na of A l e x a n d er M o n, the F i n a n ce Minister of N a r v a ez in 1844; nor of that of Ríos y R o s as for L i s b o n, a nd Pastor Diaz for Turin, b o th M o d e r a d os of v e ry indifferent capacity. I s p e ak of the nomination of Gonzalez B r a vo for t he E m b a s sy of Constantinople. He is the incarnation of Spanish corruption. In 1840 he published El Guirigay (the Slang,) a sort of Madrid Punch, in w h i ch he m a de the m o st furious a t t a c ks against Christina. T h r ee years afterward his rage for office t r a n s- f o r m ed him into a boisterous M o d e r a d o. N a r v a e z, w ho w a n t ed a pliant tool, used him as Prime Minister of Spain, and t h en kicked him a w ay as s o on as he could dispense with him. B r a v o, in the interval, appointed as his Minister of F i n a n ce o ne C a r r a s c o, w ho plundered the Spanish t r e a s u ry directly. He m a de his father U n d e r - S e c r e t a ry of the T r e a s u r y, a m an w ho h ad b e en expelled from his place as a subaltern in the E x c h e q u er b e c a u se of his m a l v e r s a t i o n s; a nd he t r a n s f o r m ed his brother-in-law, a hanger-on at t he Principe T h e a t e r, into a state-groom to the Q u e e n. W h en r e p r o a c h ed with his a p o s t a sy a nd corruption, he a n s w e r e d: " Is it n ot r i d i c u l o us to be always t he s a m e ?" This m an is the c h o s en e m b a s s a d or of t he revolution of m o- rality. 30 35 40 20 25 It is s o m e w h at refreshing to hear, in c o n t r a st w i th t he official infamies 401 Karl Marx branding t he Spanish m o v e m e n t, that the people h a ve forced t h e se fellows at least to place Christina at the disposal of the C o r t e s, a nd to c o n s e nt to t he c o n v o c a t i on of a National Constituent A s s e m b l y, w i t h o ut a S e n a t e, and c o n s e q u e n t ly neither on the election law of 1837 n or that of 1845. T he G o v e r n m e nt h as n ot yet dared to prescribe an election law of their o w n, while t he people are unanimously in favor of universal suffrage. At Madrid the elections for t he National G u a rd h a ve r e t u r n ed nothing b ut E x a l t a d o s. In t he P r o v i n c es a w h o l e s o me a n a r c hy prevails, juntas being constituted, a nd in action e v e r y w h e r e, and every j u n ta issuing d e c r e es in t he interest of its locality—one abolishing the m o n o p o ly of t o b a c c o, a n o t h er the d u ty on salt. C o n t r a b a n d i s ts are operating on an e n o r m o us scale, a nd with t he m o re efficiency, as t h ey are the only force never disorganized in Spain. At B a r c e l o na t he soldiers are in collision, n ow a m o ng e a ch other, a nd n ow with the w o r k m e n. This anarchical state of the P r o v i n c es is of great a d v a n t a ge to the c a u se of t he revolution, as it p r e v e n ts its being confiscated at t he capital. 5 10 15 T he Madrid p r e ss is at this m o m e nt c o m p o s ed of the following p a p e r s: España, Novedades, Nación, Época, Clamor Público, Diario Español, Tribuno, Esperanza, Iberia, Católico, Miliciano, Independencia, Guardia Nacional, Esparterista, Union, Europa, Espectador, Liberal, Eco de la Revolución. T he Heraldo, Boletín del Pueblo, a nd t he Mensagero, h a ve c e a s ed to exist. 20 K a rl M a r x. 402 ïÊÊm -fflBi Karl Marx Revolution in Spain—Bomarsund F r om Our O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4174, 4.September 1854 L o n d o n, F r i d a y, Aug. 2 1, 1854. 5 T he " l e a d e r s" of the Assemblée Nationale, Times, a nd Journal des Débats p r o ve t h at neither the p u re R u s s i an p a r t y, nor t he R u s s o - C o b u rg party, n or the Constitutional p a r ty are satisfied with the c o u r se of the Spanish revolu tion. F r om this it would a p p e ar t h at t h e re is s o me c h a n ce for Spain, notwith standing t he contradiction of a p p e a r a n c e s. 10 On the 8th inst. a deputation from t he U n i on Club waited on E s p a r t e ro to p r e s e nt an a d d r e ss calling for t he a d o p t i on of universal suffrage. N u m e r- o us petitions to the same effect w e re pouring in. C o n s e q u e n t l y, a long a nd a n i m a t ed debate t o ok place at t he Council of Ministers. B ut t he partisans of universal suffrage, as well as the partisans of the election-law of 1845, h a ve b e en b e a t e n. T he Madrid Gaceta publishes a d e c r ee for the c o n v o c a t i on of t he C o r t es on t he 8th of N o v ., p r e c e d ed by an exposé a d d r e s s ed to t he 15 Queen. At t he elections, the law of 1837 will be followed, with slight modi fications. T he C o r t es are to be o ne Constituent A s s e m b l y, the legislative functions of the S e n a te being suppressed. T wo p a r a g r a p hs of t he law of 1845 h a ve b e en p r e s e r v e d, viz: the m o de of forming the electoral mesas, (boards receiving t he v o t es a nd publishing t he returns,) a nd t he n u m b er of d e p u t i e s; o ne d e p u ty to be elected for e v e ry 35,000 souls. T he A s s e m b ly will thus be c o m p o s ed of from 420 to 430 m e m b e r s. According to a circular of S a n ta C r u z, the Minister of the Interior, the electors m u st be registered by t he 6th of Sept. After the verification of t he lists by t he provincial deputations, t he electoral lists will be closed on t he 12th of Sept. T he elections will t a ke place on the 3d of Oct., at the chief localities of t he Electoral Districts. T he scrutiny will be p r o c e e d ed to on the 16th of Oct., in t he capital of e a ch p r o v i n c e. In c a se o i c o n f l i c t i ng elections, the n ew proceedings which will t h e r e by be necessi tated, m u st be t e r m i n a t ed by t he 30th of Oct. T he e x p o sé states expressly t h at " t he Cortes of 1854, like t h o se of 1837, will save the m o n a r c h y; t h ey 30 will be a n ew b o nd b e t w e en t he t h r o ne and the nation, objects w h i ch c a n n ot be questioned or d i s p u t e d ." In other w o r d s, t he G o v e r n m e nt forbids t he 20 25 403 Karl Marx discussion of the dynastic question; h e n c e, The Times c o n c l u d es t he con t r a r y, supposing that t he question will n ow be b e t w e en the p r e s e nt d y n a s ty or no d y n a s ty at all—an eventuality which, it is scarcely n e c e s s a ry to r e m a r k, infinitely displeases a nd disappoints the calculations of The Times. T he Electoral law of 1837 limits the franchise by the conditions of having a h o u s e h o l d, t he p a y m e nt of the mayores cuotas, (the ship t a x es levied by the State,) and the age of twenty-five y e a r s. T h e re are further entitled to a v o te t he m e m b e rs of t he Spanish A c a d e m i es of H i s t o ry a nd of t he A r t es N o b l e s, d o c t o r s, licentiates in the faculties of divinity, l a w, of medicine, m e m b e rs of ecclesiastical c h a p t e r s, parochial c u r a t es a nd their assistant clergy, magistrates and a d v o c a t es of t wo y e a r s' standing, officers of t he a r my of a certain standing, w h e t h er on service or t he retired list, physicians, surgeons, apothecaries of t wo y e a r s' standing; architects, painters and sculp t o r s, h o n o r ed with t he m e m b e r s h ip of an a c a d e m y; p r o f e s s o rs a nd m a s t e rs in any educational establishment, supported by the public funds. Disqualified for t he v o te by t he same law are, defaulters to t he c o m m on pueblo-fund, or to local taxation, b a n k r u p t s, p e r s o ns interdicted by t he courts of law for m o r al or civil incapacity; lastly, all p e r s o ns u n d er s e n t e n c e. 5 10 15 It is t r ue t h at this d e c r ee d o es not proclaim universal suffrage, and that it r e m o v es t he dynastic question from t he forum of t he C o r t e s. Still it is doubtful w h at e v en this Assembly will d o. If the Spanish C o r t es forbore from interfering with the c r o wn in 1812, it w as b e c a u se the c r o wn w as only nominally represented—the king having b e en a b s e nt for years from the Spanish soil. If t h ey forbore in 1837, it w as b e c a u se t h ey h ad to settle with absolute m o n a r c hy before they could think of settling with the constitutional m o n a r c h y. With regard to the general situation, The Times h as truly good r e a s o ns to deplore the a b s e n ce of F r e n ch centralization in Spain, and t h at c o n s e q u e n t ly e v en a victory over revolution in t he capital decides nothing with r e s p e ct to the p r o v i n c e s, so long as that state of " a n a r c h y" survives t h e re without which no revolution c an succeed. 20 25 30 T h e re a r e, of c o u r s e, some incidents in the Spanish revolutions peculiarly belonging to t h e m. F or instance, the combination of r o b b e ry with revolution ary transactions—a connection w h i ch sprang up in the guerrilla w a rs against t he F r e n ch invasions, a nd which w as continued by t he " r o y a l i s t s" in 1823, a nd t he Carlists since 1835. No surprise will therefore be felt at t he in- formation t h at great disorders h a ve o c c u r r ed at T o r t o s a, in L o w er Catalonia. T he Junta Popular of that city says, in its proclamation of 31st July: "A b a nd of miserable assassins, availing t h e m s e l v es for p r e t e xt of t he abolition of t he indirect t a x e s, h a ve seized the town, and trampled u p on all laws of society. Plunder, assassination, incendiarism h a ve m a r k ed their s t e p s ." O r d e r, h o w- ever, w as s o on restored by the Junta—the citizens arming t h e m s e l v es and 35 40 404 Revolution in Spain—Bomarsund 5 lo coming to t he r e s c ue of t he feeble garrison of t he place. A military c o m mission is sitting, charged w i th t he p u r s u it a nd p u n i s h m e nt of t he a u t h o rs of t he c a t a s t r o p he of July 30. This c i r c u m s t a n ce h a s, of c o u r s e, given an o c c a s i on to the reactionary journals for v i r t u o us declamation. H ow little t h ey are w a r r a n t ed in this proceeding m ay be inferred from t he r e m a rk of t he Messager de Bayonne, t h at t he Carlists h a ve raised their b a n n er in t he p r o v i n c es of Catalonia, Aragon a nd Valencia, a nd precisely in t he s a me contiguous m o u n t a i ns w h e re t h ey h ad their chief n e st in the old Carlist w a r s. It w as t he Carlists w ho g a ve origin to t he ladrones faccioses, t h at c o m b i n a tion of r o b b e ry and p r e n t e n d ed allegiance to an o p p r e s s ed p a r ty in t he S t a t e. T he Spanish guerrillero of all t i m es h as h ad something of t he r o b b er since the times of Viriathus; b ut it is a novelty of Carlist invention t h at a p u re r o b b er should invest himself with t he n a me of guerrillero. T he m en of t he T o r t o sa affair certainly belong to this class. 15 20 At L é r i d a, Saragossa and B a r c e l o na m a t t e rs are serious. T he t wo former cities h a ve refused to c o m b i ne with Barcelona, b e c a u se t he military h ad t he u p p er h a nd t h e r e. Still it a p p e a rs that e v en t h e re C o n c ha is unable to m a s t er t he storm, and Gen. Dulce is to t a ke his place, t he r e c e nt popularity of t h at general being considered as offering m o re g u a r a n t e es for a conciliation of t he difficulties. T he secret societies h a ve r e s u m ed their activity at M a d r i d, and g o v e rn the d e m o c r a t ic p a r ty j u st as t h ey did in 1823. T he first d e m a nd which t h ey h a ve urged the people to m a ke is that all ministers since 1843 shall p r e s e nt their a c c o u n t s. 25 T he ministry are purchasing b a ck the a r ms w h i ch the p e o p le seized on t he d ay of the b a r r i c a d e s. In this w ay t h ey h a ve got p o s s e s s i on of 2,500 m u s k e t s, formerly in t he h a n ds of insurgents. D on M a n u el Sagasti, t he A y a c u c ho Gefe Politico of Madrid of 1843, has b e en r e i n s t a t ed in his functions. He h as a d d r e s s ed to the inhabitants and the national militia t wo p r o c l a m a t i o n s, in 30 w h i ch he a n n o u n c es his intention of energetically repressing all disorder. T he r e m o v al of the creatures of Sartorius from t he different offices p r o c e e ds rapidly. It is, p e r h a p s, t he only thing rapidly d o ne in Spain. All parties s h ow t h e m s e l v es equally quick in that line. S a l a m a n ca is n ot imprisoned, as w as a s s e r t e d. He had b e en arrested at 35 A r a n j u e z, b ut w as s o on released, a nd is n ow at Malaga. T he control of the ministry by popular p r e s s u re is p r o v ed by t he fact, t h at t he ministers of war, of the interior, a nd of public w o r k s, h a ve effected large displacements and simplifications in their several d e p a r t m e n t s, an e v e nt n e v er k n o wn in Spanish history before. 40 T he Unionist or Coburg-Braganza p a r ty is pitifully w e a k. F or w h at other r e a s on would they m a ke s u ch a noise a b o ut o ne single a d d r e ss sent from 405 Karl Marx Portugal to the N a t i o n al G u a rd of Madrid? If we look n e a r er at it, it is e v en d i s c o v e r ed t h at t he a d d r e s s, (originating with t he L i s b on Journal de Progrès) is n ot of a dynastic nature at all, b ut simply of the fraternal kind so well k n o wn in t he m o v e m e n ts of 1848. T he chief c a u se of the Spanish revolution w as the state of the finances, a nd particularly t he d e c r ee of Sartorius, ordering t he p a y m e nt of six m o n t h s' t a x es in a d v a n ce u p on t he year. All the public c h e s ts w e re e m p ty w h en the revolution b r o ke out, notwithstanding the c i r c u m s t a n ce t h at no b r a n ch of the public service h ad b e en paid; nor w e re the s u ms destined for any particu lar service applied to it during the whole of several m o n t h s. T h u s, for in- s t a n c e, the turnpike receipts w e re never appropriated to t he use of keeping up the r o a d s. T he m o n e ys set aside for public w o r ks s h a r ed t he same destiny. W h en t he chest of public w o r ks w as subjected to revision, instead of receipts for e x e c u t ed w o r k s, receipts from court favorites w e re discovered. It is k n o wn t h at financiering has long b e en the m o st profitable business in Madrid. T he Spanish b u d g et for 1853 w as as follows: 5 10 15 Civil List and A p a n a g es Legislation Interest of Public D e bt President of Council Foreign Office Justice W ar Marine Interior Police F i n a n c es P e n s i o ns Cultus E x t r as Total 47,350,000 reals. 1,331,685 reals. 213,271,423 reals. 1,687,860 reals. 3,919,083 reals. 39,001,233 reals. 278,646,284 reals. 85,165,000 reals. 43,957,940 reals. 72,000,000 reals. 142,279,000 reals. 143,400,586 reals. 119,050,508 reals. 18,387,788 reals. 1,209,708,742 reals. 20 25 30 N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng this budget, Spain is the least t a x ed c o u n t ry of E u r o p e, a nd t he economical question is n o w h e re so simple as t h e r e. T he reduction a nd simplification of the bureaucratic m a c h i n e ry in Spain are the less dif ficult, as the municipalities traditionally administer their o wn affairs; so is r e f o rm of t he tariff and conscientious application of t he bienes nacionales n ot yet alienated. T he social question in t he m o d e rn sense of t he w o rd has no foundation in a c o u n t ry with its r e s o u r c es yet u n d e v e l o p e d, and with such a scanty population as Spain—15,000,000 only. 35 Y ou will see from the English p r e ss the first exploits of t he British a r my 40 406 Revolution in Spain—Bomarsund 5 j o u r n a l s, at B o m a r s u n d. T h e se poor journals, which h ad n e v er anything brilliant to report, are in great enthusiasm a b o ut the s u c c e s s es of 10,000 F r e n ch t r o o ps over 2,000 Russians. I shall p a ss over t h e se glories, a nd o c c u py myself w i th the consideration of the result of this c a p t u re of an island—the faubourg of S t o c k h o l m, and not of St. Petersburg. T he F r e n ch Siècle h ad a n n o u n c e d, a nd that S w e d en w o u ld its a n n o u n c e m e nt w as e c h o ed by m a ny presently join t he w e s t e rn p o w e rs against R u s s ia in active m e a s u r e s. T he probabilities of this a n n o u n c e m e nt m ay be m e a s u r ed by the fact t h at S w e d en c o n c l u d ed a t r e a ty of a r m ed neutrality at t he v e ry t i me it might h a ve o p e r a t ed 10 with success against t he s w a m ps and w o o ds of Finland. Will it alter its policy n ow that t he time for operations is gone b y? England a nd F r a n ce h a ve refused to King O s c ar the required p e c u n i a ry a nd territorial guarantees for his adhesion. Moreover, h ow are we to explain t he order of t he Swedish G o v e r n m e nt for the d i s a r m a m e nt of a whole s q u a d r o n, on the supposition t h at S w e d en is about to t a ke t he field? This d i s a r m a m e nt e x t e n ds to t he ships of the line Charles X II a nd Prince O s c a r, t he frigate D é s i r é e, and the cor v e t t es Gefle and T h o r. 15 T he c a p t u re of B o r m a r s u n d, n ow that the w a t e rs in t h o se latitudes will soon be c o v e r ed with ice, c an h a ve no i m p o r t a n c e. At H a m b u r gh an opinion 20 prevails that it is to be followed by the c a p t u re of Riga, an opinion b a s ed u p on a letter of Captain H e a t h c o t e, c o m m a n d er of t he Archer, to t he English Consul, M r. Hartslet, at M e m e l, to the effect t h at all foreign vessels m u st h a ve cleared from t he h a r b or of Riga by t he 10th inst. P r u s s ia is said to be greatly encouraging smuggling articles c o n t r a b a nd of 25 w ar on its Russian frontier, and at t he same time preparing for a r u p t u re with the occidental p o w e r s. T he c o m m a n d e rs of t he h a r b o rs of Königsberg, Danzig, Colberg, and S w i n e m u n d e, h a ve received o r d e rs to a rm t h e se p l a c e s. T he m o st influential p a p e rs of N o r w ay a nd S w e d en declare that "it w o u ld be w o r se t h an m a d n e ss to join t he allies and m a ke e n o r m o us sacrifices, unless on the fixed and well-understood condition t h at R u s s ia shall be b r o k en up and Poland restored. Otherwise e v en t he transfer of Finland to S w e d en w o u ld be a delusion and a s n a r e ." It ought to be r e m e m b e r ed that all t h e se n o r t h e rn G o v e r n m e n ts are in conflict with their o wn people. At C o p e n h a g en for i n s t a n c e, matters stand t h us : the Schleswig-Holsteiners h a ve determined to abstain from all elections for t he Reichsrath; while at t he same time t he electors of C o p e n h a g en h a ve sent an a d d r e ss to D r. Madvig, D e p u ty of the Land-thing, calling u p on him n ot to a c c e pt a place in t he Reichsrath, since t he d e c r ee of t he King w as an infraction of the D a n i sh Constitution and the rights of the D a n i sh p e o p l e. 30 35 40 Karl Marx. 407 Friedrich Engels The Capture of Bomarsund (First Article) The Capture of Bomarsund. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4174, 4. September 1854 T he allied armies h a ve at length b e g un to act. T h ey h a ve t a k en B o m a r s u n d. On t he 3d or 4th ult., t he F r e n ch troops a nd British m a r i n es w e re landed on t he island of A l a n d; on the 10th, the place w as invested; on t h r ee succeeding d a ys t he batteries w e re e r e c t ed and a r m e d; on t he 14th t he fire w as o p e n e d; on the 15th the t wo r o u nd t o w e rs w e re t a k en by storm, o ne by t he F r e n c h, t he other by t he English; on t he 16th, after a short e n g a g e m e nt in which t he allies lost v e ry few m e n, the large c a s e m a t ed fort s u r r e n d e r e d. This short w ay of p r o c e e d i ng certainly looks rather spirited. F r om all t he information we p o s s e s s e d, it w as to be e x p e c t ed that a regular siege, w i th at least o ne parallel a nd about a fortnight of o p en t r e n c h e s, would be n e c e s s a ry to r e d u ce the place. E v en The London Times, which for a long time had talked in a w ay as if t he allied infantry h ad b ut to charge t he stone walls with t he b a y o n et in o r d er to m a ke t h em crumble, h ad to admit, t h at after all a siege w as inevitable, and t h at this tedious operation would p r o b a b ly last a fortnight. 5 10 15 If, t h e n, the attack has b e en brought to a successful issue in a b o ut a w e ek from t he investment, and on t he sixth day after breaking ground, t he natural inference is t h at t he besiegers m u st h a ve found far less difficulty t h an t h ey e x p e c t e d. W h at it w as t h at facilitated t he attack, we of c o u r se c an merely g u e ss until t he detailed accounts of the siege a r r i v e; b ut t h e re a re m a ny 20 c i r c u m s t a n c es w h i ch m ay h a ve operated in their favor. A considerable n u m b er of t he garrison w e re Finlanders, and in p a rt e v en A l a n d e r s. T h ey certainly w e re n ot v e ry m u ch inspired with R u s s i an patriotism, a nd if t he r e p o r ts from deserters m ay be trusted, t h ey w e re e v en resolved not to fight if t h ey could help it. T he inhabitants of t he Island a p p e ar to h a ve received the allies, as soon as t h ey saw they w e re a b o ut to a t t a ck B o m a r s u nd seri ously, as deliverers from the Russian y o k e, and m u st h a ve given t h em all kinds of information and assistance. B ut the main point, after all, m u st h a ve b e en something v e ry defective in t he construction of t he fortress itself. As 25 408 The Capture of Bomarsund (First Article) no ground plans of it are to be h a d, a nd all o ur knowledge of it is derived from views a nd s k e t c h e s, and from non-professional, (at least as far as engineering is c o n c e r n e d) descriptions, w h i ch are necessarily v e ry v a g u e, a nd as b o th views a nd descriptions are of a s o m e w h at conflicting n a t u re in t he details, we c a n n ot p r e t e nd to state w h e re t he defect lay. To judge from the s k e t c h e s, h o w e v e r, t he t wo r o u nd t o w e rs flank e a ch o t h er by their fire in a certain d e g r e e; b ut as in e v e ry r o u nd fortification t he g u ns m u st h a ve a radiating position, a nd their fire m u st be exceedingly e c centric, t he smaller the fort, a nd with it t he n u m b er of g u n s, t he greater b e c o m es t he eccentricity and the less effectual is t he fire. M o n t a l e m b e r t, t h e r e f o r e, t o ok great c a re n ot to p r o p o se t he e m p l o y m e nt of such t o w e rs unless this eccentricity w as c o u n t e r a c t ed by t he strong support which e a ch t o w er would receive from its neighbors on t he right and left and from t he main fortress in the rear. If five or six s u ch t o w e rs could c o n c e n t r a te their fire on one point, t he fire would t h en b e c o me as c o n c e n t r ic a nd effectual as it w o u ld be eccentric and w e ak before. M o n t a l e m b e r t, besides, k n ew v e ry well t h at in t he last stages of a siege, w h e n e v er it c o m es to storming, infantry fire is t he m o st effectual t h at c an be b r o u g ht to b e ar on t he assailants. T h e r e f o r e, beside the contrivances in his t o w e rs for admitting infantry d e f e n s e, he generally c o n n e c t ed the separate t o w e rs by a sort of c o v e r ed w ay or t r e n c h, n ot for safe c o m m u n i c a t i on only, b ut also for infantry fire. W h at s u ch a t r e n ch can d o, we h a ve just s e en at A r ab Tabiassi, w h e re the w h o le flanking defense w as confined to s u ch a t r e n c h, and w h e re t he R u s sians w e re driven b a c k, time after t i m e, by a m e re handful of A r n a u t s. Finally, M o n t a l e m b e rt tried to m a ke his t o w e rs entirely safe against a coup de main. He surrounded t h em with a ditch, with a c o v e r ed w a y, a nd s o m e t i m es considered t h em merely as t he réduit, or last r e s e r v ed position in a large, strong r e d o u b t. This w as his m a t u r e st plan, and evidently the best. It h as b e en a d o p t ed with m o re or less alteration in almost all r e c e nt forti- fications w h e re the smaller t o w e rs of M o n t a l e m b e rt w e re a d o p t e d. Beside t h e se difficulties of a c c e ss he has t he w h o le of t he lower story or cellar of t he t o w er arranged for infantry defense in a v e ry ingenious w a y. N o w, in e v e ry o ne of t h e se r e s p e c ts the R u s s i a ns a p p e ar to h a ve omitted i m p o r t a nt features. T he time occupied by t he b r e a c h i ng fire, t w e n ty to thirty h o u r s, is evidently t oo short to enable e v en thirty-two p o u n d e rs to effect a practicable b r e a c h, u n l e s s, indeed, t he m a s o n ry w as of a n a t u re not usually seen in fortifications. It m a y, therefore, be p r e s u m ed t h at t he t o w e rs w e re t a k en by scaling, t he soldiers entering t h r o u gh t he e m b r a s u r e s, and by bursting o p en the gates. This p r e s u p p o s es a v e ry ineffectual flanking fire, a nd as it a p p e a rs t h at the large fort h as no batteries in t he r e ar to assist t he t o w e r s, e a ch tower w as flanked by t he fire of the o t h er only. This fault is 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 * 409 Friedrich Engels t he greater, as from t he sketches it would a p p e ar t h at t he g r o u nd was v e ry u n e v e n, allowing storming parties to creep u p, c o v e r ed by accidents of ground, to a pretty close proximity. T h e n, to judge from t he sketches a nd from the e v e n t, p r e p a r a t i o ns against a coup de main m u st h a ve b e en alto gether neglected. T h e re is no t r a ce of a r e d o u bt t h r o wn up a r o u nd the t o w e r s, and t he r e d o u b ts w h i ch the Russians had c o n s t r u c t ed in front of t h em w e re a b a n d o n ed almost without resistance. T h e re w a s, it is said, a ditch a r o u nd e a ch t o w e r; b ut it m u st h a ve b e en v e ry shallow w i th no contrivances for infantry defense within it. T he t o w e rs o n ce t a k e n, t he larger fort, which t h ey c o m m a n d, w as necessarily at the m e r cy of the Allies. It c o n s e q u e n t ly fell, v e ry likely with no m o re t h an a show of resistance. Judging t h e se fortifications from w h at this short siege m a k es them a p p e ar to b e, it w o u ld almost seem that their c o n s t r u c t o rs n e v er calculated u p on a serious attack on the land side. T h ey m u st h a ve built t he t o w e rs with a view merely to resisting t he attacks of parties of marines, w h i ch at t he most could n ot e x c e ed a couple of t h o u s a n d s, and n ot muster in sufficient strength either to a t t e m pt an assault or to c o n d u ct to its close a regular siege. C o n s e q u e n t ly t he water-front w as t he strongest, and the land-front, f o r m ed by the t o w e r s, m o re s h ow t h an reality. And yet the result w o u ld almost show t h at a p a r ty of 1,000 m a r i n es might h a ve stormed the t o w e rs m a ny m o n t hs ago, and t h e r e by r e d u c ed the main fort! 5 10 15 20 25 As to the storming itself, it m u st h a ve b e en d o ne v e ry well by b o th F r e n ch a nd English. T he English are well-known stormer s ; it is their favorite maneu ver, and hardly e v er fails t h e m. T he F r e n ch prefer to charge a b o dy of troops in t he o p en field; and in sieges their mathematical t u rn of mind prefers t he m e t h o d i c al m a r ch of that eminently F r e n ch science w h i ch V a u b an invented. B ut t he ardor of a British veteran seems to h a ve driven t h em on. T h e re w as at B o m a r s u nd an old General Jones—the m an w ho i m p r o v ed u p on V a u b a n, w h e n, with hardly half-sufficient m e a n s, a nd against b r a ve and d e t e r m i n ed garrisons, at B a d a j o s, Ciudad Rodrigo and Saint Sebastian, he contrived to s h o r t en a siege by a b o ut one-third of its prescribed duration. Gen. J o n es is not a c o m m on engineer. He d o es not, like the rest of his profession, see in a siege a m e re school-festival in which the chief engineer is u n d er examina tion, a nd m u st p r o ve before the eyes of the a r my h ow far all the rules and regulations of formal sieges and of V a u b a n 's "attaque des places fortes " a re retained and properly arranged in his m e m o r y. He d o es not think that the whole a r my is t h e re for t he sake of the engineers, to p r o t e ct t h em while t h ey exhibit their tricks. I n s t e ad of this, Gen. J o n es is first a soldier, and t h en an engineer. He k n o ws t he British soldier well, a nd k n o ws w h at he c an t r u st him with. And the short, determined, and y et u n p r e t e n d i ng w ay in w h i ch 40 B o m a r s u nd w as t a k en in half the prescribed time, is so m u ch like the b r e a c h- 30 35 410 Γ The Capture of Bomarsund (First Article) ing a nd storming of t he S p a n i sh fortresses t h at n o b o dy b ut old J o n es c an be at t he b o t t om of it. As to t he F r e n c h, t h ey c o u ld n e v er h a ve invented this w ay of taking a f o r t r e s s. It goes against their grain; it is t oo blunt, t oo destitute of m a n n e rs a nd politeness. B ut t h ey c o u ld n ot c o n t e st t he a u t h o r i ty of t he 5 m an w ho h ad tried his irregular w ay of taking f o r t r e s s es u p on t h e m s e l v es fifty y e a rs b e f o r e, a nd f o u nd it to a n s w er in e v e ry c a s e. A nd w h en t h ey c a me to t he storming, t h ey a p p e ar n ot to h a ve b e en b e h i nd t he English in resolu­ tion. It is singular that t he R u s s i a n s, w ho h a ve p r i d ed t h e m s e l v es so m u ch u p on 10 their storming capacities, f r om P e r e c op a nd Otschakoff d o wn to W a r s aw a nd Bistritz, t h e se R u s s i a ns h a ve b e en r e p u l s ed in every assault u p on field- w o r k s, a n d, indeed, w e re n ot able, before Silistria, to r e d u ce a field-work by a regular siege, a nd h ad to d e c a mp w i t h o ut t he f o r t r e ss being relieved; while on t he o t h er h a n d, t he v e ry first act of t he w ar w as t he storming by t he T u r ks 15 of a p e r m a n e nt R u s s i an fortification—St. Nicolai—while t he c e l e b r a t ed fortress of B o m a r s u nd h as b e en t a k en by a s s a u lt a l m o st w i t h o ut t he h o n or of an o p en t r e n c h. We m u st n ot forget to n o te t h at t he f l e e ts a p p e ar n ot to h a ve in a ny w ay effectually c o n t r i b u t ed to this victory. T h ey seem, after all, to s h un t he n e i g h b o r h o od of c a s e m a t ed b a t t e r i es as m u ch as ever. 20 T h is s u c c e ss of t he allies, h o w e v e r, is of s u ch a n a t u re t h at it will v e ry likely i n d u ce t h em to do nothing m o re in t he e n s u i ng a u t u m n. At all e v e n t s, t he grand e x p e d i t i on to S e v a s t o p ol h as n ot yet sailed, a nd a few w e e ks m o re delay is already p r o m i s e d. T h en it will be t oo late, a nd t h us t h at r e p o se a nd relaxation during t he winter, w h i ch is so n e c e s s a ry after t he fatigues of t he 25 c a mp at V a r n a, will be s e c u r ed to t he h e r o es of t he allied forces. 411 Friedrich Engels The Capture of Bomarsund (Second Article) The Capture of Bomarsund. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4182, 13. September 1854 T he particulars of t he c a p t u re of B o m a r s u n d, so far as published, are still c o u c h ed in v a g ue a nd unbusiness-like language. We do n o t, in fact, l e a rn at w h at distance from the forts the breaching batteries w e re e r e c t ed or the ships a n c h o r ed during t he naval attack. We h e ar no further details, s u ch as might be e x p e c t e d, on the construction of the forts, n ow t h at t he allied t r o o ps h a ve p o s s e s s i on of t h e m. I n d e e d, almost every point of i m p o r t a n ce is p a s s ed o v er in o r d er to a m u se t he public with the m o re p i c t u r e s q ue a nd less professional p a rt of the b u s i n e s s. In so slovenly a m a n n er are c o n c o c t ed e v en t he official r e p o r t s, t h at n o b o dy c an m a ke o ut distinctly, w h e t h er F o rt T z e e, (as t h ey spell it,) w h en t a k en by t he F r e n c h, h ad to be s t o r m ed or not, as it s e e ms t h at hardly any o ne b ut t he commanding officer resisted. T he little we c an m a ke o ut is that, as we suspected from t he s k e t c h e s, t he t wo t o w e rs w e re e r e c t ed u p on ground of so b r o k en a n a t u re t h at ravines, slopes and r o c ks f o r m ed natural a p p r o a c h es e v en up to their v e ry d i t c h e s. In t h e se ravines t he allies could comfortably establish t h e m s e l v e s, safe from t he R u s s i an shot, w h i ch p a s s ed over their h e a d s; a nd being t h us enabled to c o n s t r u ct their batteries close to the place, at o n ce b e g an t he siege with t h o se w h i ch are generally t he last u s ed in s u ch c a s e s, n a m e l y, b r e a c h i ng b a t t e r i e s. T h at t he Russians built their forts u p on such ground, w i t h o ut at o n ce leveling it up to at least six or eight h u n d r ed y a r ds in front of t h e m, p r o v es t h at a serious land a t t a ck w as n e v er calculated u p on by t h e m. T he breaching batteries m u st h a ve b e en e r e c t ed at no greater distance t h an five or six h u n d r ed y a r ds from t he forts, as t he F r e n ch b a t t e r ed t h em with sixteen- p o u n d e r s, generally considered n ot h e a vy e n o u gh for b r e a c h i ng a wall e v en at o ne h u n d r ed or o ne h u n d r ed and fifty y a r ds distance. T w e n t y - s ix h o u r s' firing, h o w e v e r, so injured the t o w er that twelve h o u r s' m o re w o u ld h a ve b r o u g ht d o wn a whole front. T he British b a t t e r ed F o rt N o t t i ch with six thirty-two-pounders, of forty-five cwt. each. 5 10 15 20 25 412 The Capture of Bomarsund (Second Article) 5 T h e se g u n s, according to Sir H o w a rd D o u g l a s 's Naval Gunnery, a re u s ed with a regulation charge of seven lbs. p o w d e r, a nd w o u l d, at the distance of four to five h u n d r ed y a r d s, m a ke the ball p e n e t r a te from two to t wo and a half feet into solid oak. T he F r e n ch sixteen-pound g u n s, with a charge of five lbs., w o u ld h a v e, at four to five h u n d r ed y a r d s, a penetration into o ak of from o ne and a half to t wo feet. If t he British, as m ay be expected, in c r e a s ed the regulation charge to at least eight lbs., t h e re is no w o n d er t h at w i th twice t he n u m b er of guns a nd double t he caliber, t h ey laid o ne side of t he fort o p en in less t h an twelve h o u r s. 25 10 15 As to the sea attack, it w as a m e re diversion. Only Captain Pelham profited by t he occasion to m a ke a scientific experiment. He u s ed his long ten-inch pivot gun w i th all t he steadiness and regularity of breaching fire, invariably hitting, as nearly as possible, t he s a me place. T h e se long ten-inch guns are t he finest in t he British navy. Their great weight of metal (ninety-five cwt.) p e r m i ts a charge of sixteen p o u n ds of p o w d er to a solid shot of sixty-eight p o u n d s. T he effect of this shot, e v en at a distance of five or six h u n d r ed y a r d s, is inconceivably greater t h an that of t he eighteen or twenty-four- p o u nd balls hitherto generally used in b r e a c h i ng batteries ; and w h en properly u s e d, could n ot fail to p r o d u ce a t r e m e n d o us result. Accordingly, Captain 20 P e l h a m 's steady firing v e ry speedily u n r a v e l ed the m y s t e ry of R u s s i an granite fortresses. A few shots d e t a c h ed w h at hitherto a p p e a r ed a large b l o ck of solid granite, b ut t u r n ed o ut to be a m e re facing slab, the thickness of w h i ch w as in no wise proportionate to its hight a nd width. S o me m o re s h o t s, a nd t he n e xt adjoining slabs fell in, and t h en followed an a v a l a n c he of rubbish, rattling d o wn t he walls, a nd laying b a re t he v e ry h e a rt of the fortress. It t h en w as clear t h at the " g r a n i t e" w as nothing b ut s h o w; that as s o on as t he comparatively thin slabs which faced t he e s c a r pe w e re k n o c k ed d o w n, t h e re w as no solid m a s o n ry inside to resist the inroads of bullets. T he walls, in fact, w e re m e re casings, t he interstices of w h i ch w e re filled up with all sorts of b r o k en s t o n e s, sand, etc., having neither c o h e s i on n or stability. If t he m a in fortress w as t h us c o n s t r u c t e d, t h e re is no d o u bt t he m a s o n ry of t he t o w e rs w as equally b a d, a nd the rapid breaching is fully explained. A nd t h e se walls, of so little intrinsic strength, h ad by their imposing outside sufficed to k e ep t he w h o le A n g l o - F r e n ch fleet at b ay for nearly four m o n t hs ! T he disappoint- 35 m e nt of Sir Charles N a p i er w h en he s aw w h at t h ey really w e re m a de of c a n n o t, h o w e v e r, h a ve b e en greater t h an t h at of t he C z a r, w h en he learned of w h at t he " g r a n i t e ," for w h i ch he h ad so dearly paid, consisted. In t he land attack, another feature is r e m a r k a b l e. We h a ve already s e en t h at b r o k en g r o u nd s u r r o u n d ed t he forts not only within gun-range, b ut e v en within 40 m u s k e t - r a n g e. This w as t a k en advantage of by t he C h a s s e u rs of V i n c e n n e s, w ho c r e pt up v e ry close, sheltering t h e m s e l v es b e h i nd s t u m ps of t r e e s, 30 413 Friedrich Engels b o u l d er s t o n e s, r o c k s, etc., a nd o p e n ed a m u r d e r o us fire u p on t he e m b r a sures of t he c a s e m a t e s. As at a distance of four to five h u n d r ed y a r ds then- rifles h a ve an unerring aim, and m o r e o v e r, t he sloping-side e m b r a s u r e s, like a t u n n e l, m a ke every bullet which strikes t h em enter t he c e n t r al opening at t he b o t t o m, it m ay well be imagined h ow m u ch t he g u n n e rs in t he fortress w e re a n n o y ed while loading. 5 T he Russians appear to h a ve entirely neglected t he c o m m o n e st p r e c a u t i o ns against this rifle fire. T h e y, t o o, h ad rifles. W hy did t h ey not p o st t h em b e h i nd the p a r a p et of the roof of the t o w e r, w h e re t h ey c o m m a n d ed t he e n e m y 's skirmishers? B ut t he Finnishrif les at B o m a r s u nd a p p e ar to h a ve 10 h ad no inclination to fight for the glory of H o ly R u s s i a. Finally, t he F r e n ch e m p l o y e d, besides t he t h r ee breaching guns, s o me m o r t a rs a nd t h r ee howitz e r s. T he m o r t a rs sent their shells at a high angle on t he b o m b - p r o of roof of t he t o w e r, trying to c r u sh it by the c o m b i n ed force of t he fall a nd t he ex plosion. T h i s, h o w e v e r, d o es n ot appear to h a ve b e en of g r e at effect. On t he other h a n d, t he F r e n ch howitzers stuck to direct horizontal firing, a nd aimed at t he e m b r a s u r e s. At t he short distance of four or five h u n d r ed y a r ds a long twenty-four-pound b r a ss howitzer, throwing a shell of six i n c h es diameter, might v e ry well hit such an object as an e m b r a s u re o n ce in t h r ee t i m e s; and e v e ry shell entering would disable t he m en at t he gun, b e s i d es dismounting 20 t he gun itself. This fire, therefore, m u st h a ve b e en v e ry effective. 15 25 T h us we see t h at the granite walls of B o m a r s u nd t u r n ed o ut m e re R u s s i an humbug—heaps of rubbish k e pt in shape by thin stone-facings, n ot fit to resist a good and steady fire for any time. If N i c h o l as h ad b e en c h e a t ed by their c o n s t r u c t o r s, he h as s u c c e e d ed for all that in cheating t he allies out of a whole c a m p a i gn by t h e se sham fortresses. T he defense on t he p a rt of the Russians w a s, u p on t he whole, indifferent; and this m ay be t r a c ed to t he p r e t ty plainly p r o n o u n c ed disaffection of the Finnish t r o o p s. T he a t t a ck of the allies w as c h a r a c t e r i z ed by a resolution u n h e a rd of hitherto in their proceedings, a nd d u e, evidently, to G e n. J o n e s. T he difficulties o v e r c o me in moving and 30 placing t he g u n s, t h o u gh exaggerated by Sir Charles N a p i e r, w e re certainly great. T he F r e n ch attacked with breaching guns of too w e ak caliber and with m o r t a rs t h at could be of little u se u n d er t he c i r c u m s t a n c e s, b ut their m o de of horizontal shell-firing and rifle-firing at the e m b r a s u r es d e s e r v es high eulogium. T he English, as usual, c a me d o wn with t he h e a v i e st caliber t h ey could m o v e, gave plain, straight-forward and effective fire, u n d e r w e nt dif ficulties a nd stood fire with their usual steadiness, a nd carried their point without fuss, b ut also without any special distinction. 35 B o m a r s u nd being t a k e n, the question n e xt arises, w h at is to be d o ne w i th it? According to t he latest dispatches from H a m b u r g, at a council of w ar held by the A d m i r a l s, t he General-in-Chief of the expeditionary t r o o ps and the 40 414 The Capture of Bomarsund (Second Article) principal c o m m a n d e rs resolved u p on destroying all t he fortifications a nd abandoning the island, if S w e d en should n ot be inclined to o c c u py it and b uy it at t he price of a declaration of w ar against Russia. If this dispatch p r o ve t r u e, t he expedition against t he A l a nd Islands, so far from being a military 5 m o v e, as a n n o u n c ed by t he Moniteur, w o u ld p r o ve simply a diplomatic o n e, u n d e r t a k en w i th a view to entangle S w e d en in a d a n g e r o us alliance with t he same p o w e rs w h o se friendship, to u se t he w o r ds of Mr. Bright, " h as b r o u g ht u p on T u r k ey in a single y e ar such calamities as R u s s ia in her wildest d r e a ms of ambition n e v er imagined." T he S w e d i sh C o u rt hesitates, t he S w e d i sh p r e ss w a r ns t he p e o p le against t he Dañaos et dona ferentes, b ut t he S w e d i sh p e a s a n ts h a ve already p a s s ed a motion t h at t he C h a m b er should petition t he K i ng to t a ke steps that Aland m ay n e v er again b e c o me R u s s i a n. T h e re is little probability t h at the petition of t he p e a s a n ts will be listened t o, and we m ay e x p e ct s o on to h e ar that the fortress has b e en b l o wn u p. 1 o 415 Karl Marx Revolutionary Spain New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4179, 9.September 1854 Spanish Revolutions. T he revolution in Spain has n ow so far t a k en on t he a p p e a r a n ce of a per m a n e nt condition that, as our c o r r e s p o n d e nt at L o n d on h as informed u s, t he wealthy and conservative classes h a ve b e g un to emigrate a nd to seek security in F r a n c e. This is not surprising; Spain has n e v er a d o p t ed t he m o d e rn F r e n ch fashion, so generally in vogue in 1848, of beginning a nd accomplishing a revolution in t h r ee d a y s. H er efforts in t h at line are c o m p l ex and m o re prolonged. T h r ee years seems to be the shortest limit to w h i ch she restricts herself, while h er revolutionary cycle sometimes e x p a n ds to nine. T h us her first revolution in the p r e s e nt c e n t u ry e x t e n d ed from 1808 to 1814; the second from 1820 to 1823; and the third from 1834 to 1843. H ow long the p r e s e nt o ne will c o n t i n u e, or in w h at it will result, it is impossible for the k e e n e st politician to foretell; b ut it is not [too] m u ch to say t h at t h e re is no other p a rt of E u r o p e, n ot e v en T u r k ey and the R u s s i an w a r, w h i ch offers so profound an interest to t he thoughtful observer, as d o es Spain at this instant. 5 10 15 I n s u r r e c t i o n a ry risings are as old in Spain as t h at s w ay of c o u rt favorites against w h i ch t h ey are usually directed. T h us at the middle of t he fifteenth c e n t u ry t he aristocracy revolted against King J u an I I. and his favorite, D on A l v a ro de L u n a. In t he fifteenth century still m o re serious c o m m o t i o ns t o ok place against K i ng H e n ry I V. and the head of his camarilla, D on J u an de 20 P a c h e c o, Marquis de Villena. In the s e v e n t e e n th c e n t u ry t he people at L i s b on tore to pieces Vasconcellos, the Sartoriusof the Spanish V i c e r oy in Portugal, as t h ey did at B a r c e l o na w i th Santa C o l o m a, t he favorite of Philip I V. At t he e nd of the same c e n t u r y, u n d er the reign of Carlos II., t he p e o p le of Madrid r o se against the Q u e e n 's camarilla, c o m p o s ed of t he C o u n t e ss de B e r l e p s ch 25 and the C o u n ts O r o p e sa and Melgar, w ho h ad i m p o s ed on all provisions entering t he capital an oppressive duty, which t h ey s h a r ed a m o ng t h e m selves. T he people m a r c h ed to the royal p a l a c e, forced t he K i ng to a p p e ar on t he balcony, and himself to d e n o u n ce t he Q u e e n 's camarilla. T h ey t h en 416 Revolutionary Spain • First Article 5 t he insurrectionary rising in t he fifteenth c e n t u ry w as m a r c h ed to t he palaces of the C o u n ts O r o p e sa a nd Melgar, p l u n d e r ed t h e m, d e s t r o y ed t h em by fire, and tried to lay hold of their o w n e r s, w h o, h o w e v e r, h ad t he good luck to e s c a p e, at t he c o st of p e r p e t u al exile. T he e v e nt w h i ch o c c a s i o n ed t he t r e a c h e r o us treaty w h i ch the favorite of H e n ry IV., t he Marquis de Villena, h ad c o n c l u d ed with t he King of F r a n c e, according to w h i ch Catalonia w as to be s u r r e n d e r ed to L o u is X I. T h r ee centuries later, t he t r e a ty of F o n t a i n e bleau, c o n c l u d ed on Oct. 27,1807, by w h i ch t he favorite of Carlos I V. and t he minion of his Q u e e n, D on M a n u el G o d o y, t he Prince of P e a c e, c o n t r a c t ed 10 with B o n a p a r te for t he partition of Portugal and t he e n t r a n ce of t he F r e n ch armies into Spain, c a u s ed a popular insurrection at M a d r id against G o d o y, t he abdication of Carlos IV., t he a s s u m p t i on of t he t h r o ne by F e r d i n a nd V I L, his son, the e n t r a n ce of the F r e n ch a r my into Spain, a nd the following w ar of i n d e p e n d e n c e. T h us t he Spanish w ar of i n d e p e n d e n ce c o m m e n c ed with a popular insurrection against the camarilla, t h en personified in D on M a n u el G o d o y, j u st as t he civil w ar of t he fifteenth c e n t u ry c o m m e n c ed with t he rising against the camarilla, t h en personified in t he M a r q u is de Villena. S o, t o o, t he revolution of 1854, c o m m e n c ed with t he rising against t he camarilla, personified in the C o u nt San L u i s. 15 20 N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng t h e se ever-recurring insurrections, t h e re has b e en in Spain, up to the p r e s e nt c e n t u r y, no serious revolution, e x c e pt t he w ar of t he H o ly L e a g ue in t he times of Carlos I., or C h a r l es V., as the G e r m a ns call him. T he immediate pretext, as usual, w as t h en furnished by t he clique w h o, u n d er the auspices of Cardinal A d r i a n, t he Viceroy, himself a Fleming, e x a s p e r a t ed t he Castilians by their r a p a c i o us insolence, by selling t he public offices to the highest bidder, and by o p en traffic in law-suits. T he opposition against t he Flemish camarilla w as only at t he surface of t he m o v e m e n t. At its b o t t om w as the defense of the liberties of m e d i a e v al Spain against t he e n c r o a c h m e n ts of m o d e rn absolutism. T he material basis of the Spanish m o n a r c hy having b e en laid by t he union of Aragon, Castile a nd G r a n a d a, u n d er F e r d i n a nd t he Catholic, a nd Isabella I., Charles I. a t t e m p t ed to t r a n s f o rm t h at still feudal m o n a r c hy into an absolute o n e. Simultaneously he a t t a c k ed t he t wo pillars of Spanish liberty, t he Cortes and the Ayuntamientos—the f o r m er a modification of t he ancient Gothic concilia, a nd the latter t r a n s m i t t ed almost without inter r u p t i on from the R o m an times, the A y u n t a m i e n t os exhibiting t he m i x t u re of t he hereditary a nd elective c h a r a c t er p r o p er to t he R o m an municipalities. As to municipal self-government, t he t o w ns of Italy, of P r o v e n c e, N o r t h e rn Gaul, Great Britain, a nd part of G e r m a n y, offer a fair similitude to t he t h en state of the Spanish t o w n s; b ut neither t he F r e n ch States G e n e r a l, nor t he British Parliaments of the middle ages, are to be c o m p a r ed with t he Spanish 25 30 35 40 417 Karl Marx C o r t e s. T h e re w e re circumstances in the formation of the Spanish kingdom peculiarly favorable to the limitation of royal p o w e r. On t he o ne side, small p a r ts of the peninsula w e re recovered at a t i m e, and f o r m ed into separate k i n g d o m s, during the long struggles with the A r a b s. P o p u l ar laws and c u s t o ms w e re e n g e n d e r ed in t h e se struggles. T he successive c o n q u e s t s, being principally effected by t he nobles, r e n d e r ed their p o w er e x c e s s i v e, while t h ey diminished the royal p o w e r. On the other h a n d, the inland t o w ns and cities r o se to great c o n s e q u e n c e, from the necessity people found t h e m s e l v es u n d er of residing together in places of strength, as a security against the continual irruptions of t he M o o r s; while t he peninsular formation of t he c o u n t r y, and c o n s t a nt intercourse with P r o v e n ce and Italy, created first-rate c o m m e r c i al and maritime cities on the coast. As early as t he fourteenth c e n t u r y, the cities formed the m o st powerful p a rt in t he C o r t e s, w h i ch w e re c o m p o s ed of their representatives, with those of t he clergy a nd t he nobility. It is also w o r t hy of remark, that the slow r e c o v e ry from M o o r i sh dominion t h r o u gh an obstinate struggle of almost eight h u n d r ed y e a r s, gave the Penin sula, w h en wholly emancipated, a character altogether different from t h at of c o t e m p o r a n e o us E u r o p e, Spain finding itself, at t he e p o ch of E u r o p e an r e s u r r e c t i o n, with the m a n n e rs of the G o t hs and the V a n d a ls in the N o r t h, a nd w i th t h o se of t he A r a bs in the South. 5 10 15 20 Charles I. having returned from G e r m a n y, w h e re the imperial dignity had b e en b e s t o w ed u p on him, t he Cortes assembled at Valladolid, in order to r e c e i ve his o a th to the ancient laws and to invest him with the c r o w n. Charles, declining to appear, sent commissioners w h o, he p r e t e n d e d, w e re to receive the o a th of allegiance on the part of the C o r t e s. T he C o r t es refused to admit t h e se c o m m i s s i o n e rs to their p r e s e n c e, notifying t he m o n a r ch that, if he did n ot a p p e ar and swear to the laws of the c o u n t r y, he should n e v er be acknowl edged as King of Spain. Charles t h e r e u p on yielded; he a p p e a r ed b e f o re the C o r t es and t o ok the oath—as historians say, w i th a v e ry b ad grace. T he Cortes on this occasion told him: " Y ou must k n o w, Señor, t h at t he King is but t he paid s e r v a nt of the nation." S u ch w as the beginning of the hostilities b e t w e en Charles I. and t he t o w n s. In c o n s e q u e n ce of his intrigues, n u m e r o us in surrections b r o ke out in Castile, the H o ly L e a g ue of Avila w as f o r m e d, and the united t o w ns c o n v o k ed the assembly of t he C o r t es at Tordesillas, w h e n c e, on Oct. 20, 1520, a " p r o t e st against t he a b u s e s" w as a d d r e s s ed to the King, in r e t u rn for w h i ch he deprived all the d e p u t i es assembled at Tordesillas of their personal rights. T h us civil w ar h ad b e c o me inevitable; the c o m m o n e rs appealed to a r m s; their soldiers u n d er the c o m m a nd of Padilla seized t he fortress of T o r re L o b a t o n, b ut w e re ultimately defeated by superior forces at t he battle of Villalar on April 2 3, 1521. T he h e a ds of t he principal " c o n s p i r a t o r s" rolled on t he scaffold, a nd t he ancient liberties of Spain disappeared. 25 30 35 40 418 Revolutionary Spain · First Article Several circumstances conspired in favor of the rising p o w er of absolut ism. T he w a nt of union b e t w e en the different provinces deprived their efforts of the n e c e s s a ry strength; b ut it w a s, a b o ve all, t he bitter antagonism b e t w e en the classes of t he nobles and the citizens of t he t o w ns which Charles em- ployed for the degradation of b o t h. We h a ve already mentioned that since the fourteenth c e n t u ry t he influence of the t o w ns w as prominent in the C o r t e s, and since F e r d i n a nd the Catholic, t he H o ly B r o t h e r h o od (Santa H e r m a n d a d ), h ad p r o v ed a powerful i n s t r u m e nt in t he h a n ds of t he t o w ns against the Castilian nobles, w ho a c c u s ed t h em of e n c r o a c h m e n ts on their ancient privileges and jurisdiction. T he nobility, therefore, w e re eager to assist Carlos I. in his project of suppressing the H o ly L e a g u e. H a v i ng crushed their a r m ed resistance, Carlos occupied himself with the reduction of the municipal privileges of the t o w n s, which, rapidly declining in population, wealth a nd i m p o r t a n c e, soon lost their influence in the Cortes. Carlos n ow t u r n ed r o u nd u p on the nobles, w ho h ad assisted him in putting d o wn the liberties of t he t o w n s, but w ho t h e m s e l v es retained a considerable political i m p o r t a n c e. Mutiny in his army for w a nt of pay obliged him, in 1539, to assemble t he C o r t e s, in order to obtain a grant of money. Indignant at the misapplication of former subsidies to o p e r a t i o ns foreign to the interests of Spain, t he Cortes refused all supplies. Carlos dismissed t h em in a rage; and, the nobles having insisted on a privilege of e x e m p t i on from t a x e s, he declared t h at t h o se w ho claimed such a right could h a ve no claim to a p p e ar in t he C o r t e s, and consequently excluded t h em from t h at assembly. This w as the death-blow of t he C o r t e s, and their meetings w e re h e n c e f o r th r e d u c ed to t he p e r f o r m a n ce of a m e re court c e r e m o n y. T he third e l e m e nt in t he ancient constitution of t he C o r t e s, viz.: t he clergy, enlisted since F e r d i n a nd the Catholic u n d er the b a n n er of the Inquisition, had long c e a s ed to identify its interests with t h o se of feudal Spain. On t he c o n t r a r y, by the Inquisition, the C h u r ch w as transformed into the m o st formidable tool of absolutism. If after the reign of Carlos I. the decline of Spain, b o th in a political and social aspect, exhibited all t h o se s y m p t o ms of inglorious and protracted putrefaction so repulsive in the w o r st times of t he T u r k i sh E m p i r e, u n d er t he E m p e r or at least the ancient liberties w e re b u r i ed in a magnificent t o m b. This w as the time w h en V a s co N u ñ ez B a l b oa planted the b a n n er of Castile u p on t he shores of Darien, C o r t ez in M e x i c o, a nd P i z a r ro in P e r u; w h en Spanish influence reigned s u p r e me in E u r o p e, a nd the S o u t h e rn imagination of the Iberians w as bewildered with visions of E l d o r a d o s, chivalrous ad v e n t u r e s, and universal m o n a r c h y. T h en Spanish liberty disappeared u n d er the clash of a r m s, showers of gold, and the terrible illuminations of the auto-da-fé. B ut how are we to a c c o u nt for t he singular p h e n o m e n on that, after almost 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 419 Karl Marx t h r ee centuries of a H a p s b u rg dynasty, followed by a B o u r b on dynasty— either of t h em quite sufficient to crush a people—the municipal liberties of Spain m o re or less survive? t h at in t he very c o u n t r y, w h e re of all t he feudal states absolute m o n a r c hy first arose in its m o st unmitigated f o r m, centraliza tion has n e v er s u c c e e d ed in taking root? T he answer is n ot difficult. It w as in t he sixteenth c e n t u ry t h at w e re formed the great m o n a r c h i es w h i ch e s t a b lished t h e m s e l v es e v e r y w h e re on t he downfall of t he conflicting feudal classes—the aristocracy and the t o w n s. B ut in the o t h er great States of E u r o pe absolute m o n a r c hy p r e s e n ts itself as a civilizing c e n t e r, as the in itiator of social unity. T h e re it w as the laboratory, in w h i ch the various elements of society w e re so mixed and w o r k e d, as to allow t he t o w ns to c h a n ge the local i n d e p e n d e n ce and sovereignty of the Middle A g es for the general rule of t he middle classes, and the c o m m on s w ay of civil society. In Spain, on t he contrary, while the aristocracy s u nk into degradation without losing their w o r st privilege, the t o w ns lost their mediaeval p o w er without gaining m o d e rn i m p o r t a n c e. 5 10 15 20 Since the establishment of absolute m o n a r c hy t h ey h a ve vegetated in a state of c o n t i n u o us decay. We h a ve not h e re to state t he c i r c u m s t a n c e s, political or economical, which destroyed Spanish c o m m e r c e, industry, navi gation and agriculture. F or t he p r e s e nt p u r p o se it is sufficient to simply recall the fact. As the commercial and industrial life of t he t o w ns declined, internal e x c h a n g es b e c a me r a r e, the mingling of t he inhabitants of different p r o v i n c es less frequent, the m e a ns of communication neglected, a nd the great r o a ds gradually deserted. T h us t he local life of Spain, t he i n d e p e n d e n ce of its p r o v i n c es and c o m m u n e s, the diversified state of society originally b a s ed on t he physical configuration of t he c o u n t r y, and historically d e v e l o p ed by the d e t a c h ed m a n n er in w h i ch the several p r o v i n c es e m a n c i p a t ed t h e m s e l v es from t he Moorish rule, and formed little i n d e p e n d e nt commonwealths—was n ow finally strengthened and confirmed by the e c o n o m i c al revolution w h i ch dried up the sources of national activity. A nd while t he absolute m o n a r c hy found in Spain material in its v e ry n a t u re repulsive to centralization, it did all in its p o w er to p r e v e nt t he g r o w th of c o m m on interests arising out of a national division of labor and the multiplicity of internal exchanges—the v e ry basis on w h i ch alone a uniform s y s t em of administration and t he rule of general laws c an be created. T h us the absolute m o n a r c hy in Spain, bearing 35 b ut a superficial r e s e m b l a n ce to the absolute m o n a r c h i es of E u r o pe in general, is r a t h er to be ranged in a class w i th Asiatic f o r ms of g o v e r n m e n t. Spain, like T u r k e y, r e m a i n ed an agglomeration of m i s m a n a g ed republics with a nominal sovereign at their head. Despotism changed c h a r a c t er in the dif ferent p r o v i n c es with the arbitrary interpretation of the general laws by 40 viceroys a nd g o v e r n o r s; b ut despotic as w as the g o v e r n m e nt it did n ot 30 25 420 Revolutionary Spain · First Article p r e v e nt t he provinces from subsisting with different laws and c u s t o m s, different coins, military b a n n e rs of different c o l o r s, and with their respective s y s t e ms of taxation. T he oriental d e s p o t i sm a t t a c ks municipal self-govern m e nt only w h en o p p o s ed to its direct interests, b ut is v e ry glad to allow those institutions to continue so long as t h ey t a ke off its shoulders the d u ty of doing something and spare it the trouble of regular administration. 5 10 T h us it h a p p e n ed that N a p o l e o n, w h o, like all his c o t e m p o r a r i e s, con sidered Spain as an inanimate c o r p s e, w as fatally surprised at the discovery t h at w h en the Spanish State w as d e a d, Spanish society w as full of life, and e v e ry part of it overflowing with p o w e rs of resistance. By the t r e a ty of F o n t a i n e b l e au he had got his t r o o ps to M a d r i d; by alluring the royal family into an interview at B a y o n ne he h ad forced Carlos IV to retract his abdica tion, and t h en to m a ke over to him his d o m i n i o n s; and he had intimidated F e r d i n a nd V II into a similar declaration. Carlos I V, his Q u e en and t he Prince 15 of P e a c e, c o n v e y ed to C o m p i è g n e, F e r d i n a nd V II and his b r o t h e rs im prisoned in the castle of V a l e n ç a y, B o n a p a r te c o n f e r r ed t he t h r o ne of Spain on his b r o t h er J o s e p h, assembled a Spanish J u n ta at B a y o n n e, and provided t h em with o ne of his r e a d y - m a de constitutions. Seeing nothing alive in t he Spanish m o n a r c hy e x c e pt the miserable d y n a s ty w h i ch he h ad safely locked 2Q, u p, he felt quite sure of this confiscation of Spain. But, only a few days after his coup de main, he received the n e ws of an insurrection at M a d r i d. M u r a t, it is t r u e, quelled that tumult by killing a b o ut 1,000 p e o p l e; b ut w h en this m a s s a c re b e c a me k n o w n, an insurrection b r o ke o ut in A s t u r i a s, and s o on afterward e m b r a c ed t he whole m o n a r c h y. It is to be r e m a r k ed that this first s p o n t a n e o us rising originated with the p e o p l e, while the " b e t t e r" classes h ad quietly submitted to the foreign y o k e. 25 T h us it is that Spain w as p r e p a r ed for her m o re r e c e nt revolutionary career, a nd launched into the struggles which h a ve m a r k ed her d e v e l o p m e nt in the p r e s e nt century. T he facts and influences we h a ve thus succinctly detailed still act in forming her destinies and directing t he impulses of h er people. We h a ve p r e s e n t ed t h em as n e c e s s a ry n ot only to an appreciation of the p r e s e nt crisis, b ut of all she has d o ne a nd suffered since the N a p o l e o n ic usurpation—a period n ow of nearly fifty years—not w i t h o ut tragic episodes a nd heroic efforts,—indeed, o ne of t he m o st t o u c h i ng a nd instructive c h a p t e rs in all m o d e rn history. L et us h o pe that the additions n ow being m a de to their annals by t he Spanish people may p r o ve neither u n w o r t hy nor fruitless of good to themselves and to the world. 30 35 421 Karl Marx New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4192, 25. September 1854 Revolutionary Spain. We h a ve already laid before our r e a d e rs a survey of the earlier revolutionary history of Spain, as a m e a ns of understanding a nd appreciating t he de v e l o p m e n ts w h i ch that nation is now offering to the o b s e r v a t i on of t he world. Still m o re interesting, and p e r h a ps equally valuable as a s o u r ce of p r e s e nt instruction, is the great national m o v e m e nt t h at a t t e n d ed t he expulsion of t he B o n a p a r t e s, and restored t he Spanish C r o wn to t he family in w h o se p o s s e s s i on it yet r e m a i n s. B ut to rightly estimate that m o v e m e n t, with its heroic episodes a nd m e m o r a b le exhibition of vitality in a people supposed to be m o r i b u n d, we m u st go b a ck to the beginning of t he N a p o l e o n ic assault on the nation. T he efficient cause of the whole w as p e r h a ps first stated in the treaty of Tilsit, w h i ch w as concluded on July 7 , 1 8 0 7, a nd is said to h a ve received its c o m p l è t e m e nt through a secret c o n v e n t i o n, signed by Prince K o u r a k in and Talleyrand. It w as published in the Madrid Gaceta on Au gust 25, 1812, containing, among other things, t he following stipulations: 5 10 15 "Art. I. Russia is to take possession of E u r o p e an T u r k e y, and to extend h er possessions in Asia as far as she may think it convenient. Art. II. T he B o u r b on d y n a s ty in Spain and the h o u se of B r a g a n za in Portugal will c e a se to reign. Princes of the B o n a p a r te family will succeed to b o th of t h e se c r o w n s ." Supposing this treaty to be authentic, and its authenticity is scarcely disputed, e v en in the recently published memoirs of King J o s e ph B o n a p a r t e, it f o r m ed the true r e a s on for the F r e n ch invasion of Spain in 1808, while the Spanish c o m m o t i o ns of t h at time would seem to be linked by secret t h r e a ds with the destinies of Turkey. 20 25 W h e n, c o n s e q u e nt u p on the Madrid m a s s a c re a nd the transactions at B a y o n n e, simultaneous insurrections b r o ke out in t he Asturias, Galicia, Andalusia and Valencia, and a F r e n ch a r my o c c u p i ed M a d r i d, the four n o r t h e rn fortresses of P a m p e l u n a, San Sebastian, Figueras and B a r c e l o na had b e en seized by B o n a p a r te u n d er false p r e t e n s es ; p a rt of the Spanish a r my h ad b e en r e m o v ed to the island of Fiinen, destined for an a t t a ck u p on S w e d e n; lastly all the constituted authorities, military, ecclesiastic, judicial a nd administrative, as well as the aristocracy, e x h o r t ed t he people to submit to the foreign intruder. B ut there w as o ne c i r c u m s t a n ce to c o m p e n s a te for all t he difficulties of the situation. T h a n ks to N a p o l e o n, t he c o u n t ry w as rid 35 of its King, its royal family, and its g o v e r n m e n t. T h us the shackles w e re b r o k en which might else h a ve prevented t he Spanish p e o p le from displaying 30 422 w Revolutionary Spain · Second Article their native energies. H ow little t h ey w e re able to resist t he F r e n ch u n d er the c o m m a nd of their Kings and u n d er ordinary c i r c u m s t a n c e s, had b e en p r o v ed by the disgraceful campaigns of 1794 and 1795. 5 N a p o l e on had s u m m o n ed the m o st distinguished p e r s o ns in Spain to m e et him at B a y o n n e, and to receive from his h a n ds a King and a Constitution. With v e ry few e x c e p t i o n s, t h ey a p p e a r ed t h e r e. On J u ne 7,1808, K i ng J o s e ph received at B a y o n ne a deputation of the g r a n d e es of Spain, in w h o se n a me the D u ke of M e n t a d o, F e r d i n a nd V I I 's m o st intimate friend, addressed him as follows: 10 " S i r e, the grandees of Spain h a ve at all times b e en celebrated for then- loyalty to their Sovereign, and in t h em y o ur Majesty will n ow find t he same fidelity and a d h e s i o n ." T he royal Council of Castile assured p o or J o s e ph t h at " he w as the principal b r a n ch of a family destined by H e a v en to reign." N ot less abject was t he congratulation of the D u ke del P a r q u e, at the head of a deputation r e p r e senting the army. On the following day the s a me p e r s o ns published a procla mation, enjoining general submission to the B o n a p a r te dynasty. On July 7, 1808, the n ew Constitution w as signed by 91 Spaniards of t he highest dis tinction; a m o ng t h em D u k e s, C o u n t s, and M a r q u i s e s, as well as several h e a ds of t he religious orders. During t he discussions on t h at Constitution, all t h ey found c a u se to r e m o n s t r a te against w as the repeal of their old privileges and e x e m p t i o n s. T he first ministry and t he first royal h o u s e h o ld of J o s e ph w e re the same p e r s o ns w ho had formed the ministry and t he royal household of F e r d i n a nd V I I. S o me of the u p p er classes c o n s i d e r ed N a p o l e on as the providential regenerator of Spain; o t h e rs as the only b u l w a rk against revolu tion; n o ne believing in the c h a n c es of national resistance. 15 20 25 T h us from the very beginning of the Spanish W ar of I n d e p e n d e n ce the high nobility and t he old Administration lost all hold u p on t he middle classes and u p on the p e o p l e, b e c a u se of their having d e s e r t ed t h em at t he c o m- 30 m e n c e m e nt of the struggle. On t he o ne side stood t he Afrancesados, (the Frenchified,) and on t he other t he nation. At Valladolid, Cartagena, G r a n a d a, J a e n, San L u c a r, Carolina, Ciudad Rodrigo, Cadiz and Valencia, t he most p r o m i n e nt m e m b e rs of the old Administration—governors, generals, and other m a r k ed personages p r e s u m ed to be F r e n ch agents and obstacles to the national movement—fell victims to t he infuriated p e o p l e. E v e r y w h e re the existing authorities w e re displaced. S o me m o n t hs previous to t he rising, on M a r ch 19, 1808, the popular c o m m o t i o ns t h at h ad t a k en place at Madrid, intended to r e m o ve from their p o s ts El Choricero (the sausage-maker, a n i c k n a me of G o d o y) and his obnoxious satellites. This object w as n ow gained on a national scale, and with it t he internal revolution w as accomplished so far as contemplated by the m a s s e s, and as n ot c o n n e c t ed with resistance to 35 40 423 Karl Marx t he foreign intruder. On the whole, the m o v e m e nt a p p e a r ed to be directed r a t h er against revolution than for it. National by proclaiming the inde p e n d e n ce of Spain from F r a n c e, it w as at the same t i me dynastic by opposing t he " b e l o v e d" F e r d i n a nd V II to J o s e ph B o n a p a r t e; r e a c t i o n a ry by opposing t he old institutions, c u s t o m s, a nd l a ws to t he rational innovations of N a p o- l e o n; superstitious and fanatical by opposing " h o ly religion," against w h at w as called F r e n ch Atheism, or t he destruction of t he special privileges of t he R o m an C h u r c h. T he priests terrified by the fate t h at h ad fallen u p on their b r e t h r en in F r a n c e, fostered t he popular passions in t he interest of self- preservation. " T he patriotic f i r e ," says S o u t h e y, "flamed higher for this holy oil of superstition." All t he w a rs of i n d e p e n d e n ce waged against F r a n ce b e ar in c o m m on the s t a mp of regeneration, mixed up with reaction; b ut n o w h e re to s u ch a degree as in Spain. T he King a p p e a r ed in the imagination of the p e o p le in the light of a r o m a n t ic prince, forcibly abused and locked up by a giant robber. T he m o st fascinating and popular e p o c hs of their p a st w e re encircled with the holy a nd miraculous traditions of t he w ar of t he c r o ss against t he c r e s c e n t; a nd a great portion of the lower classes w e re a c c u s t o m ed to w e ar the livery of m e n d i c a n t s, and live u p on t he sanctified p a t r i m o ny of t he C h u r c h. A S p a n i sh author, D on Josef C l e m e n te C a r n i c e r o, published in t he y e a rs 1814 a nd '16, t he following series of w o r k s: " N a p o l e o n, t he T r ue D on Quixote of E u r o p e ;" "Principal E v e n ts of the Glorious R e v o l u t i on of S p a i n ;" " T he Inquisition Rightly R e e s t a b l i s h e d ;" it is sufficient to n o te t he titles of t h e se b o o ks to u n d e r s t a nd this o ne aspect of the Spanish revolution w h i ch we m e et with in t he several manifestoes of t he Provincial J u n t a s, all of t h em proclaim- ing t he King, their holy religion, and the c o u n t r y, and s o me e v en telling t he p e o p le t h at "their h o p es of a better world w e re at s t a k e, a nd in v e ry imminent d a n g e r ." H o w e v e r, if the p e a s a n t r y, the inhabitants of small inland cities, and the n u m e r o us a r my of t he mendicants, frocked and u n f r o c k e d, all of t h em deeply i m b u ed with religious and political prejudices, f o r m ed t he great majority of t he national party, it contained on t he other h a nd an active and influential minority w h i ch considered the popular rising against t he F r e n ch invasion as t he signal given for t he political a nd social r e g e n e r a t i on of Spain. This minority w as c o m p o s ed of the inhabitants of the s e a p o r t s, c o m m e r c i al t o w n s, and p a rt of t he provincial capitals, w h e r e, u n d er t he reign of Charles V, t he material conditions of m o d e rn society had d e v e l o p ed t h e m s e l v es to a certain degree. T h ey w e re strengthened by the m o re cultivated portion of t he u p p er a nd middle classes, a u t h o r s, physicians, l a w y e r s, a nd e v en priests, for w h om t he P y r e n e es h ad formed no sufficient barrier against t he invasion of t he philosophy of the X V I I I th century. As a true manifesto of this faction m ay 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 424 Revolutionary Spain · Second Article be considered the f a m o us m e m o r a n d um of Jovellanos on t he i m p r o v e m e n ts of agriculture and the agrarian law, published in 1795, a nd d r a wn up by order of t he royal Council of Castile. T h e re w a s, finally, t he y o u th of t he middle classes, s u ch as t he students of the University, w ho h ad eagerly a d o p t ed the aspirations and principles of the F r e n ch revolution, a nd w h o, for a m o m e n t, e v en e x p e c t ed to see their c o u n t ry r e g e n e r a t ed by t he assistance of F r a n c e. So long as the c o m m on defense of t he c o u n t ry alone w as c o n c e r n e d, t he t wo great elements composing the national p a r ty r e m a i n ed in perfect union. Their antagonism did not a p p e ar till t h ey m et together in t he C o r t e s, on the battle-ground of a new Constitution t h e re to be d r a wn u p. T he revolutionary minority, in order to f o m e nt t he patriotic spirit of t he p e o p l e, had n ot hesitat ed themselves to appeal to the national prejudices of the old popular faith. F a v o r a b le to the immediate objects of national r e s i s t a n c e, as t h e se tactics might h a ve a p p e a r e d, t h ey could not fail to p r o ve fatal to this minority w h en t he time h ad arrived for t he c o n s e r v a t i ve interests of t he old society to intrench t h e m s e l v es b e h i nd t h e se v e ry prejudices and popular p a s s i o n s, with a view of defending t h e m s e l v es against t he p r o p er and ulterior plans of the revolutionists. 5 10 15 25 20 W h en F e r d i n a nd left Madrid u p on the s u m m o ns of B o n a p a r t e, he h ad established a s u p r e me J u n ta of g o v e r n m e nt u n d er the presidency of t he Infante D on A n t o n i o. B ut in M ay this J u n ta h ad already disappeared. T h e re existed t h en no central G o v e r n m e n t, and t he insurgent t o w ns f o r m ed J u n t as of their o w n, presided over by t h o se of the provincial capitals. T h e se provin cial J u n t as constituted, as it w e r e, so m a ny i n d e p e n d e nt G o v e r n m e n t s, e a ch of w h i ch set on foot an a r my of its o w n. T he J u n ta of R e p r e s e n t a t i v es at O v i e do declared t h at t he entire sovereignty h ad d e v o l v ed into their h a n d s, proclaimed w ar against B o n a p a r t e, and sent deputies to England to conclude an armistice. T he s a me w as d o ne afterward by t he J u n ta of Seville. It is a curious fact that by the m e re force of c i r c u m s t a n c es t h e se exalted Catholics 30 w e re driven to an alliance with E n g l a n d, a p o w er w h i ch t he Spaniards w e re a c c u s t o m ed to look u p on as the incarnation of t he m o st d a m n a b le h e r e s y, a nd little b e t t er t h an t he G r a nd T u rk himself. A t t a c k ed by F r e n ch Atheism, t h ey w e re t h r o wn into the a r ms of British P r o t e s t a n t i s m. No w o n d er that F e r d i n a nd V I I, on his r e t u rn to Spain, declared, in a d e c r ee reestablishing the H o ly Inquisition, t h at o ne of t he c a u s es " t h at h ad altered the purity of religion in Spain w as t he sojourn of foreign t r o o ps of different sects, all of t h em equally infected with hatred against the holy R o m an C h u r c h ." 35 T he provincial J u n t as w h i ch had so suddenly sprung into life, altogether i n d e p e n d e nt of e a ch other, c o n c e d ed a certain, b ut v e ry slight and undefined degree of a s c e n d a n cy to the s u p r e me J u n ta of Seville, t h at city being r e g a r d ed as t he capital of Spain while Madrid w as in t he h a n ds of the foreigner. 40 425 Karl Marx T h us a v e ry anarchica] kind of federal G o v e r n m e nt w as established, w h i ch t he s h o ck of opposite interests, local jealousies, a nd rival influences, made a r a t h er b ad instrument for bringing unity into the military c o m m a n d, and to c o m b i ne t he operations of a campaign. T he a d d r e s s es to the people issued by these several J u n t a s, while display- ing all t he heroic vigor of a people suddenly a w a k e n ed from a long lethargy and r o u s ed by an electric shock into a feverish state of activity, are not free from t h at p o m p o us exaggeration, that style of mingled buffoonery a nd b o m b a s t, and t h at r e d u n d a nt grandiloquence w h i ch c a u s ed Sismondi to p ut u p on Spanish literature the epithet of Oriental. T h ey exhibit no less t he childish vanity of the Spanish character, the m e m b e rs of the J u n t as for instance assuming t he title of Highness and loading t h e m s e l v es with gaudy uniforms. 5 10 T h e re are two circumstances connected with t h e se Juntas—the o ne show ing t he low standard of the people at the time of their rising, while t he other w as detrimental to the progress of the revolution. T he J u n t as w e re n a m ed by general suffrage; b ut " t he very zeal of t he lower classes, displayed itself in o b e d i e n c e ." T h ey generally elected only their natural superiors, the provincial nobility a nd gentry backed by clergymen a nd v e ry few notabilities of the middle class. So conscious w e re the people of their o wn w e a k n e ss t h at t h ey limited their initiative to forcing the higher classes into resistance against the invader, without pretending to share in the direction of that r e s i s t a n c e. At Seville, for instance, " t he first thought of the people w as t h at t he parochial clergy and the heads of the C o n v e n ts should a s s e m b le to c h o o se t he m e m b e rs of the J u n t a ." T h us the J u n t as w e re filled with p e r s o ns c h o s en on a c c o u nt of their previous station, and very far from being revolutionary leaders. On t he other hand, the people w h en appointing t h e se authorities did n ot think either of limiting their p o w er or of fixing a term to their duration. T he J u n t a s, of c o u r s e, thought only of extending t he one and of perpetuating the o t h e r. T h us t h e se first creations of the popular impulse at the com- m e n c e m e nt of t he revolution remained during its w h o le c o u r s e, as so m a ny d y k es against the revolutionary c u r r e nt w h en threatening to overflow. On July 20, 1808, w h en J o s e ph B o n a p a r te entered M a d r i d, 14,000 F r e n c h, u n d er Generals D u p o nt and Vedel, were forced by C a s t a ñ os to lay d o wn their a r ms at Baylen, and J o s e ph a few days afterward h ad to retire from Madrid to B u r g o s. T h e re w e re t wo events beside which greatly e n c o u r a g ed t he S p a n i a r d s; the o ne being the expulsion of L e f e b v re from Saragossa by Gen. Palafox, and the other t he arrival of the a r my of the Marquis de la R o m a n a, at C o r u n a, with 7,000 m e n, w ho had e m b a r k ed from the island of Fiinen in spite of t he F r e n c h, in order to c o me to t he assistance of their c o u n t r y. 15 20 25 30 35 40 426 F Revolutionary Spain · Third Article It w as after the battle of B a y l en t h at the revolution c a me to a h e a d, a nd t h at p a rt of t he high nobility w ho h ad a c c e p t ed t he B o n a p a r te d y n a s ty or wisely k e pt b a c k, c a me forward to join t he popular cause—an advantage to t h at c a u se of a very doubtful character. 5 (Third Article) New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4214, 20. Oktober 1854 10 15 T he division of p o w er a m o ng the provincial j u n t as had saved Spain from t he first s h o ck of t he F r e n ch invasion u n d er N a p o l e o n, not only by multiplying t he r e s o u r c es of the country, but also by putting the invader at a loss for a m a rk w h e r e at to strike; t he F r e n ch being quite a m a z ed at t he discovery t h at t he center of Spanish resistance w as n o w h e re and e v e r y w h e r e. N e v e r t h e l e s s, shortly after the capitulation of Baylen a nd t he e v a c u a t i on of Madrid by J o s e p h, the necessity of establishing some kind of central g o v e r n m e nt b e c a me generally felt. After t he first s u c c e s s e s, t he dissensions b e t w e en t he provincial juntas h ad g r o wn so violent t h at Seville, for instance, w as barely p r e v e n t ed by Gen. C a s t a ñ os from marching against G r a n a d a. T he F r e n ch a r my which, with the exception of the forces u n d er Marshal Bessières had w i t h d r a wn to the line of t he E b ro in the greatest confusion, so that, if vigor ously h a r r a s s e d, it w o u ld t h en h a ve easily b e en dispersed, or at least c o m pelled to r e p a ss t he frontier, w as t h us allowed to r e c o v er and to t a ke up a strong position. B ut it w a s, a b o ve all, the bloody suppression of t he Bilbao insurrection by Gen. Merlin, which e v o k ed a national cry against the jealous ies of the j u n t as and the e a sy laissez-faire of t he c o m m a n d e r s. T he urgency of combining military m o v e m e n t s; t he certainty t h at N a p o l e on would soon r e a p p e ar at the head of a victorious a r m y, collected from the b a n ks of the 25 N i e m e n, t he Oder, and t he shores of the Baltic; t he w a nt of a general au 20 thority for concluding treaties of alliance w i th G r e at Britain or other foreign p o w e r s, a nd for keeping up t he c o n n e c t i on with, a nd receiving tribute from Spanish A m e r i c a; the existence at B u r g os of a F r e n ch central p o w e r, a nd t he necessity of setting up altar against altar,—all t h e se circumstances con- spired to force the Seville J u n ta to resign, h o w e v er reluctantly, its ill-defined a nd rather nominal s u p r e m a c y, and to p r o p o se to t he several provincial j u n t as to select e a ch from its o wn b o dy t wo d e p u t i e s, t he assembling of w h om w as to constitute a Central Junta, while t he provincial j u n t as w e re to remain invested with the internal m a n a g e m e nt of their respective districts, " b ut u n d er d ue subordination to the General G o v e r n m e n t ." T h us t he Central Junta, c o m p o s ed of 35 deputies from provincial j u n t a s, (34 for the Spanish 30 35 427 Karl Marx j u n t a s, a nd o ne for t he C a n a ry Islands,) m et at A r a n j u ez on S e p t e m b er 26, 1808, j u st o ne day b e f o re the p o t e n t a t es of R u s s ia and G e r m a ny p r o s t r a t ed t h e m s e l v es before N a p o l e on at Erfurt. U n d er revolutionary, still m o re t h an u n d er ordinary c i r c u m s t a n c e s, t he destinies of armies reflect t he true n a t u re of t he civil g o v e r n m e n t. T he Central J u n t a, charged with the expulsion of the invaders from the Spanish soil, w as driven by t he success of the hostile a r ms from Madrid to Seville, a nd from Seville to Cadiz, t h e re to expire ignominiously. Its reign w as m a r k ed by a disgraceful succession of defeats, by t he annihilation of t he Spanish a r m i e s, and lastly by t he dissolution of regular w a r f a re into guerrilla exploits. As said Urquijo, a Spanish nobleman, to Cuesta, t he Captain- G e n e r al of Castile, on April 3, 1808: 5 10 " O ur Spain is a Gothic edifice, c o m p o s ed of h e t e r o g e n e o us m o r s e l s, with as m a ny forces, privileges, legislations, and c u s t o m s, as t h e re are p r o v i n c e s. T h e re exists in h er nothing of w h at t h ey call public spirit in E u r o p e. T h e se r e a s o ns will p r e v e nt t he establishment of any central p o w er of so solid a structure as to be able to unite our national f o r c e s ." 15 20 If, t h e n, t he actual state of Spain at the e p o ch of the F r e n ch invasion, t h r ew t he greatest possible difficulties in t he w ay of creating a revolutionary c e n t e r, the v e ry c o m p o s i t i on of the Central J u n ta incapacitated it from proving a m a t ch for t he terrible crisis in which t he c o u n t ry f o u nd itself placed. Being t oo n u m e r o us and too fortuitously mixed for an e x e c u t i ve g o v e r n m e n t, t h ey w e re t oo few to p r e t e nd to the authority of National C o n v e n t i o n. T he mere fact of their p o w er having b e en delegated from the provincial juntas r e n d e r ed t h em unfit for overcoming t he ambitious propensities, t he ill will, and t he capricious egotism of those bodies. T h e se juntas—the m e m b e rs of which, as we h a ve s h o wn in a former article, w e re elected on t he w h o le in consideration of the situation t h ey occupied in the old society, r a t h er t h an of their capacity to inaugurate a n ew o n e, sent in their t u rn to the " C e n t r a l" Spanish g r a n d e e s, p r e l a t e s, titularies of Castile, ancient ministers, high civil a nd military offi- 30 cials, instead of revolutionary u p s t a r t s. At t he o u t s et t he Spanish revolution failed by its e n d e a v or to remain legitimate and r e s p e c t a b l e. 25 T he t wo m o st m a r k ed m e m b e rs of the Central J u n t a, u n d er w h o se b a n n e rs its t wo great parties ranged t h e m s e l v e s, w e re Florida B l a n ca and Jovellanos, b o th of t h em m a r t y rs of G o d o y 's persecution, former Ministers, valetudinar- i a n s, a nd g r o wn old in t he regular and pedantic habits of t he procrastinating Spanish régime, t he solemn a nd circumstantial slowness of w h i ch h ad b e c o me proverbial e v en at t he times of Bacon, w ho o n ce exclaimed, " M ay d e a th r e a ch me from Spain: it will then arrive at a late h o u r !" 35 F l o r i da B l a n ca and Jovellanos r e p r e s e n t ed an a n t a g o n i s m, b ut an antago- n i sm belonging to t h at part of t he eighteenth c e n t u ry which p r e c e d ed the era 40 428 Revolutionary Spain · Third Article 5 of t he F r e n ch Revolution; the former a plebeian b u r e a u c r a t, the latter an aristocratic philanthropist; Florida B i a n ca a partisan a nd a practicer of t he enlightened despotism r e p r e s e n t ed by P o m b a l, F r e d e r ic II., and J o s e ph I I. Jovellanos, a "friend of t he p e o p l e ," hoping to raise t h em to liberty by an anxiously wise succession of economical l a w s, and by the literary p r o p a g a n da of g e n e r o us doctrines; b o th o p p o s ed to t he traditions of feudalism, the o ne by trying to disentangle the monarchical p o w e r, t he other by seeking to rid civil society of its shackles. T he part a c t ed by either in t he history of their c o u n t ry c o r r e s p o n d ed with the diversity of their opinions. Florida 15 10 Blanca ruled s u p r e me as t he Prime Minister of Charles III., a nd his rule grew despotic according to t he m e a s u re in w h i ch he m et w i th resistance. Jovel lanos, w h o se ministerial c a r e er u n d er Charles I V. w as b ut short-lived, gained his influence over the Spanish p e o p l e, n ot as a Minister, b ut as a scholar; not by d e c r e e s, but by e s s a y s. Florida Blanca, w h en t he s t o rm of t he t i m es carried him to the head of a revolutionary G o v e r n m e n t, w as an octogenarian, u n s h a k en only in his belief in despotism, and his distrust of popular s p o n t a n e ity. W h en delegated to Madrid he left w i th the Municipality of M u r c ia a secret protest, declaring that he h ad only c e d ed to force a nd to t he fear of popular assassinations, and that he signed this p r o t o c ol with the e x p r e ss view to p r e v e nt King J o s e ph from e v er finding fault with his a c c e p t a n ce of t he people's m a n d a t e. N ot satisfied with returning to the traditions of his m a n h o o d, he r e t r a c ed such steps of his ministerial past, as he n ow judged to h a ve b e en t oo rash. T h u s, he w ho had expelled the Jesuits from Spain, w as hardly installed in t he Central J u n t a, w h en he c a u s ed it to grant leave for their r e t u rn "in a private c a p a c i t y ." If he acknowledged a ny c h a n ge to h a ve o c c u r r ed since his time, it w as simply this: that G o d o y, w ho h ad b a n i s h ed him, a nd had dispossessed the great C o u nt of Florida B l a n ca of his G o v e r n m e n t al o m n i p o t e n c e, w as n ow again replaced by t h at same C o u nt of Florida Blanca, and driven o ut in his turn. This w as t he m an w h om the Central J u n ta c h o se as its President, and w h om its majority recognized as an infallible leader. 20 25 30 Jovellanos, w ho c o m m a n d ed t he influential minority of the Central J u n t a, h ad also g r o wn old, a nd lost m u ch of his energy in a long and painful im p r i s o n m e nt inflicted u p on him by G o d o y. B ut e v en in his b e st times he w as not a m an of revolutionary action, b ut r a t h er a well-intentioned reformer, 35 w h o, from over-niceness to the m e a n s, w o u ld n e v er h a ve dared to a c complish an end. In F r a n c e, he w o u ld p e r h a ps h a ve g o ne t he length of M o u n i er or Lally-Tollendal, b ut not a step further. In England, he w o u ld h a ve figured as a popular m e m b er of t he H o u se of L o r d s. In insurrectionized Spain, he w as fit to supply the aspiring y o u th w i th i d e a s, b ut practically no 40 m a t ch e v en for the servile tenacity of a Florida Blanca. N ot altogether free from aristocratic prejudices, and therefore w i th a strong leaning t o w a rd t he 429 Karl Marx Anglomania of Montesquieu, this fair c h a r a c t er s e e m ed to p r o ve t h at if Spain had exceptionally b e g ot a generalizing mind, she w as unable to do it e x c e pt at t he cost of individual energy, which she could only p o s s e ss for local affairs. It is true that the Central J u n ta included a few men—headed by D on L o r e n zo Calvo de R o z a s, the delegate of Saragossa—who, while adopting the reform views of Jovellanos, spurred on at the s a me time to revolutionary action. B ut their n u m b e rs w e re t oo few and their n a m es t oo u n k n o wn to allow t h em to p u sh thé slow State-coach of the J u n ta o ut of the b e a t en t r a ck of Spanish ceremonial. 5 10 This p o w e r, so clumsily c o m p o s e d, so nervelessly constituted, with such outlived reminiscences at its head, w as called u p on to accomplish a revolu tion and to b e at N a p o l e o n. If its proclamations w e re as vigorous as its d e e ds w e re w e a k, it w as due to D on Manuel Quintana, a Spanish poet, w h om t he J u n ta had the taste to appoint as their secretary and to intrust with the writing of their manifestoes. 15 L i ke C a l d e r o n 's p o m p o us h e r o es w h o, confounding conventional dis tinction with genuine greatness, used to a n n o u n ce t h e m s e l v es by a tedious e n u m e r a t i on of all their titles, the J u n ta occupied itself in the first place with decreeing the h o n o rs and decorations due to its exalted position. Their President received the predicate of " H i g h n e s s ," the other m e m b e rs t h at of " E x c e l l e n c y ," while to t he J u n ta in corpore w as r e s e r v ed t he title of Majesty. T h ey a d o p t ed a species of fancy uniform resembling t h at of a General, a d o r n ed their b r e a s ts with badges representing t he t wo w o r l d s, and v o t ed t h e m s e l v es a yearly salary of 120,000 reals. It w as a t r ue idea of the old Spanish school, that, in order to m a ke a great a nd dignified e n t r a n ce u p on t he historical stage of E u r o p e, the chiefs of insurgent Spain ought to w r ap t h e m s e l v es in theatrical c o s t u m e s. We should transgress the limits of t h e se s k e t c h es by entering into the internal history of t he J u n ta and t he details of its administration. F or o ur end it will suffice to answer two questions. W h at w as its influence on the d e v e l o p m e nt of t he Spanish revolutionary m o v e m e n t? W h at on t he defense of the c o u n t r y? T h e se two questions a n s w e r e d, m u ch t h at until n ow has a p p e a r ed mysterious and u n a c c o u n t a b le in the Spanish revolutions of t he n i n e t e e n th c e n t u ry will h a ve found its explanation. 20 25 30 35 At the o u t s et the majority of the Central J u n ta thought it their main d u ty to suppress t he first revolutionary t r a n s p o r t s. Accordingly t h ey tightened a n ew the old t r a m m e ls of the p r e s s, and appointed a n ew G r a nd Inquisitor, w ho was happily p r e v e n t ed by t he F r e n ch from resuming his functions. Although t he greater p a rt of the real p r o p e r ty of Spain w as t h en locked up in mortmain—in t he entailed estates of t he nobility, a nd the unalienable 40 430 Revolutionary Spain · Fourth Article estates of the Church—the J u n ta ordered the selling of the m o r t m a i n s, w h i ch h ad already b e g un to be suspended, threatening e v en to a m e nd t he private contracts affecting the ecclesiastical estates that had already b e en sold. T h ey acknowledged the national debt, b ut t o ok no financial m e a s u re to free t he civil list from a world of b u r d e n s, with which a secular succession of corrupt g o v e r n m e n ts h ad e n c u m b e r ed it, to reform their proverbially unjust, absurd and vexatious fiscal system, or to o p en to the nation new productive r e sources, by breaking t h r o u gh t he shackles of feudalism. 5 New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4220, 27.Oktober 1854 (Fourth Article) 20 15 10 A l r e a dy at the times of Philip V., F r a n c i s co Benito de la Soledad had said: "All the evils of Spain are derived from t he togados (lawyers)." At t he h e ad of the mischievous magisterial hierarchy of Spain w as placed the Consejo Real of Castile. Sprung up in the turbulent times of the D on J u a ns and t he E n r i q u e s, strengthened by Philip II, w ho discovered in it a w o r t hy c o m- p l e m e nt of t he S a n io Oficio, it h ad i m p r o v ed by t he calamities of t he times and the w e a k n e ss of the later kings to u s u rp and accumulate in its h a n ds the most h e t e r o g e n e o us attributes, and to add to its functions of Highest Tribunal those of a legislator and of an administrative superintendent of all the king d o ms of Spain. T h us it surpassed in p o w er e v en t he F r e n ch Parliament which it resembled in m a ny points, e x c e pt that it w as never to be found on the side of t he people. Having b e en the m o st powerful authority in ancient Spain, t he Consejo Real w a s, of c o u r s e, t he m o st implacable foe to a new Spain, and to all the recent popular authorities threatening to cripple its s u p r e me influence. Being the great dignitary of t he o r d er of the lawyers and the incarnate guaranty of all its a b u s es and privileges, t he Consejo naturally disposed of all the n u m e r o us and influential interests vested in Spanish j u r i s p r u d e n c e. It w as therefore a p o w er with which t he revolution could enter into no c o m p r o m i s e, b ut which had to be s w e pt a w ay unless it should be allowed to s w e ep away t he revolution in its turn. As we h a ve s e en in a former article, the Consejo had prostituted itself before N a p o l e o n, and by that act 25 30 of t r e a s on h ad lost all hold u p on t he people. But on t he day of their a s s u m p tion of office the Central J u n ta w e re foolish e n o u gh to c o m m u n i c a te to t he Consejo their constitution, and to a sk for its o a th of fidelity, after having received w h i ch they declared they would dispatch t he formula of the same o a th to all t he other authorities of t he kingdom. By this inconsiderate step, the Consejo b e c a me loudly disapproved by all the revolutionary p a r t y, 35 431 Karl Marx c o n v i n c ed t h at t he Central J u n ta w a n t ed its support; it t h us r e c o v e r ed from its d e s p o n d e n c y, and, after an affected hesitation of s o me d a y s, t e n d e r ed a malevolent submission to the Junta, backing its o a th by an e x p r e s s i on of its o wn reactionary scruples exhibited in its advice to the J u n ta to dissolve, by reducing its n u m b er to t h r ee or five m e m b e r s, according to L ey 3, Par- tida 2, Titulo 15; a nd to order the forcible extinction of the provincial j u n t a s. After t he F r e n ch h ad r e t u r n ed to Madrid a nd d i s p e r s ed t he Consejo Real, the Central J u n t a, n ot contented with their first b l u n d e r, h ad the fatuity to r e s u s c i t a te t he Consejo by creating the Consejo Reunido—a r e u n i on of t he Consejo Real with all the other w r e c ks of the ancient royal councils. T h us t he J u n ta spontaneously created for the counter-revolution a central p o w e r, w h i c h, rivaling their o wn p o w e r, never c e a s ed to h a r a ss and c o u n t e r a ct t h em with its intrigues and conspiracies, seeking to drive t h em to t he m o st un popular steps, and then, with a show of virtuous indignation to d e n o u n ce t h em to t he impassioned c o n t e m pt of the people. It hardly n e ed be m e n t i o n ed that, having first a c k n o w l e d g ed and t h en reestablished t he Consejo Real, t he Central J u n ta w as u n a b le to reform anything, either in t he organization of Spanish tribunals, or in their m o st vicious civil and criminal legislation. 5 10 15 That, notwithstanding the p r e d o m i n a n ce in the Spanish rising, of the national and religious elements, t h e re existed, in t he t wo first y e a r s, a most decided t e n d e n cy to social and political reforms, is p r o v ed by all t he manifes tations of t he provincial juntas of that time, which, t h o u gh c o m p o s ed as t h ey mostly w e r e, of the privileged classes, never neglected to d e n o u n ce the ancient régime and to hold out promises of radical reform. T he fact is further p r o v ed by the manifestos of the Central Junta. In their first a d d r e ss to the nation, dated Oct. 26, 1808, t h ey say: 20 25 "A t y r a n ny of t w e n ty y e a r s, exercised by the m o st incapable h a n d s, h ad b r o u g ht t h em to t he very brink of perdition; t he nation w as alienated from its G o v e r n m e nt by hatred and contest. A little time only h as p a s s ed since, o p p r e s s ed and degraded, ignorant of their o wn strength, a nd finding no p r o t e c t i on against the governmental evils, neither in t he institutions nor in t he l a w s, t h ey h ad e v en regarded foreign dominion less hateful t h an t he wasting t y r a n ny which c o n s u m ed them. T he d o m i n i on of a will always capricious, a nd m o st often unjust, had lasted t oo long; their patience, their love of order, their generous loyalty had too long b e en a b u s e d; it w as time t h at law f o u n d ed on general utility should c o m m e n ce its reign. R e f o r m, t h e r e f o r e, w as n e c e s s a ry t h r o u g h o ut all b r a n c h e s. T he J u n ta w o u ld form different c o m m i t t e e s, e a ch entrusted with a particular d e p a r t m e nt to w h om all writings on m a t t e rs of G o v e r n m e nt and Administration might be ad d r e s s e d ." 30 35 40 In their a d d r e ss dated Seville, 28th Oct., 1809, t h ey say: 432 Revolutionary Spain · Fourth Article " An imbecile and decrepit despotism p r e p a r ed t he w ay for F r e n ch t y r a n n y. To leave t he state sunk in old a b u s es would be a crime as e n o r m o us as to deliver you into the hands of B o n a p a r t e ." 5 10 T h e re s e e ms to h a ve existed in the Central J u n ta a m o st original division of labor—the Jovellanos party being allowed to proclaim and to protocol t he revolutionary aspirations of the nation, and t he F l o r i da Blanca p a r ty r e serving to t h e m s e l v es t he pleasure of giving t h em t he lie direct, and of opposing to revolutionary fiction counter-revolutionary fact. F or u s, h o w ever, t he important point is to p r o ve from t he v e ry confessions of the provin- cial juntas deposited with the Central, the often-denied fact of the existence of revolutionary aspirations at t he e p o ch of t he first Spanish rising. 25 20 15 T he m a n n er in w h i ch the Central J u n ta m a de u se of the opportunities for reforms afforded by t he good will of t he nation, the p r e s s u re of e v e n t s, a nd the p r e s e n ce of immediate danger, m ay be inferred from the influence exercised by their Commissioners in the several provinces t h ey w e re sent t o. O ne Spanish author candidly tells us t h at t he Central Junta, n ot over flowing with capacities, t o ok good care to retain t he eminent m e m b e rs at t he c e n t e r, and to dispatch t h o se w ho w e re good for nothing to the circum ference. T h e se Commissioners w e re invested with the p o w er of presiding over t he provincial j u n t a s, and of representing the Central in the plenitude of its attributes. To q u o te only s o me i n s t a n c es of their doings; General R o m a n a, w h om the Spanish soldiers u s ed to call M a r q u is de las R o m e r í a s, from his perpetual m a r c h es and countermarches—fighting n e v er taking place e x c e pt w h en he h a p p e n ed to be out of the way—this R o m a na w h en b e a t en by Soult out of Galicia, e n t e r ed Asturias, a nd as a Commissioner of t he Central. H is first business w as to pick a quarrel w i th t he provincial j u n ta of O v i e d o, w h o se energetic a nd revolutionary m e a s u r es h ad d r a wn d o wn u p on t h em the hatred of the privileged classes. He w e nt the length of dissolving and replacing it by p e r s o ns of his o wn invention. General N e y, informed of t h e se dissensions, in a province w h e re the r e s i s t a n ce against the F r e n ch h ad b e en general and u n a n i m o u s, instantly m a r c h ed his forces into Asturias, expelled the Marquis de las R o m e r í a s, e n t e r ed O v i e do and sacked it during t h r ee d a y s. T he F r e n ch having e v a c u a t ed Galicia at t he e nd of 1809, our M a r q u is and Commissioner of the Central J u n ta e n t e r ed C o r u n n a, united in his p e r s on all public authority, s u p p r e s s ed t he district j u n t a s, which h ad multiplied with t he insurrection, and in their places appointing military g o v e r n o r s, threatening t he m e m b e rs of t h o se j u n t as with persecution, actu ally persecuting the patriots, affecting a s u p r e me benignity t o w a rd all w ho had e m b r a c ed the c a u se of the invader, a nd proving in all other r e s p e c ts a 40 m i s c h i e v o u s, impotent, capricious b l o c k h e a d. A nd w h at had been the short comings of the district a nd provincial J u n t as of Galicia? T h ey had o r d e r ed 30 35 433 Karl Marx a general r e c r u i t m e nt without exemption of classes or p e r s o n s; they h ad levied t a x es u p on the capitalists and p r o p r i e t o r s; t h ey h ad lowered the salaries of public functionaries; they had c o m m a n d ed t he ecclesiastical c o r p o r a t i o ns to k e ep at their disposition the r e v e n u es existing in their chests. In o ne w o r d, they had taken revolutionary m e a s u r e s. F r om the time of the glorious Marquis de las Romerías, Asturias and Galicia, t he t wo provinces m o st distinguished by their general resistance to the F r e n c h, withheld from partaking in t he w ar of i n d e p e n d e n c e, w h e n e v er released from immediate danger of invasion. In Valencia, w h e re new p r o s p e c ts appeared to o p en as long as the people w e re left to t h e m s e l v es and to chiefs of their o wn choosing, t he revolutionary spirit w as b r o k en d o wn by the influence of the Central G o v e r n m e n t. N ot c o n t e n t ed to place t h at province under the generalship of o ne D on J o sé C a r o, the Central J u n ta dispatched as "their o w n" commissioner, the B a r on L a b a- zora. This B a r on found fault with the provincial j u n ta b e c a u se it h ad resisted certain superior o r d e r s, and canceled their d e c r ee by w h i ch the appointments to v a c a nt c a n o n s h i p, ecclesiastical benefices, and c o m m a n d r i es h ad b e en judiciously s u s p e n d ed and the r e v e n u es destined for the benefit of the military hospitals. H e n ce bitter contests b e t w e en the Central J u n ta and t h at of Valencia; h e n c e, at a later epoch, the sleep of Valencia u n d er the liberal administration of Marshal S u c h e t; hence its eagerness to proclaim Ferdi nand V I I. on his return against the t h en revolutionary G o v e r n m e n t. At Cadiz, the m o st revolutionary place in Spain at t he e p o c h, the p r e s e n ce of a Commissioner of the Central Junta, t he stupid and conceited Marquis de Villel, c a u s ed an insurrection to break out on the 22d and 23d of F e b r u a r y, 1809, which, if n ot timely shifted to the w ar of i n d e p e n d e n c e, would h a ve h ad the m o st disastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s. T h e re exists no better sample of the discretion exhibited by the Central J u n ta in t he appointment of their o wn C o m m i s s i o n e r s, t h an t h at of the delegate to Wellington, Señor L o z a no de T o r r e s, w h o, while humbling him- self in servile adulation before the English General, secretly informed the J u n ta t h at the G e n e r a l 's complaints on his w a nt of provisions w e re altogether groundless. Wellington having found out t he double-tongued wretch, chased him ignominiously from his c a m p. 5 10 15 20 25 30 T he Central J u n ta w e re placed in the m o st f o r t u n a te c i r c u m s t a n c es for realising w h at t h ey had proclaimed in one of their a d d r e s s es to the Spanish nation. " It h as seemed good to P r o v i d e n ce t h at in this terrible crisis y ou should not be able to advance one step t o w a rd i n d e p e n d e n ce without a d v a n c ing o ne likewise t o w a rd liberty." At the c o m m e n c e m e nt of their reign the F r e n ch h ad n ot y et obtained possession of one-third of Spain. T he ancient 40 authorities they found either absent or p r o s t r a t ed by their c o n n i v a n ce with 35 434 ' w Revolutionary Spain · Fourth Article 5 10 t he intruder, or dispersed at his bidding. T h e re w as no m e a s u re of social reform, transferring p r o p e r ty and influence from the c h u r ch and the aristoc racy to the middle-class and t he p e a s a n t s, which t he c a u se of defending t he c o m m on c o u n t ry could not h a ve enabled t h em to carry. T h ey had the same g o od luck as t he F r e n ch Comité du salut public—that t he c o n v u l s i on within w as b a c k ed by the necessities of defense against aggressions from w i t h o u t; m o r e o v er t h ey h ad before t h em t he e x a m p le of t he bold initiative which certain provinces had already b e en forced into by the p r e s s u re of circum stances. B ut not satisfied with hanging as a dead-weight on t he Spanish revolution t h ey actually w o r k ed in the sense of the counter-revolution, by reestablishing t he ancient authorities, by forging a n ew the chains which had b e en b r o k e n, by stifling the revolutionary fire w h e r e v er it broke out, by t h e m s e l v es doing nothing and by preventing others from doing anything. During their stay at Seville, on July 20,1809, e v en the English T o ry G o v e r n- 15 ment thought n e c e s s a ry to a d d r e ss t h em a n o te strongly protesting against their counter-revolutionary c o u r se " a p p r e h e n d i ng t h at t h ey w e re likely to suffocate t he public e n t h u s i a s m ." It h as b e en r e m a r k ed s o m e w h e re t h at Spain endured all the evils of revolution without acquiring revolutionary strength. If t h e re be any t r u th in this r e m a r k, it is a sweeping c o n d e m n a t i on p a s s ed u p on the Central Junta. 20 We h a ve thought it the m o re n e c e s s a ry to dwell u p on this point, as its decisive i m p o r t a n ce has n e v er b e en u n d e r s t o od by any E u r o p e an historian. Exlusively under the reign of the Central J u n t a, it w as possible to blend w i th the actualities a nd exigencies of national defense t he transformation of Spanish society, a nd the emancipation of the native spirit, without w h i ch any political constitution must dissolve like a p h a n t om at t he slightest c o m b at with real life. T he C o r t es w e re placed in quite opposite circumstances—they t h e m s e l v es driven b a ck to an insulated spot of t he Peninsula, cut off from the main b o dy of the m o n a r c hy during t wo y e a rs by a besieging F r e n ch a r m y, a nd representing ideal Spain while real Spain w as c o n q u e r ed or fighting. At the time of the Cortes Spain w as divided into two p a r t s. At the Isla de L e o n, ideas without action—in t he rest of Spain, action without ideas. At the time of t he Central Junta, on the contrary, particular w e a k n e s s, incapacity and ill will w e re required on t he part of t he S u p r e me G o v e r n m e nt to d r aw a line of distinction b e t w e en the Spanish w ar and t he Spanish revolution. T he C o r t e s, therefore, failed, not, as F r e n ch a nd English writers assert, b e c a u se they w e re revolutionists, but b e c a u se their p r e d e c e s s o rs had b e en reaction ists a nd h ad missed the p r o p er season of revolutionary action. M o d e rn Spanish writers, offended by the A n g l o - F r e n ch critics, h a ve nevertheless p r o v ed unable to refute t h e m, and still wince u n d er t he bon mot of the A b bé de P r a d t: " T he Spanish people r e s e m b le the wife of Sganarelle w ho w a n t ed to be b e a t e n ." 25 30 35 40 435 Karl Marx (Fifth Artide) New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4222, 30. Oktober 1854 T he Central J u n ta failed in the defense of their c o u n t r y, b e c a u se t h ey failed in their revolutionary mission. Conscious of their o wn w e a k n e s s, of the u n s t a b le tenor of their p o w e r, and of their e x t r e me unpopularity, h ow could t h ey h a ve a t t e m p t ed to answer t he rivalries, jealousies, and overbearing p r e t e n s i o ns of their generals c o m m on to all revolutionary e p o c h s, b ut by u n w o r t hy tricks a nd petty intrigues? K e p t, as t h ey w e r e, in c o n s t a nt fear and suspicion of their o wn military chiefs, we m ay give full credit to Wellington w h en writing to his brother, t he Marquis of Wellesley, on Sept. 1, 1809: 5 "I am m u ch afraid, from w h at I h a ve seen of the proceedings of the Central J u n t a, t h at in t he distribution of their forces, t h ey did not consider military defense and military operations so m u ch as t h ey do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political o b j e c t s ." 10 In revolutionary times, w h en all ties of subordination are loosened, mili t a ry discipline c an only be restored by civil discipline sternly weighing u p on t he generals. As the Central Junta, from its incongruous complexion, n e v er s u c c e e d ed in controlling the generals, the generals a l w a ys failed in con trolling the soldiers, a nd to the end of the w ar the Spanish a r my n e v er r e a c h ed an average degree of discipline and subordination. This insubordination w as k e pt up by the w a nt of food, clothing, and all t he o t h er material requisites of an army—for t he moral of an army, as N a p o l e on called it, d e p e n ds alto gether on its material condition. T he Central J u n ta w as unable regularly to provide for t he a r m y, b e c a u se t he poor p o et Q u i n t a n a 's manifestos w o u ld n ot do in this instance, and to add coercion to their d e c r e es t h ey m u st h a ve r e c u r r ed to t he s a me revolutionary m e a s u r es which t h ey h ad c o n d e m n ed in t he p r o v i n c e s. E v en t he general enlistment w i t h o ut r e s p e ct to privilege and e x e m p t i o n s, and t he facility granted to all Spaniards to obtain e v e ry g r a de in the a r m y, w as the w o rk of the provincial j u n t a s, a nd n ot of the Central J u n t a. If t he defeats of t he Spanish armies w e re t h us p r o d u c ed by t he coun ter-revolutionary incapacities of the Central J u n t a, t h e se disasters in their t u rn still m o re d e p r e s s ed t h at G o v e r n m e n t, a nd by making it t he object of popular c o n t e m pt and suspicion, its d e p e n d e n ce u p on p r e s u m p t u o us b ut incapable military chiefs. increased 15 20 25 30 T he Spanish standing army, if e v e r y w h e re defeated, n e v e r t h e l e ss p r e sented itself at all points. M o re t h an t w e n ty t i m es dispersed, it w as always r e a dy again to show front to the e n e m y, and frequently r e a p p e a r ed w i th i n c r e a s ed strength after a defeat. It w as of no u se to b e at t h e m, b e c a u s e, 35 436 Revolutionary Spain • Fifth Article quick to flee, their loss in m en w as generally small, and as to the loss of t he field t h ey did not care a b o ut it. Retiring disorderly to t he sierras, t h ey w e re sure to r e a s s e m b le and r e a p p e ar w h en least e x p e c t e d, strengthened by n ew reinforcements, a nd able, if not to resist t he F r e n ch armies, at least to k e ep t h em in continual m o v e m e n t, and to oblige t h em to scatter their forces. M o re f o r t u n a te t h an the Russians, t h ey did n ot e v en n e ed to die in order to rise from the dead. T he disastrous battle at O c a ñ a, N o v. 19, 1809, w as the last great pitched battle which t he Spaniards fought; from t h at time t h ey confined t h e m s e l v es to guerrilla w a r f a r e. T he m e re fact of t he a b a n d o n m e nt of regular warfare p r o v es t he disappearance of t he national b e f o re t he local centers of G o v e r n m e n t. W h en the disasters of the standing a r my b e c a me regular, t he rising of t he guerrillas b e c a me general, and t he b o dy of t he p e o p l e, hardly thinking of t he national defeats, exulted in the local s u c c e s s es of their h e r o e s. In this point at least the Central J u n ta shared t he p o p u l ar delusion. " F u l l er a c c o u n ts w e re given in the Gaceta of an affair of guerrillas than of the battle of O c a ñ a ." 5 10 15 As D on Quixote had p r o t e s t ed with his lance against g u n p o w d e r, so t he guerrillas p r o t e s t ed against N a p o l e o n, only with different s u c c e s s. " T h e se 20 guerrillas," says the Austrian Military Journal, (Vol. I, 1821,) "carried their basis in t h e m s e l v e s, as it w e r e, and e v e ry o p e r a t i on against t h em t e r m i n a t ed in t he disappearance of its o b j e c t ." 25 T h e re are three periods to be distinguished in the history of the guerrilla warfare. In t he first period t he population of w h o le provinces t o ok up a r ms and m a de a partisan warfare, as in Galicia and Asturias. In the second period, guerrilla b a n ds formed of the w r e c ks of t he Spanish armies, of Spanish deserters from the F r e n ch armies, of smugglers, etc., carried on the w ar as their o wn c a u s e, independently of all foreign influence and agreeably to their immediate interest. F o r t u n a te e v e n ts and c i r c u m s t a n c es frequently brought 35 30 w h o le districts u n d er their colors. As long as t he guerrillas w e re t h us con stituted, t h ey m a de no formidable a p p e a r a n ce as a b o d y, b ut w e re n e v e r t h e less extremely dangerous to t he F r e n c h. T h ey f o r m ed t he basis of an actual a r m a m e nt of the p e o p l e. As soon as an o p p o r t u n i ty for a c a p t u re offered itself, or a c o m b i n ed enterprise w as meditated, t he m o st active a nd daring a m o ng the people c a me o ut a nd joined the guerrillas. T h ey r u s h ed with t he u t m o st rapidity u p on their b o o t y, or placed t h e m s e l v es in order of battle, according to the object of their undertaking. It w as not u n c o m m on to see t h em standing out a whole day in sight of a vigilant e n e m y, in order to intercept a carrier or to c a p t u re supplies. It w as in this w ay that the younger 40 Mina c a p t u r ed the Viceroy of N a v a r r a, appointed by J o s e ph B o n a p a r t e, and that Julian m a de a prisoner of the C o m m a n d a nt of Ciudad Rodrigo. As s o on 437 Karl Marx as t he enterprise w as completed, e v e r y b o dy w e nt his o wn w a y, and a r m ed m en w e re seen scattering in all directions ; b ut the associated p e a s a n ts quietly r e t u r n ed to their c o m m on occupation without " as m u ch as their a b s e n ce having b e en n o t i c e d ." T h us the communication on all t he r o a ds w as closed. T h o u s a n ds of enemies w e re on t he spot, t h o u gh n ot o ne could be discovered. No courier could be dispatched without being t a k e n; no supplies could set o ut without being intercepted; in short, no m o v e m e nt could be effected without being o b s e r v ed by a hundred e y e s. At the same time, t h e re existed no m e a ns of striking at the r o ot of a combination of this kind. T he F r e n ch w e re obliged to be constantly armed against an e n e my w ho continually flying, always r e a p p e a r e d, a nd w as e v e r y w h e re without being actually seen, t he m o u n t a i ns serving as so m a ny curtains. " It w a s ," says the A b bé de Pradt, " n e i t h er battles nor engagements which e x h a u s t ed t he F r e n ch forces, but t he incessant molestations of an invisible e n e m y, w h o, if p u r s u e d, b e c a me lost a m o ng t he people, out of which he r e a p p e a r ed immediately afterward with r e n e w ed strength. T he lion in the fable t o r m e n t ed to d e a th by a gnat gives a true picture of t he F r e n ch a r m y ." In their third period, the guerrillas aped the regularity of the standing army, swelled their c o r ps to the n u m b er of from 3,000 to 6,000 men, c e a s ed to be t he c o n c e rn of w h o le districts, and fell into the h a n ds of a few leaders, w ho m a de s u ch use of t h em as best suited their o wn p u r p o s e s. This change in t he s y s t em of t he guerrillas gave t he F r e n c h, in their c o n t e s ts with t h e m, considerable a d v a n t a g e. R e n d e r ed in capable by their great n u m b e rs to conceal t h e m s e l v e s, and to suddenly disappear without being forced into battle, as they h ad formerly d o n e, the guerrilleros w e re n ow frequently overtaken, defeated, dispersed, and dis- abled for a length of time from offering any further molestation. By c o m p a r i ng the three periods of guerrilla warfare with t he political history of Spain, it is found that t h ey r e p r e s e nt t he r e s p e c t i ve degrees into w h i ch the counter-revolutionary spirit of the G o v e r n m e nt h ad s u c c e e d ed in cooling the spirit of t he people. Beginning with t he rise of w h o le populations, the partizan w ar w as n e xt carried on by guerrilla b a n d s, of w h i ch whole districts formed t he r e s e r v e, and terminated in c o r ps francs continually on the point of dwindling into banditti, or sinking d o wn to the level of standing regiments. 5 10 15 20 25 30 E s t r a n g e m e nt from the S u p r e me G o v e r n m e n t, relaxed discipline, con- 35 tinual disasters, c o n s t a nt formation, decomposition, and recomposition during six years of the cadrez m u st h a ve necessarily s t a m p ed u p on the b o dy of t he Spanish a r my the character of praetorianism, making t h em equally r e a dy to b e c o me the tools or the scourges of their chiefs. T he generals t h e m s e l v es h ad necessarily participated in, quarrelled with, or conspired 40 against the Central G o v e r n m e n t, and always t h r o wn the weight of their sword 438 Revolutionary Spain · Sixth Article into t he political balance. T h us Cuesta, w ho afterwards seemed to win t he confidence of the Central J u n ta at the same r a te that he lost the battles of t he c o u n t r y, had begun by conspiring with t he Consejo Real and by arresting the L e o n e se deputies to the Central Junta. G e n. M o r ia himself, a m e m b er of t he Central Junta, w e nt over into t he B o n a p a r t i st c a m p, after he h ad s u r r e n d e r ed Madrid to t he F r e n c h. T he coxcombical M a r q u is de las R o m e rías, also a m e m b er of the Junta, conspired w i th t he vainglorious F r a n c i s co Palafox, t he w r e t c h ed Montijo, and t he t u r b u l e nt J u n ta of Seville against it. T he Generals C a s t a ñ o s, Blake, La Bisbal (an O'Donnell) figured a nd intrigued successively at t he times of t he C o r t es as regents, a nd t he Captain- G e n e r al of Valencia, D on Xavier Elio s u r r e n d e r ed Spain finally to t he mercies of F e r d i n a nd V I I. T he praetorian element was certainly more developed w i th t he generals t h an w i th their t r o o p s. 5 10 On the other hand, the a r my and guerrilleros—which received during t he 15 w ar part of their chiefs, like Porlier, L a c y, E r ó l es and Villacampa, from t he r a n ks of distinguished officers of the line, while the line in its turn afterward received guerrilla chiefs, like Mina, E m p e c i n a d o, etc.—were the m o st revolu tionized portion of Spanish society, recruited as they w e re from all r a n k s, including the whole of t he fiery, aspiring a nd patriotic youth, inaccessible to the soporific influence of the Central G o v e r n m e n t; e m a n c i p a t ed from the shackles of t he ancient régime; part of t h e m, like Riego, returning after some y e a r s' captivity in F r a n c e. We are, t h e n, n ot to be surprised at the influence exercised by the Spanish a r my in s u b s e q u e nt c o m m o t i o n s; neither w h en taking t he revolutionary initiative, nor w h en spoiling t he revolution by p r a e- torianism. 20 25 As to the guerrillas, it is evident that, having for some years figured u p on the theater of sanguinary c o n t e s t s, t a k en to roving habits, freely indulged all their passions of h a t r e d, r e v e n g e, and love of plunder, t h ey m u s t, in times of p e a c e, form a most dangerous m o b, always ready at a n od in t he n a me of any p a r ty or principle, to step forward for him w ho is able to give t h em good p ay or to afford t h em a p r e t e xt for plundering excursions. 30 New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4244, 24. November 1854 (Sixth Article) 35 On S e p t e m b er 24, 1810, the E x t r a o r d i n a ry C o r t es assembled on t he Island of L e o n; on F e b r u a ry 20, 1811, they r e m o v ed their sittings t h e n ce to Cadiz; on M a r ch 19,1812, they promulgated the N ew Constitution; and on S e p t e m ber 20, 1813, they closed their sittings, t h r ee y e a rs from the period of their opening. 439 Karl Marx T he c i r c u m s t a n c es under which this Congress m et are w i t h o ut parallel in history. While no legislative b o dy had ever before g a t h e r ed its m e m b e rs from s u ch v a r i o us p a r ts of t he globe, or pretended to control s u ch i m m e n se territo ries in E u r o p e, A m e r i ca and Asia, such a diversity of r a c es a nd such a complexity of interests—nearly the whole of Spain w as o c c u p i ed by t he F r e n c h, a nd t he Congress itself, actually c ut off from Spain by hostile a r m i e s, a nd relegated to a small n e ck of land, h ad to legislate in the sight of a surrounding a nd besieging army. F r om the r e m o te angle of t he Isla Gaditana t h ey u n d e r t o ok to lay the foundation of a n ew Spain, as their fore fathers h ad d o ne from t he mountains of C o v a d o n ga a nd S o b r a r b e. H ow are we to a c c o u nt for the curious p h e n o m e n on of the Constitution of 1812, after w a rd b r a n d ed by t he c r o w n ed h e a ds of E u r o p e, a s s e m b l ed at V e r o n a, as the m o st incendiary invention of Jacobinism, having sprung up from t he head of old m o n a s t ic a nd absolutionist Spain at t he v e ry e p o ch w h en she s e e m ed totally a b s o r b ed in waging a holy w ar against t he R e v o l u t i o n? H o w, on the other h a n d, are we to a c c o u nt for t he s u d d en d i s a p p e a r a n ce of this s a me constitution, vanishing like a shadow—like t he "sueño de sombra, " say t he Spanish historians—when brought into c o n t a ct with a living B o u r b o n? If t he b i r th of t h at Constitution is a riddle, its d e a th is no less so. To solve the enigma, we p r o p o se to c o m m e n ce with a short r e v i ew of this s a me Consti- tution of 1812, w h i ch the Spaniards tried again to realize at t wo s u b s e q u e nt e p o c h s, first during t he period from 1820-'23, a nd t h en in 1836. T he Constitution of 1812 consists of 384 articles a nd c o m p r e h e n ds the following 10 divisions: 1. On the Spanish nation a nd t he S p a n i a r d s. 2. On t he territory of Spain; its religion, g o v e r n m e n t, a nd on Spanish citizens. 3. On t he C o r t e s. 4. On t he King. 5. On the tribunals and administration of justice in civil and criminal m a t t e r s. 6. On t he interior g o v e r n m e nt of the p r o v i n c es a nd c o m m u n e s. 7. On the t a x e s. 8. On t he national military forces. 9. On public education. 10. On the o b s e r v a n ce of the Constitution, and m o de of p r o c e e d i ng to m a ke alternations therein. P r o c e e d i ng from the principle that " t he sovereignty resides essentially in t he nation, to which, therefore, alone belongs exclusively t he right of e s t a b lishing fundamental l a w s ," the Constitution, n e v e r t h e l e s s, proclaims a divi sion of p o w e r s, according to which, " T he legislative p o w er is placed in t he C o r t es jointly with the K i n g ;" " t he execution of the laws is confided to the K i n g ," " t he application of t he laws in civil a nd criminal affairs belongs exclusively to t he tribunals, neither t he C o r t es n or t he K i ng being in any c a se e m p o w e r ed to exercise judicial authority, a d v o c a te p e n d i ng c a s e s, or c o m m a nd t he révisai of concluded j u d g e m e n t ." 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 T he basis of the national representation is m e re population, o ne d e p u ty for e v e ry 70,000 souls. T he Cortes consists of o ne h o u s e, viz: T he c o m m o n s, 40 440 Revolutionary Spain · Sixth Article 5 the election of the deputies being by universal suffrage. T he elective fran chise is enjoyed by all Spaniards, with t he e x c e p t i on of menial s e r v a n t s, b a n k r u p ts and criminals. After the y e ar 1830, no citizen c an enjoy this right, w ho c a n n ot r e ad a nd write. T he election is, h o w e v e r, indirect, having to p a ss t h r o u gh the t h r ee degrees of parochial, district a nd provincial elections. T h e re is no defined p r o p e r ty qualification for a deputy. It is t r ue t h at ac cording to art. 92, "it is n e c e s s a r y, in order to be eligible as a d e p u ty to the C o r t e s, to p o s s e ss a p r o p o r t i o n a te annual i n c o m e, proceeding from real p e r s o n al p r o p e r t y ," b ut art. 93 s u s p e n ds t he preceding article, until the 10 C o r t es in their future meetings declare t he period to h a ve arrived in which it shall t a ke effect. T he King has neither t he right to dissolve nor p r o r o g ue t he C o r t e s, w ho annually m e et at t he Capital on t he first of M a r c h, without being c o n v o k e d, a nd sit at least t h r ee m o n t hs consecutively. A new C o r t es is elected e v e ry s e c o nd y e a r, a nd no D e p u ty c an sit in t wo 15 C o r t es consecutively; i.e., o ne can only be reelected after an intervening C o r t es of t wo y e a r s. No D e p u ty c an ask or a c c e pt r e w a r d s, p e n s i o n s, or h o n o rs from t he King. T he Secretaries of S t a t e, t he C o u n c e l o rs of State, a nd t h o se fulfilling offices of the royal h o u s e h o l d, are ineligible as Deputies to t he C o r t e s. No public officer e m p l o y ed by G o v e r n m e nt shall be elected 20 D e p u ty to the Cortes from t he p r o v i n ce in w h i ch he discharges his trust. To indemnify t he Deputies for their e x p e n s e s, t he r e s p e c t i ve p r o v i n c es shall contribute s u ch daily allowances as the C o r t e s, in the s e c o nd y e ar of every G e n e r al Deputation, shall point out for t he D e p u t a t i on t h at is to succeed it. T he C o r t es c a n n ot deliberate in the p r e s e n ce of the K i n g. In t h o se c a s es 25 w h e re t he Ministers h a ve any c o m m u n i c a t i on to m a ke to t he Cortes in t he n a me of the King, they m ay attend the d e b a t es w h e n, and in such m a n n e r, as t he Cortes m ay think fit, and m ay s p e ak therein, b ut t h ey c a n n ot be p r e s e nt at a v o t e. T he King, the Prince of A s t u r i a s, and the R e g e n ts have to swear to the Constitution before t he C o r t e s, w ho d e t e r m i ne any question of fact or right that m ay o c c ur in the order of thé succession to the C r o w n, a nd elect a R e g e n cy if necessary. T he C o r t es are to a p p r o v e, previous to ratification, all treaties of offensive alliances, or of subsidies and c o m m e r c e, to p e r m it or refuse t he admission of foreign t r o o ps into t he K i n g d o m, to d e c r ee t he in the tribunals established by the creation a nd suppression of offices 35 Constitution, and also t he creation or abolition of public offices ; to d e t e r m i ne e v e ry year, at the r e c o m m e n d a t i on of the King, t he land and sea forces in p e a ce and in war, to issue ordinances to t he a r m y, the fleet, and the national militia, in all their b r a n c h e s; to fix t he e x p e n s es of the public administration; to establish annually t he t a x e s, to t a ke p r o p e r ty on loan, in c a s es of necessity, u p on t he credit of t he public funds, to decide on all m a t t e rs respecting m o n e y, weights a nd m e a s u r e s; to establish a general plan of public education, to 40 30 441 Karl Marx p r o t e ct t he political liberty of the p r e s s, to r e n d er real and effective the responsibility of t he Ministers, etc. T he King enjoys only a suspensive veto, w h i ch he m ay exercise during two consecutive sessions, b ut if the same project of n ew law should be p r o p o s ed a third t i m e, and a p p r o v ed by t he C o r t es of the following year, the King is u n d e r s t o od to h a ve given his assent, and h as actually to give it. Before the Cortes t e r m i n a te a session, t h ey appoint a p e r m a n e nt c o m m i t t e e, consisting of seven of their m e m b e r s, sitting in the capital until t he meeting of the next Cortes, e n d o w ed with p o w e rs to w a t ch over the strict o b s e r v a n ce of the Constitution and administration of the laws ; reporting to t he n e xt Cortes any infraction it m ay h a ve o b s e r v e d, and e m p o w e r ed to c o n v o ke an extraordinary C o r t es in critical times. T he King c a n n ot quit the K i n g d om without the consent of the C o r t e s. He requires the c o n s e nt of the C o r t es for contracting a marriage. T he C o r t es fix the annual r e v e n ue of the K i n g 's household. T he only Privy Council of the King is the Council of S t a t e, in w h i ch t he ministers h a ve no seat, and which consists of forty p e r s o n s, four ec clesiastics, four grandees of Spain, and the rest formed by distinguished administrators, all of t h em c h o s en by the King from a list of o ne h u n d r ed a nd t w e n ty p e r s o ns nominated by the C o r t e s; b ut no actual d e p u ty c an be a councilor, and no councilor can accept offices, h o n o r s, or e m p l o y m e nt from the King. T he Councilors of State c a n n ot be r e m o v ed without sufficient r e a s o n s, p r o v ed before the S u p r e me C o u rt of Justice. T he C o r t es fix the salary of these councilors w h o se opinion the King will hear u p on all im p o r t a nt m a t t e r s, and w ho nominate the c a n d i d a t es for ecclesiastical and judicial places. In the sections respecting the judicature, all the old consejos are abolished, a n ew organization of tribunals is i n t r o d u c e d, a S u p r e me Court of Justice is established to try the Ministers w h en i m p e a c h e d, to t a ke cogni z a n ce of all c a s es of dismissal and suspension from office of Councilors of S t a t e, and the officers of C o u r ts of Justice, e t c. W i t h o ut proof that r e c o n ciliation has b e en attempted, no law-suit can be c o m m e n c e d. T o r t u r e, com- pulsion, confiscation of p r o p e r ty are suppressed. All exceptional tribunals are abolished b ut t he military and ecclesiastic, against t he decisions of w h i ch appeals to the S u p r e me C o u rt are h o w e v er permitted. F or the interior g o v e r n m e nt of towns and c o m m u n e s, ( c o m m u n e s, w h e re t h ey do not exist, to be formed from districts with a population of 1,000 souls,) A y u n t a m i e n t os shall be formed of one or m o re magistrates, aldermen and public councilors, to be presided over by the chief of police (corregidor) and to be c h o s en by general election. No public officer actually e m p l o y ed and appointed by the King, c an be eligible as a magistrate, a l d e r m an or public councilor. T he municipal e m p l o y m e n ts shall be public d u t y, from w h i ch no p e r s on can be e x e m pt without lawful reason. T he municipal corporations 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 442 Revolutionary Spain · Sixth Article shall discharge all their duties u n d er the inspection of t he provincial deputa tion. T he political g o v e r n m e nt of the P r o v i n c es shall be placed in the G o v e r n or (gefe politico) appointed by the King. This G o v e r n or is c o n n e c t ed with a d e p u t a t i o n, over w h i ch he p r e s i d e s, and w h i ch is elected by the districts w h en assembled for the general election of the m e m b e rs for a n ew Cortes. T h e se provincial deputations consist of seven m e m b e r s, assisted by a S e c r e t a ry paid by t he C o r t e s. T h e se deputations shall hold sessions for ninety days at m o st in e v e ry year. F r om the p o w e rs and duties assigned to t h e m, t h ey m ay be considered as p e r m a n e nt C o m m i t t e es of t he C o r t e s. All m e m b e rs of t he A y u n t a m i e n t os and provincial d e p u t a t i o n s, in entering office, swear fidelity to t he Constitution. With regard to t he t a x e s, all Spaniards are b o u n d, without any distinction w h a t e v e r, to contribute, in p r o p o r t i on to their m e a n s, to the e x p e n s es of the State. All c u s t o m - h o u s es shall be s u p p r e s s e d, e x c e pt in t he seaports and on the frontier. All Spaniards are likewise b o u nd to military service, and, beside the standing army, t h e re shall be formed c o r ps of na tional militia in e a ch p r o v i n c e, consisting of t he inhabitants of t he same, in proportion to its population a nd c i r c u m s t a n c e s. Lastly, the Constitu tion of 1812 c a n n ot be altered, augmented, or c o r r e c t ed in any of its d e- tails, until eight y e a rs h a ve elapsed after its having b e en carried into p r a c tice. W h en the Cortes d r ew up this n ew plan of the Spanish State, t h ey w e re of c o u r se a w a re that such a m o d e rn political constitution would be altogether incompatible with the old social s y s t e m, and c o n s e q u e n t l y, they promulgated a series of d e c r e e s, with a view to organic c h a n g es in civil society. T h us t h ey abolished the Inquisition. T h ey suppressed the seignorial jurisdictions; with their exclusive, prohibitive, and privative feudal privileges, i.e., t h o se of t he c h a s e, fishery, forests, mills, etc, excepting s u ch as had b e en acquired on an o n e r o us title, a nd which w e re to be reimbursed. T h ey abolished t he tithes throughout the m o n a r c h y, suspended the nominations to all ecclesiastic p r e b e n ds n ot n e c e s s a ry for the p e r f o r m a n ce of divine service, and t o ok steps for the suppression of the m o n a s t e r i es and the sequestration of their p r o p e r t y. T h ey intended to transform the i m m e n se w a s te l a n d s, royal domains and c o m m o ns of Spain into private p r o p e r t y, by selling o ne half of t h em for t he extinction of the public debt, distributing another part by lot as a patriotic r e m u n e r a t i on for the disbanded soldiers of t he war of i n d e p e n d e n ce and granting a third part, gratuitously, and also by lot, to the poor p e a s a n t ry w ho should desire to p o s s e ss b ut not be able to b uy t h e m. T h ey allowed the inclosure of p a s t u r es and other real p r o p e r t y, formerly forbidden. T h ey repealed t he absurd laws which p r e v e n t ed p a s t u r es from being c o n v e r t ed 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 443 Karl Marx into arable land or arable land converted into p a s t u r e, and generally freed agriculture from t he old arbitrary and ridiculous rules. T h ey r e v o k ed all feudal laws with r e s p e ct to farming c o n t r a c t s, and the law, according to w h i ch t he successor of an entailed estate w as n ot obliged to confirm t he leases granted by his predecessor, the leases expiring with him w ho had granted t h e m. T h ey abolished t he voto de Santiago, u n d er w h i ch n a me w as u n d e r s t o od an ancient tribute of a certain m e a s u re of the b e st b r e ad and the b e st wine to be paid by t he laborers of certain p r o v i n c es principally for t he m a i n t e n a n ce of t he Archbishop and Chapter of Santiago. T h ey d e c r e ed the introduction of a large progressive tax, etc. It being o ne of their principal aims to hold p o s s e s s i on of the A m e r i c an colonies, which h ad already b e g un to revolt, t h ey a c k n o w l e d g ed the full political equality of the A m e r i c an a nd E u r o p e an S p a n i a r d s, proclaimed a general a m n e s ty without any exception, issued d e c r e es against t he op p r e s s i on weighing u p on the original natives of A m e r i ca a nd Asia, canceled t he mitas, t he repartimientos, etc., abolished t he m o n o p o ly of quicksilver, a nd t o ok t he lead of E u r o pe in suppressing the slave-trade. T he Constitution of 1812 has been accused on the o ne hand—for instance, by F e r d i n a nd V II himself (see his decree of M ay 4, 1814)—of being a mere imitation of the F r e n ch Constitution of 1791, t r a n s p l a n t ed on t he Spanish soil by visionaries, regardless of t he historical traditions of Spain. On the other h a n d, it has b e en contended—for instance, by t he A b bé de P r a dt (De la Révolution actuelle de l'Espagne)-that t he C o r t es u n r e a s o n a b ly clung to antiquated formulas, b o r r o w ed from the ancient Fueros, a nd belonging to feudal t i m e s, w h en the royal authority w as c h e c k ed by t he exorbitant privi- leges of t he g r a n d e e s. T he truth is that the Constitution of 1812 is a r e p r o d u c t i on of the ancient F u e r o s, b ut read in t he light of the F r e n ch Revolution, a nd a d a p t ed to t he w a n ts of m o d e rn society. T he right of insurrection, for i n s t a n c e, is generally regarded as o ne of t he boldest innovations of t he J a c o b in Constitution of 1793, b ut y ou m e et this same right in the ancient F u e r os of S o b r a r b e, w h e re it is called t he "Privilegio de la Union. " Y ou find it also in t he ancient Constitution of Castile. According to the F u e r os of S o b r a r b e, t he K i ng c a n n ot m a ke p e a ce nor declare war, nor conclude treaties, without the previous c o n s e nt of the C o r t e s. T he P e r m a n e nt C o m m i t t e e, consisting of s e v en m e m b e rs of the Cortes, w ho are to w a t ch over t he strict o b s e r v a n ce of the Constitution during the prorogation of the Legislative b o d y, w as of old established in Aragon, and w as introduced into Castile at t he time w h en the principal C o r t es of the M o n a r c hy w e re united in o ne single b o d y. To the period of t he F r e n ch invasion a similar institution still existed in t he kingdom of N a v a r r e. T o u c h i ng t he formation of a State Council from a list of 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 444 Revolutionary Spain · Sixth Article 10 120 p e r s o ns p r e s e n t ed to t he King by t he C o r t es a nd paid by them—this singular creation of the Constitution of 1812 w as suggested by the r e m e m b r a n ce of t he fatal influence exercised by t he Camarillas at all e p o c hs of the Spanish M o n a r c h y. T he State Council w as intended to supersede t he 5 Camarilla. Besides, t h e re existed analogous institutions in t he past. At t he time of F e r d i n a nd IV, for instance, the K i ng w as always surrounded by t w e l ve c o m m o n e r s, designated by t he cities of Castille, to serve as his privy councilors; and, in 1419, the Delegates of the cities complained t h at their c o m m i s s i o n e rs w e re no longer admitted into t he King's council. T he e x- elusion of the highest functionaries and the m e m b e rs of the King's household from t he C o r t e s, as well as t he prohibition to t he D e p u t i es to a c c e pt h o n o rs or offices on the p a rt of the King, s e e m s, at first view, to be b o r r o w ed from t he Constitution of 1791, and naturally to flow from t he m o d e rn division of p o w e r s, sanctioned by t he Constitution of 1812. But, in fact, we m e et n ot only in t he ancient Constitution of Castille with p r e c e d e n t s, but we k n ow t h at the people, at different times, r o se and assassinated the D e p u t i es w ho h ad a c c e p t ed h o n o rs or offices from t he C r o w n. As to t he right of t he Cortes to appoint regencies in c a se of minority, it h ad continually b e en exercised by t he ancient Cortes of Castille during t he long minorities of t he f o u r t e e n th c e n t u r y. 15 20 It is true t h at the Cadiz C o r t es deprived the king of t he p o w er he had always e x e r c i s ed of convoking, dissolving, or proroguing t he C o r t e s; b ut as t he C o r t es had fallen into disuse by the v e ry m a n n er in w h i ch the kings i m p r o v ed their privileges, t h e re w as nothing m o re evident t h an t he necessity of cancel- ing it. T he alleged facts m ay suffice to show t h at the anxious limitation of t he royal power—the most striking feature of t he constitution of 1812—other wise fully explained by the r e c e nt and revolting souvenirs of G o d o y 's con temptible despotism, derived its origin from t he ancient F u e r os of Spain. T he C a d iz C o r t es b ut transferred the control from t he privileged estates to t he national representation. H ow m u ch t he Spanish kings stood in a we of t he ancient F u e r os m ay be seen from the fact t h at w h en a n ew collection of the Spanish laws h ad b e c o me n e c e s s a r y, in 1805, a royal o r d i n a n ce o r d e r ed t he r e m o v al from it of all the r e m a i ns of feudalism contained in the last collection of laws, and belonging to a time w h en t he w e a k n e ss of t he m o n a r c hy forced the kings to enter with their vassals into c o m p r o m i s es derogatory to the sovereign p o w e r. If the election of the D e p u t i es by general suffrage w as an innovation, it m u st not be forgotten t h at t he C o r t es of 1812 w e re t h e m s e l v es elected by general suffrage, that all the juntas h ad b e en elected by it; that a limitation of it would, therefore, h a ve b e en an infraction of a right already c o n q u e r ed by the people ; and, lastly, that a p r o p e r ty qualification, at a time w h en almost 25 30 35 40 445 Karl Marx all t he real p r o p e r ty of Spain w as locked up in mortmain, w o u ld h a ve ex cluded t he greater p a rt of the population. T he meeting of the Representatives in o ne single h o u se w as by no m e a ns c o p i ed from t he F r e n ch Constitution of 1791, as t he m o r o se English Tories will h a ve it. O ur r e a d e rs know already that since Charles I (the E m p e r or Charles V) t he aristocracy and t he clergy h ad lost their seats in t he Cortes of Castille. B ut e v en at t he times w h en t he C o r t es w e re divided into brazos, ( a r m s, branches,) representing the different e s t a t e s, t h ey a s s e m b l ed in one single hall, separated only by their seats, and voting in c o m m o n. F r om the P r o v i n c e s, in which alone the Cortes still p o s s e s s ed real p o w er at t he e p o ch of the F r e n ch invasion, N a v a r re continued the old c u s t om of convoking the C o r t es by estates ; b ut in the Vascongadas t he altogether d e m o c r a t ic assem blies admitted not e v en the clergy. Besides, if the clergy and aristocracy had saved their obnoxious privileges, they h ad long since c e a s ed to form inde p e n d e nt political bodies, the existence of w h i ch constituted the basis of the c o m p o s i t i on of the ancient Cortes. T he separation of the judiciary from the executive p o w e r, d e c r e ed by the Cadiz C o r t e s, w as d e m a n d ed as early as the eighteenth c e n t u r y, by the most enlightened s t a t e s m en of Spain; and the general odium w h i ch the Consejo Real, from the beginning of the revolution, h ad c o n c e n t r a t ed u p on itself, m a de the necessity of reducing the tribunals to their p r o p er sphere of action universally felt. T he section of the Constitution w h i ch refers to the Municipal G o v e r n m e nt of the c o m m u n e s, is a genuine Spanish offspring, as we h a ve s h o wn in a former article. T he Cortes only reestablished the old municipal s y s t e m , w h i le t h ey stripped off its mediaeval character. As to t he provincial deputations, invested with the same p o w e rs for the internal g o v e r n m e nt of the provinces as t he a y u n t a m i e n t os for the administration of t he c o m m u n e s, t he Cortes modelled t h em in imitation of similar institutions still existing at the time of t he invasion in N a v a r r e, Biscaya and Asturias. In abolishing t he e x e m p t i o ns from the military service, the Cortes sanctioned only w h at h ad b e c o me the general practice during the w ar of i n d e p e n d e n c e. T he abolition of the in quisition w as also but t he sanction of a fact, as the holy office, although reestablished by t he Central Junta, h ad n ot dared to r e s u me its functions, its holy m e m b e rs being content with pocketing their salaries, and p r u d e n t ly waiting for better times. As to t he suppression of feudal a b u s e s, the Cortes w e nt n ot e v en the length of the reforms insisted u p on in the f a m o us memorial of Jovellanos, p r e s e n t ed in 1795 to the Consejo Real in the n a me of the economical society of Madrid. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 T he ministers of the enlightened despotism of t he latter p a rt of t he eight- e e n th c e n t u r y, Florida B l a n ca and C a m p o m a n e s, h ad already b e g un to t a ke 40 446 Revolutionary Spain · Sixth Article 5 steps in this direction. B e s i d e s, it m u st n ot be forgotten that simultaneously with the C o r t e s, t h e re sat a F r e n ch G o v e r n m e nt at Madrid, which, in all t he p r o v i n c es o v e r r un by the armies of N a p o l e o n, had swept a w ay from the soil all monastic and feudal institutions, and i n t r o d u c ed t he m o d e rn s y s t em of administration. T he Bonapartist p a p e rs d e n o u n c ed the insurrection as en tirely p r o d u c ed by the artifices and bribes of England, assisted by t he m o n ks a nd the Inquisition. H ow far t he rivalry with the intruding G o v e r n m e nt m u st h a ve exercised a salutary influence u p on t he decisions of t he Cortes, may be inferred from the fact that the Central J u n ta itself, in its d e c r ee dated 10 S e p t e m b e r, 1809, wherein the c o n v o c a t i on of t he C o r t es is a n n o u n c e d, a d d r e s s ed the Spaniards in the following t e r m s: " O ur d e t r a c t o rs say that we are fighting to defend old abuses and the i n v e t e r a te vices of our c o r r u p t ed G o v e r n m e n t. L et t h em k n ow that your struggle is for the happiness as well as the i n d e p e n d e n ce of your c o u n t r y; that y ou will n ot d e p e nd h e n c e f o r w a rd on the uncertain will or the various t e m p er of a single m a n ," etc. 15 20 25 30 On the other hand, we m ay t r a ce in the Constitution of 1812 s y m p t o ms not to be m i s t a k en of a c o m p r o m i se e n t e r ed into b e t w e en the liberal ideas of the eighteenth century and the dark traditions of priestcraft. It suffices to quote Art. 12, according to which " t he religion of t he Spanish nation is and shall be perpetually Catholic, Apostolic, and R o m a n, t he only true religion. T he nation p r o t e c ts it by wise and j u st l a w s, and prohibits t he exercise of any other w h a t e v e r ;" or Art. 173, ordering the King to t a k e, on his accession to t he t h r o n e, t he following oath before t he C o r t e s: " N ., by the grace of God, and the Constitution of the Spanish M o n a r c h y, K i ng of Spain, I swear by t he Almighty and t he H o ly Evangelists, t h at I will defend a nd p r e s e r ve t he Catholic, R o m a n, and Apostolic religion, w i t h o ut tolerating any other in t he k i n g d o m ." On a closer analysis, then, of the Constitution of 1812, we arrive at t he conclusion that, so far from being a servile c o py of the F r e n ch Constitution of 1791, it w as a genuine and original offspring of Spanish intellectual life, regenerating the ancient and national institutions, introducing t he m e a s u r es of reform loudly d e m a n d ed by the m o st celebrated a u t h o rs and s t a t e s m en of the eighteenth century, making inevitable c o n c e s s i o ns to popular preju dice. 447 Karl Marx (Seventh Artide) New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4245, 25. November 1854 T h e re w e re s o me circumstances favorable to the assembling at Cadiz of the most progressive m en of Spain. W h en t he elections t o ok place, t he m o v e m e nt had n ot y et subsided, and the very disfavor w h i ch t he Central J u n ta had incurred r e c o m m e n d ed its antagonists, w h o, to a great e x t e n t, belonged to the revolutionary minority of the nation. At the first m e e t i ng of the C o r t e s, t he most d e m o c r a t ic provinces, Catalonia and Galicia, w e re almost ex clusively r e p r e s e n t e d; the deputies from L e o n, Valencia, M u r c ia and the Islas B a l e a r e s, not arriving till t h r ee m o n t hs later. T he m o st reactionary p r o v i n c e s, t h o se of the interior, w e re n ot allowed, e x c e pt in s o me few lo- calities, to p r o c e ed with the elections for the Cortes. F or t he different king d o m s, cities and t o w ns of old Spain, w h i ch the F r e n ch armies p r e v e n t ed from choosing deputies, as well as for the ultramarine p r o v i n c es of N ew Spain, w h o se deputies could n ot arrive in d ue time, s u p p l e m e n t a ry r e p r e s e n t a t i v es w e re elected from t he m a ny individuals w h om t he t r o u b l es of t he w ar h ad driven from the provinces to Cadiz, and the n u m e r o us S o u th A m e r i c a n s, m e r c h a n t s, natives and o t h e r s, w h o se curiosity or t he state of affairs had likewise assembled at that place. T h us it h a p p e n ed t h at t h o se p r o v i n c es w e re r e p r e s e n t ed by m en m o re fond of innovation, a nd m o re impregnated with the ideas of the eigtheenth century, than w o u ld h a ve b e en t he c a se if they h ad b e en enabled to c h o o se for t h e m s e l v e s. Lastly, t he c i r c u m s t a n ce of the C o r t es meeting at Cadiz w as of decisive influence, t h at city being t h en k n o wn as t he m o st radical of t he kingdom, m o re resembling an A m e r i c an t h an a Spanish t o w n. Its population filled the galleries in the Hall of the C o r t es and d o m i n e e r ed t he reactionists, w h en their opposition g r ew t oo o b n o x i o u s, by a s y s t em of intimidation and p r e s s u re from without. 5 10 15 20 25 It w o u l d, h o w e v e r, be a great mistake to s u p p o se t h at t he majority of the C o r t es consisted of reformers. T he Cortes w e re divided into t h r ee parties— t he Serviles, t he Liberales, (these party d e n o m i n a t i o ns s p r e ad from Spain t h r o u gh the whole of E u r o p e ,) a nd the Americans, t he latter voting alter- nately with the o ne or the other party, according to their particular interests. T he Serviles, far superior in n u m b e r s, w e re carried a w ay by t he activity, zeal and enthusiasm of the Liberal minority. T he ecclesiastic d e p u t i e s, w ho f o r m ed t he majority of t he Servile party, w e re always r e a dy to sacrifice t he royal prerogative, partly from the r e m e m b r a n ce of the antagonism of the 35 C h u r ch to t he State, partly with a view to courting popularity, in order t h us to save the privileges and abuses of their c a s t e. D u r i ng the d e b a t es on the 30 448 Revolutionary Spain · Seventh Article general suffrage, t he o n e - c h a m b er system, t he n o - p r o p e r ty qualification and the suspensive veto the ecclesiastic p a r ty always c o m b i n ed with t he m o re d e m o c r a t ic part of t he Liberals against t he partisans of t he English Con stitution. O ne of t h e m, t he C a n on C a ñ e d o, afterward A r c h b i s h op of B u r g o s, and an implacable p e r s e c u t or of t he L i b e r a l s, a d d r e s s ed S e ñ or M u ñ oz T o r r e r o, also a C a n o n, b ut belonging to t he Liberal p a r t y, in t h e se t e r m s: " Y ou suffer the King to r e m a in excessively powerful, b ut as a priest y ou ought to plead t he cause of the C h u r c h, r a t h er t h an t h at of the K i n g ." Into t h e se c o m p r o m i s es with t he C h u r ch p a r ty t he L i b e r a ls w e re forced to enter, as we h a ve already s h o wn from s o me articles of the Constitution of 1812. W h en the liberty of t he p r e ss w as discussed, t he p a r s o ns d e n o u n c ed it as " c o n t r a ry to religion." After the m o st s t o r my d e b a t e s, a nd after having declared t h at all p e r s o ns w e re at liberty to publish their sentiments without special license, the C o r t es unanimously admitted an a m e n d m e n t, w h i c h, by inserting t he w o rd political, curtailed this liberty of half its extent, a nd left all writings u p on religious m a t t e rs subject to t he c e n s u re of the ecclesiastic authorities, according to t he d e c r e es of the Council of T r e n t. On A u g u st 18, 1813, after a d e c r ee p a s s ed against all w ho should conspire against the Constitution, another d e c r ee w as p a s s e d, declaring t h at w h o e v er should conspire to m a ke the Spanish nation cease to p r o f e ss t he Catholic R o m an religion should be p r o s e c u t ed as a traitor, a nd suffer death. W h en t he Voto de Santiago w as abolished, a c o m p e n s a t o ry resolution w as carried, declaring Saint T h e r e sa de J e s us t he p a t r o n e ss of Spain. T he Liberals also t o ok c a re n ot to p r o p o se and carry the d e c r e es a b o ut the abolition of t he Inquisition, t he tithes, t he monasteries, etc., till after t he Constitution h ad b e en pro claimed. B ut from t h at v e ry m o m e nt the opposition of the Serviles within t he C o r t e s, and t he clergy without, b e c a me inexorable. H a v i ng n ow explained the c i r c u m s t a n c es w h i ch a c c o u nt for the origin a nd t he characteristic features of t he Constitution of 1812, t h e re still r e m a i ns t he p r o b l em to be solved of its s u d d en and resistless d i s a p p e a r a n ce at t he r e t u rn of F e r d i n a nd V I I. A m o re humiliating spectacle h as seldom b e en witnessed by the world. W h en F e r d i n a nd entered Valencia, on April 16, 1814, " t he j o y o us people y o k ed t h e m s e l v es to his carriage, a nd testified by e v e ry possible expression of w o rd and d e e d, their desire of taking t he old y o ke u p on t h e m s e l v e s, shouting, ' L o ng Uve t he absolute King!' ' D o wn with t he Con stitution!' " In all the large t o w n s, the Plaza M a y o r, or G r e at S q u a r e, h ad b e en n a m ed Plaza de la Constitución, a nd a stone with t h e se w o r ds e n g r a v ed on it, e r e c t ed t h e r e. In Valencia this stone w as r e m o v e d, and a " p r o v i s i o n a l" stone of w o od set up in its place with t he inscription: " R e al Plaza de F e r- n a n do V I I ." T he p o p u l a ce of Seville d e p o s ed all t he existing authorities, elected others in their stead to all t he offices w h i ch h ad existed u n d er t he 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 449 Karl Marx old régime, and t h en required those authorities to reestablish t he Inquisition. F r om A r a n j u ez to Madrid F e r d i n a n d 's carriage w as d r a wn by t he people. W h en the K i ng alighted, the m ob t o ok him up in their a r m s, triumphantly s h o w ed him to t he i m m e n se concourse, assembled in front of the palace, and in their a r ms c o n v e y ed him to his a p a r t m e n t s. T he w o rd L i b e r ty a p p e a r ed in large b r o n ze letters over t he e n t r a n ce of the Hall of t he C o r t es in Madrid; t he r a b b le hurried thither to r e m o ve it; t h ey s e t up l a d d e r s, forced o ut letter by letter from t he stone, and as e a ch w as t h r o wn into t he street, t he spectators r e n e w ed their shouts of exultation. T h ey collected as m a ny of t he journals of t he C o r t es a nd of the p a p e rs and p a m p h l e ts of t he Liberals as could be got together, f o r m ed a procession in which the religious fraternities a nd the clergy, regular a nd secular, t o ok t he lead, piled up t h e se p a p e rs in o ne of t he public s q u a r e s, and sacrificed t h em there as a political auto-da-fé, after w h i ch high m a ss w as performed and the Te D e um sung as a thanksgiving for their t r i u m p h. M o re important perhaps—since t h e se s h a m e l e ss d e m o n s t r a t i o ns of t he t o wn m o b, partly paid for their p e r f o r m a n c e s, a nd like t he L a z z a r o ni of N a p l e s, preferring t he w a n t on rule of kings and m o n ks to the sober régime of t he middle classes—is the fact that t he s e c o nd general elections resulted in a decisive victory of the Serviles; the constituent C o r t es being replaced by the ordinary C o r t es on Sept. 2 0 , 1 8 1 3, w ho transferred their sittings from C a d iz to Madrid on Jan. 15, 1814. 5 10 15 20 25 We h a ve s h o wn in former articles h ow the revolutionary p a r ty itself had participated in rousing a nd strengthening the old popular prejudices, with a view to t u rn t h em into so m a ny w e a p o ns against N a p o l e o n. We h a ve t h en seen h ow t he Central J u n t a, at the only period w h en social c h a n g es w e re to be b l e n d ed w i th m e a s u r es of national defense, did all in their p o w er to p r e v e nt t h e m, and to suppress the revolutionary aspirations of t he provinces. T he C a d iz C o r t e s, on the contrary, cut off, during t he greater p a rt of their e x i s t e n c e, from all connection with Spain, w e re n ot e v en enabled to m a ke their constitution and their organic d e c r e es k n o w n, e x c e pt as t he F r e n ch 30 armies retired. T he Cortes arrived, as it w e r e, post factum. T h ey found society fatigued, e x h a u s t e d, suffering; t he n e c e s s a ry p r o d u ct of so protract ed a w a r, entirely carried on u p on t he Spanish soil; a w ar in w h i ch t he armies, being always on t he m o v e, the G o v e r n m e nt of to-day w as seldom t h at of t o - m o r r o w, while b l o o d s h ed did not c e a se o ne single day during a l m o st six 35 y e a rs t h r o u g h o ut the whole surface of Spain, from Cadiz to P a m p e l u n a, and from G r a n a da to Salamanca. It w as not to be e x p e c t ed t h at s u ch a society should be v e ry sensible of the abstract beauties of a ny political constitution w h a t e v e r. N e v e r t h e l e s s, w h en t he constitution w as first proclaimed at M a d r i d, and t he other provinces e v a c u a t ed by t he F r e n c h, it w as received 40 with " e x u l t a nt delight," t he m a s s es being generally expecting a s u d d en 450 Revolutionary Spain · Seventh Article d i s a p p e a r a n ce of their social sufferings from m e re change of G o v e r n m e n t. W h en t h ey discovered t h at t he constitution w as n ot possessed of s u ch miraculous p o w e r s, the v e ry overstrained e x p e c t a t i o ns w h i ch had w e l c o m ed it, turned into disappointment, a nd with t h e se passionate S o u t h e rn peoples t h e re is b ut o ne step from disappointment to hatred. 5 10 20 15 T h e re w e re s o me particular c i r c u m s t a n c es w h i ch principally contributed to estrange t he popular sympathies from t he Constitutional régime. T he C o r t es had published the severest d e c r e es against t he Afrancesados or the Josephites. T he Cortes w e re partly driven to t h e se d e c r e es by the vindictive clamor of the populace and the reactionists, w ho at o n ce turned against t he C o r t es as s o on as t he d e c r e es they h ad w r u ng from t h em w e re put to execu tion. U p w a r ds of 10,000 families b e c a me t h us exiled. A lot of p e t ty tyrants let loose on t he p r o v i n c e s, e v a c u a t ed by t he F r e n c h, established their p r o c o n sular authority, and b e g an by inquiries, p r o s e c u t i o n, prison, inquisitorial proceedings against t h o se c o m p r o m i s ed t h r o u gh a d h e r e n ce to t he F r e n c h, by having accepted offices from t h e m, b o u g ht national p r o p e r ty from t h e m, e t c. T he R e g e n c y, instead of trying to effect t he transition from t he F r e n ch to the national régime in a conciliatory and discreet w a y, did all in their p o w er to aggravate t he evils a nd e x a s p e r a te t he p a s s i o n s, inseparable from such changes of dominion. B ut w hy did t h ey do so ? In o r d er to be able to a sk from t he Cortes a suspension of t he Constitution of 1812, which, they told t h e m, w o r k ed so very offensively. Be it r e m a r k e d, en passant, that all the R e gencies, t h e se s u p r e me executive authorities appointed by t he C o r t e s, w e re regularly c o m p o s ed of t he m o st decided e n e m i es of t he C o r t es a nd their 25 Constitution. This curious fact is simply explained by t he A m e r i c a ns always combining with the Serviles in the a p p o i n t m e nt of the executive p o w e r, t he the attainment of w e a k e n i ng of which t h ey c o n s i d e r ed n e c e s s a ry for A m e r i c an i n d e p e n d e n ce from the m o t h er c o u n t r y, since t h ey w e re sure t h at an e x e c u t i ve simply at variance with t he sovereign C o r t es w o u ld p r o ve insufficient. T he introduction by t he C o r t es of a single direct t ax u p on t he rental of land, as well as u p on industrial a nd c o m m e r c i al p r o d u c e, excited also great discontent a m o ng the p e o p l e, a nd still m o re so the absurd d e c r e es forbidding t he circulation of all Spanish specie coined by J o s e ph B o n a p a r t e, and ordering its p o s s e s s o rs to e x c h a n ge it for national coin, simultaneously interdicting the circulation of F r e n ch m o n e y, a nd proclaiming a tariff at w h i ch it w as to be e x c h a n g ed at t he national mint. As this tariff greatly differed from t h at proclaimed by t he F r e n ch in 1808, for t he relative value of F r e n ch and Spanish coins, m a ny private individuals w e re involved in great losses. This a b s u rd m e a s u re also c o n t r i b u t ed to raise the price of the first n e c e s s a r i e s, already highly a b o ve the average r a t e s. 30 35 40 T he classes m o st interested in the o v e r t h r ow of the Constitution of 1812, 451 Karl Marx a nd t he r e s t o r a t i on of the old régime—the G r a n d e e s, t he Clergy, t he Friars and the Lawyers—did n ot fail to excite to the highest pitch t he popular discontent c r e a t ed by t he unfortunate c i r c u m s t a n c es which h ad m a r k ed t he introduction on t he Spanish soil of the Constitutional régime. H e n ce the victory of t he Serviles in the general elections of 1813. Only from the p a rt of the a r my could the K i ng a p p r e h e nd a ny serious r e s i s t a n c e, b ut G e n e r al Elio a nd his officers, breaking t he o a th t h ey h ad s w o rn to the Constitution, proclaimed F e r d i n a nd V II at Valencia, without mentioning t he Constitution. Elio w as soon followed by t he o t h er military chiefs. In his d e c r e e, d a t ed M ay 4, 1814, in which F e r d i n a nd V II dissolved the Madrid C o r t es a nd cancelled t he Constitution of 1812, he simultaneously proclaimed his h a t r ed of despotism, promised to c o n v e ne t he C o r t es u n d er t he old legal f o r m s, to establish a rational liberty of t he p r e s s, e t c. He r e d e e m ed his pledge in the only m a n n er which t he r e c e p t i on he h ad m et on t he p a rt of t he Spanish people deserved—by rescinding all the acts emanating from t he C o r t e s, by restoring everything to its ancient footing, by r e e s t a b lishing t he H o ly Inquisition, by recalling t he Jesuits b a n i s h ed by his grand- sire, by consigning the m o st p r o m i n e nt m e m b e rs of the J u n t a s, t he C o r t es a nd their a d h e r e n ts to t he galleys, African prisons, or to exile; and, finally, by ordering t he m o st illustrious guerrilla chiefs, Porlier a nd De L a c y, to be shot. 5 10 15 20 New-Yörk Daily Tribune. Nr.4251, 2. Dezember 1854 (Eighth Article) During the y e ar 1819 an expeditionary a r my w as a s s e m b l ed in t he environs of Cadiz for t he p u r p o se of reconquering t he revolted A m e r i c an colonies. E n r i q ue O'Donnell, C o u nt La Bisbal, the uncle of L e o p o ld O'Donnell, the p r e s e nt Spanish Minister, w as intrusted with t he c o m m a n d. T he former expeditions against Spanish A m e r i ca having swallowed up 14,000 m en since 1814, a nd being carried out in t he most disgusting a nd reckless m a n n e r, h ad g r o wn m o st odious to the army, and w e re generally c o n s i d e r ed a malicious m e a ns of getting rid of t he dissatisfied regiments. Several officers, a m o ng t h em Quiroga, L o p ez B a ñ o s, S an Miguel, (the p r e s e nt Spanish Lafayette,) O'Daly, and A r co A g ü e r o, determined to i m p r o ve t he discontent of the soldiers, to shake off the y o k e, and to proclaim t he Constitution of 1812. La Bisbal, w h en initiated into the plot, promised to put himself at t he h e ad of the m o v e m e n t. T he chiefs of the conspiracy, in conjunction w i th h i m, fixed 25 30 35 452 Revolutionary Spain · Eighth Article 10 on July 9, 1819, as t he d ay on w h i ch a general review of t he expeditionary t r o o ps w as to t a ke p l a c e, in the midst of w h i ch act t he grand blow w as to be struck. At t he h o ur of the review La Bisbal a p p e a r e d, indeed, b ut instead of keeping his w o r d, o r d e r ed the conspiring regiments to be disarmed, sent 5 Quiroga a nd the other chiefs to prison, a nd dispatched a courier to Madrid, boasting t h at he h ad p r e v e n t ed the m o st alarming of c a t a s t r o p h e s. He w as r e w a r d ed with p r o m o t i on and decorations, b ut t he C o u rt having obtained m o re a c c u r a te information, afterward deprived him of his c o m m a n d, a nd o r d e r ed him to w i t h d r aw to t he capital. This is t he same La Bisbal w h o, in 1814, at the time of the King's r e t u rn to Spain, sent an officer of his staff with t wo letters to F e r d i n a n d. T oo great a distance from t he spot rendering it impossible for him to o b s e r ve t he K i n g 's m o v e m e n t s, a nd to regulate his c o n d u ct according to t h at of the Monarch—in o ne letter La Bisbal m a de a p o m p o us eulogy of the Constitution of 1812, on t he supposition that t he K i ng 15 w o u ld t a ke t he o a th to support it. In t he other, on t he c o n t r a r y, he r e p r e s e n t ed the constitutional system as a s c h e me of a n a r c hy a nd confusion, con gratulated F e r d i n a nd on his exterminating it, a nd offered himself and his a r my to o p p o se the rebels, d e m a g o g u e s, a nd enemies of the t h r o ne a nd altar. T he officer delivered this s e c o nd dispatch, w h i ch w as cordially received by the B o u r b o n. 20 N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng the s y m p t o ms of rebellion w h i ch had s h o wn t h e m s e l v es a m o ng the expeditionary army, the Madrid G o v e r n m e n t, at the h e ad of w h i ch w as placed the D u ke of San F e r n a n d o, t h en Foreign Minister and P r e s i d e nt of t he Cabinet, persisted in a state of inexplicable a p a t hy a nd inactivity, a nd did nothing to accelerate the expedition, or to scatter t he a r my in different s e a p o rt t o w n s. Meanwhile a simultaneous m o v e m e nt w as agreed u p on b e t w e en D on Raphael del Riego, c o m m a n d i ng t he second battalion of Astu rias, t h en stationed at L as C a b e z as de S an J u a n, a nd Quiroga, San Miguel, a nd other military chiefs of t he Isla de L e o n, w ho h ad contrived to get o ut of prison. Riego's position w as far t he m o st difficult. T he c o m m u ne of L as C a b e z as w as in the center of t h r ee of the h e a d q u a r t e rs of the expeditionary army—that of the cavalry at U t r e r a, t he s e c o nd division of infantry at Lebrija, and a battalion of guides at A r c o s, w h e re the commander-in-chief and t he staff w e re established. He nevertheless s u c c e e d e d, on J a n u a ry 1, 1820, in surprising and capturing t he c o m m a n d er and the staff, although the battalion c a n t o n ed at A r c os w as double t he strength of t h at of Asturias. On t he same d ay he proclaimed in t h at v e ry c o m m u ne t he Constitution of 1812, elected a provisional alcalde, and, not c o n t e nt with having e x e c u t ed t he t a sk de volved u p on him, seduced the guides to his c a u s e, surprised the battalion of Aragon lying at B o m o s, m a r c h ed from B o r n os on X e r e s, a nd from X e r es on P o rt St. Marie, e v e r y w h e re proclaiming the Constitution, till he r e a c h ed 25 30 35 40 453 Karl Marx t he Isla de L e o n, on t he 7th January, w h e re he deposited t he military prison e rs he h ad m a de in t he fort of St. Petri. C o n t r a ry to their p r e v i o us agreement, Quiroga a nd his followers h ad n ot p o s s e s s ed t h e m s e l v es by a c o up de main of t he bridge of S u a z o, and t h en of the Isla de L e o n, b ut r e m a i n ed tranquil to t he 2d of J a n u a r y, after Oltra, Riego's messenger, h ad c o n v e y ed to t h em official intelligence of the surprise of A r c os and the c a p t u re of the staff. T he w h o le forces of t he Revolutionary A r m y, t he s u p r e me c o m m a nd of w h i ch w as given to Quiroga, did not e x c e ed 5,000 m e n, a nd their a t t a c ks u p on t he gates of Cadiz having b e en repulsed, t h ey w e re t h e m s e l v es shut up in t he Isla de L e o n. " O ur situation," says San Miguel, " w as e x t r a o r d i n a r y; the revolution, stationary for 25 days without losing or gaining o ne inch of g r o u n d, p r e s e n t ed o ne of the m o st singular p h e n o m e na in politics." T he P r o v i n c es s e e m ed r o c k ed into lethargic slumber. During t he w h o le m o n th of J a n u a r y, at the e nd of w h i ch Riego, apprehending the flame of revolution might be extinguished in t he Isla de L e o n, f o r m e d, against the counsels of Quiroga and the o t h er Chiefs, a movable column of 1,500 m e n, a nd m a r c h ed over a p a rt of Andalusia, in p r e s e n ce of and p u r s u ed by a t en t i m es stronger t h an his o w n, proclaiming t he Constitution at Algeciras, R o n d a, force Malaga, C o r d o v a, etc., e v e r y w h e re received by t he inhabitants in a friendly w a y, b ut n o w h e re provoking a serious p r o n u n c i a m e n t o. M e a n w h i le his p u r s u e r s, c o n s u m i ng a whole m o n th in fruitless m a r c h es a nd counter m a r c h e s, seemed to desire nothing b ut to avoid, as m u ch as possible, coming to close q u a r t e rs with his little army. T he c o n d u ct of t he G o v e r n m e nt t r o o ps w as altogether inexplicable. Riego's expedition, w h i ch began on Jan. 27, 1820, t e r m i n a t ed on M a r ch 11, he being t h en forced to disband t he f ew m en t h at still followed him. H is small corps w as not dispersed t h r o u gh a decisive b a t t l e, b ut d i s a p p e a r ed from fatigue, from continual p e t ty e n c o u n t e rs with the e n e m y, from sickness and desertion. Meanwhile the situation of the insurrectionists in t he Isla w as by no m e a ns promising. T h ey continued to be b l o c k ed up by sea and land, and within t he t o wn of C a d iz e v e ry declaration for their c a u se w as suppressed by t he garrison. H o w, t h e n, did it h a p p en that, Riego having disbanded in the Sierra M o r e na t he Constitutional t r o o ps on t he 11th of M a r c h, F e r d i n a nd V II w as forced to s w e ar to t he Constitution, at M a d r i d, on t he 9th of M a r c h, so t h at Riego really gained his e nd just t wo d a ys before he finally despaired of his c a u s e? T he m a r ch of Riego's column had riveted a n ew the general attention; t he p r o v i n c es w e re all expectation, and eagerly w a t c h ed e v e ry m o v e m e n t. M e n 's m i n d s, struck by the boldness of Riego's sally, t he rapidity of his m a r c h, his vigorous repulses of the e n e m y, imagined t r i u m p hs n e v er gained, a nd ag gregations and r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts never obtained. W h en t he tidings of Riego's enterprise r e a c h ed t he m o re distant provinces, t h ey w e re magnified in no 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 454 Revolutionary Spain · Eighth Article 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 small d e g r e e, and t h o se m o st r e m o te from t he s p ot w e re t he first to declare t h e m s e l v es for t he Constitution of 1812. So far w as Spain m a t u r ed for a revolution, that e v en false n e ws sufficed to p r o d u ce it. S o, t o o, it w as false n e ws t h at p r o d u c ed t he h u r r i c a ne of 1848. In Galicia, Valencia, Saragossa, B a r c e l o na a nd P a m p e l u n a, successive insurrections b r o ke out. E n r i q ue O'Donnell, alias t he C o u nt of La Bisbal, being s u m m o n ed by t he king to o p p o se t he expedition of Riego, n ot only offered to t a ke a r ms against him, b ut to annihilate his little a r my a nd seize on his p e r s o n. He only d e m a n d ed t he c o m m a nd of t he t r o o ps c a n t o n ed in t he P r o v i n ce of La M a n c h a, and m o n ey for his p e r s o n al necessities. T he king himself gave him a p u r se of gold and t he requisite o r d e rs for t he t r o o ps of La M a n c h a. B ut on his arrival at O c a ñ a, La Bisbal p ut himself at t he h e ad of t he t r o o ps and proclaimed t he C o n s t i t u t i on of 1812. T he n e ws of this defection r o u s ed t he public spirit of Madrid w h e re t he revolution b u r st forth immediately on t he intelligence of this e v e n t. T he G o v e r n m e nt b e g an t h en to negotiate with t he Revolution. In a d e c r e e, d a t ed M a r ch 6, t he King offered to c o n v o ke t he ancient C o r t e s, a s s e m b l ed in Estamentos ( E s t a t e s ), a d e c r ee suiting no p a r t y, neither t h at of t he old m o n a r c hy nor t h at of t he revolution. On his r e t u rn from F r a n c e, he had held o ut t he s a me p r o m i se and failed to r e d e em his pledge. During t he night of t he 7 th revolutionary d e m o n s t r a t i o ns having t a k en place in M a d r i d, t he Gaceta of t he 8th published a d e c r ee by w h i ch F e r d i n a nd V II p r o m i s ed to s w e ar to t he Constitution of 1812. " L et all of u s ," he said, in t h at d e c r e e, " a nd myself t he first, fairly e n t er u p on t he p a th of t he C o n s t i t u t i o n ." T he people h a v i ng got p o s s e s s i on of t he palace on t he 9th, he saved himself only by reestablishing t he M a d r id A y u n t a m i e n to of 1814, b e f o re w h i ch he s w o re to t he Constitution. H e, for his p a r t, did n ot care for false o a t h s, having always at h a nd a c o n f e s s or r e a dy to grant him full remission of all possible sins. Simultaneously a Consultative J u n ta w as established, t he first d e c r ee of w h i ch set free t he political prisoners and recalled t he political refugees. T he p r i s o n s, n ow o p e n e d, sent t he first Constitutional Ministry to t he r o y al p a l a c e. C a s t r o, H e r r e r o s, a nd A. A r guelles—who formed t he first Ministry—were m a r t y rs of 1814, and D e p u t i es of 1812. T he true source of t he e n t h u s i a sm w h i ch h ad a p p e a r ed on t he accession of F e r d i n a nd to t he t h r o n e, w as j oy at t he r e m o v al of Charles IV., his father. A nd t h us t he source of t he general exultation at t he p r o c l a m a t i on of t he Constitution of 1812, w as j oy at t he r e m o v al of F e r d i n a nd V I I. As to t he Constitution itself, we k n ow that, w h en finished, t h e re w e re no territories in w h i ch to proclaim it. F or t he majority of t he S p a n i sh people, it w as like the u n k n o wn god w o r s h i p ed by t he ancient A t h e n i a n s. 40 In o ur d a ys it h as b e en affirmed by English w r i t e rs with an e x p r e ss allusion to t he p r e s e nt Spanish Revolution, on t he o ne h a nd that t he m o v e m e nt of 455 Karl Marx 1820 w as b ut a military conspiracy, and on the o t h er t h at it w as b ut a R u s s i an intrigue. B o th assertions are equally ridiculous. As to t he military in surrection, we h a ve seen that, notwithstanding its failure, the revolution p r o v ed victorious; and, b e s i d e s, the riddle to be solved w o u ld n ot be t he c o n s p i r a cy of 5,000 soldiers, b ut the sanction of that c o n s p i r a cy by an a r my of 35,000 m e n, a nd by a m o st loyal nation of twelve millions. T h at t he revolu tion first acted t h r o u gh t he r a n ks of the a r my is easily explained by the fact t h a t, of all t he b o d i es of t he Spanish m o n a r c h y, t he a r my w as t he only o ne thoroughly t r a n s f o r m ed and revolutionized during the w ar of i n d e p e n d e n c e. As to R u s s i an intrigue, it is n ot to be denied t h at R u s s ia h ad h er h a n ds in t he b u s i n e ss of the Spanish Revolution; that, of all the E u r o p e an p o w e r s, R u s s ia first acknowledged t he Constitution of 1812, by t he t r e a ty concluded in Weliki L u k i, on July 20,1812; that she first kindled the R e v o l u t i on of 1820, first d e n o u n c ed it to F e r d i n a nd VII., first lighted t he t o r ch of counter-revolu tion on several points of the Peninsula, first solemnly p r o t e s t ed against it b e f o re E u r o p e, a nd finally forced F r a n ce into an a r m ed intervention against it. M o n s i e ur de Tatischeft, the Russian E m b a s s a d o r, w as certainly the m o st p r o m i n e nt c h a r a c t er at t he C o u rt of Madrid—the invisible h e ad of t he C a m a rilla. He h ad succeeded in introducing A n t o n io U g a r t e, a w r e t ch of low station, at Court, and making him the head of t he friars a nd f o o t m en w h o, in their b a c k s t a i r c a se council, swayed the scepter in t he n a me of F e r d i n a nd V I I. By Tatischeff, U g a r te w as m a de Director-General of t he ex peditions against S o u th A m e r i c a, and by U g a r te t he D u ke of S an F e r n a n do w as appointed Foreign Minister and President of t he Cabinet. U g a r te effect ed from R u s s ia the p u r c h a se of rotten ships destined for the South A m e r i c an E x p e d i t i o n, for w h i ch t he o r d er of St. A nn w as b e s t o w ed u p on him. U g a r te p r e v e n t ed F e r d i n a nd and his b r o t h er D on Carlos from presenting t h e m s e l v es to t he a r my at t he first m o m e nt of the crisis. He w as t he mysterious a u t h or of the D u ke of S an F e r n a n d o 's u n a c c o u n t a b le a p a t h y, a nd of the m e a s u r es w h i ch led a Spanish Liberal to say at Paris in 1836: " O ne c an hardly resist the conviction t h at the G o v e r n m e nt w as rendering itself the m e a ns for the o v e r t h r ow of t he existing o r d er of t h i n g s ." If we a dd t he c u r i o us fact t h at t he P r e s i d e nt of t he United States praised R u s s ia in his m e s s a ge for her having promised him not to suffer Spain to meddle with t he S o u th A m e r i c an Colonies, t h e re c an r e m a in b ut little d o u bt as to t he p a rt acted by R u s s ia in t he Spanish Revolution. B ut w h at d o es all this p r o v e? T h at R u s s ia p r o d u c ed t he Revolution of 1820? By no m e a n s, but only t h at she p r e v e n t ed the Spanish G o v e r n m e nt from resisting it. T h at t he Revolution would h a ve earlier or later o v e r t u r n ed the absolute and m o n a s t ic m o n a r c hy of F e r d i n a nd V II is p r o v ed 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 1. By t he series of conspiracies w h i ch since 1814 h ad followed e a ch other 2. By t he t e s t i m o ny of M. de Martignac, t he F r e n ch C o m m i s s a ry w ho a c- 40 456 Revolutionary Spain · Eighth Article 5 10 c o m p a n i ed t he D u ke of A n g o u l è me at the time of t he Legitimist invasion of Spain; 3. By testimony n ot to be rejected—that of F e r d i n a nd himself. In 1814 Mina intended a rising in N a v a r r a, g a ve t he first signal for r e sistance by an appeal to a r m s, e n t e r ed t he fortress of P a m p e l u n a, b ut dis- trusting his o wn followers, fled to F r a n c e. In 1815 General Porlier, o ne of t he m o st r e n o w n ed Guerrilleros of t he W ar of I n d e p e n d e n c e, proclaimed t he Constitution at C o r u n a. He w as b e h e a d e d. In 1816, Richard i n t e n d ed captur ing t he K i ng at Madrid. He w as hanged. In 1817, N a v a r r o, a lawyer, w i t h f o ur of his accomplices, expired on the scaffold at Valencia for having proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. In the s a me y e ar the intrepid G e n. L a cy w as shot at M a j o r ca for having c o m m i t t ed t he s a me crime. In 1818, Col. Vidal, Capt. Sola, and o t h e r s, w ho had proclaimed t he Constitution at Valencia, w e re defeated a nd put to the sword. T he Isla de L e on conspiracy t h en w as b ut the last link in a chain formed by the b l o o dy h e a ds of so m a ny valiant 15 m en from 1808 to 1814. M. de Martignac w h o, in 1832, shortly b e f o re his death, published his w o r k: L'Espagne et ses Révolutions, m a k es t he following s t a t e m e n t: " T wo y e a rs had p a s s ed a w ay since F e r d i n a nd V II had r e s u m ed his a b solute p o w e r, a nd t h e re continued still t he proscriptions, proceeding from a Camarilla recruited from the dregs of m a n k i n d. T he w h o le State m a c h i n e ry w as t u r n ed upside d o w n; t h e re reigned nothing b ut disorder, languor a nd confusion—taxes m o st unequally distributed—the state of the finances w as abominable—there w e re loans without credit, impossibility of meeting t he m o st urgent w a n ts of the State, an a r my n ot paid, magistrates indemnifying t h e m s e l v es by bribery, a c o r r u pt and do-nothing Administration u n a b le to ameliorate anything, or e v en to p r e s e r ve anything. H e n ce the general discon t e nt of t he people. T he n ew constitutional s y s t em w as received with en thusiasm by the great t o w n s, the commercial a nd industrial classes, liberal professions, a r my a nd proletariat. It w as r e s i s t ed by t he m o n k s, a nd it stupe- fied t he c o u n t ry p e o p l e ." S u ch are the confessions of a dying m an w ho w as mainly instrumental in subverting t h at n ew system. F e r d i n a nd VII., in his d e c r e es of J u ne 1,1817, M a r ch 1,1817, April 11,1817, N o v e m b er 24,1819, etc., literally confirms the assertions of M. de Martignac, and r e s u m es his lamentations in t h e se w o r d s: " T he miseries that r e s o u nd in the ears of our Majesty, on the p a rt of the complaining people, o v e r s et o ne a n o t h e r ." T h is s h o ws t h at no Tatischeff w as n e e d ed to bring a b o ut a Spanish Revolution. 20 25 30 35 457 Karl Marx (Ninth Artide) New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4345, 23. März 1855 M. de C h a t e a u b r i a n d, in his Congrès de Verone, a c c u s es the S p a n i sh R e v o l u t i on of 1820-23 of having b e en nothing b ut a servile p a r o dy of t he first F r e n ch R e v o l u t i o n, p e r f o r m ed on t he Madrid stage, and in Castilian c o s t u m e s. He forgets t h at t he struggles of different peoples emerging from t he feudal state of society, and moving t o w a rd middle class civilization, c a n n ot be s u p p o s ed to differ in anything b ut t he peculiar coloring derived f r om r a c e, nationality, language, stage c u s t o ms a nd c o s t u m e s. H is c e n s u re r e m i n ds us of t he foolish old w o m an w ho strongly suspected all e n a m o r ed girls of mimicking her o wn b e t t er d a y s. A w h o le library h as b e en written pro and con u p on t he Constitution of 1812, t he p r o c l a m a t i on of which, in 1820, g a ve rise to a t h r ee y e a r s' struggle b e t w e en the prejudices and interests of the old society a nd t he w a n ts a nd aspirations of t he n ew o n e. T he Constitution of 1812 h ad strongly i m p r e s s ed u p on it t h at s a me stamp of impracticability w h i ch c h a r a c t e r i z es all c h a r t e rs originally d r a wn up by m o d e rn nations at t he e p o ch of their regeneration. At t he revolutionary e p o c h, to w h i ch t h ey o we their origin, t h ey are im practicable, n ot in c o n s e q u e n ce of this or t h at p a r a g r a p h, b ut simply b e c a u se of their constitutional n a t u r e. At the Constitutional e p o ch t h ey are o ut of p l a c e, b e c a u se of their being impregnated with t he g e n e r o us delusions. inseparable from the d a wn of social regeneration. T he F r e n ch Constitution of 1791, for i n s t a n c e, at its o wn time justly c o n s i d e r ed to be reactionary, w o u ld h a ve b e en f o u nd guilty of Jacobinism in 1830. W hy s o? In 1791 t he r o y al p o w er a nd t he ruling forces of t he ancient society it r e p r e s e n t e d, h ad n ot y et u n d e r g o ne t h o se transformations w h i ch w e re to enable t h em to enter into c o m b i n a t i on with, a nd to take place within t he e l e m e n ts of t he n ew society. W h at w as t h en w a n t ed w as revolutionary action to b r e ak d o wn the r e s i s t a n ce of t he old society, and n ot a Constitution sanctioning an impossible c o m p r o m i se w i th it. In 1830, on the contrary, w h en limited m o n a r c hy h ad b e c o me possible, it w as generally u n d e r s t o od t h at it m e a nt t he rule of t he bourgeoisie instead of the emancipation of the p e o p l e. T he Constitution of 1791 m u st t h en h a ve a p p e a r ed an incendiary a n a c h r o n i s m. T he s a me argu m e nt h o l ds good for the Spanish Constitution of 1812, b ut t h e re is still t h at distinction to be d r a wn b e t w e en F r a n ce in 1791, and Spain in 1820; t h at t he Constitution of 1791 only p r e t e n d ed to m a ke a halt, in a t wo y e a r s' revolution- ary m a r c h, while t he Constitution of 1812 w as to s u p e r s e de revolution alto gether. Spain, t he d ay before an Oriental d e s p o t i s m, w as to be a d ay later—a 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 458 Revolutionary Spain - Ninth Article d e m o c r a cy with a m o n a r ch at its h e a d. S u ch s u d d en changes belong e x clusively to Spanish history. F e r d i n a nd V I I, w h en r e s t o r ed to absolute p o w e r, in 1823, as well as in 1814, e x p u n g e d, by o ne stroke of t he p e n, all t h at h ad b e en d o ne in t he revolutionary interregnum. T he Revolutionists, on their part, acted in t he s a me m a n n e r. In 1854, t he Spanish people b e g an with E s p a r t e r o, w i th w h om t h ey e n d ed in 1843. In 1814 t he revolution w as termi n a t ed by F e r d i n a n d 's refusing to swear to t he C a d iz Constitution. In 1820, it b e g an w i th forcing u p on him t he o a th to t h at s a me Constitution. He r e a s s e m b l ed the s a me C o r t es he h ad dissolved t wo y e a rs b e f o r e, and m a de t he very m en Ministers he h ad b a n i s h ed or imprisoned in 1814. All parties in Spain, with equal obstinacy, t e ar out all t h o se l e a v es from t he b o ok of their national history w h i ch t h ey h a ve n ot w r i t t en t h e m s e l v e s. H e n ce t h e se s u d d en c h a n g e s, t h e se m o n s t r o us exactions, this e n d l e s s, uninterrupted series of c o n t e s t s. H e n c e, also, t h at indelible p e r s e v e r a n ce w h i ch m ay be defeated, b ut c an n e v er be disheartened or discouraged. 5 10 15 20 T he first Constitutional Ministry, as t he chief of w h i ch D on Augustin Arguelles m ay be considered, w a s, as we h a ve s e e n, f o r m ed of t he m a r t y rs of 1814. M a r t y rs a r e, on t he w h o l e, v e ry d a n g e r o us political c h a r a c t e r s, deflowered, as it w e r e, by t he c o n s c i o u s n e ss of their p a st failures; inflated by exaggerated notions of their p a st m e r i t s; inclined to attribute to t h e m selves t he greater capacities b e c a u se of their d a m p ed c o u r a g e; p r o ne to declare the era of revolution closed w i th their arrival in t he g o v e r n m e n t; from t he v e ry fact of their r e s t o r a t i on likely to a s s u me t he c h a r a c t er of revolution ary legitimists or of legitimate revolutionists; over-jealous of t he n ew m en 25 w h om they are astonished to find their rivals ; c o n s t a n t ly vacillating b e t w e en the fear of counter revolution a nd t he a p p r e h e n s i on of a n a r c h y; by t he v e ry force of c i r c u m s t a n c es i n d u c ed to c o m p r o m i se w i th t he former, in order n ot to be s w e pt a w ay by t he latter, or to see o v e r t h r o wn w h at t h ey u s ed to call t he t r ue b o u n d a r i es of p r o g r e s s. S u ch w as t he Ministry of Arguelles. During the four m o n t hs w h i ch elapsed from its formation till the meeting of t he C o r t e s, all public authority w a s, in fact, s u s p e n d e d. J u n t as in the p r o v i n c es and in the capital, public clubs b a c k ed by secret societies, for the first time a popular a nd unbridled p r e s s, s t o r my petitions, patriotic songs, t he e r e c t i on of constitutional m o n u m e n t s, d e m o n s t r a t i o ns of effervescence natural with a nation on t he r e c o v e ry of its liberty, b ut y et no acts of v e n g e a n c e, no c r i m es c o m m i t t e d, a nd a magnanimity displayed w h i ch w as n ot to be e x p e c t ed from s o u t h e rn n a t u r es w o nt to a b a n d on t h e m s e l v es to t he impetuosity of their p a s s i o n s. 35 30 T he C o r t es at last o p e n ed their first session on July 9, 1820. T h ey m a de 40 D on J o sé Espiga, A r c h b i s h op of Seville, their president. F e r d i n a nd V II swore before t h e m, as he h ad d o ne before t he A y u n t a m i e n t o s, on t he Gospel, 459 Karl Marx to o b s e r ve t he Cadiz Constitution. " So s o o n ," he said, " as t he e x c e ss of u n d e s e r v ed suffering b r o u g ht t he long-suppressed w i s h es of t he p e o p le to a distinct expression, I h a s t e n ed to p u r s ue t he c o u r se t h ey indicated, a nd p r o f e s s ed t he o a th of fidelity to the Constitution of the C o r t es of 1812. F r om this m o m e nt t he king a nd the people entered on their legitimate rights. My resolution was free and voluntary." F e r d i n a nd V I I, a d e s p o t ic c o w a r d, a tiger w i th t he h e a rt of a h a r e, a m an as greedy of authority as unfit to exercise it, a p r i n ce p r e t e n d i ng to absolute p o w er in o r d er to be enabled to r e n o u n ce it into t he h a n ds of his footmen, p r o u d, h o w e v e r, of o ne thing, namely, his p e r f e ct m a s t e ry in h y p o c r i s y. He enjoyed a sort of satisfaction in exaggerat- ing his o wn self-humilation before a victorious e n e m y, r e s o l v e d, as he w a s, to a v e n g e, at t he o p p o r t u ne m o m e n t, his abjection by still m o re astounding perfidy. W h en a prisoner of N a p o l e o n, he h u m b ly t h a n k ed h im for t he refuge he h ad afforded him, and begged for the hand of a p r i n c e ss of the B o n a p a r te family. W h en B o n a p a r te negotiated with him for his r e s t o r a t i on to t he Spanish t h r o n e, he p r o t e s t e d, in an adulatory letter, t h at he should be t he m e a n e st of mortals, a nd b e c o me a b y w o rd in E u r o p e, if he e v er p r o v ed ungrateful to his imperial benefactor, simultaneously writing a secret letter to t he R e g e n cy at Madrid, informing t h em that, o n ce set at liberty, his first act w o u ld be to b e t r ay the F r e n ch E m p e r o r. W h e n, on J u ly 9,1820, he s w o re a n ew to t he Constitution, declaring t h at his " r e s o l u t i on w as free a nd volun t a r y ," t he C o u nt of E s p a g ne a nd M. P o ns w e re already negotiating in his n a m e, at P a r i s, with t he Pavillon Marsan—viz., t he C o u nt of Artois (afterward C h a r l es X) a nd his coterie—on the m e a ns of subverting t h at s a me C o n stitution. 5 10 15 20 25 T h e re w e re s o me m o m e n ts in his political life, as for i n s t a n ce t he d e c r ee of S e p t e m b er 30, 1823, w h en he m a de false p r o m i s es in t he m o st solemn m a n n e r, for no o t h er possible p u r p o se t h an t he m e re p l e a s u re of b r e a k i ng t h e m. T he serious w o rk of c o u n t er revolution, he c o m m i t t ed entirely to the partisans of t he ancient régime, reserving to himself to e n c o u r a ge their efforts in e v e ry possible w a y, b ut with t he mental r e s e r v a t i on of disowning t h em if u n f o r t u n a t e, a nd quietly delivering t h em to the r e s e n t m e nt of their e n e m i es if b e a t e n. No mortal ever b o re o t h e r s' sufferings w i th m o re stoical a p a t h y. F or his o wn official p a rt he limited himself to showing his disgust at t he Constitution by playing t he fool with it. O ne night, for i n s t a n c e, he writes to t he h e ad of the Cabinet, a letter to the effect t h at he h ad appointed G e n. C o n t a d or as W ar Minister. T he Ministers, at a loss to find a C o n t a d or in t he a r my list, are astonished at discovering at length t h at C o n t a d or w as t he ex-chief of a s q u a d r o n, 84 y e a rs old, long since disabled for a ny k i nd of service. T he Ministers so insolently m o c k e d, t e n d e r ed their resignation. F e r d i n a n d, having s u c c e e d ed in c o m p o s i ng t he difference, p r o p o s es to 30 35 40 460 Revolutionary Spain · Ninth Article replace C o n t a d or by G e n. M a r t i n ez R o d r i g u e z, as u n k n o wn as his p r e d e cessor. N ew t r o u b l e s o me r e s e a r c h es having t a k en place, it a p p e a rs t h at M a r t i n ez h ad b e en dangerously h u rt in the head at B a d a j o z, by the explosion of a p o w d er barrel, and h ad n e v er r e c o v e r ed his s e n s es since t h at accident. 5 A sort of virtuoso in the art of p a s s i ve audacity a nd active c o w a r d i c e, F e r d i n a nd V II n e v er s h r u nk from p r o v o k i ng a c a t a s t r o p h e, resolved, as he w a s, to be beforehand with t he danger. 10 15 20 25 T he majority of the C o r t es w as c o m p o s ed of deputies to the Cadiz C o r t e s, t he a u t h o rs of t he Constitution a nd their a d h e r e n t s, while the minority consisted of m en w ho had conspired to reestablish t he Constitution. T he majority considering t he proclamation of t he Constitution as the final t e rm of the revolution, while the minority c o n s i d e r ed it as its beginning; t he former having laid hold of t he G o v e r n m e n t, while t he latter w e re still striving to seize it; a schism b e t w e en the Liberals of 1812 a nd the Liberals of 1820, b e t w e en t he M o d e r a d os and the E x a l t a d o s, b e c a me inevitable. If the influence of t he Liberals of 1812 w as p r e p o n d e r a nt in the C o r t e s, the Liberals of 1820 w e re t he stronger in t he clubs, the p r e s s, and t he streets. If t he former disposed of the Administration, the latter relied u p on the a r my of the Isla, which, strengthened by some regiments t h at h ad n ot participated in the military revolt, w as still c o n c e n t r a t ed in Andalusia, and placed u n d er the s u p r e me c o m m a nd of Riego, Quiroga having b e en sent as a d e p u ty to the C o r t e s. In o r d er to b r e ak t he stronghold of t he E x a l t a d o s, t he Marquis de las Amarillas, Minister-of-War, disbanded t he a r my of t he Isla, Riego having b e f o re b e en r e m o v ed from his t r o o ps on the p r e t e xt of being installed as Captain-General of Galicia. H a r d ly w as t he a r my of t he Isla disbanded—the only military c o r ps in Spain that d e s e r v ed the n a me of an army—when t he first B a n ds of the F a i th w e re seen to a p p e ar in Castile and in the N o r th of Spain. 30 R i e g o, secretly s u m m o n ed by his p a r t i s a n s, on the 31st August suddenly a p p e a r ed at Madrid, w h e re he b e c a me t he idol of t he p e o p l e, w ho received him with turbulent ovations and w i th an overflow of e n t h u s i a s m, w h i ch t he Ministry v i e w ed as a general calamity. T h ey r e s o l v ed u p on exiling him to Oviedo—several other Isla officers being also b a n i s h ed to different places. Although Riego did not resist this arbitrary act of proscription, t he Ministers, a p p r e h e n d i ng an insurrection as likely to b r e ak o ut u p on his nocturnal 35 d e p a r t u re from Madrid, called t he garrison to a r m s, o c c u p i ed the principal p l a c e s, filled the streets of Madrid w i th artillery, while on t he following d a y, Arguelles p r o p o s ed in t he C o r t es t h at m e a s u r es should be t a k en against popular assemblies, w h i ch w as w a r m ly s u p p o r t ed by T o r e no and M a r t i n ez de la R o s a. F r om this day, (Sept. 7, 1820,) is to be dated t he o p en r u p t u re b e t w e en the t wo Liberal fractions and the retrogression of the revolutionary m o v e m e n t. T he s a me fanaticism of order, t he s a me complaints of incessant 40 461 Karl Marx agitation, and t he same angry impatience at e v e ry s y m p t om of popular effervescence, w h i ch E u r o pe witnessed during t he first w e e ks after t he R e v o l u t i on of 1848, n ow p o s s e s s ed at o n ce the Liberal A r i s t o c r a cy and t he higher r a n ks of t he middle classes in t he Peninsula. T he first session of the C o r t es being closed on N o v e m b er 9 , 1 8 2 0, F e r d i- n a nd V I I, w ho h ad retired to t he Escurial, w i th V i c t or S a e z, his confessor, t h o u g ht t he m o m e nt o p p o r t u ne for putting o ut his feelers. In spite of the Constitution, he n o m i n a t e d, by a royal d e c r e e, without t he counter-signature of a responsible minister, Gen. Carvajal as Captain-General of N e w - C a s t i le a nd C o m m a n d a nt of Madrid, in t he place of Gen. Vigodet, w h o, h o w e v e r, refused to resign his place into the h a n ds of Carvajal. T he Ministry, believing t h e m s e l v es lost, n ow appealed to t he very p a r ty t h ey h ad c o m m e n c ed by persecuting. T h ey applied to t he directors of the C l u b s, a nd received, in the m o st gracious m a n n e r, t he violent a d d r e ss of t he M a d r id A y u n t a m i e n t o, w h i ch insisted u p on t he K i n g 's r e t u rn to Madrid. A similar a d d r e ss w as d r a wn up by t he p e r m a n e nt Commission, w ho r e p r e s e n t ed t he C o r t es during their a b s e n c e. T he garrison a nd t he militia w e re p ut u n d er a r m s; t he sittings of t he Clubs b e c a me p e r m a n e n t; t he p o p u l a ce b u r st f o r th into insulting m e n a c es against t he K i n g; insurrection w as openly p r e a c h ed by t he daily p a p e r s, a nd a m a ss expedition to t he Escurial, to fetch t he King, s e e m ed imminent. B e n d i ng b e f o re t he storm, F e r d i n a nd r e v o k ed his offensive d e c r e e, dis missed his anti-liberal confessor, a nd r e t u r n e d, w i th his w h o le family, to M a d r i d, w h e re he arrived on N o v. 2 1, 1820. His e n t ry r e s e m b l ed that of L o u is X V I, a nd his family, on their forced r e t u rn from Versailles to Paris on O c t o b er 6, 1789. T he Ministry h ad n ot obtained the support of t he Liberals of 1820 without giving t h em d ue reparation, by removing t he M a r q u is de las Amarillas, w ho afterward openly professed himself a zealous partisan of absolute m o n a r c h y, from t he W ar Ministry, a nd by raising the Isla officers to s e p a r a te c o m m a n d s. Riego w as appointed Captain-General of A r a g o n, M i n a, Captain-General of Galicia, a nd V e l a s c o, Captain-General of E s t r e m a d u r a. T he Ministry of t he M a r t y r s, irresolutely floating b e t w e en fear of r e a c t i on a nd alarm at a n a r c h y, contrived to b e c o me equally discredited with all parties. As to t he royal family, its position—to q u o te the w o r ds of a t h o r o u gh Legitimist—"continued p r e c a r i o u s, owing to t he indiscreet zeal of t he R o y a l i s t s, w h i ch it b e c a me impossible to c o n t r o l ." At t he o p e n i ng of the s e c o nd session, ( M a r ch 1,1821,) t he K i ng a c t ed his p a rt quite in t he t o ne a nd with t he gestures of a s t u mp orator. N ot c o n t e nt w i th simply reciting the s p e e ch d r a wn up by bis Cabinet, he p u z z l ed the ministers, by altering their text in a revolutionary s e n s e, a nd laying higher colors u p on the m o st decisive p a s s a g e s, s u ch as t h at relating to t he invasion 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 462 Revolutionary Spain · Ninth Article of N a p l es by Austria. F or a m o m e nt t h ey fancied t h ey h ad m a de a c o n v e rt of him, b ut w e re soon disabused. F e r d i n a nd t e r m i n a t ed his speech with a fulminant accusation of his o wn ministers, w ho h ad suffered him to be e x p o s ed to m e n a ce and insults, w h i ch w o u ld n ot h a ve t a k en p l a c e, if the 5 G o v e r n m e nt h ad displayed t h at energy a nd vigor r e q u i r ed by t he Con stitution a nd desired by the C o r t e s. T he K i n g 's constitutional s p e e ch w as only t he forerunner of the dismissal of t he Ministry, a nd the nomination of a Cabinet which, to t he great astonish m e nt of the nation, contained n ot a single individual attached to the n ew institutions, or w ho h ad not figured as an agent of d e s p o t i sm in t he former G o v e r n m e n t. 10 25 T he cief of the n ew Cabinet, M . F e l i u, formerly a sub-lieutenant in a militia regiment of L i m a, a nd D e p u ty to t he C o r t es of 1812 for P e r u, w a s, e v en at the e p o ch of the C a d iz C o r t e s, k n o wn as a venal a nd subtle intriguer. 15 Bardaji, t he Minister of Foreign Affairs, w as a f o r m er diplomatist c o n n e c t ed with t he h e a ds of the absolutist C a b i n e t s, a nd Pelegrin, formerly a m e m b er of t he Council of Castile, b o a s t ed t h at he w as entirely d e v o t ed to t he H o ly Alliance. T he a v o w ed aim of this Ministry, w h i ch could n ot e v en p r e t e nd to any influence in t he C o r t e s, w as " to r e s t o re o r d er and suppress a n a r c h y ." 20 Accordingly, t he E x a l t a d os w e re again r e m o v ed from their c o m m a n d s, and full s w ay w as given to the servile p a r t y; t he m o st i m p o r t a nt places w e re intrusted to m en k n o wn for their h a t r ed of t he prevailing system, a vail being c a st u p on all t he royalist conspiracies t h at h ad b u r st forth in t he Peninsula, and their a u t h o r s, nearly all imprisoned by the p e o p l e, being set at liberty by t he G o v e r n m e n t. G e n. Morillo, C o u nt of C a r t a g e n a, h ad j u st arrived from T e r ra F i r m a, w h e re he h ad r e n d e r ed himself notorious for his ferocity, dictatorial m a n n e r s, w a nt of probity, a nd a six y e a rs fratricidal w a r, w h i ch he carried on with fanatical e n t h u s i a s m. On his r e t u r n, he staid a few days at Paris, w h e re he c o n n e c t ed himself with t he intrigues of t he Pavilion 30 M a r s a n, t he ultra journals at Paris signalizing him as t he m an w ho w as to r e s t o re t he K i ng to his ancient rights, a nd d e s t r oy t he influence of t he C o r t e s. W h en he arrived at M a d r i d, t he Ministry lavished on him t he strongest e x p r e s s i o ns of deference a nd r e s p e c t, and appointed h im C o m m a n d er of t he City a nd Province of Madrid. It w as apparently this nomination w h i ch t he servile p a r ty waited for to e x e c u te a c o up d état. T he Brigadier D on J o sé M a r t i n ez S an M a r t i n, a m an of inflexible e n e r gy and strong Legitimist opinions, w as joined to M o r ü lo in t he quality of G e re Politico of t he capital. While Madrid seemed o v e r a w ed by the terror of Morillo's n a m e, Catalonia a nd Galicia b e c a me t he scenes of p a s s i o n a te c o n t e s t s. Cadiz, Seville a nd 40 B a d a j oz b r o ke o ut in o p en revolt, refused to admit the G o v e r n m e nt officers, a nd disclaimed acknowledging any royal o r d e rs unless t he Ministry w e re 35 463 Karl Marx dismissed. In a m e s s a ge dated N o v. 2 5 , 1 8 2 1, the K i ng s u m m o n ed the C o r t es to c h e ck t h e se disorders. T he Cortes, in their a n s w e r, d r a wn up by D on J o sé M a r ia Calatrava, b l a m ed the c o n d u ct of Cadiz a nd Seville, b ut insisted u p on t he dismissal of t he Ministry, w ho h ad lost t he confidence of t he c o u n t r y, a nd " t he m o r al force to carry on G o v e r n m e n t ." N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng this v o te of distrust, F e r d i n a nd did not think fit to appoint a n o t h er Ministry till forty- eight h o u rs b e f o re the opening of the n ew C o r t es on M a r ch 1, 1822. T he elections to t he n ew C o r t es having t a k en p l a ce at t he m o m e nt w h en t he popular passions w e re exaggerated by t he c o u n t er revolutionary c o u r se of the G o v e r n m e n t, by t he n e ws of Austria's a r m ed interference to suppress t he Spanish Constitution proclaimed at N a p l e s, and by t he plundering ex peditions of t he B a n ds of the Faith at different points of t he Peninsula, the L i b e r a ls of 1820, t h en called E x a l t a d o s, h a d, of c o u r s e , a l a r ge majority. " T he large majority of t he n ew L e g i s l a t u r e ," says a M o d e r a d o, " b e i ng p o s s e s s ed of nothing, h ad nothing to l o s e ." T h ey belonged a l m o st exclusively to t he plebeian r a n ks of t he middle-class a nd t he a r m y. T he difference b e t w e en t h em a nd their p r e d e c e s s o rs m ay be u n d e r s t o od from the single fact that, while t he latter h ad appointed t he A r c h b i s h op of Seville as their President, t h e y, on their p a r t, called to t he presidential chair t he h e ro of L as Cabezas— D on Rafael del Riego. 5 10 15 20 T he n ew Ministry, consisting of E x - D e p u t i es to t he C o r t es of 1820, w as f o r m ed by Martinez de la Rosa, w ho a c c e p t ed t he Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M a r t i n ez de la Rosa—who has since acted an i m p o r t a nt p a rt u n d er t he reign of t he innocent Isabella; formerly a D e p u ty to t he short-lived M a d r id C o r t es of 1814; p e r s e c u t ed during t he period of r e a c t i o n; a M o d e r a do p ar excellence ; o ne of t he m o st elegant Spanish p o e ts a nd prose-writer s—has p r o v ed at all e p o c hs a true partisan of the doctrinaire school of the G u i z o t s, t he m o d e r a t i on of w h i ch gentlemen consists in their fixed notion t h at con cessions to t he m a ss of m a n k i nd c an n e v er be of t oo m o d e r a te a c h a r a c t e r. T h ey exult in t he erection of a liberal Aristocracy a nd t he s u p r e me rule of the Bourgeoisie, b l e n d ed with the greatest possible a m o u nt of t he a b u s es and traditions of t he ancient régime. Martinez de la Rosa—overwhelmed with politeness, c o u r t ed a nd f l a t t e r ed by t he successive F r e n ch E m b a s s a d o rs at Madrid—the P r i n ce L a v al de M o n t m o r e n cy a nd t he C o u nt Lagarde—aimed to modify t he Constitution of 1812, by establishing a H o u se of Peers—giving t he King an absolute v e t o, introducing a p r o p e r ty qualification for t he L o w er H o u s e, and laying restrictions upon the p r e s s. F r om 1834 to 1836 this incor rigible doctrinaire h ad t he pleasure of witnessing t he i n t r o d u c t i on a nd t he downfall of the abortive Constitution he h ad h a t c h ed in 1822. T he F r e n ch diplomatists m a de h im u n d e r s t a nd that t he C o u rt of t he Tuileries w o u ld a p p r o ve of institutions similar to those w h i ch t h en existed in F r a n c e, while 25 30 35 40 464 Revolutionary Spain • Ninth Article he flattered himself t h at t he King w o u ld n ot be a v e r se to a c h a r t er which h ad enabled L o u is X V I II to do w h at he liked. T he King, on his part, cajoled t he self-conceited M o d e r a d o, w h om he i n t e n d e d, as w as afterward p r o v e d, to send directly from the palace to t he scaffold. A c c o r d i ng to the plan c o n c o c t ed b e t w e en t he Camarilla a nd the Ministry, all conspiracies w e re to be winked at, a nd confusion w as to be suffered to reign, so a s, afterward, by t he assistance of F r a n c e, to introduce o r d e r, a nd give t he nation a m o d e r a te C h a r t e r, capable of perpetuating p o w er a nd influence in its original p r o m o t e r s, a nd winning o v er t he privileged classes to the n ew system. Consequently, in opposition to the secret societies of the L i b e r a l s, a secret society w as f o u n d ed on m o d e r a te principles—the Society of t he Anillo, t he m e m b e rs of w h i ch w e re to act conjointly w i th t he Ministry. M o n ey w as plentifully scattered a m o ng t he R o y al Life G u a r d s, b ut t h e se distributions being d e n o u n c ed to t he Ministry by m e m b e rs of t he municipal police, t h ey ridiculed t h e m, treating t he information as a s y m p t om of radical i sm a nd republicanism. T he regiment of t he R o y al Cuirassiers, c a n t o n ed in Andalusia, w as completely s e d u c e d; alarming r e p o r ts w e re s p r e ad in t he different p r o v i n c es whither w e re sent, as Political Chiefs, m e m b e rs of t he Society of t he Anillo. At t he same time the tribunals received secret in- structions to treat with great indulgence all conspiracies t h at might fall u n d er their judicial p o w e r s. T he object of t h e se p r o c e e d i n gs w as to excite an explosion at Madrid, w h i ch w as to coincide with a n o t h er at Valencia. Gen. Elio, the traitor of 1814, t h en a prisoner in that t o w n, w as to p ut himself at t he h e ad of the c o u n t er revolution in t he e a s t e rn p a rt of Spain, t he garrison of Valencia being c o m p o s ed of only o ne regiment, greatly a t t a c h ed to Elio, a nd hostile, therefore, to t he Constitutional system. T he D e p u ty B e r t r án de L y z, in t he A s s e m b ly of the C o r t e s, e n t r e a t ed t he Ministers to w i t h d r aw this b o dy of soldiers from Valencia, and w h en t h ey r e m a i n ed inflexible, b r o u g ht in a m o t i on of i m p e a c h m e n t. T he d ay appointed for t he explosion w as t he last day of M a y, (1822,) t he feast of St. F e r d i n a n d. T he C o u rt w as t h en at A r a n j u e z. On a given signal the guards r u s h ed into the streets a n d, b a c k ed by t he A r a n j u ez m o b, a s s e m b l ed in t he front of t he p a l a c e, shouting cries of " L o ng live our absolute m o n a r c h! D o wn w i th t he C o n s t i t u t i o n ." This r i ot w a s, h o w e v e r, instantly s u p p r e s s ed by G e n. Z a y a s, a nd t he simultaneous revolt of the regiment of Valencia p r o v e d, after a b l o o dy c o m b at b e t w e en t he militia a nd t he soldiers, no m o re successful. T he failures of A r a n j u ez a nd Valencia served only to e x a s p e r a te t he Liberals. On all sides parties p r e p a r ed for self-defense. T he agitation b e c o m i ng universal, t he Ministers alone r e m a i n ed passive spectators in the midst of t he confusion t h at a n n o u n c ed an approaching storm. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 465 Karl Marx: Central junta (Draft). Seite 1 Karl Marx Central junta (Draft) | 1| (January 1809 F l o r i da B l a n ca +) A) Centraijunta. 26 September 1808 (Aranjuez)-29 January 1810. Madrid having b e en e v a c u a t ed by t he F r e n c h, it w as to be e x p e c t ed t h at N a p o l e on would s o on re-appear at the h e ad of a m o re powerful a r m y. M e a s u r es of c o m m on defence b e c a me t h en inevitable a nd it w as generally felt t h at t he P o l y a r c hy of the Provincial J u n t a s, w h o se dissensions g r ew e v en m o re c l a m o r o us after the success at Baylen, m u st give w ay to s o me sort of Central G o v e r n m e n t. T he j u n t a s, however, anxious to retain their hold u p on P o w e r, resolved, u p on the proposal of the J u n ta of Sevilla, to select e a ch from their o wn b o dy t wo deputies t he r e u n i on of w h om w as to constitute t he Central G o v e r n m e n t, while the Provincial J u n t as r e m a i n ed invested w i th t he internal g o v e r n m e nt of their respective G o v e r n m e n t. T h us a Central J u n t a, c o m p o s ed of 34 deputies from the Provincial J u n t as m et on S e p t e m b er 26, 1808, at A r a n j u ez and r e m a i n ed at t he h e ad of affairs till J a n u a ry 29, 1810, This Central J u n ta w as driven by the I n v a d er from M a d r id to Sevilla and from Sevilla to Cadiz. While t h ey w a g ed a w ar of edicts from t he R o y al P a l a ce of A r a n j u e z, t he p a ss of Somosierra w as forced by t he F r e n c h, a nd while t h ey a m u s ed t he people with vigorous proclamations from Sevilla, t he p a s s es of the Sierra M o r e na w e re lost and Soult's a r my inundated Andalusia. W h en " H is Majesty"—this w as the title a s s u m ed by t he Junta—fled from Sevilla, Cadiz offered the only asylum, and if the D u ke of A l b u q u e r q u e, i n s t e ad of marching his c o r p s . u p on Cadiz, h ad in o b e d i e n ce to their o r d e rs p r o c e e d ed to C o r d o v a, his o wn a r my w o u ld h a ve b e en cut off, C a d iz m u st h a ve s u r r e n d e r ed to t he F r e n ch a nd t h e re would h a ve b e en an e nd of any Central P o w er in Spain. During the reign of the Central J u n t a, t he Spanish armies d i s a p p e a r ed from the soil, ignominious defeats o v e r s et e a ch other, and the disastrous battie at O c a ña ( N o v e m b er 19„ 1809) w as the last pitched 5 10 15 20 25 466 Centraijunta (Draft) battle w h i ch t he Spaniards fought, from t h at t i me confining t h e m s e l v es to a Guerrilla w a r f a r e. W h e re heroic r e s i s t a n ce is exceptionally m et with, it is not by t he regular armies, in t he o p en field, b ut only on t he part of assieged t o w ns as at Saragossa and G e r o n a. 5 T h e se few reminiscences from t he Spanish w ar of I n d e p e n d e n ce suffice to characterise t he Central J u n t a. T he expulsion of t he F r e n ch a r my from the Span[ish] soil w as the great object of their installation a nd in t h at object t h ey signally failed. U n d er revolutionary still m o re t h an u n d er ordinary c i r c u m s t a n c es the successes of armies reflect t he c h a r a c t er of t he Central 10 G o v e r n m e n t. T he m e re fact of t he a b a n d o n m e nt of regular warfare for Guerrilla exploits p r o v es the d i s a p p e a r a n ce of the national centre before t he local c e n t r es of resistance. W h e n ce this failure of t he National govern m e n t? 25 15 T he v e ry composition of the Central J u n ta certainly n ot suited the t a sk i m p o s ed u p on t h e m. Being for a dictatorial p o w er t oo m a ny a nd t oo fortui tously mixed together, t h ey w e re too few to p r e t e nd to the authority of a National Convention. T he m e re fact of their p o w er being delegated from t he Provincial J u n t a s, incapacitated t h em to o v e r c o me the self-governing p r o pensities, the b ad will, and t he capricious egotism of t h e se J u n t a s. T he t wo 20 m o st marking m e m b e rs of the Central Junta—Florida Blanca—the octogenar ian minister of t he enlightened d e s p o t i sm of Charles III—and J o v e l l a n o s, a well-intentioned reformer w ho from o v e r c o n s c i e n t i o us scruples as to the m e a ns n e v er d a r ed to accomplish an end—were certainly no m a t ch for t he terrible crisis the c o u n t ry w as placed in. T he sense of their o wn w e a k n e ss a nd t he unstable t e n u re of their p o w er with r e s p e ct to t he people, k e pt t h em in c o n s t a nt fear and suspicion of the generals to w h om t h ey w e re obliged to entrust t he military c o m m a n d s. General Moria, himself a m e m b er of t he Central Junta, w e nt over into the Bonapartist c a m p, after he h ad s u r r e n d e r ed Madrid to N a p o l e o n. C u e s ta [who] h ad b e g un with arresting the L e o n e se 30 Deputies to the Central J u n ta and w i th forging p l a ns for the restauration of the old authority of t he Captains General and t he R o y al Audiencias, also s e e m ed afterwards to win t he confidence of t he G o v e r n m e nt in t he same m e a s u re as he lost the battles of t he c o u n t r y. Their distrust in Generals la R o m a na and C a s t a ñ o s, the victor of Baylen, p r o v ed well founded by the o p en hostility t he former s h e w ed t h em in his a d d r e ss to t he nation || d.d. Sevilla, on O c t o b er 4, 1809, and the other by his c o n d u ct t o w a r ds t h em w h en he b e c a me a m e m b er of t he R e g e n c y. T he D u ke of A l b u q u e r q u e, w ho of all t he Spanish Generals of that e p o ch w as p e r h a ps the o n ly m an to c o n d u ct a great war, s e e m ed to be singularly gifted with all t he d a n g e r o us qualities of a 40 military dictator, a r e a s on quite sufficient to r e m o ve him from all i m p o r t a nt c o m m a n d s. We m ay t h en give full credit to the D u ke of Wellington writing 35 469 Karl Marx.- Spain-Intervention (Draft). S e i te 3 Karl Marx to his b r o t h e r, t he Marquis of Wellesley, on S e p t e m b er 1,1809: "I am m u ch afraid, from w h at I h a ve seen of t he proceedings of t he Central J u n t a, t h at in the distribution of their forces t h ey did n ot consider military d e f e n c e, and military o p e r a t i o n s, so much, as t h ey do political intrigue, a nd t he attainment of trifling political o b j e c t s ." T he first popular g o v e r n m e nt of Spain s e e m ed o v e r a w ed by a presentiment of the p r o m i n e nt p a rt military m en w e re des tined to act in their internal c o m m o t i o n s. Devoid as t h ey w e re of all truly revolutionary force by their very composition, t he Central J u n ta could not b ut r e s o rt to p e t ty intrigues in order to c h e ck t he a s c e n d a n cy of their o wn generals. On t he other hand, incapable to resist t he p r e s s u re of popular c l a m o u r, t h ey often forced the generals into precipitate actions w h e re the s u c c e ss could only be e x p e c t ed from most cautious a nd protracting stay u p on the defensive. | 5 10 470 Karl Marx Spain-Intervention (Draft) |3| b a n n er of revolution, t he a r my of Ballesteros, w h i c h, since t he capitulation of his chief still c o n c e n t r a t ed at Priego, 10 leagues n o r th of Malaga. On this his second Cadiz expedition he w as m a de a prisoner by o ne of General Molitor's c o r p s, s u r r e n d e r ed to t he apostolical b a n d, and sent to Madrid t h e re to be e x e c u t e d, on t he 7th N o v e m b e r, four d a ys before F e r d i n a n d 's r e t u rn to the capital. 5 " N on p or su culpa caia R i e g o: Traición D ' un vil B o r b o n !" 10 ( N ot by his fault fell Riego b ut by t he t r e a s on of a vile Bourbon.) W h en F e r d i n a nd on his arrival at Madrid w as waited u p on a nd con gratulated by the officers of t he b a n ds of t he F a i th t h ey having withdrawn, he exclaimed in t he midst of his c o u r t: " It is t he s a me dogs b ut with different collars." 15 20 25 T he n u m b er of friars w ho in 1822 had m u s t e r ed 16,310, a m o u n t ed in 1830 to 61,727, being an increase of 45,417 in t he c o u r se of 8 y e a r s. F r om t he Madrid Gaceta we see t h at in the single m o n th from t he 24th August to t he 24th S e p t e m b er 1824, 1200 p e r s o ns w e re shot, h a n g e d, a nd quartered, a nd t h en t he b a r b a r o us d e c r ee against C o m u n e r o s, F r e e m a s o ns e t c. h ad not y et b e en divulgated. T he University of Sevilla w as closed for y e a r s, b ut in its stead a governmental school of bullfighting w as established. F r e d e r i ck the G r e a t, conversing with his W ar minister, asked him, w h i ch c o u n t ry in E u r o pe he thought most difficult to ruin? Perceiving t he minister to be rather e m b a r r a s s e d, he a n s w e r ed for h i m: " It is Spain: as its o wn g o v e r n m e nt has for m a ny y e a rs e n d e a v o u r ed to ruin it;—but all in v a i n ." F r e d e r i ck t he G r e at s e e ms to h a ve prognosticated the reign of F e r d i n a nd VII. T he failure of the Revolution of 1820-3 is easily a c c o u n t ed for. It w as a middleclass revolution and, m o re especially, a t o wn revolution, while t he country, ignorant, lazy, w e d d ed to the p o m p o us c e r e m o n i es of the c h u r c h, 30 473 Karl Marx 5 10 15 r e m a i n ed passive o b s e r v e rs of t he party strife t h ey did hardly u n d e r s t a n d. In the few p r o v i n c es w h e re t h ey exceptionally t o ok an active share in the struggle, it w as rather on t he side of t he counterrevolution,—a fact n ot to be w o n d e r ed at in Spain, " t h at storehouse of ancient c u s t o m s, t h at r e p o s i t o ry of all, e l s e w h e re forgotten and past b y ," a c o u n t ry w h e r e, during t he war of i n d e p e n d e n ce p e a s a n ts w e re seen using spurs t a k en from t he a r m o u ry of t he A l h a m b ra a nd a r m ed with halberds and pikes of curious a nd ancient w o r k m a n s h i p, w h i ch had b e en wielded in the w a rs of t he 15th century. Besides it w as a feature peculiar to Spain that e v e ry p e a s a nt w ho h ad a noble ensign cut in stone over the door of his miserable cabin, c o n s i d e r ed himself a n o b l e m an and t h at thus the c o u n t ry people, generally, if p o or a nd plun dered, did n e v er groan u n d er that consciousness of abject degradation w h i ch e x a s p e r a t ed t h em in the rest of feudal E u r o p e. T h at t he revolutionary p a r ty did n ot k n ow h ow to link t he interests of the p e a s a n t ry to t he t o wn m o v e m e n t, is a v o w ed by t wo m e n, b o th of w h om acted a principal p a rt in t he Revolution, by G e n e r al Morillo and by S an Miguel. Morillo, w ho c a n n ot be suspected of revolutionary sympathies, w r o te from Galicia to t he D u ke of A n g o u l ê m e: "If the Cortes h ad sanctioned the bill on the seignorial rights, and thus despoiled t he grandees of their properties in favour of t he multitude, Y o ur H i g h n e ss w o u ld h a ve e n c o u n t e r ed n u m e r o u s, patriotic a nd formidable ar- mies, w h i ch w o u ld h a ve organized t h e m s e l v e s, as t h ey did in F r a n c e, u n d er similar c i r c u m s t a n c e s ." ||4| On t he other hand S an Miguel (see his "Civil W ar of S p a i n ." Madrid, 1836) tells u s: " T he greatest error of t he liberals consisted in their n ot considering that by far the majority of the nation w e re indifferent or hostile to the n ew laws. T he n u m e r o us d e c r e es published by t he Cortes with a view to ameliorating the material condition of the p e o p l e, w e re unable to p r o d u ce so immediate results as w e re required by t he c i r c u m s t a n c e s. N e i t h er the abolition of half the tithes, nor the sale of the m o n a s t ic e s t a t e s, contributed to ameliorating t he material condition of t he l o w er agricultural classes. T he last m e a s u r e, on the contrary, by throwing t he land o ut of the h a n ds of the indulgent m o n ks into those of calculating capitalists, unpaired t he position of t he old farmers by causing higher r e n ts to be i m p o s ed u p on t h e m, so t h at the superstition of this n u m e r o us class, already w o u n d ed by the alienation of sanctified patrimony, b e c a me exaggerated by the suggestions of material i n t e r e s t s ." T he revolutionary t o w n p o p u l a t i on t h us estranged 35 from the m a ss of the nation, w as therefore forced, in their struggle with the G r a n d e e s, t he rural clergy, the monastic p o w e r, a nd t he c r o wn w h i ch r e p r e sented all t h e se antiquated elements of society, to d e p e nd altogether on the a r my a nd its chiefs. T he very position t h us u s u r p ed by t he a r my in the revolutionary c a m p, together with its isolation from t he m a s s e s, m a de it an 40 i n s t r u m e nt d a n g e r o us for the h a n ds that wielded it, b ut inoffensive to the 25 20 30 474 Spain-Intervention (Draft) e n e my it w as to strike. Finally, the u p p er r a nk of t he Middleclass, the socalled M o d e r a d o s, b e c a me s o on l u k e w a rm and t h en traitors to the C a u se of t he Revolution, lulling t h e m s e l v e s, as t h ey did, into the h o pe of getting their reign established by m e a ns of a F r e n ch intervention a nd t h us enjoying t he fruits of a n ew society w i t h o ut painstaking and w i t h o ut admitting the plebejans to participate in t h e m. 5 20 15 10 T he positive result of the Revolution of 1820-3 w as n ot limited to t he great fermentation w h i ch e x p a n d ed t he minds a nd r e n e w ed t he c h a r a c t er of s o me large classes of the nation. T he second restauration, in w h i ch t he antiquated e l e m e n ts of society a s s u m ed s u ch shapes as to b e c o me insupportable t o, a nd incompatible w i th t he national existence of Spain, w as itself a p r o d u ct of t he Revolution. Its principal w o rk w as to w h et t he antagonism to such a point as to m a ke all c o m p r o m i s es impossible a nd a w ar to the knife inevitable. W h en according to L o rd Liverpool himself, t h e re n e v er w as an extensive political change a t t e n d ed with less violence or b l o o d s h ed t h an the Spanish Revolution during 1820-3. W h en we b e h o ld t h e r e f o r e, t he civil w ar of 1833-43 exterminating t he antiquated elements of Spanish society, with fire and sword a nd disgracing itself by acts of cannibalism, we must n ot attribute t he savage inexorableness of that e p o ch to the peculiar character of the Spanish r a c e, b ut to t he same force of c i r c u m s t a n c es t h at i m p o s ed u p on F r a n ce t he reign of terrorism. While the F r e n ch centralised and, t h e r e f o r e, abbreviated t he reign of terrorism, t he Spaniards, t r ue to their traditions, discentralised and, consequently, procrastinated it. Conforming to Spanish tradition, t he revolutionary p a r ty w as not likely to p r o ve victorious by subverting t he t h r o n e. W i th t h e m, to be successful, the R e v o l u t i on itself n e e d ed to a p p e ar as a C o m p e t i t or for t he t h r o n e. T he struggle of t he t wo societies ought to a s s u me the form of a struggle of opposite dynastic interests. T he Spain of t he 19th c e n t u ry did h er revolution with e a s e, w h en she w as allowed to give it the form of the civil w a rs of the X l V th century. It w as F e r d i n a nd t he S e v e n th w ho gave the Revolution a royal name—that of Isabella—while he leagued to the old Counterrevolution t he D on Q u i x o t te of the Auto-da-fé, D on Carlos. || F e r d i n a nd V II p r o v ed t r ue to his c h a r a c t er to t he end. If, during his whole life, he h ad c h e a t ed the liberals by false p r o m i s e s, should he n ot indulge t he sport of cheating t he serviles on his d e a t h b e d? As to religious 35 m a t t e r s, he h ad always b e en a sceptic. He w as u n a b le to convince himself that a ny one—even t he holy ghost—should be so silly as to s p e ak t he truth. | 30 25 475 Karl Marx The Reaction in Spain New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4185, 16. September 1854 The Reaction in Spain. F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. L o n d o n, F r i d a y, Sept. 1, 1854. 5 T he e n t r a n ce into Madrid of the " V i c a l v a r o" regiments has e n c o u r a g ed t he G o v e r n m e nt to greater counter-revolutionary activity. T he revival of t he restrictive press-law of 1837, adorned w i th all t he rigors of t he s u p p l e m e n t a ry law of 1842, has killed all the " i n c e n d i a r y" p o r t i on of t he p r e ss w h i ch w as u n a b le to offer the required cautionnement On t he 24th t he last n u m b er w as given o ut of t he Clamor de las Barricadas with t he title of Ultimas Barricadas, the t wo editors having b e en arrested. Its place w as t a k en on the s a me d ay 10 by a n ew reactionary p a p er called Las Cortes. " H is E x c e l l e n c y, t he Captain- G e n e r a l, D on S an M i g u e l ," says the p r o g r a m me of t he last-mentioned p a p e r, " w ho h o n o rs us with his friendship, has offered to this j o u r n al t he favor of his collaboration. H is articles will be signed with his initials. T he m en at the h e ad of this enterprise will defend with energy t h at revolution w h i ch van- quished the a b u s es and e x c e s s es of a corrupt p o w e r, b ut it is in t he enceinte of the Constituent A s s e m b ly t h at t h ey will plant their b a n n e r. It is t h e re t h at t he great battle m u st be fought." T he great battle is for Isabella I I, and E s p a r t e r o. Y ou will r e m e m b er t h at this same S an Miguel, at t he b a n q u et of t he p r e s s, declared t h at the p r e ss had no other corrective b ut itself, c o m m on sense and public education, t h at it w as an institution w h i ch neither s w o rd nor transportation, nor exile, n or any p o w er in t he w o r ld could crush. On t he v e ry day on w h i ch he offers himself as a contributor to t he p r e s s, he has n ot a w o rd against the decree confiscating his beloved liberty of the p r e s s. 20 15 T he suppression of t he liberty of t he p r e ss h as b e en closely followed by t he suppression of the right of meeting, also by royal d e c r e e. T he clubs h a ve 25 476 The Reaction in Spain b e en dissolved at Madrid, a nd in t he P r o v i n c es t he J u n t as a nd C o m m i t t e es of Public Safety, with the exception of t h o se a c k n o w l e d g ed by the Ministry as " d e p u t a t i o n s ." T he Club of t he U n i on w as shut up in c o n s e q u e n ce of a d e c r ee of t he w h o le Ministry, notwithstanding t h at E s p a r t e ro had only a few d a ys previously a c c e p t ed its h o n o r a ry p r e s i d e n c y, a fact w h i ch The London Times vainly labors to d e n y. This club h ad sent a deputation to the Minister of t he Interior, insisting on t he dismissal of S e ñ or Sagasti, t he Gefe Politico of Madrid, charging him with having violated t he liberty of t he p r e ss and t he right of meeting. Señor S a n ta C r uz a n s w e r ed t h at he could n ot b l a me a public functionary for taking m e a s u r es a p p r o v ed by t he Council of Ministers. T he c o n s e q u e n ce w as t h at a serious t r o u b le a r o s e; b ut t he Plaza de la Constitu ción w as occupied by t he National G u a r d, a nd nothing further o c c u r r e d. T he p e t ty journals h ad scarcely b e en s u p p r e s s ed w h en t he greater o n es t h at h ad hitherto granted their p r o t e c t i on to Sagasti, found o c c a s i on to quarrel w i th him. In o r d er to silence t he Clamor Publico, its chief editor, S e ñ or Corradi, w as appointed minister. B ut this step will n ot be sufficient, as all editors c a n n ot be a t t a c h ed to t he Ministry. T he b o l d e st stroke of t he counter-revolution, h o w e v e r, w as t he permission for Q u e en Christina's d e p a r t u re for L i s b o n, after t he Council of Ministers h ad engaged to k e ep her at t he disposal of t he C o n s t i t u e nt Cortes—a b r e a ch of faith w h i ch t h ey h a ve tried to c o v er by an anticipated confiscation of Christina's estates in Spain, notoriously t he least considerable portion of her wealth. T h us Christina h ad a c h e ap e s c a p e, a nd n ow we h e ar t h at S an L u i s, t o o, h as safely arrived at B a y o n n e. T he m o st curious p a rt of the transaction is t he m a n n er in w h i ch t he d e c r ee alluded to w as obtained. On t he 26th s o me patriots a nd national guards assembled to consider t he safety of t he public c a u s e, blaming t he G o v e r n m e nt on a c c o u nt of its vacillation a nd half and half m e a s u r e s, and agreeing to send a d e p u t a t i on to t he Ministry calling u p on t h em to r e m o ve Christina from t he Palace, w h e re she w as plotting liberticide p r o j e c t s. T h e re w as a v e ry suspicious c i r c u m s t a n ce in the a d h e s i on of t wo aids-de-camp of E s p a r t e ro with Sagasti himself, to this proposition. T he result w as t h at t he Ministry m et in Council, and the u p s h ot of their meeting w as t he e l o p e m e nt of Christina. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 On t he 25th the Q u e en a p p e a r ed for t he first time in public, on the p r o m e- n a de of t he P r a d o, a t t e n d ed by w h at is called h er h u s b a n d, a nd by t he Prince of Asturias. B ut h er r e c e p t i on a p p e a rs to h a ve b e en e x t r e m e ly cold. The c o m m i t t ee appointed to r e p o rt on t he state of t he finances at t he e p o ch of the fall of t he Sartorius Ministry h as published its r e p o rt in t he Gaceta, w h e re it is p r e c e d ed by an e x p o sé by Señor Collado, t he Minister of F i n a n c e. 40 According to this t he floating d e bt of Spain n ow a m o u n ts to $33,000,000, a nd t he total deficit to $50,000,000. It a p p e a rs t h at e v en the extraordinary r e- 477 Karl Marx s o u r c es of t he G o v e r n m e nt w e re anticipated for y e a rs a nd s q u a n d e r e d. T he r e v e n u es of H a v a na and the Philippines w e re anticipated for t wo y e a rs and a half. T he yield of t he forced loan h ad d i s a p p e a r ed w i t h o ut leaving a t r a c e. T he A l m a d én quick-silver mines w e re engaged for y e a r s. T he b a l a n ce in h a nd due to t he Caja of deposits did n ot exist. N or did t he fund for military substitution. 7,485,692 reals w e re due for the p u r c h a se of t o b a c co obtained, b ut n ot paid for. Ditto 5,505,000 reals for bills on a c c o u nt of public w o r k s. A c c o r d i ng to the s t a t e m e nt of Señor Collado the a m o u nt of obligations of t he m o st pressing n a t u re is 252,980,253 reals. T he m e a s u r es p r o p o s ed by him for the covering of this deficit are those of a true b a n k e r, viz: to r e t u rn to quiet a nd order, to continue to levy all t he old t a x e s, and to c o n t r a ct n ew l o a n s. In compliance with this advice E s p a r t e ro has obtained from the princi pal Madrid b a n k e rs $2,500,000 on a promise of a p u re Moderado policy. H ow willing he is to k e ep this promise is p r o v ed by his last m e a s u r e s. It m u st n ot be imagined that t h e se reactionary m e a s u r es h a ve r e m a i n ed altogether unresisted by the people. W h en t he d e p a r t u re of Christina b e c a me k n o w n, on t he 28th August, barricades w e re e r e c t ed again; b u t, if we are to believe a telegraphic dispatch from B a y o n n e, published by t he F r e n ch Moniteur, " t he t r o o p s, united to the National G u a r d, carried the barricades a nd p ut d o wn t he m o v e m e n t ." This is t he cercle vicieuxm w h i ch abortive r e v o l u t i o n a ry g o v e r n m e n ts are c o n d e m n ed to m o v e. T h ey recognize the d e b ts c o n t r a c t ed by their counter revolutionary p r e d e c e s s o rs as national obligations. In o r d er to be able to p ay t h em t h ey must continue their old t a x es a nd c o n t r a ct n ew d e b t s. To be able to c o n t r a ct n ew loans t h ey m u st give guaranties of "order, " t h at is, t a ke counter-revolutionary m e a s u r es t h e m s e l v e s. T h us t he n ew popular G o v e r n m e nt is at o n ce transformed into the hand-maid of the g r e at capitalists, and an o p p r e s s or of t he people. In exactíy the s a me m a n n er w as t he Provisional G o v e r n m e nt of F r a n ce in 1848 driven to the n o t o r i o us m e a s u re of t he 45 c e n t i m e s, a nd t he confiscation of t he savings b a n k s' funds in order to p ay their interest to t he capitalists. " T he revolutionary g o v e r n m e n ts of S p a i n ," says t he English a u t h or of t he Revelations on Spain, " a re at least not s u nk so d e ep as to a d o pt the infamous doctrine of repudiation as practiced in t he U n i t ed S t a t e s ." T he fact is t h at if any former Spanish revolution h ad o n ce practiced repudiation, the infamous G o v e r n m e nt of S an L u is w o u ld n ot h a ve found a ny b a n k er willing to oblige it with a d v a n c e s. B ut p e r h a ps our author holds the view that it is the privilege of-the counter-revolution to contract, as it is the privilege of revolution to pay d e b t s. It a p p e a rs t h at Saragossa, Valencia and Algeciras do n ot c o n c ur in this view, as t h ey h a ve abrogated all t a x es obnoxious to t h e m. N ot c o n t e nt with sending B r a vo Murillo as E m b a s s a d or to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e, 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 478 The Reaction in Spain t he G o v e r n m e nt h as dispatched G o n z a l ez B r a vo in t he s a me capacity to V i e n n a. On S u n d a y, 27th Aug., the electoral r e u n i o ns of t he District of Madrid a s s e m b l ed in order to appoint, by general suffrage, the Commissioners charged w i th t he superintendence of the election at the capital. T h e re exist t wo Electoral C o m m i t t e es at Madrid—the Liberal U n i o n, and t he U n i on del C o m e r c i o. T he s y m p t o ms of reaction a b o ve collected a p p e ar less formidable to p e r s o ns acquainted with t he history of Spanish revolutions t h an t h ey m u st to the superficial observer—since Spanish revolutions generally only d a te from t he meeting of t he C o r t e s, usually t he signal for t he dissolution of G o v e r n m e n t. At M a d r i d, b e s i d e s, t h e re are only a few t r o o p s, a nd at t he highest 20,000 National G u a r d s. B ut of t he latter only a b o ut o ne half are properly a r m e d, while the people are k n o wn to h a ve disobeyed t he call to deliver up their a r m s. N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng the tears of t he Q u e e n, O'Donnell has dissolved her body-guard, t he regular a r my being jealous of t he privileges of this corps, from w h o se r a n ks a G o d o y, noticed as a good player u p on t he guitar and a singer of seguidillas graciosas y picantes, c o u ld raise himself to b e c o me the h u s b a nd of the King's niece, and a M u ñ o z, only k n o wn for his private a d v a n t a g e s, b e c o me t he h u s b a nd of a Q u e en M o t h e r. At Madrid a portion of the republicans h a ve circulated the following Constitution of a Federal Iberian Republic: "Titulo I. Organization of the Federal Iberian Republic. A r t. 1. Spain and its isles and Portugal will be united and form the F e d e r al Iberian Republic. T he colors of t he b a n n er will be a u n i on of t he t wo actual b a n n e rs of Spain a nd Portugal. Its device will be L i b e r t y, Equality, F r a t e r nity. 5 10 15 20 25 30 A r t. 2. T he sovereignty resides in the universality of the citizens. It is inalienable and imprescriptible. No individual, no fraction of t he people c an u s u rp its exercise. Art. 3. T he law is t he expression of t he national will. T he judges are appointed by t he people t h r o u gh universal suffrage. Art. 4. All citizens of 21 y e a rs of age and enjoying their civil rights to be 35 electors. A r t. 5. T he p u n i s h m e nt of d e a th is abolished, b o th for political and c o m m on crimes. T he j u ry is to judge in all c a s e s. Art. 6. P r o p e r ty is sacred. T he e s t a t es t a k en from political emigrants are r e s t o r ed to t h e m. 40 A r t. 7. T he contributions will be paid in p r o p o r t i on to i n c o m e s. T h e re will be o ne t ax only, direct and general. All indirect contributions, octroi, a nd 479 Karl Marx on c o n s u m p t i on are abolished. Likewise abolished are t he G o v e r n m e nt monopolies of salt and t o b a c c o, t he stamps, t he p a t e nt d u e s, a nd t he con scription. A r t. 8. T he liberty of the p r e s s, of meeting, of association, of domicile, of e d u c a t i o n, of c o m m e r c e, and of c o n s c i e n c e, is g r a n t e d. Every religion will have to pay for its own ministers. 5 A r t. 13. T he administration of the republic is to be federal, provincial and municipal. Titulo II. Federal Administration. Art. 14. It will be intrusted to an E x e c u t i ve Council appointed and r e v o- 10 cable by t he Central F e d e r al Congress. Art. 15. T he international and commercial relations, t he uniformity of m e a s u r e s, weights a nd coins, t he Post-Office, a nd t he a r m ed force are the d o m a in of the F e d e r al Administration. A r t. 16. T he Central F e d e r al Congress will be c o m p o s ed of nine Deputies for e v e ry p r o v i n c e, elected by universal suffrage a nd b o u nd by their in structions. A r t. 17. T he Central F e d e r al Congress is in p e r m a n e n c y. A r t. 20. W h e n e v er a law is to be e n a c t e d, t he Administration thinking it n e c e s s a ry will bring t he project u n d er t he cognizance of t he confederation six m o n t hs b e f o re if it be for t he Congress, a nd t h r ee m o n t hs if it be for t he Provincial Legislation. A r t. 2 1. A ny d e p u ty of the people failing to a d h e re to his instructions is 15 20 h a n d ed over to j u s t i c e ." A r t. 3, Titulo III, refers to the Provincial a nd Municipal Administration, and confirms similar principles. T he last article of this c h a p t er s a y s: "There are to be no longer any Colonies; t h ey will be c h a n g ed i n to P r o v i n c es a nd a d m i n i s t e r ed on provincial principles. Slavery shall be abolished. 25 Titulo TV. The Army. A r t. 34. T he w h o le people will be a r m ed and organized in a national guard, 30 o ne p o r t i on to be mobile and t he other s e d e n t a r y. A r t. 35. T he mobile guard to consist of the celibaterios b e t w e en t he ages of 21 a nd 35; their officers to be c h o s en in t he military schools by elec tion. Art. 36. T he s e d e n t a ry militia consists of all citizens b e t w e en 35 and 56 y e a r s; officers to be appointed by election. Their service is the defense of the communities. 35 A r t. 38. T he c o r ps of artillery and engineers are recruited by v o l u n t a ry enlistment, p e r m a n e n t, and garrisoning t he fortresses on t he c o a st a nd the frontiers. No fortresses shall be suffered in t he interior. 40 A r t. 39, alluding to the m a r i n e, contains similar p r o v i s i o n s. 480 The Reaction in Spain A r t. 40. T he staffs of the p r o v i n c es and captain-generalcies are sup pressed. A r t. 42. T he Iberian Republic r e n o u n c es all w a rs of conquest, and will submit its quarrels to t he arbitration of G o v e r n m e n ts disinterested in t he question. A r t. 4 3. T h e re shall be no standing a r m i e s ." Karl M a r x. 481 Karl Marx Progress of the War September 8, 1854 New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4190, 22. September 1854 Progress of the War. T he reply of the Czar w as sent in duplicate to Austria and Prussia. E a ch of t he points insisted on by t he w e s t e rn p o w e rs is duly set forth, refused, and r e a s o ns given for the refusal. F u r t h e r, the Czar says that he has w i t h d r a wn his t r o o ps from t he Principalities in deference to t he interests of t he G e r m an p o w e r s; t h at he will recall his forces across the P r u t h, and t h en await other hostile a t t a c k s, or pacific overtures, as m ay b e. It is stated that at a Cabinet Council held at V i e n na on the 6th inst., the E m p e r or F r a n c is J o s e ph presiding, it w as decided t h at t he rejection of the g u a r a n t e es required by Austria and the w e s t e rn p o w e rs d o es n ot a m o u nt to a casus belli against Russia, b ut t h at Austria will p e r s e v e re in supporting t h e se conditions, and will maintain her neutral position while she awaits the result of t he attack by t he allied p o w e rs u p on Sevastopol. T he following is published from Vienna. It, h o w e v e r, r e s ts on no better authority t h an a n e w s p a p er letter: " S i n ce the receipt of the answer of the E m p e r or N i c h o l as to the w e s t e rn p o w e r s, P r u s s ia a p p e a rs anxious to reenter t he E u r o p e an c o n c e rt from which it had to a certain degree w i t h d r a w n. With t h at view she is said to h a ve offered to sign a n ew protocol, in which the n o te of V i e n na of t he 8th of A u g u st should be e m b o d i e d, as w as the t r e a ty of April in a f o r m er d o c u m e n t, d r a wn up a nd signed by t he C o n f e r e n c e ." T he following is the t e xt of the Prussian n o te to Russia: 5 10 15 20 "Berlin, Aug. 13. To the Baron von Werther in St. Petersburg In my dispatch of the 5th inst. I had the honor of forwarding y ou a c o py of t h at o ne which I h ad addressed to his Majesty's r e p r e s e n t a t i v es in Paris and in L o n d o n, instructing t h em to c o m m u n i c a te to t h o se Cabinets t he i m p r e s s i o ns p r o d u c ed on us by t he Russian a n s w e rs of t he 29th a nd 30th of J u n e, and to e x p r e ss to t h em our hopes that t h ey w o u l d, with u s, recognize 25 482 Progress of the War. September 8, 1854 15 in t h em some germs of an understanding a nd elements of a c c o m m o d a t i o n. Although no direct answer to those o v e r t u r es has r e a c h ed us either from Paris or L o n d o n, we h a v e, from confidential a nd oral c o m m u n i c a t i o ns m a de to u s, and which h a ve in p a rt crossed t he démarches we ourselves w e re 5 making, not b e en able to conceal from o u r s e l v e s, that the views t a k en by F r a n ce and England with reference to the R u s s i an explanations are e s s e n tially different from our o w n, and by no m e a ns of a n a t u re to afford a c o m m on point de départ. It h as b e en m o re particularly the prolonged stay of t he Russian t r o o ps in t he Principalities that, according to t he views of t he 10 w e s t e rn p o w e r s, p r e v e n t ed t h em from attaching any practical value to t he pacific professions of t he Cabinet of St. P e t e r s b u r g. Its accession to t he principles laid d o wn in the protocol of April 9 s e e m ed to t h e m, m o r e o v e r, not carried out sufficiently far, i n a s m u ch as it did not contain any mention of t he guarantees which, according to the protocol alluded t o, w e re to be sought out for the p u r p o se of connecting t he further existence of T u r k ey still closer with the general b a l a n ce of p o w er in E u r o p e. T he Cabinets of Paris a nd L o n d on h a ve n ot left us in ignorance that, according to their v i e w s, t h e se guarantees m u st necessarily include several cardinal points which, u n d er reservation, of c o u r s e, of any modifications called for by t he progress of e v e n t s, should serve as the indispensable basis of a ny negotiations for a p e a ce or a suspension of hostilities. T h e se points w e re subsequently defined in identical N o t e s, which the representatives of F r a n ce and England de livered to t he Cabinet of Vienna, and w h i ch t he latter h as in its answer adopted. T he Austrian Cabinet, while advising us of this step, informs us t h at it looks on t h em as t he natural c o n s e q u e n c es of t he principles laid d o wn in the p r o t o c ol of April 9, and believes, t h e r e f o r e, t h at it c a n n ot r e c o m m e nd t h em warmly enough to t he u n r e s e r v ed a c c e p t a n ce of t he Cabinet of St. P e tersburg. I h a ve it in c o m m a nd from the King to engage you, B a r o n, to second this step of the Austrian Cabinet by every possible e n d e a v o r. O ur august 30 m a s t er looks u p on it as inspired by the sincere desire to p a ve the w ay for 20 25 35 negotiations and a cessation of hostilities on b o th sides. His Majesty also considers it of a n a t u re calculated to facilitate this result. After having m a de himself m a s t er of the ensemble of t he four points contained in t he a b o v e- m e n t i o n ed N o t e s, and c o m p a r ed t h em with the spirit of the last explanations on t he part of Russia, his Majesty finds himself u n a b le to find anything not reconcilable with all that his august brother-in-law has already declared himself as r e a dy to a d o pt as t he point de départîor an amicable a r r a n g e m e n t. T he E m p e r o r, also, will doubtless h a ve already convinced himself of the necessity of preventing for t he future t he u n p l e a s a n t n e s s es a nd dangers 40 w h i ch for Russia, as well as the rest of E u r o p e, w e re involved in institutions w h i ch c o m p o s ed the public law of t he Principalities and Servia; and his 483 Karl Marx 5 15 10 Imperial M a j e s t y 's enlightened solicitude for t h e se countries will n ot fail to a c k n o w l e d ge t he advantages w h i ch a collective g u a r a n t ee of their privileges, on the p a rt of the E u r o p e an p o w e rs would confer on t h e m. T he free naviga tion of t he D a n u be could n ot fail of falling in with t he interests of Russian c o m m e r c e, and, although the impediments to it at the m o u th of this river are n ot yet quite r e m o v e d, t he lofty sentiments of the E m p e r or a nd t he r e p e a t ed declarations of his Cabinet leave no r o om for doubting of his d e t e r m i n ed intention speedily to p ut an e nd to them. W i th r e f e r e n ce to t he privileges of t he Christian subjects of the Sultan, n ot only h as his Majesty t he E m p e r o r, in acceding to t he protocol of April 9, declared his a g r e e m e nt with t he principle of an identical and collective solicitude on t he p a rt of the p o w e rs for t he condition of our co-religionists, b ut also t he s a me t h o u g ht w as promi n e nt in the declarations m a de on this subject some time b a ck by the Cabinet of St. P e t e r s b u rg to that of Berlin; and, as the i n d e p e n d e n ce and sovereignty of the Sultan h a ve b e en so often and so openly p r o c l a i m ed to be in conformity with t he political views of the E m p e r o r, his Majesty will n ot withhold from t he joint e n d e a v o rs of the p o w e rs the bringing of t he i m p r o v e m e nt of the position of t he Christian R a y a hs into h a r m o ny with t he interests of t he O t t o m an G o v e r n m e nt by securing to this latter the initiative w h i ch is a n e c e s s a ry condition of its i n d e p e n d e n ce a nd dignity. Finally, t he t r e a ty of July 13, 1841, w as the result of such peculiar c i r c u m s t a n c es t h at its revision by all the contracting parties would probably, in principle, m e et with no difficulty; and Russia, as a littoral p o w er of the B l a ck Sea, s e e ms e v en especially called to t a ke part in the examination of t he i m p o r t a nt questions c o n n e c t ed therewith. T h e se a r e, B a r o n, the general considerations w h i ch 25 impel t he King, o ur august master, urgently to desire t he a c c e p t a n ce on t he p a rt of the C o u rt of St. P e t e r s b u rg of the points a b o ve indicated as the basis of a further negotiation, as Austria h as d r a wn t h em u p, in conjunction with the Cabinets of L o n d on and Paris. Avail yourself, t h e r e f o r e, of the e x t r e me bienveillance with w h i ch the E m p e r or deigned to h o n or y ou immediately on y o ur arrival in St. P e t e r s b u r g, and the confidence w h i ch C o u nt N e s s e l r o de h as b e s t o w ed u p on y o u, to convince t he Imperial Cabinet of t he im m e a s u r a b le range of results that will probably spring from its resolutions on t he p r e s e nt occasion; of t he u n b o u n d ed p r o s p e c ts of p e a ce w h i ch t h ey m ay o p en up to E u r o pe ; and of the victory w h i ch t h ey w o u ld necessarily achieve over t he calumniators of Russian policy, w h en t h ey clearly p r o ve to its bitterest backbiters on w h at side the really pacific sentiments are. I need not tell y o u, B a r o n, with w h at impatience we shall look f o r w a rd to n e ws from you of the reception and operation of the p r e s e nt dispatch, w h i ch y ou will, without loss of time, bring to the knowledge of C o u nt N e s s e l r o d e. 20 40 35 30 R e c e i ve t he a s s u r a n c e s, e t c ., ManteuffeV 484 Notizen von M a rx ü b er d as A b s e n d en e i n i g er Artikel an die „ N e w - Y o rk T r i b u n e" im August, S e p t e m b er und O k t o b er 1854 Progress of the War. September 8, 1854 An additional article, of w h i ch the c o n t e n ts are as y et secret, is p r o p o s ed to be a d d ed to the Austro-Prussian t r e a ty of t he 20th April. T he p r o p o s ed alterations and additions to t he treaty will be m a de w i th the cognizance of the G e r m a n ic Diet. At all e v e n t s, t he first p a r a g r a ph of t he convention, 5 mutually guaranteeing the territories of the contracting p a r t i e s, will r e m a in unchanged. 10 A surmise, f o r m ed on the a b o ve c i r c u m s t a n c e, has exerted some attention. T he B u n d, it is supposed, will, on meeting after its short r e c e s s, p r o c e e d, at the invitation of Austria and Prussia, to p r o n o u n ce t he treaty of April 20 lapsed as regards its additional articles. T h e n, taking u n d er consideration t he engagement that A u s t r ia has m a de w i th the w e s t e rn p o w e r s, a n ew scheme will be d r a wn up on this basis for a p e a c e, w h i ch it is believed that R u s s ia will accept. Active secret negotiations h a ve b e en going on for some time b e t w e en 15 Nicholas a nd the P o p e. It n ow transpires t h at t he C z ar holds a p r o s p e ct of a change t o w a rd t he R o m an Catholics in Poland and of concessions to the Latins at Jerusalem. He is t h us intriguing against the F r e n c h. According to the Corriere Italiano t he Czar has t he intention to declare his third son, Nicholas, King of Poland, and as he is a m e m b er of t he G r e ek C h u r c h, it 20 w as considered n e c e s s a ry to give the P o pe some tranquillizing a s s u r a n c es 25 30 35 40 respecting t he Polish Catholics. All t he B o m a r s u nd forts h a ve b e en d e s t r o y ed and the t r o o ps r e ë m b a r k e d. A few steam-frigates r e m a in cruising a m o ng t he islands. G e n s. Baraguay d'Hilliers and Niel w e re at D a n t z ic on the 7th. T h e re is nothing else in t he shape of n e w s. Constantinople letters of August 30 m e n t i on t h at t he British guards, and 28th, 42d, 44th, 79th and 93d regiments h ad e m b a r k ed at V a r n a, a nd t he light division and L o rd Cardigan's [are] u n d er o r d e r s. L o rd Raglan w as to e m b a rk on b o a rd t he C a r a d oc on S e p t e m b er 2, at V a r n a. T he expedition is to r e n d e z- v o us at Baltshik, at w h i ch place, and at B o u r g a s, the F r e n ch are to t a ke ship. is 25,000 English, T he 26,000 F r e n c h, and 20,000 T u r k s. G e n. Sir J o hn B u r g o y ne has arrived to t a ke c o m m a n d. Prince N a p o l e on and t he D u ke of Cambridge h a ve gone to V a r na to join their regiments. T he t r o o ps are described as animated with m u ch e n t h u s i a s m. Cholera h as almost disappeared. the expedition service of strength land for A c c o u n ts from R u s t c h uk S e p t e m b er 3, state t h at all t he vessels with t r o o ps left V a r na on the 2d for Baltschik. F r om t he 1st instant provisions for t he a r my are to be sent to the Crimea. M a r s h al St. A r n a ud has issued an order stating t h at Sevastopol will be t a k en and held as a g u a r a n t ee of p e a c e. Supposing t he siege begun by the middle of S e p t e m b e r, it is h o p ed the place will be t a k en by the e nd of N o v e m b e r. 487 Karl Marx T he R u s s i an E m b a s sy at V i e n na has received notice that the greater p a rt of t he R u s s i an a r my will h a ve quitted Moldavia by t he 20th of S e p t e m b e r, and the remainder by the beginning of O c t o b e r, unless hostile operations shall r e n d er a n ew concentration necessary. T he Austrians e n t e r ed t he Principalities at four p o i n t s, namely R o t h e n t h u r m, Prediala, and Boitza for Wallachia, a nd Bistritz for Moldavia. O m er P a s ha c o n t i n u es to c o n c e n t r a te his main a r my along the b a nk of the River K a r a s u, b e l ow B u s e o, w h e n ce he m e n a c ed Brailow a nd Galatz. On 1st A u g u st a strong force of English and F r e n ch g u n b o a ts entered the 5 Sulina c h a n n el of t he D a n u b e, and another is to enter by t he Kilia m o u t h, with the view of keeping the navigation open. 10 T he R u s s i a ns are making preparations to b u rn the cities of O d e s s a, Reni, Brailow, Galatz and Ismail, should t h ey be forced to a b a n d on t h e m. T h ey h a ve p r e p a r ed combustibles, and have cut off the supply of w a t er and b u r n ed t he fire engines. O r d e rs are issued that w h e r e v er t he e n e my a p p e a rs in superior strength t o w ns and villages are to be r e d u c ed to a s h e s. U n c e a s i ng p r e p a r a t i o ns are being m a de in Sevastopol for defense. All criminal prisoners are liberated and enrolled in companies to w o rk the p o rt b a t t e r i e s. A gang of 200 of the worst convicts are still in irons, to be e m p l o y ed in carrying ammunition. 15 20 T he G o v e r n or of Sevastopol, taking advantage of t he inefficiency of the b l o c k a d e, t o ok t he masts out of s o me steamers to r e n d er t h em less easily discovered, and has b e en sending them to and from Nicolaieff, at the m o u th of t he River Bug, w h e n ce they h a ve brought considerable quantities of s t o r e s, ammunition, artillery and e v en t r o o p s. O ne of t he n ew inner forts of S e v a s t o p ol is m o u n t ed with guns c o n v e y ed in this m a n n e r. 25 T he b a s h i - b o z o u k s, including those in the p ay of the allies, h a ve b e en disbanded by a general order from O m er P a s h a, t he rascals being quite incorrigible. T wo P a i x h a ns g u n s, t a k en from t he Tiger frigate, w e re tried at O d e s sa the other d ay in [the] p r e s e n ce of G o v e r n or Annenkoff. At t he fourth shot o ne of the guns burst, killing o ne artilleryman and w o u n d i ng several o t h e r s. 30 On Sept. 2 the British steamer S h e a r w a t er and t he F r e n ch steamer P r o m é- t h ée entered the port of Cattaro. T he r e a s on given by t he c o m m a n d e rs for their visit w as a desire to obtain information respecting a p r o j e c t ed razzia of the Montenegrins. 35 A Russian steamer from Sevastopol had c a p t u r ed a Wallachian vessel and t a k en her into t h at port. T h ey h ad sent to Constantinople the Captains of the t h r ee T u r k i sh m e r c h a n t m en w h i ch t h ey had r e c e n t ly b u r n ed at H e r a- clea. 40 K u r s c h id P a s ha (Gen. G u y o n) is at length appointed, on the representa- 488 Progress of the War. September 8, 1854 tions of L o rd Stratford de Redcliffe, to t he chief c o m m a nd in Asia, in r o om of M u s t a p ha P a s h a. G u y on would long ere this h a ve b e en appointed to c o m m a n d, b ut he refused, a nd still refuses, to apostatize from the Christian form of religion. Ismael P a s h a, a T u r k i sh officer w ho greatly distinguished himself in the defense of Kalefat, is also appointed to a high c o m m a nd in the a r my of Asia. T he British G o v e r n m e nt h as sent as Commissioners Col. Williams of the R o y al E n g i n e e r s, and F r a n ce will accredit an officer in a similar capacity. Col. Williams spent t h r ee y e a rs u n d er c a n v as in making a topographical survey of t h e se p r o v i n c e s, as British Commissioner charged to r un t he b o u n d a ry line b e t w e en T u r k ey and Persia. 5 10 A c c o r d i ng to the Paris Presse, the Russian forces in A s ia had fallen b a ck as far as E r i v a n, after having sacked Bajasid. Russian agents, disguised as B e d o u i n s, h a ve b e en arrested at D a m a s c u s. F r om A t h e ns we learn that King O t ho positively refuses any indemnity 15 to T u r k e y. 489 Karl Marx The Rumours about Mazzini's Arrest— The Austrian Compulsory Loan- Spain—The Situation in Wallachia F r om Our O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4197, 30. September 1854 L o n d o n, T u e s d a y, Sept. 12, 1854. T he p a p e rs contain diverse r u m o rs about Mazzini's arrest at Bale. I h a ve received t he following information from a friend: Mazzini w as really arrested by t wo gens d ' a r m es at Zurich, but only for a few h o u r s, after which he e s c a p e d. This e s c a pe was facilitated by another Italian causing himself to be arrested simultaneously at another place by pretending to be Mazzini. By this coup the authorities w e re misled, and M. D r u ey himself telegraphed from B e r ne to G e n e v a, t h at no further investigations w o u ld be required, as Mazzini w as in prison. It is supposed that t he p e r s on a r r e s t ed in Mazzini's stead is Saffi, while some say it is a Hungarian officer of the n a me of Tiirr. 5 10 T he Milan Gazette of t he 31st August t a k es p l e a s u re in a n n o u n c i ng t h at the the municipal council of Pavia have for 28th August, 200,000 florins. In c o n t r a st to this statement a non-official p a p er publishes t he following as t he real resolution of the Council in question: their sitting of subscribing in loan by to participate the national resolved in 15 " T he Municipality of P a v ia subscribes for t he q u o ta imposed on and fixed for t he t o wn of Pavia; b ut it does so neither as R e p r e s e n t a t i ve of t he C o m m u n e, n or in their quality as contributors, b ut only as an organ of G o v e r n ment, and as d e p e n d e nt on the executive p o w er to which it is b o u nd by the circular of 1830 to absolute obedience, as well as in e x e c u t i on of the o r d e rs transmitted to it by t he Lieutenant-General on Aug. 7 ." 20 At T r e v i so also the voluntary loan has only b e en subscribed to in con s e q u e n ce of direct m e n a c e. F r om t he statement of t he Trieste Council, it a p p e a rs that e v en in t h at arch-Austrian loyal city the loan is neither voluntary n or so very generally t a k en as r e p r e s e n t ed by the A u s t r i an j o u r n a l s: 25 " O ur c o m m u ne h as subscribed for another million of the national loan. T he Magistrates h e r e by a n n o u n c e, that this s um will be distributed a m o ng t he contributors w ho h a ve t a k en no part hitherto in the loan or n o t i n p r o p o r- 490 The Rumours about Mazzini's Arrest—The Austrian Compulsory Loan—Spain tion to their fortune. T he 6th of S e p t e m b er is, at t he same time, fixed as t he last t e rm for voluntary subscriptions. T he Council h o pe that e v e r y b o dy will h a s t en to profit by the advantages held out by t he loan, t he m o re so as, after the a b o ve t e r m, the Council will be u n d er t he grievous necessity of proceed- ing by f o r c e ." 5 T he reactionary P r e ss is not yet satisfied w i th t he late m e a s u r es of t he Spanish G o v e r n m e n t; t h ey grumble at the fact t h at a n ew c o m p r o m i se h ad b e en entered into with the revolution. T h us we read in the Journal des Débats: 10 15 " It w as only on the 7th August w h en E s p a r t e ro declared 'that in conformity with the wishes of the people of Madrid, t he D u c h e ss of Rianzares should not leave the Capital, either by d ay or night, or in any furtive m a n n e r .' It is only on t he 28th August t h at Q u e en Christina, after a detention of t w e n t y- o ne d a y s, is allowed to d e p a rt in b r o ad d a y, w i th a sort of ostentation. B ut t he G o v e r n m e nt h as b e en w e ak enough to order, simultaneously, t he con fiscation of her e s t a t e s ." in this T he Débats n ow h o p es that this order will be canceled. B ut the h o p es of instance, e v en more d o o m ed to dis the Débats are, p e r h a p s, a p p o i n t m e nt than w h en it u t t e r ed faint h o p es t h at the confiscation of the 20 Orleans e s t a t es would n ot be carried o ut by B o n a p a r t e. T he Gefe Politico of Oviedo has already p r o c e e d ed to sequestrate t he coal mines p o s s e s s ed by Christina in the Province of Asturias. T he directors of the mines of Siero, L a n g r e o, and Piero Corril h a ve received o r d e rs to m a ke a s t a t e m e nt and to place their administration u n d er t he G o v e r n m e n t. 25 30 With regard to the " b r o ad d a y" in which the Débats effects the d e p a r t u re of Christina, they are very wrongly informed. Q u e en Christina on leaving her a p a r t m e n t s, crossed the corridors in dead silence—everybody being stu diously k e pt out of t he way. T he National Guard, occupying t he b a r r a c ks in the court of the Palace w e re not a w a re of her d e p a r t u r e. So secretly w as the whole plan arranged t h at e v en Garrigo, w ho w as to h a ve charge of h er escort, only received his o r d e rs on the m o m e nt of starting. T he e s c o rt only learned the mission with which t h ey w e re intrusted at a distance of twelve miles from Madrid, w h en Garrigo had all sorts of difficulties in preventing his m en from either insulting Christina or returning direct to Madrid. T he 35 Chiefs of the National G u a rd did n ot learn anything of the affair until t wo h o u rs after t he d e p a r t u re of M m e. M u ñ o z. According to t he s t a t e m e nt of the España she r e a c h ed the P o r t u g u e se frontier on the morning of t he 3d S e p t e m b e r. She is said to h a ve b e en in very good spirits on the j o u r n e y, but her D u ke w as s o m e w h at triste. T he relations of Christina and this s a me M u ñ oz c an only be u n d e r s t o od from t he a n s w er given by D on Quixote to S a n c ho P a n z a 's question w hy he w as in love with such a low c o u n t ry w e n ch as his 40 491 Karl Marx 5 Dulcinea, w h en he could h a ve princesses at his feet: "A l a d y ," a n s w e r ed the w o r t hy knight, " s u r r o u n d ed by a h o st of high-bred, rich, and witty followers, w as a s k ed w hy she t o ok for her lover a simple p e a s a n t. ' Y ou m u st k n o w ,' said the lady, 'that for t he office I use him he p o s s e s s es m o re philosophy t h an Aristotle himself.'" T he view t a k en by the reactionary p r e ss in general on Spanish affairs m ay be j u d g ed of by s o me e x t r a c ts from the Kölnische Zeitung and t he In dépendance Belge: " A c c o r d i ng to a well-informed and t r u s t w o r t hy c o r r e s p o n d e n t, himself an a d h e r e nt of O'Donnell and the m o d e r a do p a r t y ," says t he former, " t he position of affairs is grievous, a deep conflict continuing to exist a m o ng parties. T he working classes are in a state of p e r m a n e nt e x c i t e m e n t, being w o r k ed u p on by the agitators." t h at vociferated " T he future of the Spanish m o n a r c h y ," says the Indépendance, "is ex p o s ed to great dangers. All t r ue Spanish patriots are u n a n i m o us on t he necessity of putting d o wn the revolutionary orgies. T he rage of the libelers a nd of the c o n s t r u c t o rs of barricades is let loose against E s p a r t e ro a nd his G o v e r n m e nt with the s a me v e h e m e n ce as against S an L u is and the b a n k e r, S a l a m a n c a. B u t, in truth, this chivalrous nation c a n n ot be held responsible for such e x c e s s e s. T he people of Madrid m u st n ot be c o n f o u n d ed with the m ob ' D e a th to Christina,' n or for t he infamous libels l a u n c h ed a m o ng the population, u n d er the title of ' R o b b e r i es of San L u i s, Christina a nd t he Acolytes.' T he 1,800 barricades of Madrid and t he ultra C o m m u n i st manifestations of Barcelona b e s p e ak t he intermeddling of for eign D e m o c r a cy with t he Spanish Saturnalia. So m u ch is certain, t h at a great n u m b er of the refugees of F r a n c e, G e r m a ny and Italy h a ve participated in t he deplorable e v e n ts n ow agitating the Peninsula. So m u ch is certain, that Spain is on t he brink of a social conflagration; t he m o re immediate con s e q u e n c es will be t he loss of t he Pearl of t he Antilles, t he rich Island of C u b a, b e c a u se it places Spain in the impossibility to c o m b at A m e r i c an ambition, or the patriotism of a Soulé or Sanders. It is time t h at Spain should o p en her e y e s, a nd that all h o n e st m en of civilized E u r o pe should c o m b i ne in giving t he a l a r m ." 10 15 20 25 30 It certainly requires no intervention of foreign d e m o c r a cy to stir up t he population of Madrid w h en t h ey see their G o v e r n m e nt b r e ak on t he 28th t he w o rd given on the 7th; suspend the right of freely assembling, and r e s t o re t he press-law of 1837, requiring a cautionnement of 40,000 reals a nd 300 reals of direct t a x es on the p a rt of e v e ry editor. If the p r o v i n c es r e m a in agitated by u n c e r t a in and u n d e c i d ed m o v e m e n t s, w h at other r e a s on are we to find for this fact, b ut the a b s e n ce of a center for revolutionary action? N ot a single d e c r ee beneficent to t he Provinces h as a p p e a r ed since t he so-called revolu- 35 40 492 The Rumours about Mazzini's Arrest—The Austrian Compulsory Loan—Spain 5 10 15 20 tionary g o v e r n m e nt fell into the h a n ds of E s p a r t e r o. T he P r o v i n c es behold it s u r r o u n d ed by t he same s y c o p h a n c y, intrigues, a nd place hunting that h ad subsisted u n d er S an L u i s. T he same s w a rm hangs a b o ut the Government—the plague which has infested Spain since t he age of t he Philips. L et us just cast a glance at the last n u m b er of the Madrid Gaceta of the 6th S e p t e m b e r. T h e re is a r e p o rt of O'Donnell a n n o u n c i ng a s u p e r a b u n d a n ce of military places and h o n o rs to s u ch a degree t h at o ut of e v e ry t h r ee generals only o ne c an be e m p l o y ed on active service. It is t he v e ry evil w h i ch has c u r s ed Spain since 1823—this s u p e r i n c u m b r a n ce of generals. O ne w o u ld fancy t h at a d e c r ee w as to follow abating t he n u i s a n c e. N o t h i ng of the sort. T he d e c r ee following the r e p o rt c o n v o k es a consultative j u n ta of w a r, c o m p o s ed of a certain n u m b er of generals, a p p o i n t ed by the G o v e r n m e nt from the generals holding at p r e s e nt no c o m m i s s i on in t he a r m y. Besides their ordinary p ay t h e se m en are to receive: e a ch L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r al 5,000 reals, and e a ch M a r é c h a l - d e - C a mp 6,000 reals. G e n e r al M a n u el de la C o n c ha h as b e en n a m ed President of this military sinecurist junta. T he same n u m b er of the Gaceta p r e s e n ts another h a r v e st of d e c o r a t i o n s, a p p o i n t m e n t s, etc., as if the first great distribution h ad failed to do its work. S an Miguel a nd Dulce h a ve received the grand-cross of the order of Charles III.; all t he r e c o m- p e n s es and provisional h o n o rs d e c r e ed by the j u n ta of S a r a g o s sa are con firmed a nd enlarged. B ut t he m o st r e m a r k a b le portion of this n u m b er of the Gaceta is the a n n o u n c e m e nt t h at the p a y m e nt of the public creditors will be r e s u m ed on t he 11th inst. Incredible folly of t he Spanish people not to be satisfied with t h e se a c h i e v e m e n ts of their revolutionary govern- 25 ment! Travelers w ho h a ve recently arrived from Wallachia give a v e ry distressing a c c o u nt of t he state of t h at Principality. It is k n o wn t h at R u s s ia saddled t he Principalities with a d e bt of 14,000,000 francs, on a c c o u nt of the o c c u p a t i on in 1848-49. This s um has b e en raised by t he R u s s i an generals during the late occupation. T he R u s s i a ns retreat after having emptied all the chests—the vestry c h e s t s, t he central chests of t he m o n a s t e r i e s, t he municipal chests— and it is with the c o n t e n ts of t h e se t h at t h ey h a ve paid the supplies c o n t r a c t ed for with t he Wallachian proprietors a nd p e a s a n t s. B ut t he t r a n s p o r t s, which m a ke a v e ry important item in an agricultural c o u n t r y, w o o d, coals, straw, etc., w e re n ot paid at all, b ut simply foraged. T he t r e a s u ry of t he Principalities accordingly is so m u ch e x h a u s t ed that the vestries are e x p e c t ed to b e c o me b a n k r u p t. All this without taking into a c c o u nt t he u se of t he h o u s es t r a n s formed into hospitals, and the t h o u s a n ds of p r o p e r ty intrusted to Russian h a n ds from t he fear of t he b o y a r ds of T u r k i sh r o b b e r y. We r e ad in a letter from A t h e n s, dated 29th A u g u s t: " T he King continues to refuse any indemnity to T u r k e y. T he hatred against 30 35 40 493 Karl Marx t he Occidental t r o o ps increases, and already several F r e n ch soldiers h a ve b e en ill-treated by the p e o p l e ." It would be a curious history to e x p o se to your r e a d e rs h ow the G r e ek communities h a ve b e en dissolved by British influence—how C a po d'Istria w as i m p o s ed u p on t h e m, and how the whole of this p e o p le has b e en d e- moralized by the agency of L o rd Palmerston. T he h o n e st intentions of t he British G o v e r n m e nt e v en at this m o m e nt of their intervention in G r e e c e, are sufficiently b e t r a y ed by t he support it gives to General Kalergis, a m a n, like C a po d'Istria, b o r n, b r ed and domiciliated in Russia. L o rd Stratford de Redcliffe and the British G o v e r n m e nt h a ve at length obtained w h at t h ey h a ve labored to bring about—a revolution in T u r k e y, if n ot in E u r o p e, at least in Anatolia. We knew already by r e p o r ts from R h o d e s, t h at on t he c o a st opposite this island, t he Z e y b e k s, a warlike O t t o m an m o u n t a i n - t r i b e, had revolted. T he Journal de Constantinople of 20th A u g. n ow a n n o u n c es t h at a n a r c hy in t h o se parts is daily increasing. T he rebels, in the a b s e n ce of the regular army, constantly d e s c e nd from the m o u n t a i n s, i n v a de t he villages, raise the tithes, plunder t he inhabitants a nd c a r a v a n s, violate the w o m e n, and m u r d er every o ne that r e s i s t s. Their e x c e s s es are gravest in the p r o v i n ce of M e s t e s c a k. F r om A i d en t he G o v e r n or has b e en obliged to flee to T h y r r h a. Denissli is in their h a n d s, and the mufti Sahib Effendi, w ho w e nt to inform the Governor-General, h as b e en seized a nd b e h e a d ed with his followers. Their strength a m o u n ts to t h o u s a n d s. T he s o u r ce of t h e se disturbances are the Bashi-Bozouks returning from K a rs a nd B a y a z i d, w ho d e n o u n ce the P o r te for its o p p r e s s i on t o w a rd the T u r ks and its submission t o w a rd Russia. If we c a st a look at E u r o p e, we m e et with s y m p t o ms of revolution in Spain, Italy, D e n m a r k, t he Danubian Principalities, G r e e c e, Asiatic T u r k e y; and e v en in the r a n ks of the F r e n ch a r my at V a r n a, t he cry h as r e s o u n d e d, "À bas les singes!" 5 10 15 20 25 K a rl M a r x. 30 494 Karl Marx The Actions of the Allied Fleet— The Situation in the Danubian Principalities- Spain—British Foreign Trade F r om O ur O wn C o r r e s p o n d e n t. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4198, 2. Oktober 1854 L o n d o n, F r i d a y, Sept. 15, 1854. We r e ad in y e s t e r d a y 's Moniteur the following telegraphic dispatch: "Therapia, S e p t . 7 . - T he F r e n ch a nd the T u r ks left V a r na on the 5th. T he 5 English fleet was to join t h em at t he Island of t he Serpents. T he w e a t h er is beautiful." 10 15 20 25 T he delay in the d e p a r t u re of this first portion of the expeditionary a r my w as c a u s ed by the violent storms w h i ch visited t he B o s p h o r us up to t he 27th of August. T he wind having c o me r o u nd from the north-east on the 27th, t he fleet of t r a n s p o r ts w as enabled to leave Constantinople for the Black Sea. T he Isle of t he Serpents (Hade Adessi) is a little r o c ky islet at s o me distance from the Bessarabian coast, a nd nearly opposite t he m o u th of t he D a n u b e. Its circumference is n ot m o re than t h r ee English miles. T he d e p a r t u re not having b e en effected until the 5th, t he d i s e m b a r k a t i on of t he t r o o ps c a n n ot h a ve t a k en place before the 9th of S e p t e m b e r. A curious passage o c c u rs in an article published by t he Moniteur, in w h i ch t he c h a n c es of t he expedition are discussed. "If," says the Moniteur, " if the n u m b er of t he R u s s i an t r o o ps stationed in t he Crimea should be found to be more considerable t h an we are led to believe by t he previous r e p o r t s; if t he force of Sevastopol should offer a protracted defense; if o b s t a c l es should be afforded by t he season ; if, finally, an i m p o r t a nt R u s s i an a r my should s u c c e ed in reënf orcing t he Crimea, we should be quits for this time with a simple r e ë m b a r k a t i o n, and the a t t a ck of Sevastopol would be r e s u m ed in t he spring." In o ne w o r d, if any serious difficulties should be e n c o u n t e r ed by t h at "powerful a r m a d a, with its t h o u s a nd agencies of d e s t r u c t i o n ," it will quickly r e t u rn to the B o s p h o r u s. At all e v e n t s, it will n ot be their fault if such dif ficulties should not be m et with, due notice of t he expedition having b e en given to the Czar m o n t hs ago, and it having b e en delayed up to the v e ry last 495 Karl Marx d a ys of the season. T he confidence felt by t he F r e n ch mariners in their c o m m a n d er m ay be judged of by t he following e x t r a ct of a letter from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e, published by t he Augsburger Zeitung: " In t he fleet St. A r n a ud is generally called Florival, the n a me u n d er w h i ch he m a de his d é b ut at t he Ambigu Comique at P a r i s ." 5 A c c o r d i ng to the latest dispatches from H a m b u rg and C o p e n h a g e n, p a rt of the F r e n ch fleet, t r a n s p o r ts a nd soldiers, h a ve p a s s ed t h r o u gh t he Belt on their r e t u rn to F r a n c e. A Bonapartist paper, the Constitutionnel, m a k es a revelation on t he B o m a r s u nd affair: " H is majesty t he E m p e r or N a p o l e on III did n or wish t h at t he devotion of t he n a vy should be deprived of the recompense merited by it after such a prolonged and painful cruise in the B a l t i c ." 10 B o m a r s u n d, t h e n, w as only b o m b a r d ed for the a m u s e m e nt of the fleet, a nd as a c o n c e s s i on to t he impatience a nd ennui of t he officers. T h o se t wo laconic allusions of the Moniteur and Constitutionnel c o n t a in m o re in quali- fication of the c h a r a c t er of t he war t h an all the swaggering leading articles of the ministerial English p r e s s. 15 T he Czar h as o r d e r ed the arrest of all the engineers w ho w e re engaged in t he c o n s t r u c t i on of t he forts of B o m a r s u n d. T h ey are to be p ut on their trial. O ne of the charges raised against t h em is that the fortifications should h a ve b e en c o n s t r u c t ed entirely of blocks of p u re granite, while it has b e en p r o v ed since their fall that t he interior of the walls w as simply filled with sand a nd rough stones. All the c o m m a n d e rs of the different fortresses along the Gulf of Finland h a ve received orders from St. P e t e r s b u rg to inquire into t he m o st minute details of their construction, a nd to r e p o rt on this subject w i t h o ut delay. It is n ow ascertained that F o rt G u s t a v s v ä rn at H a n go H e ad w as b l o wn up by t he Russians t h e m s e l v e s, at t he m o m e nt w h en Baraguay d'Hilliers and G e n. J o n es appeared before it on their reconnoitering ex pedition. T he Russians feared an attack on A b o, a nd in o r d er to m a ke the t r o o ps of F o rt G u s t a v s v ä rn disposable for the defense of that t o wn the fort w as destroyed. 20 25 30 Being still in t he Baltic I m ay as well give a place h e re to t he following piece of n e ws c o n t a i n ed in t he Aftonbladet. "A c o r r e s p o n d e nt from C o p e n h a g en a n n o u n c es as certain t h at the D a n i sh G o v e r n m e nt authorized on Aug. 16, M r . T . P . S h a f f n er to establish a line of electric telegraph extending from N o r th A m e r i ca t h r o u gh G r e e n l a n d, Iceland, t he F a r oe Islands a nd N o r w ay to C o p e n h a g e n. On t he 26th a line is w as o p e n ed 686,700 y a r d s ." to M a l m ö. T he e x t e nt of from Stockholm line this 35 S o me of the L o n d on p a p e rs to-day give telegraphic n e ws of a victory 40 gained by S h a m yl s o m e w h e re in the neighborhood of Tif lis. T he F r e n ch and 496 The Action of the Allied Fleet—The Situation in the Danubian Principalities G e r m an p a p e rs contain no mention of this fact. On Sept. 4 the T u r ks c r o s s ed t he D a n u be n e ar Matchin, a nd occupied t he island situated b e t w e en t h at fortress a nd Ibraila. A great portion of the T u r k i sh flotilla of the D a n u be h as also cast a n c h or off Matchin. T he o c c u p a t i on of Ibraila by t he T u r ks w as to t he proclamation of Gen. K r u s e n s t e r n, p o s t ed up on t he walls of O d e s sa on t he 30th Aug., in which t he inhabitants a re w a r n e d, u n d er h e a vy penalties, not to o p p o se the setting fire to the city should this act be d e e m ed n e c e s s a ry by the t r o o ps for the defense of the country. T he Russians h a ve also given o r d e rs in all the inst. Y ou will notice t a ke place on the 5th districts of Bessarabia to b u rn t o w ns and villages at t he a p p r o a ch of t he e n e m y. T he order is the m o re ludicrous as t he R u s s i a ns are well a w a re t h at t he R o u m a ns of Bessarabia w o u ld no more regret their withdrawal t h an t he R o u m a ns of Wallachia and Moldavia. 5 10 I h a ve described the c i r c u m s t a n c es a c c o m p a n y i ng the enrolment in the 15 Russian service of t he Wallachian a nd Moldavian militia. F r om t he English p a p e rs of to-day y ou will learn the details of the scenes which t o ok place on t he 28th August, b e t w e en M. de B u d b e rg a nd t he officers of the R o u m an militia, scenes w h i ch e n d ed in C a p t. Phillippesco telling the R u s s i an general to his face t h at t he Wallachians considered t he Sultan as their only suzerain. 20 He w a s, of c o u r s e, placed u n d er arrest, in c o m p a ny with t wo b r o t h er officers w ho h ad indulged in similar r e m o n s t r a n c e s. T he following a c c o u nt of t he e v e n ts w h i ch o c c u r r ed on the 29th, the d ay on w h i ch t he Russian campaign in t he Principalities w as brought to s u ch a glorious conclusion, is from t he Paris Presse of to-day: 25 30 35 40 " T he arrest of Capt. Phillippesco a nd t wo o t h er officers, w ho dared to set at defiance t he injunctions of Gen. B u d b e r g, h ad c a u s ed a great irritation in the r a n ks of the Moldavian militia, and a u g m e n t ed its reluctance to serve in t he Russian a r m y. On t he 29th, shortly b e f o re t he h o ur fixed for their review, the H e t m án M a v r o c o r d a to repaired to the b a r r a c ks of the cavalry, situated opposite t he Administrative Palace. G r e at w as his consternation at finding it completely d e s e r t e d. T he soldiers, instead of saddling their h o r s es for t he review, h ad contrived to m a ke their e s c a pe from t he stables, a b a n d o n ing their a r ms and baggage. T he u n f o r t u n a te H e t m án h a s t e n ed to the bar r a c ks of t he artillery to m e et with a n ew surprise. T he c a n n on w e re in their places in the Court, b ut t he m en had disappeared. M a v r o c o r d a t o, in despair, fancied himself already on t he r o ad to Siberia. B ut he s u c c e e d ed in reuniting a b o ut 30 m e n. Trembling with rage and fear, he o r d e r ed t h em to p ut t he h o r s es to t he g u ns and to m a r ch o ut to t he place of t he review. ' L et us be carried a w ay by f o r c e ,' t h ey s h o u t e d. ' We r e c e i ve no o r d e rs from t he R u s- sians.' W i th t h e se w o r ds t h ey shut up t he gates of t he b a r r a c k s. At t h at m o m e nt d r u ms r e s o u n d ed in t he place. It w as t he w h o le division of O s t e n- 497 Karl Marx Sacken, c o m p o s ed of twelve battalions, o ne regiment of d r a g o o n s, and t h r ee battalions of artillery, which, after intercepting the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s, f o r m ed up on t he place a nd completely blocked up b o th t he Administrative Palace and the b a r r a c ks of the Moldavian cavalry. Sixty M o l d a v i an h o r s e m en w ho h ad b e en b r o u g ht b a ck w e re d r a wn up before t he b a r r a c k s. Opposite to t h em w e re 12,000 Russians—infantry, cavalry and artillery. O s t e n - S a c k en arrived, followed by Gen. B u d b e rg a nd a n u m e r o us staff. T he M u s c o v i te t r o o ps d e p l o y ed in c o l u m n s, a nd defiled before their generals, w i th b a y o n e ts fixed, shouting their h u r r a h s. T h ey n e xt formed in squares at a distance of 150 y a r ds from t he Moldavian h o r s e m e n. T h ey received t he c o m m a nd to load. T he R u s s i an soldiers after having m a de t he sign of the c r o s s, e x e c u t ed t he order. Aim w as t a k en at the sixty h o r s e m e n. This being d o n e, O s t e n - S a c k en ad v a n c ed with his staff t o w a rd the little b o dy of Moldavian militia-men, and s u m m o n ed t h em to follow his a r my with the t h r e at of having t h em all shot in c a se of refusal. A silence of several minutes followed his injunction. A terrible emotion seizes u p on the c r o wd w ho h ad a s s e m b l ed on the place. T h en o ne of t he Moldavians steps from the r a n ks and in a calm voice ad d r e s s es the R u s s i an General. ' We are Moldavian soldiers, and our d u ty is to defend our c o u n t r y, not to fight for t he foreigner. Do with us as y ou please. We shall not m a r ch w i th y o u .' ' Y ou m ay m u r d er u s, b ut we shall not m a r ch with y o u ,' r e p e at the sixty soldiers with one voice. On hearing this bold a n s w e r, O s t e n - S a c k en o r d e r ed them to d i s m o u nt from their h o r s es and to lay d o wn their a r m s, as t h o u gh for immediate execution. T h ey o b e y, p r e p a r ed to die. In a m o m e nt t h o u s a n ds of soldiers s u r r o u nd t h e m, r u sh u p on t h e m, and t a ke t h em prisoners. This great feat of a r ms accomplished, t he M u s c o- vites a d v a n ce to the Moldavian artillery b a r r a c ks w h e re the thirty m en c o n t i n ue to k e ep t he gates closed. T he gates having b e en forced, t h ey p e n e t r a te into the interior; a struggle t a k es place, and t he artillerists also, over w h e l m ed by superior n u m b e r s, are t a k en prisoners. T h ey are hurried away in the m i d st of insults and m e n a c es of death. T h ey r e m a in impassible. Only o n e, a y o u ng c o r n et of 22 y e a r s, his e y es kindled w i th r a g e, a d v a n c es t o w a rd Gen. W r a n g e l, and uncovering his breast, exclaims: ' T h e re is my b r e a s t, pierce it with y o ur balls if y ou dare.' T he General did not d a r e. T he c o r n et a nd his c o m r a d es disarmed, w e re c o n d u c t ed b e t w e en t wo r o ws of b a y o n e ts a nd b r o u g ht to t he c a mp of Osten-Sacken, outside t he g a t es of J a s s y. W h at has b e c o me of t h e m, n o b o dy k n o w s. As to the t h r ee officers arrested on the evening before, it is generally feared t h at t h ey will be shot. On t he same evening the R u s s i a ns s u r r o u n d ed the place w h e re the regiment of Moldavian infantry w as e n c a m p e d. B ut they found only 150 m e n, t he rest having es c a p e d. T he population of J a s sy uttered loud execrations against their p r o t e c- t o r s. Sixty h o r s e m e n, thirty artillerists, and one h u n d r ed a nd fifty infantry 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 498 The Action of the Allied Fleet—The Situation in the Danubian Principalities captured and disarmed by 12,000 R u s s i a ns w i th t h r ee batteries. This is the only victory, the laurels of which t he Russians carry h o me from their c a m paign in t he Principalities." 5 In a former letter I m e n t i o n ed the order given by O m er P a s ha to suppress the publication of t he Austrian manifesto of Gen. H e s s. We are n ow informed on w h at grounds this o r d er w as given, viz.: b e c a u se t he said proclamation called u p on t he Wallachian authorities to apply exclusively to t he Austrian c o m m a n d er in all affairs. O m er P a s ha sent w o rd to G e n. H e ss t h at he h ad b e t t er abstain from intermeddling with the civil Administration of Wallachia, 10 w h i ch belonged to his (Omer P a s h a ' s) p r o v i n c e. H a v i ng only intended his proclamation as a feeler h ow far he might go, Gen. H e ss apologised for t he objectionable passage, and in o r d er to convince O m er P a s ha t h at it w as all a mistake, he c o m m u n i c a t ed to him t he original G e r m an text, w h e re t he Wallachian authorities are only invited to apply to his Aid-de-Camp in s u ch 15 matters as are c o n n e c t ed with the Austrian t r o o p s. T he Austrian general Popovitch, w ho h ad entered B u c h a r e st w i th the Austrian vanguard on t he 3d S e p t e m b e r, and immediately c o m m e n c ed to play t he part of H a y n a u, w as likewise checked by O m er Pasha. H ow w e l c o me the Austrian occupation is to t he Wallachians in general m ay be u n d e r s t o od from an extract from t o - d a y 's Daily News: 20 " M a ny of the villages on the road by w h i ch the Austrians advanced, h a ve b e en deserted by their inhabitants, carrying with t h em all their worldly g o o d s, fearing t h at t h ey would be obliged to supply provisions or m e a ns of t r a n s p o rt in r e t u rn for paper m o n e y, w o r th exactly half its nominal value. T he con- sequence is, that b r e ad for t he Austrian t r o o ps m u st be forwarded from Bucharest, t w e n ty and e v en thirty miles d i s t a n t ." It is certainly w i th r e s p e ct to the infamies committed in the Principalities— the consequences of English diplomacy-that t he s o b er Economist, alluding to s o me comparatively v e ry slight faults of A m e r i c an diplomacy in E u r o p e, d r a ws t he following line of distinction b e t w e en English and A m e r i c an di p l o m a c y: " N o w, we h a ve no d o u bt t h at m en of gentlemanly feeling, of d e ep sense of d e c o r u m, of a clear perception of w h at is d ue to o t h e r s, a b o u nd in America as well as h e r e. T he difference b e t w e en u s, and t he misfortune of our cousins, are t h e s e: t h at s u ch m en do not at t he other side of t he Atlantic either elect a g o v e r n m e nt or give t he t o ne to the nation, or guide the language of the press. W i th us t he e d u c a t ed a nd the upper classes h a ve t he p o w er in their o wn h a n d s. In the U n i t ed States it is the m a ss w ho govern; it is the populace w ho u s u rp t he n a me a nd title of the nation; it is t h ey w ho dictate w h at shall be d o ne or said; it is t h ey w ho elect the g o v e r n m e nt and w h om the govern m e nt must s e r v e; it is t h ey w ho support t he p r e ss and w h om t he p r e ss 25 30 35 40 499 Karl Marx m u st p l e a s e; in fact, it is they w ho h a ve to be acted d o wn to and w r i t t en d o wn t o ." T h us speaks the servant of the English stock-jobbers, as if English di p l o m a cy w e re n ot an identical t e rm with infamy, a nd as if t he " g e n t l e m e n" appointed by M r. Wilson, the editor of The Economist, a nd M r. G l a d s t o n e, his superior, h ad n ot b e en convicted before Parliament of swindling, gam bling a nd larceny. F r om Spain n e ws is scarce. On the 8th inst. t he Consultative J u n ta of Madrid definitively dissolved itself. T he J u n ta of Seville only dissolved after a strong p r o t e st against the reactionary c o u r se of the C e n t r al G o v e r n m e n t. T he D e m o c r a ts of Catalonia h a ve published a manifesto against G e n. Prim, w ho h ad sent in his adhesion to the p r e s e nt G o v e r n m e nt from T u r k e y, in o r d er not to be excluded from a share in t he spoils. He c o n t r a c t ed t he hatred of the Catalonians by the investment of the Castle of Figueras in 1843, m a r k ed by t he m o st shocking barbarities, c o m m i t t ed f r om p u re rage at the b r a ve defense of t he place by a comparatively small force u n d er the c o m m a nd of AmetUer. This Prim w as characterized at t h at t i me as "a p e r s on of ridiculous vanity, w h o se head had b e en t u r n ed by fortuitous s u c c e ss and by being m a de a c o u nt and a lieutenant-general." We r e ad in the Epoca that on the 7th a small battle w as fought at A r a n j u ez b e t w e en t he N a t i o n al G u a rd a nd a b a nd of which it is n ot y et k n o wn w h e t h er it w as c o m p o s ed of Carlists or R e p u b l i c a n s. Q u i ck and certain as the s u c c e ss of t he reaction s e e ms to b e, t he counter-revolutionary j o u r n a ls do n ot cease to give v e nt to their a p p r e h e n s i v e n e ss t h at m a t t e rs m ay n ot e v en y et be settled in Spain. F r om t he a c c o u n ts of t r a de and navigation just issued I e x t r a ct t he follow ing statement: Total declared Value of the Exports of British and Irish Produce and Manufactures in each of the following years: Russia, nothern ports and Black Sea Sweden and Norway Denmark Prussia Hanover and Hanseatic towns Holland and Belgium France Portugal Azores and Madeira 1831 £ 1,195,565 115,707 92,294 192,816 3,642,952 J J 2,082,536 2,082,536 602,688 975,991 80,698 Foreign. 1842 £ 1,885,953 334,017 194,304 376,651 6,202,700 H. 3,573,362 B. 1,099,490 3,193,939 947,855 64,909 1853 £ 1,228,400 556,183 569,733 579,588 7,565,493 4,482,955 1,371,817 2,636,330 1,210,411 124,971 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 500 The Action of the Allied Fleet—The Situation in the Danubian Principalities 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Spain and Balearic Isles Canary Islands Italy Sardinian Territories Duchy of Tuscany Papal Territories Naples and Sicily Austrian Territories Greece Turkey Wallachia and Moldavia Syria and Palestine Egypt Morocco French Possessions in Senegambia West Coast of Africa Java and Sumatra Philippines China Cuba Hayti United States and California Mexico New-Granada Venezuela Brazile Uruguay Buenos Ayres Chili Peru Other Countries Total of Foreign countries Channel Islands Gibraltar Malta Ionian Islands South Africa Mauritius East Indies Hong Kong Australia North American Colonies West Indies Other Possessions Total to British Possessions Total of British and Foreign [1831] £ 597,848 33,282 [1842] £ 322,614 54,564 [1853] £ 1,360,719 107,638 2,490,376 2,494,197 899,100 1,489,826 122,832 426 234,768 285,296 39,513 519,443 663,531 376,103 9,053,583 728,858 248,250 248,250 1,238,371 339,870 339,870 654,617 409,003 215 £26,909,432 £ 324,634 367,285 134,519 50,883 257,245 148,475 3,857,969 403,223 2,089,327 2,581,949 39,431 £10,254,940 £37,164,372 375,551 221,003 41,952 459,685 306,132 47,019 969,381 711,938 141,896 3,535,381 374,969 231,711 231,711 1,756,805 969,791 969,791 950,466 684,013 7,223 £34,119,587 British Possessions. £ 364,359 937,719 289,304 83,600 369,076 244,922 5,169,888 998,952 2,333,525 2,591,425 18,675 £ 13,261,436 £47,381,023 J J J J 1,112,447 639,794 207,491 639,544 637,353 135,315 2,029,305 179,510 306,580 787,111 75,257 1,725 617,764 558,212 386,552 1,373,689 1,124,864 133,804 23,658,427 791,940 450,804 248,190 3,186,407 529,883 551,035 1,264,942 1,246,730 912,662 £65,551,579 £ 470,107 670,840 297,906 116,567 1,212,630 385,879 8,185,695 357,908 14,513,700 4,898,544 1,906,689 347,787 £33,382,202 £98,933,781 501 Karl Marx The Economist selects the year of 1842, in order to exhibit t he advantages of free t r a de since t h at period, forgetting, with its usual c a n d o u r, t h at 1842 w as a y e ar of commercial depression, and 1853 a y e ar of the greatest p r o s p e r ity. If t he progress of English exports w e re p r o d u c ed by t he magic of free t r a d e, it w o u ld h a ve b e en better p r o v ed by c o m p a r i s on of t he relative e x p o r ts to countries maintaining a strict protectionist system, R u s s ia a nd F r a n ce for i n s t a n c e; the former of t h e se countries being m o r e o v er t h at from w h i ch i m p o r ts h a ve m o st increased, and which h as b e en m o st subject to t he in fluence of British free t r a d e. N ow we find that t he e x p o r ts to b o th t h e se countries h a ve declined. The export to Russia having been While in 1831 it was And the export to France having been in 1853 While in 1842 it was £1,106,767 1,195,565 2,636,330 3,193,939 T he aggregate value of British e x p o r ts in the s e v en m o n t hs ending 5th August, 1854, c o m p a r ed with t h o se during t he c o r r e s p o n d i ng m o n t hs of 1853, s h o ws an increase, in c o n s e q u e n ce of the metals having increased in v a l u e; but in the other ruling p r o d u c ts of British industry we find a m a r k ed decline, as s h o wn by the following table: Linen manufactures Linen yarn Silk manufactures Silk, thrown Wool manufactures Cotton manufactures Cotton yarn 1853 £ 2,650,150 646,578 965,345 132,689 3,741,261 15,515,224 3,897,080 1854 £ 2,456,953 581,752 834,275 120,890 3,731,453 14,762,981 3,838,393 T he decline in c o t t on appears still m o re striking since the quantity of e x p o r ts h as increased, while the value realised h as d e c r e a s e d. In 1854 t h e re w e re e x p o r t ed 981,994,130 y a r ds of cotton m a n u f a c t u r e s, exclusive of lace a nd p a t e nt net, while in 1853 t h e re w e re only e x p o r t ed 969,293,663 y a r d s. K a rl M a r x. 5 10 15 20 25 30 502 w Friedrich Engels The Attack on Sevastopol The Attack on Sevastopol. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4209, 14. Oktober 1854 5 10 15 20 25 At last it seems possible that the F r e n ch a nd English m ay strike a serious blow at t he p o w er and prestige of Russia, and we in this c o u n t ry are a c cordingly looking with r e n e w ed interest to the m o v e m e nt against Sevastopol, t he latest intelligence from w h i ch is detailed in a n o t h er column. As a matter of c o u r s e, the British and F r e n ch journals m a ke a great p a r a de a b o ut this undertaking, and if we c an believe t h e m, nothing grander w as e v er h e a rd of in military history; b ut t h o se w ho look at the facts in the case—at the inex plicable delays a nd senseless apologies attending t he setting out of t he expedition, and all the c i r c u m s t a n c es preceding a nd attending it—will refuse to be i m p o s ed u p o n. T he termination of t he enterprise may be glorious, b ut its origin would rather seem to be disgraceful. L o ok at the p a st history of the allied armies in T u r k e y. At first t h e se v e ry heroic, b ut also exceedingly cautious warriors i n t e n d ed to land at E n o s, on this side of the Dardanelles, and to a p p r o a ch t h at peninsula only after e v e r y thing should h a ve t u r n ed out to be quite safe. Before this daring feat, h o w ever, w as accomplished, t h ey stretched their courage to an u n e x p e c t ed extent, and risked a landing on t he T h r a c i an C h e r s o n e s us at Gallipoli. B ut this w as merely d o ne in order to h a ve the defensive w o r ks across t he penin- sula c o m p l e t ed in less time, t h us securing to t h e m s e l v es t h at m o st essential of all requisites, a b a se of o p e r a t i o n s. All the while the T u r ks on the D a n u be w e re facing t h o se formidable o p p o n e n ts w h o se p r e s e n ce in Wallachia w as t he p r e t e xt for t h e se learned m a n e u v e rs of t he allies; and t h ey w e re facing t h e m, t o o, with considerable s u c c e s s. B ut as m o re ships and m o re t r o o ps arrived, it w as found o ut that the Dardanelles a nd peninsula c a n n ot harbor t h em all. T h us another hole is m a de in t he scientific a r r a n g e m e n ts agreed u p on b e t w e en Paris and L o n d o n. A portion of the t r o o ps h ad actually to e n d u re t he dangers and risks of a landing at t h at v e ry e x p o s ed spot, Con stantinople! To r e m e dy this, t he fortification of this t o wn w as at o n ce t a k en 503 Friedrich Engels in h a n d. F o r t u n a t e l y, a good deal of time w as spent in all t h e se operations, a nd t h us t he m a in object w as secured—not to gain t i m e, b ut to lose it. T h en it w as ascertained t h at a division might, with little risk, be sent to V a r n a, to garrison t h at i m p o r t a nt p l a c e, for surely the T u r ks w ho so gloriously d e f e n d ed it in 1828, h ad since t h en m a de such progress in E u r o p e an discipline, t h at t he defense of such a p o st could no longer be e n t r u s t ed to t h e m. T he division w as sent accordingly, and o ne or t wo divisions m o r e. W h en finally e v e ry p r e t e xt for keeping the troops in the B o s p h o r us w as fairly w o rn out, t he g r a nd c o m b i n ed a r my w as v e ry leisurely c o n c e n t r a t ed at V a r n a. This w as d o ne at the same time w h en an Austrian a r my a p p e a r ed like a m e n a c i ng t h u n d er cloud on t he flank a nd rear of the R u s s i a n s, a nd w h en t h u s, by political c o m b i n a t i o n s, t he b a se of the allied o p e r a t i o ns w as at o n ce t r a n s ferred, for t he m o m e n t, from Constantinople to T r a n s y l v a n ia a nd Galicia. W i t h o ut this, t h e re is e v e ry r e a s on to believe t h e re w o u ld n e v er h a ve b e en an allied a r my in Bulgaria. T he proof of it is in their b e h a v i or during t he siege of Silistria. E v e r y b o dy k n o ws t h at t h e re w as the turning point of t he c a m paign, a nd t h at on s u ch an e m e r g e n c y, w h en b o th parties h a ve b e en straining their p o w e rs to the u t m o s t, the smallest e x t ra weight a d d ed on o ne side, will in nine c a s es o ut of ten, t u rn t he b a l a n ce in its favor. Y e t, during this decisive siege, t h e re w e re 20,000 English and 30,000 F r e n ch soldiers, " t he flower of the t wo a r m i e s ," smoking their pipes, and v e ry quietly getting t h e m s e l v es in trim for the cholera at a v e ry few d a y s' m a r ch from t he f o r t r e s s. A n d, b ut for t he h a v oc m a de by disease a m o ng t he R u s s i a n s, a nd for t he u n a c c o u n t a b le b r a v e ry of a handful of A r n a u ts e n s c o n c ed in a ditch plowed by shells in e v e ry direction, Silistria would h a ve fallen into t he h a n ds of t he e n e m y. T h e re is no instance in the history of w ar of an a r my within e a sy r e a c h, t h us c o w a r d ly leaving its allies to shift for t h e m s e l v e s. No expedition to t he Crimea, a nd no victory will e v er clear a w ay t h at stain from the h o n or of t he F r e n ch a nd English c o m m a n d e r s. W h e re w o u ld t he British h a ve b e en at W a t e r l oo if old Blücher, after his defeat at Ligny, t wo d a ys b e f o r e, h ad t h us conscientiously acted in the m a n n er of Raglan and St. A r n a u d? 5 10 15 20 25 30 T he handful of A r n a u ts in t he skirmishing ditch of A r ab Tabiassi p r o v ed a m a t ch for t he skill, intellect and military strength of Russia. No relieving a r my d r o ve the R u s s i a ns across the D a n u b e; their o wn foolishness, t he valor of the d e f e n d e r s, t he m a r sh fever, t he passive weight of t he Austrians on t he Dniester and of the allies on the D e v n a, (for w ho could think t h ey w o u ld act as t h ey did?) m a de t h em finally a b a n d on t he siege, a nd give up b o th t he campaign, t he Principalities and the Dobrodja. After this great s u c c e s s, t he allied generals of c o u r se t h o u g ht of following it up—always according to t he rules of t h at strategic system which t h ey h ad hitherto applied with so m u ch 40 effect. C o n s e q u e n t l y, L o rd Cardigan led t he British cavalry to t he D a n u b e, 35 504 The Attack on Sevastopol 5 10 on a reconnoitering expedition, in w h i ch t h ey saw no R u s s i a n s, lost m a ny h o r s e s, a nd e a r n ed nothing b ut sickness a nd ridicule; while Gen. E s p i n a s s e, mainly k n o wn by his betrayal of the N a t i o n al A s s e m b ly on D e c e m b er 2 , 1 8 5 1, led his division into t he D o b r o d ja for no o t h er p u r p o se t h an having a couple of fine regiments half d e s t r o y ed by cholera, a nd bringing the germ of that epidemic into t he allied c a m p. T he great invasion of c h o l e ra which e n s u ed a m o ng t he allies at V a r na w as t h us the well e a r n ed result of their fine strategic combinations. T he soldiers fell off by t h o u s a n ds b e f o re t h ey h ad e v en s e en an e n e m y; t h ey died like flies in a c a mp w h e r e, u n a t t a c k ed and undisturbed, t h ey w e re enabled to live in c o m p a r a t i ve luxury. Discouragement, distrust in their c o m m a n d e r s, disorganization e n s u e d, n ot so m u ch a m o ng t he E n g lish, w ho suffered less and w ho h a ve m o re p o w er of e n d u r a n c e, as a m o ng the F r e n c h, w h o se national c h a r a c t er is m o re apt to give w ay to such in fluences, especially while their c o m m a n d e rs hold t h em in a state of inactivity. 20 15 B ut t h e re w as visible in t he riots t h at actually b r o ke o ut a m o ng t he F r e n ch t r o o p s, t he natural effect of t he a b n o r m al state in w h i ch t h ey h a ve existed since 1849. T he F r e n ch soldier has b e en t a u g ht by t he Bourgeoisie he r e s c u ed from t he terrors of t he revolution, to look u p on himself as t he savior of his c o u n t ry a nd of society at large. He has b e en p e t t ed by L o u is B o n a p a r te as t he i n s t r u m e nt t h at r e s t o r ed t he E m p i r e. He w as t r e a t ed all the while in a w ay w h i ch taught him to c o m m a nd a nd m a de him forget to o b e y. Superior as he w as instructed to consider himself to civilians, he v e ry s o on got a notion t h at he w as at least equal to his c o m m a n d e r s. E v e ry effort w as used to m a ke him a pretorian, and all history s h o ws t h at pretoriane are b ut degenerate soldiers. T h ey begin by c o m m a n d i ng to t he civilians, t h ey n e xt p r o c e ed to dictating to their generals, and t h ey e nd by being thoroughly thrashed. 25 N ow look at w h at o c c u r r ed at V a r n a. W h en w h o le battalions d r o p p ed d o wn on t he burning s a n d s, writhing in t he agonies of cholera, t he old soldiers b e g an to c o m p a re t he a d v e n t u r e rs w ho n ow are at their head, w i th the old c o m m a n d e rs that led t h em successfully t h r o u gh t h o se v e ry African c a m paigns w h i ch the h e r o es of t he m o d e rn L o w er E m p i re affect so m u ch to disdain. Africa w as a hotter c o u n t ry t h an Bulgaria, a nd t he S a h a ra is a good deal less pleasant t h an e v en the D o b r o d j a; b ut no such mortalities e v er m a r k ed t he p a t hs of African c o n q u e st as a t t e n d ed t he r e p o se of D e v n a, and the e a sy reconnoitering m a r c h es a r o u nd K u s t e n d j e. Cavaignac, B e d e a u, Changarnier, L a m o r i c i è re led t h em t h r o u gh greater d a n g e r s, with far less loss, at a time w h en E s p i n a s se and L e r oy St. A r n a ud w e re still buried in the obscurity from which political infamies only could raise t h e m. Accordingly the Z o u a v e s, t he m en w ho h ad d o ne m o st w o rk and smelt m o st p o w d e r, t he b e st r e p r e s e n t a t i v es of the African a r m y, r o se in a b o dy and s h o u t e d: "A b as les singes! Il n o us faut L a m o r i c i è r e !" D o wn w i th t he a p e s! give us 30 35 40 505 Friedrich Engeis L a m o r i c i è r e! H is Imperial Majesty, N a p o l e on I I I, t he h e ad a nd soul of this actual official apery of a great past, m u st have felt w h en this c a me to his k n o w l e d ge t h at t he cry of the Z o u a v es w as for h im " t he beginning of t he e n d ." At V a r n a, it h ad a magic effect. We m ay say it w as t he chief c a u se of t he expedition to t he Crimea. After the experience of this s u m m e r 's campaigning, or r a t h er p r o m e n a d ing, from Gallipoli to Scutari, from Scutari to V a r n a, from V a r na to Devna, A l a d yn a nd b a ck again, n o b o dy will e x p e ct us to treat seriously t he p r e t e x ts p ut forth by t he allied c o m m a n d e r s, why the expedition, after being so long delayed, w as finally so hurriedly u n d e r t a k e n. O ne instance will sufficiently s h ow w h at their arguments are worth. T he delay w as owing, it w as said, to t he F r e n ch siege artillery n ot having arrived. Well, w h en t he cholera riots o c c u r r e d, a nd L e r oy St. A r n a ud saw t h at he m u st n ow play his b e st c a rd a nd t h at without delay, he sent to Constantinople for T u r k i sh siege artillery and ammunition, and it was got r e a dy and e m b a r k ed in a v e ry short t i m e; a nd if the F r e n ch siege train had not arrived in the m e an time, t h ey w o u ld h a ve sailed without it. B ut t he T u r k i sh siege artillery w as r e a dy m a ny a m o n th b e f o r e, and thus all the delays that had o c c u r r ed are p r o v ed to h a ve b e en needless. 5 10 15 25 20 T h us we see that this grandiloquent expedition to t he C r i m e a, with six h u n d r ed ships and sixty t h o u s a nd soldiers, with t h r ee siege-trains and n o b o dy k n o ws h ow m a ny field-pieces, instead of being t he deliberate result of skillful m o v e m e n t s, prepared scientifically long b e f o r e h a n d, is nothing b ut a hurried coup de tête, u n d e r t a k en to save L e r oy Saint A r n a ud from being m a s s a c r ed by his o wn soldiers; p o or old soft L o rd Raglan n ot being the m an to resist, especially as any longer delay w o u ld bring his a r my d o wn to the s a me state of discipline and d e s p o n d e n cy which h as already seized t he F r e n ch t r o o p s. T he tony of events, as a G e r m an writer has it, is still at w o rk in c o n t e m p o r a ry as m u ch as in p a st history, and poor L o rd Raglan is its p r e s e nt victim. As to L e r oy Saint A r n a u d, n o b o dy e v er t r e a t ed him as a c o m m a n d e r. He is a m e m b er of the swell-mob of t oo long standing—this notorious old c o m p a n i on of female thieves and swindlers—this w o r t hy a c o lyte of t he m an w h om " D e b t, not D e s t i n y ," hurried on to t he expedition of Boulogne. In spite of the censorship, his c h a r a c t er a nd a n t e c e d e n ts are k n o wn well e n o u gh in gossiping Paris. T he twice c a s h i e r ed Lieutenant—the Captain w ho r o b b ed the regimental cash-box w h en P a y m a s t er in Africa, is k n o wn well enough, and w h a t e v er he may accomplish in t he Crimea, his successful expedition to a L o n d on p a w n - s h op w i th his landlady's b l a n k e t s, followed up by his well-executed retreat to Paris, will still f o rm his chief title to military glory. B ut poor Raglan, the D u ke of Wellington's Adjutant- 40 General, a m an g r o wn h o a ry a m o ng the theoretical labors a nd m i n u te details 30 35 506 The Attack on Sevastopol of a staff-command, no doubt actually believes in t he m o t i v es he gives for his actions. A nd u p on him falls t he full weight of t he curious fact t h at t he w h o le of the campaign has b e en so scientifically p l a n n e d, so skillfully execut ed, t h at t en t h o u s a nd m e n, or a b o ut o ne in seven, died before t h ey saw an e n e m y, a nd that the w h o le of t h e se elaborate proceedings h a ve served only to bring a b o ut a heiter skelter expedition into t he C r i m ea at the close of t he season. T h e re is nothing so pungent as this v e ry " i r o ny of e v e n t s ." F or all t h at the expedition m ay be successful. T he allies almost d e s e r ve it, for nothing would hold up to greater c o n t e m pt the w ay in which t h ey h a ve previously carried on the campaign. So m u ch fuss, s u ch an e x p e n d i t u re of caution, s u ch a profusion of science, against an e n e my w ho s u c c u m bs to an u n d e r t a k i ng w h i ch has for its e n d, n ot his destruction, b ut t he p r e s e r v a t i on of their o wn a r m y; this would be t he greatest c o n d e m n a t i on t he allies could p a ss u p on t h e m s e l v e s. B ut t h e n, t h ey are n ot y et in Sevastopol. T h ey h a ve l a n d ed at E u p a t o r ia and at S t a r o ye Ukreplienie. T h e n ce t h ey h a ve re spectively fifty and t w e n ty miles m a r ch to Sevastopol. Their h e a vy artillery is to be landed close to t he latter place, to s a ve t he trouble of land-carriage; t he landing t h en is far from completed. T he force of the Russians is not exactly k n o w n, b ut t h e re is no d o u bt it is large e n o u gh to allow t h em to be stronger t h an the allies on m o st points in the immediate vicinity of Sevas topol. T he hilly ground and t he b ay cutting into t he land s o me ten miles d e e p, will force the allies to e x p a nd on a v e ry long line as soon as they a t t e m pt to invest t he fortress. To b r e ak their line cannot, with a determined c o m m a n d e r, be a m a t t er of great difficulty. We do not of c o u r se k n ow w h at t he land-defenses of t he place a r e; b ut w h at we k n ow of old Menchikoff, leads us to p r e s u me t h at he will n ot h a ve lost his t i m e. 5 10 15 20 25 T he first attack, we are led to believe from s t a t e m e n ts in t he British journals, a nd from the line of operations c h o s en by t he allies, will be the fort c o m m a n d i ng the t o wn from a hill on the n o r th side. This is called by t he 30 Russians S e v e r n a ya K r e p o s t, t he N o r t h e rn F o r t. If this fort is anything like solidly c o n s t r u c t e d, it is capable of lengthy r e s i s t a n c e. It is a large square r e d o u b t, caponnière, c o n s t r u c t ed u p on M o n t a l e m b e r t 's polygonal, or s y s t e m, the flanking defense being f o r m ed by a low c a s e m a t ed w o rk lying at t he b o t t om of the ditch in t he middle of e a ch side of t he square, a nd sweeping the ditch b o th right a nd left. T h e se w o r ks h a ve the advantage of not being e x p o s ed to t he direct fire of the e n e my until he has c o me with his w o r ks to the v e ry brink of the ditch. T he proximity of this w o rk to the main fortress allows it to be m a de u se of offensively as a support a nd b a se for strong sorties, and altogether its p r e s e n ce m u st force the allies to confine their main operations to the n o r t h e rn shore of the bay. 35 40 B ut the experience of B o m a r s u nd has taught us that nothing certain c an 507 Friedrich Engels be said a b o ut R u s s i an fortifications until t h ey are actually put to t he test. T he c h a n c es of success for the C r i m e an expedition c a n n o t, t h e r e f o r e, n ow be ascertained with any probability. But this m u ch is p r e t ty certain, t h at if the operations should be of a protracted character, if the setting in of winter should c a u se a fresh irruption of sickness, if the t r o o ps should be w a s t ed in hurried and u n p r e p a r ed a t t a c k s, like those of the R u s s i a ns against Silistria, t he F r e n ch a r m y, and m o st likely t he T u r k i sh a r m y, will r e l a p se into t h at state of dissolution w h i ch t he former u n d e r w e nt at V a r n a, a nd t he latter has m o re t h an o n ce exhibited in Asia. T he English are sure to hold t o g e t h er longer; b ut t h e re is a point at w h i ch e v en the b e st disciplined t r o o ps give w a y. This is t he real danger for t he allies, a nd if t he Russian resistance brings this state of things about, it m u st m a ke a r e ë m b a r k a t i on b e f o re a victorious e n e my a v e ry h a z a r d o us thing. T he expedition m ay v e ry likely p r o ve successful; but on the o t h er hand, it m ay turn o ut a second W a l c h e r e n. 5 10 508 Friedrich Engels The News from the Crimea The News from the Crimea. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4211, 17. Oktober 1854 5 O ur c o l u m ns this morning are filled w i th the stirring n e ws of sanguinary battles in t he Crimea, including t he c a p t u re of S e v a s t o p o l, t he destruction of its principal forts a nd of a great p a rt of t he R u s s i an fleet, a nd the final s u r r e n d er of Prince Menchikoff, a nd the r e m a i ns of his defeated a nd m o re t h an decimated forces as p r i s o n e rs of w a r. If t h e se r e p o r ts a re strictly correct, for nearly forty y e a rs t he world h as witnessed no such gigantic b l o o d s h e d, nor any martial e v e nt p r e g n a nt w i th c o n s e q u e n c es so m o m e n t o u s. As to t he c o r r e c t n e ss of the n e w s, t h at is a point on which some light 10 m ay p e r h a ps be t h r o wn by carefully separating w h at we k n ow officially a nd positively from w h at we h a ve only from v a g ue a nd u n c e r t a in sources. 20 We m u s t, t h e n, distinguish the s t a t e m e n ts into t wo classes—those relating to t he battle of t he Alma, fought on Sept. 20, and t h o se announcing t he c a p t u re of Sevastopol itself. A c c o r d i ng to the dispatches of L o rd Raglan and 15 M a r s h al St. A r n a u d, t he allied armies on t he 20th s t o r m ed the R u s s i an in t r e n c h ed c a mp on the hights to the s o u th of the river A l m a, and forced t he R u s s i a ns to retreat. T he British t o ok t wo g u n s. T he F r e n c h, in their dispatch, mention no trophies at all. T he F r e n ch loss w as a b o ut 1,400; British t he s a m e. T he R u s s i a ns w e re estimated at 45,000 to 50,000 m e n; their loss at 4,000 to 6,000. T h e se dispatches are evidently w r i t t en in the full flush of a m a i d en victory. T he 50,000 R u s s i a ns p r e s e nt on t he A l ma contrast very strongly with the 45,000 troops w h i ch w e re said to be t he m a x i m um of w h at w as spread over t he length and b r e a d th of t he Crimea. T he t wo g u ns t a k en in an in t r e n c h ed c a m p, d e f e n d ed by a " n u m e r o us h e a vy artillery," look like v e ry insignificant trophies w h en it is c o n s i d e r ed t h at it is a l m o st impossible to s a ve guns o ut of field-fortifications w h en o n ce carried. Still m o re o m i n o us is Marshal St. A r n a u d 's silence a b o ut t he taking of guns by t he F r e n c h. S u p p o s ing Menchikoff had actually c o n c e n t r a t ed 45,000 to 50,000 m en in the in t r e n c h ed c a mp on t he Alma, w h at w o u ld it p r o v e? Either t h at he h ad far m o re 25 509 Friedrich Engels t r o o ps t h an w as e x p e c t e d, being able to bring so m a ny to t he o p en field, or t h at t he fortifications of Sevastopol w e re so w e ak on t he land side t h at he could n ot hold the p l a c e, e x c e pt by defeating the allies in the o p en field; or, thirdly, t h at he m a de a t r e m e n d o us mistake in exposing his t r o o ps to an o p en battle, a nd to t he demoralisation c o n s e q u e nt u p on a decisive defeat. 5 If we are to t r u st the earlier reports the R u s s i an c a mp on the A l ma m u s t e r ed n ot m o re t h an 10,000 men. T h e se might h a ve b e en reënf o r c e d, b ut to bring t h em up e v en to 25,000 or 30,000 m en t he R u s s i a ns m u st h a ve m a de considerable effort. With 50,000 m en within easy r e a ch of t he Alma, or within fifteen miles of the place of landing, h ow are we to a c c o u nt for their n ot having p o u n c ed u p on t he allies in t he v e ry act of d e b a r k a t i o n? T he c o u n t ry b e t w e en the Old F o r t, w h e re the allies landed, a nd Sevastopol is intersected by t h r ee w a t e r - c o u r s e s, forming, by their d e ep r a v i n e s, as m a ny military positions. T he o ne n e a r e st to Sevastopol is the T s h o r n a y a, e m p t y i ng itself into the e a s t e rn e nd of t he b ay of Sevastopol. While F o rt S e v e r n a ya defends the n o r t h e rn shore of this b a y, t h at rivulet, or r a t h er its deeply-cut valley f o r ms a sort of natural ditch on t he east of t he t o w n. T h e r e, t h e n, is naturally the last important position for the defense. T he n e xt river is t he K a t s h a, r u n n i ng e a st and w e st a few miles to t he n o r th of S e v e r n a y a; a nd again a b o ut twelve miles to the n o r t h w a rd r u ns the A l m a. Of the t h r ee lines of defense, in spite of tactical advantages w h i ch m ay exist, and w h i ch c a n n ot be judged at this distance, it is hardly to be supposed that t he R u s s i a ns should h a ve c h o s en t he first a nd t he r e m o t e st for a pitched battle in w h i ch t he fate of S e v a s t o p ol could h a ve b e en decided. T he a b s e n ce of the m a in b o dy of t he allied cavalry, h o w e v e r, might h a ve e n c o u r a g ed t he R u s s i a ns to send a strong corps into the intrenchments of the A l m a, as their o wn m o m e n t a ry superiority in t h at a rm would secure t h em against flank m o v e m e n ts of t he hostile h o r s e. T he impossibility of making u se of this arm w h en o n ce c o o p ed up in S e v a s t o p ol m ay h a ve acted as an i n d u c e m e n t. 10 15 20 25 T he R u s s i an defeat on the A l ma b e c o m es still m o re r e d u c ed in its tactical e x t e nt w h en more closely examined. T he Russians are not fond of en trenching t h e m s e l v es in o p en walls. T h ey prefer, w h e r e v er t h ey h a ve time a nd intend furious resistance, closed square r e d o u b t s. To save t he artillery from such r e d o u b ts is impossible, as soon as the assault is actually carried through. B ut e v en f r om t h at class of w o r k s, technically k n o wn as l u n e t t e s, o p en at the gorge, t h e re is almost no c h a n ce of saving artillery in t he face of a storming e n e m y. F o r, if t he guns be w i t h d r a wn at t he v e ry m o m e nt of t he assault, t he defense deprives itself of its o wn w e a p o n; the ditch o n ce c r o s s e d, w ho is to drag t he guns from t he e m b a n k m e n ts or t he platform, w ho to re-limber t h em and drive off u n d er the close fire of the e n e m y? " G u ns in e n t r e n c h m e n ts must be considered as lost w h en t he e n t r e n c h m e n ts t h e m- 30 35 40 510 The News from the Crimea selves c an no longer be held ; the only thing y ou c an do is to sell t h em as dearly as possible"—says General Dufour in his M a n u al of Field Fortifications. T he fact t h at t he Russians lost b ut t wo guns is a proof t h at the c a mp w as n ot defended to t he last extremity, and that, p e r h a p s, only o ne or t wo en- t r e n c h m e n ts w e re actually t a k en at the point of t he b a y o n e t. T he r e m a i n d er c a n n ot h a ve b e en defended with t h at a r m, b ut must h a ve b e en all b ut aban d o n e d, before the storming column w e re in the ditch. T he retreat of t he Russians a p p e a rs to h a ve b e en e x e c u t ed in good o r d e r; their cavalry would p r o t e ct t h e m, and t he impossibility of bodies of allied cavalry rapidly c r o s s- ing t he A l ma and ravine, would give t h em an a d v a n t a g e. B ut then, t he saving of almost all their artillery is a sufficient proof t h at t h ey b r o ke off t he battle b e f o re any great b l ow h ad t h r o wn t h em into disorder. This is all we k n ow a b o ut the victory on t he hights to t he s o u th of the A l ma w h i ch w as a n n o u n c ed in E n g l a nd on the 1st inst. by t he t h u n d er of c a n n on a nd the ringing of bells, proclaimed at t he R o y al E x c h a n ge on S a t u r d ay evening, Sept. 30, at 10 o'clock by t he L o rd M a y o r, p r e c e d ed by a t r u m p e t er sounding his bugle; c h e e r ed at the t h e a t e r s, and registered by The London Times as t he anticipated effect of t he A r c h b i s h op of C a n t e r b u r y 's thanksgiv ings p r a y e r. C o r r e s p o n d e n ts a n n o u n ce t h at M a r s h al St. A r n a ud h ad b e en u n a b le to m o u nt on h o r s e b a c k. Historians relate t he s a me of N a p o l e on at the battle of W a t e r l o o. T he victory of the A l ma w as p e r h a ps d ue to the same c i r c u m s t a n ce as t he defeat of W a t e r l o o. 5 10 15 20 25 We c o me n ow to the class of m o re startling n e ws referring to the capture of Sevastopol. T he first a n n o u n c e m e nt of this e v e nt [that] r e a c h ed L o n d on from B u c h a r e st by telegraph, is dated from the latter t o w n, Sept. 28. It stated t h at Sevastopol h ad fallen into t he h a n ds of t he allies after a c o m b i n ed attack by sea and by land. It p u r p o r t ed to be derived in t he first place from a F r e n ch s t e a m er dispatched from Sevastopol to Constantinople with this intelligence, w h i ch steamer w as fallen in with by another F r e n ch steamer en r o u te for 30 V a r n a. If t he c a p t u re of the fortresses t o ok place on t he 25th, as is asserted, t he n e ws could h a ve r e a c h ed V a r na in the night from the 26th to t he 27th, and could h a ve b e en c o n v e y ed to B u c h a r e st by n o on on the 28th—the dis t a n ce b e t w e en V a r na and B u c h a r e st being s o m e w h at m o re than 100 miles, and generally t r a v e r s ed by couriers in 24 h o u r s. T h is w as the n e ws on which 35 B o n a p a r te founded his a d d r e ss to the c a mp of Boulogne, w h i ch will be found in another column. B ut it t u r ns out t h at no courier arrived at B u c h a r e st before S e p t e m b er 30. T he s e c o nd n e ws of the fall of Sevastopol, which is at least within topographical probability, is only d a t ed from B u c h a r e st at t he v e ry d ay on w h i ch B o n a p a r te m a de his a n n o u n c e m e n t. This telegraphic dispatch, received by t he Austrian G o v e r n m e nt at 6 P.M. on Oct. 1, and c o m m u n i c a t ed to The Times by t he T u r k i sh Minister at L o n d on on t he 3d, is published by 40 511 Friedrich Engels t he Moniteur of t he same day, with t he r e m a rk t h at "it h ad b e en f o r w a r d ed to the F r e n ch G o v e r n m e nt by M. de Buoi, w ho had c o m m a n d ed M. de H ü b n er to congratulate t he F r e n ch E m p e r o r, in the n a me of t he E m p e r or of Austria, on the glorious success w h i ch had attended t he F r e n ch a r ms in t he C r i m e a ." It should be observed t h at t he value of this intelligence entirely r e s ts u p on t he verbal s t a t e m e nt of the courier sent from Constantinople to O m er P a s h a, w h i ch courier, n ot finding O m er P a s ha at B u c h a r e s t, started again for Silistria, w h e re O m er P a s ha t h en h ad his q u a r t e r s. A c c o r d i ng to t he s t a t e m e nt of this courier, Sevastopol h ad b e en t a k e n, 18,000 R u s s i a ns killed, 22,000 m a de prisoners, F o rt Constantine d e s t r o y e d, t he other forts with 800 guns c a p t u r e d, six Russian ships-of-war sunk, a nd P r i n ce M e n c h i koff retired to t he h e ad of the bay, with the r e m a i n d er of t he s q u a d r o n, declaring t h at he would blow t h em up rather t h an m a ke an unconditional surrender. T he allies h ad allowed him six h o u rs for consideration. C o n stantinople w as to be illuminated for ten d a ys 5 10 15 20 After w h at we h a ve witnessed of Russian fortifications at Aland, a nd after t he s u c c e ss of t he allies on t he Alma, a s u r r e n d er of S e v a s t o p ol within something like a fortnight offered strong probabilities. B ut w ho c an think of an a r my of 50,000 m en having had t he good f o r t u ne to save a l m o st all its artillery o ut of a lost battle, c o m m a n d ed by the m o st daring officer w ho h as y et a p p e a r ed on t he R u s s i an side during this campaign, w ho c an think of s u ch an a r my laying d o wn their a r ms after the first a t t a ck on t he t o w n? N e v e r t h e less, this w ar h as already offered such improbabüities a nd e x t r a o r d i n a ry f e a t u r e s, t h at we m u st n ot be reluctant to " m a r ch from surprise to s u r p r i s e ," as N a p o l e on did at t he receipt of Sebastiani's d i s p a t c h es from C o n- 25 stantinople in 1807. T he allies h a ve d o ne everything t h r o u g h o ut the w ar to m e et with an u n p r e c e d e n t ed disaster. W hy should it n ot h a ve pleased fortune to force u p on t h em a triumph without c o m p a r i s o n? H i s t o r y, n e v er w i t h o ut a grain of irony, p e r h a ps desired to r e s e r ve to t he world t he curious t r e at of lodging in a m o d e st t o w er of the B o s p h o r us that old M u s c o v i te R o d o m o n te w ho b ut a y e ar ago left the capital of the dying m an with t he p r o ud t h r e at of swallowing up his e m p i r e. W h at a bitter p u n i s h m e nt for the p r o ud and arrogant Menchikoff, t he fomenter and beginner of t he war, to r e t u rn to Constantinople a prisoner! 30 If this courier spoke truth, the history of the C r i m e an c a m p a i gn m ay be r e s u m ed in a v e ry few w o r d s: On t he 14th a nd 16th t he a r my l a n d ed at Old F o rt w i t h o ut meeting r e s i s t a n c e; on the 19th it m a r c h e d; on t he 20th it w on the battle of the Alma, and on the 25th c a p t u r ed Sevastopol. 35 T he n e xt steamer d ue from Liverpool is the Africa, w h i ch c o m es directly to this port, and d o es not t o u ch at Halifax. We c an h a r d ly e x p e ct h er to arrive before F r i d a y, till w h en we c a n n ot h o pe for absolute certainty on this m o st 40 512 The News from the Crimea interesting question. Meanwhile it will p r o b a b ly be most fashionable to believe implicitly the w h o le story of this T u r k i sh courier, and we h o pe that t h o se w ho t h us receive it m ay not be t a k en d o wn as m u ch as our friend Louis B o n a p a r te w as at Boulogne on the same subject. T h at imperial gentleman, as our r e a d e rs m ay see by referring to another p a rt of this paper, proclaimed the intelligence at a review the other morning, in a r a t h er melodramatic style, in t he clear and positive w o r ds Sevastopol est prise. As he said this h e, p e r h a p s, a p p e a r ed to himself a real N a p o l e on announcing a great victory to his t r o o p s. Unfortunately for t he n e p h e w, t he uncle n e v er stood in need of announcing a victory: he fought his o wn b a t t l e s, and his soldiers, w ho saw the e n e my fly, required no confirmation. M o re unfortunately, the a n n o u n c e m e nt of w h i ch L o u is B o n a p a r te could n ot withhold h ad to be qualified in t he evening by t he Sous-Préfet of Boulogne, w ho p l a c a r d ed a statement t h at some dispatch had arrived stating the c a p t u re of Sevastopol, b ut that its c o r r e c t n e ss could not be v o u c h ed for. T he E m p e r or of the F r e n ch was t h us corrected by his o wn Sous-Préfet of Boulogne ! It is a striking circumstance also, t h at t he official journal of t he F r e n ch G o v e r n m e nt of Oct. 3, t he latest, d a t e, contains no confirmation of the r e p o r t ed great e v e n t. Still it m ay all t r ue enough, a nd we wait with intense interest for positive in- prove telligence. 5 10 15 20 513 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels The Sevastopol Hoax The Sevastopol Hoax. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4215, 21. Oktober 1854 " C a t ch a T a r t a r ," is an English p r o v e r b. It h a p p e ns t h at n ot only t he English, b ut t he F r e n ch and Austrians as well, h a ve b e en caught by a Tartar. We m a y, p e r h a p s, be p a r d o n ed for expressing a little satisfaction that The Tribune and t h o se of its r e a d e rs w ho carefully follow t he c o u r se of t he p r e s e nt campaign in the C r i m e a, w e re n ot caught with the rest. W h en the extraordinary story of the c a p t u re of S e v a s t o p ol first r e a c h ed u s, we e n d e a v o r ed to show, by an examination of t he alleged channels of the intelligence, as well as on critical military g r o u n d s, t h at the victory of t he Alma, h o w e v er decisive it might h a ve b e e n, could scarcely h a ve b e en followed in so close succession by the surrender of the object of the cam paign. B ut we think we established, at the same time, t he fact t h at no v e ry decisive victory h ad b e en gained at all by the allies, the R u s s i a ns having retired in g o od order with all their guns. Lastly, we t o ok particular c a re to point o ut h ow t he w h o le statement, in so far as it e x c e e d ed the limits of the official r e p o rt on t he battle of t he Alma, rested exclusively on t he verbal relation of a T a r t ar sent to O m er P a s ha with sealed d i s p a t c h e s. T h us we w e re fully p r e p a r ed for receiving t he n e ws t h at t he t r e m e n d o us " F a ll of S e v a s t o p o l" w as nothing b ut an imaginary exaggeration of t he victory of t he A l m a, r e p o r t ed by a j o c o se T a r t ar at B u c h a r e s t, a n n o u n c ed by t he melodramatic Louis N a p o l e on at Boulogne, and implicitly believed by t h at excellent speci m en of h u m a n i t y, t he English shopkeeper. T he English p r e ss in general has p r o v ed a w o r t hy representative of that class, and it w o u ld s e em t h at the v e ry n a me of Sevastopol n e ed only be p r o n o u n c ed in E n g l a nd to p ut e v e r y b o dy in a fool's p a r a d i s e. P e r h a ps our r e a d e rs will recollect t h at at t he close of t he last Parliamentary session the destruction of S e v a s t o p ol w as a n n o u n c ed by L o rd J o hn Russell to be in the plans of the English G o v e r n m e n t, w h i ch a n n o u n c e m e n t, t h o u gh in t he s a me sitting duly r e c a n t e d, k e pt t he h o n o r a b le m e m b e rs five h o u rs in a fool's paradise—to u se the w o r ds of M r. Disraeli, 5 10 15 20 25 514 The Sevastopol Hoax u t t e r ed on t h at occasion. The London Times h as n ow written no less t h an nine l e a d e r s, by actual c o u n t, all c o n c e i v e d, bona fide or mala fide, in this identical fool's p a r a d i s e; all, as it w o u ld a p p e a r, only with a view to entrap Sir Charles Napier into a headlong attack u p on C r o n s t a dt or S w e a b o r g. 5 Affecting to be d r u nk with glory a nd flushed with success, t h at journal e v en p r o c e e d ed to bombard—in imagination of course—the Prussian coasts on the Baltic, as well as King B o m ba at N a p l e s, and t he G r a nd D u ke of T u s c a n y, at L e g h o r n. In fact it w as r e a dy to m a ke w ar on all the world, n ot omitting " t he rest of m a n k i n d ," of c o u r s e. 10 T he actual state of the land fortifications of S e v a s t o p ol is too little k n o wn to admit of any positive prognostication as to h ow long that fortress m ay be able to hold o u t. T he s u c c e ss on the A l ma is an almost certain indication t h at the place will be t a k e n, as it must h a ve raised the courage a nd spirit of the allied t r o o p s, and will p r o ve a powerful p r e v e n t i ve against sickness—the 15 m o st dangerous e n e my t h ey h a ve to deal with in t he Crimea, and o ne which is r e p o r t ed to be already at work. B ut it is foolish to e x p e ct that the allies should walk into Sevastopol as t h ey w o u ld into a coffee-house. After the great mystification of the c o n q u e st of the place, with its 30,000 killed a nd w o u n d ed and 22,000 prisoners—a mystification w h o se like w as never k n o wn in all the history of hoaxes—it w o u ld be natural to e x p e ct that the real official d o c u m e n ts w o u ld at least p o s s e ss the merit of affording clear and positive information as far as they go. Still t he r e p o rt published in L o n d on on t he 5th of O c t o b er in an extraordinary n u m b er of The Gazette, and copied in o ur columns this morning, is, after all, n ot free from ambiguous expressions. Indeed, it is most o p en to criticism—a c i r c u m s t a n ce which must be ascribed to its proceeding from L o rd Stratford de Redcliffe, o ne of the Palmerston school of diplomacy. This dispatch, in t he first place, purports to h a ve b e en sent to England from B u c h a r e st on the 30th of S e p t e m b er at 3 V2 P.M., while L o rd Redcliffe d a t es it from Constantinople on t he 30th at 9V2 P . M .; so t h at the dispatch purports to h a ve b e en actually received at B u c h a r e st six h o u rs before it w as sent off from Constantinople. In the second place, the dispatch omits all mention of w h at p a s s ed in t he Crimea b e t w e en the 20th and 28th of S e p t e m b e r, telling us t h at " t he allied armies established their basis of operations at Balaklava on t he morning of the 28th, and w e re preparing to m a r ch w i t h o ut delay to Sevastopol. T he A g a m e m n on (with Admiral L y o n s) a nd other vessels of war w e re in t he B ay of Balaklava. T h e re w e re facilities t h e re for disembarking t he battering t r a i n ." A s s u m i ng this dispatch to be exact, t he English p r e ss has naturally c o n c l u d ed that the allied armies h ad p a s s ed the Belbek and S e v e r n a y a, forced the hights at the b a ck of t he B ay of Sevastopol, and p e n e t r a t ed in a straight line to t he Bay of Balaklava. We h a ve here to o b s e r ve that, on military g r o u n d s, it is incon- 20 25 30 35 40 515 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels ceivable t h at an a r my in possession of the hights c o m m a n d i ng Sevastopol should quietly d e s c e nd from them on the other side, in order to m a r ch to a b ay e l e v en miles distant, for no other p u r p o se t h an to " e s t a b l i sh a b a se of o p e r a t i o n s ." On t he other h a n d, it is quite conceivable t h at Admiral L y o ns should go a r o u nd C a pe C h e r s o n e se with a portion of t he fleet for t he p u r p o se of securing a harbor of refuge, at o n ce close to S e v a s t o p ol and adapted to t he d e b a r k a t i on of the siege artillery, which, we h a ve always c o n t e n d e d, had n ot before b e en landed. T he guns, of c o u r s e, would n ot be landed without a protecting force, w h i ch may h a ve b e en either d e t a c h ed from t he main b o dy of the a r my after landing at Old F o r t, or m ay consist of a p o r t i on of the r e s e r ve shipped from Constantinople a nd V a r n a. T he n ew dispatch further states that " P r i n ce Menchikoff w as in the field at t he h e ad of 20,000 m e n, expecting r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s ." H e n ce the English p a p e rs conclude that the Russians m u st h a ve lost 25,000 to 30,000 m en in t he c o m b a ts b e t w e en Sept. 20 and 28, assuming with L o rd Raglan t h at they w e re from 45,000 to 50,000 strong in the battle of the A l m a. We h a ve p r e viously stated our prima facie disbelief in t h e se n u m b e r s, and h a ve n e v er allowed m o re t h an a b o ut 25,000 m en to Prince Menchikoff, disposable for field operations, and in this it t u r ns out that we w e re within t he m a rk of t he R u s s i an s t a t e m e n t s. T he dispatch next p r o c e e ds to state that " t he fortified place of A n a pa has b e en b u r n ed by the Russians. Its garrison was marching to the scene of a c t i o n ." We c a n n ot believe this n e ws to be true. If Prince Menchikoff e x p e c ts a ny r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts at all to r e a ch him in time, t h ey c an do so m u ch better from P e r e k op than from A n a p a, w h i ch is nearly t wo h u n d r ed miles distant; if n o ne could be e x p e c t ed by him from t he former place, it w o u ld h a ve b e en m o st foolish, by calling up the garrison of A n a p a, on t he o t h er side of the B l a ck Sea, to sacrifice in addition to Sevastopol the last stronghold u p on t he C a u c a s u s. It will be seen, t h e n, that with all the " i n f o r m a t i o n" of this official dispatch, we are still sent b a ck to the battle of t he A l ma as the chief e v e nt w h o se authenticity m u st be admitted. Of this event, h o w e v e r, the details are also still wanting, and the D u ke of N e w c a s t le has n ow w a r n ed t he British public that t h ey m u st n ot e x p e ct to receive t h em before M o n d a y, Oct. 9. All t h at we h a ve learned, in addition to t he official r e p o rt by telegraph from L o rd Raglan, a m o u n ts to this: T h at the hero of the L o n d on p a w n - s h o p, M a r s h al St. A r n a u d, w as " i n d i s p o s e d" on t he day of battle—(who e v er h e a rd t he like of other heroes?)—that L o rd Raglan had the chief c o m m a n d, that the English loss w as not 1,400 b ut 2,000, including 96 officers, a nd that already six steamers w i th w o u n d ed had arrived at Constantinople. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 T he m o v e m e n ts of O m er P a s h a 's army, which is directed from B u c h a r e st a nd Wallachia, by w ay of R u s t c h u k, Silistria and Oltenitza, to t he c o a st of 40 516 f ci» The Sevastopol Hoax the Black Sea, a p p e ar to confirm the r e p o rt t h at the allied c o m m a n d e rs in t he Crimea h a ve asked for reënf o r c e m e n t s. B ut this retreat of the T u r ks from Wallachia m ay also be attributed to Austria's desire to k e ep them from e v e ry r o ad in t he direction of Bessarabia, e x c e pt t he impracticable one t h r o u gh the 5 Dobrodja. In the e n o r m o us credulity of w h i ch the English public h a ve given us such imposing proofs, it deserves to be noted t h at t he L o n d on E x c h a n ge was very little caught by the general e n t h u s i a s m, t he rise in the funds having n e v er e x c e e d ed 5/8 per cent. At Paris, h o w e v e r, t he r e n t es r o se immediately IV2 p er cent., a rise which, after all, is insignificant w h en c o m p a r ed with the rise of 10 p er cent, after the defeat of W a t e r l o o. T h us the h o a x, if, as is possible, it w as invented for commercial p u r p o s e s, has altogether failed to realize t he great results its a u t h o rs m u st h a ve c o u n t ed on. 10 517 Karl Marx/F ri ed ri eh Engels The Sevastopol Hoax—General N e ws New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4215, 21.Oktober 1854 The Sevastopol Hoax—General News. C o r r e s p o n d e n ce of the N . Y. T r i b u n e. L o n d o n, F r i d a y, Oct. 6, 1854. It is impossible to describe the excitement and suspense of the English during the week. On S a t u r d ay last the dispatch about t he victory of t he Alma w as proclaimed by the L o rd M a y or before the E x c h a n g e, with the sound of the t r u m p e t; b ut t he u n a u t h e n t i c a t ed n e ws of the fall of Sevastopol spread all over the country. All the world w as taken in. N a p o l e on a n n o u n c ed it to his a r my at Boulogne, the English and F r e n ch p a p e rs c o n t a i n ed leaders on the h a p py e v e n t, the E m p e r or of Austria congratulated the E m p e r or and the Q u e en u p on their s u c c e s s, b ut cautiously did n ot m e n t i on S e v a s t o p o l; bon fires w e re lighted, and t he c a n n on b o o m e d. We soon o b t a i n ed t he dispatch w h i ch originated all this joy and exultation; and indeed it p r o v ed to p r o c e ed from a v e ry suspicious source. A Tartar—that is'to say, a T u r k i sh p o s t m a n- h ad arrived at B u c h a r e st with dispatches from Constantinople for O m er P a s h a, w h i c h, as the General w as absent, h ad to be sent to him unopened— t h e r e f o re we d o n 't k n ow their contents. B ut t he p o s t m an related that at his d e p a r t u re from Constantinople the t o wn w as illuminated, and that o r d e rs w e re given to continue t he illumination for ten d a y s. He c o n c l u d e d, t h e r e fore, t h at Sevastopol w as taken, and gave just such details as a T u r k i sh or L o n d on p o s t b oy could give in a p o t h o u s e. He m e n t i o n ed 18,000 R u s s i a ns killed, b ut only 200 guns t a k e n, though the forts contain a b o ve 500 g u n s; 22,000 Russians w e re of c o u r se prisoners, since it w as k n o wn t h at the garri son a m o u n t ed to about 40,000. T he fleet w as first t a k e n; t h en again a portion of it w as destroyed, and Prince Menchikoff w as on t he point of blowing himself up w i th t he remainder, etc., e t c. B ut it r e m a i n ed r a t h er curious that s u ch an important event h ad not b e en c o m m u n i c a t ed by L o rd Redcliffe to 5 10 15 20 25 518 The Sevastopol Hoax—General News 5 10 15 20 25 30 the Consul at B u c h a r e s t, and that no dispatch h ad r e a c h ed the F r e n ch G o v e r n m e n t. Still, the n e ws w as t oo good not to be believed, and accordingly it w as believed. N e xt day, it is t r u e, there arrived a r e p o rt from St. P e t e r s b u rg mentioning a dispatch of Prince Menchikoff of t he 26th, w h i ch s h o w ed that after the battle of the A l ma he w as retreating t o w a rd S y m p h e r o p o l. Still the p a p e rs believed t h at it w as a misprint, and t h at t he real date of t he dispatch w as the 20th, rather t h an to give up the agreeable delusion of the fall of Sevastopol at the first onset. To-day, h o w e v e r, h as brought t he English public to r e a s o n; the miraculous c a p t u re of a great fortress without a siege p r o v es to h a ve b e en a cruel h o a x, which will m a ke the p a p e rs more cautious in future. In Spain disturbances h a ve t a k en place n ot only in Malaga, w h e re the Republican party, as I r e m a r k ed in my last letter, is v e ry strong, but e v en in L o g r o ñ o, w h e re E s p a r t e ro resided for m a ny y e a r s; and in J a e n, the tele- graph a d d s, that a Republican conspiracy has b e en discovered, a nd that t he Infant D on E n r i q u e, the b r o t h er of the idiotic h u s b a nd of the Q u e e n, has b e en exiled to the Balearic Islands. Still the e x c i t e m e nt a b o ut Sevastopol is so great that n o b o dy p a ys attention to Spain. In D e n m a rk the Diet w as o p e n ed on the 2d. T he royal speech from the t h r o ne b r e a t h es defiance to the Assembly. It w as received by hisses and by h e a r ty c h e e rs for t he Constitution. T he Frankfort Journal reiterates t he statement that t he allied p o w e rs h a ve resolved to reconsider the famous treaty of the 8th of M a y, 1852, by w h i ch the succession to t he Danish throne was eventually m a de over to the E m p e r or of Russia. U r q u h a rt has not c e a s ed to bring this discreditable piece of E u r o p e an diplomacy before the public over a nd over again, a nd his e n d e a v o rs s e em n ow at last to h a ve s u c c e e d e d. T he object of this m o v e m e n t, if t h e re be anything in the r u m o r, is simply by reopening t he question to get Prussia, w ho dissented from t h at protocol, to ally herself with the w e s t e rn p o w e r s. It is w o r t hy of n o te that P a l m e r s t on called the protocol, like the treaty of 1840, m e a s u r es against Russia, while its suspension is n ow to be considered as an act of hostility t o w a rd Russia. Austria is r e p o r t ed to h a ve sent a n o te to St. P e t e r s b u r g, offering o n ce more the four conditions as the basis of p e a c e, and declaring t h at the refusal of the Czar to accept t h em will be t a k en for a c a s us belli by Francis Joseph. 35 This is o ne of the results of the victories in the Crimea. T he following o b s e r v a t i o ns on a r e c e nt article in The Economist are t a k en from the t r a de circular of M e s s r s. Smith & Charles: "Of all the a n n o u n c e m e n ts or intimations that h a ve a p p e a r ed since the w ar began, t h at put forth on S a t u r d ay last by The Economist is by far the m o st i m p o r t a nt in a R u s s o - c o m m e r c i al point of view. It must be borne in mind that this weekly journal is the property of one of the Secretaries to the 40 519 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Treasury (Mr. Wilson) and hence the remarks to which we are about to draw attention may be regarded as semi-official. H a v i ng explained t he c o u r se of e x c h a n ge in P e t e r s b u r g, and s h o wn that, as a c o n s e q u e n ce of o ur t r a de with Prussia, British gold must necessarily be furnished by this c o u n t ry to R u s s ia for its belligerent p u r p o s e s; having stated that this w as all f o r e s e en by our G o v e r n m e n t, b ut t h at t h ey considered such a state of things t he lesser of t wo evils, The Economist p r o c e e ds to say, that after the fall of S e v a s t o p ol ' we shall be in undisturbed possession of the Black S ea a nd its s h o r e s, and m a s t e rs of t he D a n u b e. B ut in the meantime Russia m ay t a ke a p o s t u re w h i ch we c an n e v er by our a r ms reach, in t he h o pe of wearying t he patience of E n g l a n d, as in such a p o s t u re Russia can only be r e a c h ed by her t r a d e, and it m ay b e c o me a question w h e t h er our national interests will n ot dictate before long a different policy from that we h a ve hitherto followed. We shall find that we b l o c k a de t he p o r ts in vain, so long as our p r o d u ce finds a r e a dy 10 5 20 15 m a r k et t h r o u gh neighboring c o u n t r i e s; so long as we p e r m it P r u s s ia to profit so m u ch by being t he m e d i um t h r o u gh which our b l o c k a de of R u s s i an shores can be so easily e v a d e d, e tc If, therefore, considerations of general policy shall r e n d er it needful again to consider t he question of t he e x t e nt to which the blockade shall be enforced and the trade restricted by land as well as by sea,' e t c. The Economist concludes with a m o st s o l e mn warning, saying: 'It will be well for those w ho are disposed to engage in s u ch h a z a r d o us u n d e r t a k i n gs (as supplying t he Russians with capital to p u r c h a se goods in the winter, to be f o r w a r d ed to this country n e xt year) to consider that it m ay be found needful to p u r s ue a v e ry different policy in t he second y e ar of a Russian campaign, from t h at which w as wisest and b e st in t he first.' We need hardly point out that t he u p s h ot of all this (and we strongly r e c o m m e nd our friends carefully to consider the entire article) is, t h at the Allied P o w e rs h a ve determined—as t he only w ay of bringing t he w ar to a close—to prohibit t he overland traffic n e xt y e a r; and to p r e v e nt capitalists from e m b a r k i ng in a t r a de which will t h en be prohibited, t he G o v e r n m e nt has v e ry considerately allowed o ne of the Secretaries of the T r e a s u ry to m a ke k n o wn their in- tentions in sufficient time to p r e v e nt t he serious c o n s e q u e n c es to our mer- c h a n ts w h i ch w o u ld otherwise e n s u e. On S a t u r d ay t he tallow m a r k et w as quiet at a shade u n d er F r i d a y 's prices. It is probable t h at b ut for t he article in The Economist, to w h i ch we h a ve d r a wn attention, o ur m a r k et w o u ld h a ve declined to-day in c o n s e q u e n ce of the n e ws from Sevastopol, t h e re being an opinion t h at the fall of this important fortress is likely to bring the E m p e r or to t e r m s. O ur opinion is t he v e ry r e v e r s e, and t h at t he c a t a s t r o p he in question is calculated only to excite the exasperation of the Czar, a nd to lead him to s e ek r e v e n ge in s o me other direction. It is quite certain t h at until he is 40 compelled to fly from his o wn great cities he m ay consider himself not utterly 35 25 30 520 i : | j I [ j j I j. | I i ! The Sevastopol Hoax—General News b e a t e n, and he has too m u ch at stake to give in until he is driven to t he u t m o st extremity. We therefore look on this w ar as o ne w h i ch m ay be p r o t r a c t ed t h r o u gh m a ny y e a r s, unless t he c o u r se intimated by The Economistas likely to be a d o p t ed by t he allies is actually p ut in f o r c e ." 5 10 15 20 T he Moniteur of t he 5th Oct. a n n o u n c es t h at Barbes, for t he last t h r ee y e a rs a prisoner at Belle-île, has b e en set at liberty w i t h o ut condition by order of B o n a p a r te on a c c o u nt of a letter in w h i ch he e x p r e s s es anxious feelings of h o pe for t he success of D e c e m b r i st civilization against Muscovite civilization, the former of w h i c h, by t he w a y, has recently manifested itself at A t h e ns by reproducing t he d a ys of J u n e, 1849—the F r e n ch soldateskathere seizing an " o b n o x i o u s" n e w s p a p er editor, burning his b o o ks a nd letters, and throwing him into prison. F r om this m o m e nt Barbes h as c e a s ed to be o ne of the revolutionary chiefs of F r a n c e. By declaring his sympathies for t he F r e n ch a r ms in w h a t e v er c a u s e, and u n d er w h a t e v er c o m m a nd t h ey may be e m p l o y e d, he has irretrievably associated himself with t he M u s c o v i t es t h e m selves, sharing their indifference as to t he object of their campaigns. Barbes a nd Blanqui h a ve long shared the real s u p r e m a cy of revolutionary F r a n c e. B a r b es never c e a s ed to calumniate a nd t h r ow suspicion u p on Blanqui as in c o n n i v a n ce w i th the G o v e r n m e n t. T he fact of his letter and of B o n a p a r t e 's order decides t he question as to w ho is t he m an of t he Revolution a nd w ho not. 521 Friedrich Engels The Battle of the Alma The Battle of the Alma. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4219, 26.Oktober 1854 T he official a c c o u n ts of the battle of the A l ma h a ve finally arrived, and the dispatches of the c o m m a n d e r s, the reports of English journalists w ho w e re present, a nd of several naval officers, are given at great length in o ur c o l u m ns this morning, confirming in every important r e s p e ct t he conclusions we d r ew from the first telegraphic r e p o r ts of the action. T he following are the facts as t h ey a p p e ar to h a ve o c c u r r e d: A b o ut t h r ee miles from the coast, the river Alma m a k es a b e nd so as to f o rm a crescent, the t wo h o r ns of which point t o w a rd t he N o r t h. T he s o u t h e rn side of the river, generally formed by cliffs about 300 feet high, h e re offers an amphitheater sloping d o w n, more or less gently, t o w a rd t he stream. This slope, supported on the right and left by a b r u pt high cliffs forming the edges of t he plateau, w as selected by the Russians as their position. If repulsed, their superior cavalry could always cover the r e t r e at on t he level ground of t he plateau, which also offered almost e v e r y w h e re facilities for carrying off the artillery. On a sort of t e r r a ce midway b e t w e en t he plateau and the valley of t he river, t he Russians had placed their main b o dy of infantry, p r o t e c t e d, on the left, by the steep cliffs, considered impracticable, a nd on the right by equally steep cliffs, by a r e d o u bt on the t e r r a c e, a nd a h e a vy enfilading b a t t e ry on the c o m m a n d i ng hights. Admiral Hamelin maintains t h at this b a t t e ry w as m o u n t ed with t w e l ve 32-pounders, but h ow s u ch h e a vy o r d n a n ce could h a ve b e en carried off during the retreat, as it m o st assuredly w a s, r e m a i ns a secret to be explained by t h at officer. T he g r o u nd in front of t he R u s s i an position, intersected by vineyards and r o c k s, w as favorable to the defense, a nd r e n d e r ed still m o re difficult by abattis a nd other artificial obstacles, which, h o w e v e r, from the w a nt of w o od in the c o u n t r y, c a n n ot h a ve b e en v e ry formidable. On the high plateau, b e h i nd a nd on b o th flanks of the R u s s i a n s, w e re placed their r e s e r v es and cavalry. In front, their skirmishers e x t e n d ed b e y o nd t he river Alma, occupying t he villages of Alma and Bourliouk. 5 10 15 20 25 30 522 The Battle of the Alma Against this strong position the allies a d v a n c ed on the 20th; the F r e n ch h ad t he right, the English t he left wing. E a r ly in t he morning t he F r e n ch sent Gen. B o s q u e t 's division (the 2d) with eight T u r k i sh battalions along t he sea shore to climb the cliffs on that side, u n d er the p r o t e c t i on of the guns of the s t e a m e r s, a nd t h us to t u rn t he R u s s i an left. T he English w e re to e x e c u te a similar m o v e m e nt against t he e n e m y 's right. T h e y, h o w e v e r, could not be p r o t e c t ed by ships, and h ad the principal m a ss of the e n e m y 's cavalry against t h em on t he plateau, so t h at this p a rt of t he plan of a t t a ck w as n ot e x e c u t e d. T he F r e n c h, u n d er B o s q u e t, in the m e a n t i me s u c c e e d ed in climbing t he r o c ky e d ge of t he plateau, and while t he R u s s i an t r o o ps on this elevation w e re shelled by the h e a vy guns of t he s t e a m e r s, t he third F r e n ch division u n d er Prince N a p o l e on a d v a n c ed in front against t he R u s s i an left. F u r t h er off, t he R u s s i an center and right w e re attacked by t he English. N e xt to Prince N a p o l e o n 's c a me t he s e c o nd English division u n d er Sir De L a cy E v a n s, t he c o m m a n d er of the British Legion in Spain during the Carlist W a r. He w as s u p p o r t ed by Gen. England, (3d division,) while t he e x t r e me left wing of t he allies w as formed by the British light division u n d er Sir G. B r o w n, supported by t he division of G u a r ds u n d er t he D u ke of C a m b r i d g e. T he r e s e r ve (4th di vision, Sir G. C a t h c a r t, and cavalry division, E a rl of L u c a n ,) m a n e u v e r ed in t he rear of t he left to p r e v e nt any outflanking a t t e m p ts of t he e n e m y. 5 10 15 20 25 30 T he battle a p p e a rs to h a ve b e en distinguished by the feature, that its first phase—that of skirmishing along the w h o le line, while t he real decisive m a n e u v e rs are carried on b e h i nd this covering curtain—was v e ry m u ch shortened. T he position of t he R u s s i a ns w a s, indeed, so clearly defined, a nd their powerful artillery so placed, t h at any lengthened skirmishing w o u ld h a ve n ot only b e en useless to t he allies b ut positively damaging. T he F r e n ch a p p e ar to h a ve had to e x p o se themselves for a while to this galling fire, t he English being t he last in line; but, this o n ce carried out, t he F r e n ch c o l u m ns and the English e x t e n d ed line a d v a n c ed steadily into the difficult ground before t h e m, dislodged the Russians from t he villages of A l ma and Bourliouk, (the latter of w h i ch w as b u r n ed by the retreating force, so as to p r e v e nt its being u s ed as shelter by t he allies,) p a s s ed t he river a nd p r e s s ed up t he hights w i t h o ut any u n n e c e s s a ry formalities. H e re the c o m b at on m a ny points of t he ground, in t he v i n e y a r d s, a m o ng t he r o c ks a nd abattis, p a r t o ok of t he c h a r a c t er of the battles b e t w e en V e r o na and Castiglione in 1848. No regular a d v a n ce w as possible; a thick, irregular cloud of skirmishers, mostly acting independently, w o r k ed their w ay up to t he first t e r r a c e, w h e re the R u s s i an lines awaited t h e m. In t he m e a n t i m e, Gen. B o s q u et s u c c e e d ed in establishing o ne of his brigades on t he plateau, w h e n ce he m e n a c ed the Russian left; a 40 brigade of t he fourth division ( F o r e y ' s) w as sent to his assistance, while F o r e y 's second brigade supported N a p o l e o n 's division. T h us the F r e n ch 35 523 Friedrich Engels m a de good a position by which t he Russian left w as seriously c o m p r o m i s e d. On the R u s s i an right, Sir George B r o wn t o ok the R u s s i an redoubt—the k ey of t h at p a rt of their position on t he t e r r a c e; a nd t h o u gh an a d v a n ce of t he R u s s i an r e s e r ve from the hights for a m o m e nt dislodged him, an a t t a ck of t he Highlanders (Cambridge's division) finally s e c u r ed t he p o s s e s s i on of this w o r k. T h us the left wing of the Russians w as t u r n e d, a nd their right wing w as b r o k e n. T he center, completely engaged along its front, could only b e at a r e t r e at up the slope t o w a rd t he plateau, which, o n ce r e a c h e d, t h ey found t h e m s e l v es secure from any serious attack by t he p r e s e n ce of their cavalry a nd horse-artillery, in a c o u n t ry eminently a d a p t ed for the e m p l o y m e nt of t h e se t wo a r m s. N e v e r t h e l e s s, some disorder must h a ve reigned for a while on their left w h en out-flanked by B o s q u e t; the F r e n ch r e p o r ts are u n a n i m o us as to that point, and the fact t h at Menchikoff's carriage h e re fell into t he h a n ds of t he F r e n c h, fully p r o v es it. On the other h a n d, t he carrying off of all their artillery, e v en of t he h e a vy siege-guns in t he b a t t e ry on t he right, (the F r e n ch t o ok no g u n s, the English b ut t h r e e, and t h o se p r o b a b ly dis m o u n t e d) p r o v es t he great order in which the retreat, generally speaking, w as e x e c u t e d, as well as the wise resolution of Menchikoff, to b r e ak off the struggle as s o on as t he scales h ad t u r n ed against him. 5 10 15 T he b r a v e ry of t he allied t r o o ps a p p e a rs to h a ve b e en v e ry great. T h e re are few e x a m p l es of a battle consisting, like this, of an almost uninterrupted, slow b ut steady a d v a n c e, and offering n o ne of the vicissitudes a nd incidents which give s u ch a dramatic interest to most other great battles. T h is single fact is sufficient to p r o ve at least a considerable numerical superiority on t he part of t he allies, and to show that t he allied Generals in their r e p o r ts h a ve far o v e r r a t ed the strength of the R u s s i a n s. We shall r e c ur to this presently. 20 25 T he generalship of the allies w as good, b ut s h o ws m o re confidence in t he valor of their t r o o ps and t he assistance of t he fleet t h an in t he inventive capacities of t he Generals themselves. It w a s, so to say, a plain, homely sort of battle, of a purely tactical n a t u r e, destitute in a r a re d e g r ee of all strategical features. T he flank m a n e u v er of B o s q u et w as a v e ry natural c o n c e p t i o n, and well e x e c u t ed by the African soldiers, w ho h ad b e en taught h ow to do s u ch w o rk in the defiles of the Atlas. T he British b r o ke t he R u s s i an right by unsophisticated h a rd fighting, facilitated, very likely, by g o od regimental and brigade m a n e u v e r i n g; b ut the m o n o t o ny of t he British a d v a n ce in t wo suc cessive long lines w as b r o k en by the obstacles of t he g r o u nd alone, not by grand m a n e u v e rs intended to mislead or surprise the e n e m y. 30 35 Prince Menchikoff h ad well selected his position. He d o es not, h o w e v e r, a p p e ar to h a ve m a de all t he u se of his cavalry he might h a ve done. W hy w as t h e re no cavalry on the left, to precipitate B o s q u e t 's isolated brigade d o wn 40 524 The Battle of the Alma t he cliffs again as s o on as it a t t e m p t ed to f o r m? T he breaking off of t he battle, t he disengaging his t r o o ps from fire, t he carrying off of his artillery, and the r e t r e at in general, a p p e ar to h a ve b e en carried out in a highly creditable style, and do m o re h o n or to his generalship t h an the victory d o es to t h at of t he allied generals. 5 20 As to the forces engaged, the allies had u n d er fire t h r ee F r e n ch and four English divisions, beside their artillery, leaving o ne F r e n ch a nd o ne English division and all the cavalry, in r e s e r v e, b e s i d es eight T u r k i sh battalions, which w e re sent to support B o s q u e t, b ut arrived after t he close of t he action. 10 N o w, the F r e n ch having left stronger d e t a c h m e n ts and suffered greater losses at V a r na t h an t he British, t he divisions m ay be considered almost equal on the day of the battle—the F r e n ch a b o ut 6,000, the British a b o ut 5,500 strong, each. This would give an infantry force actually engaged of 40,000 infantry, w i th a r e s e r ve of a b o ut 16,000 m e n, including the T u r k s, 15 w h i ch a p p e a rs to agree with t he statements as to t he force of t he expedition, deducting for the sick and for d e t a c h m e n t s. T he R u s s i a ns are stated by Marshal St. A r n a ud to h a ve m u s t e r ed t wo divisions of t he line, t he 16th a nd 17th, with t wo brigades of r e s e r v e, (soldiers on furlough, recalled to duty,) t he 14th and 13th, b e s i de t he 6th battalion of rifles. This force w o u ld c o m p r i se forty-nine battalions if the brigades had the full n u m b er of battalions. E v e ry battalion counting 700 m en (they h a ve n e v er m u s t e r ed stronger in this war, although in t he H u n g a r i an w ar t h ey w e re fifty m en stronger,) would give a total of 34,300 men. B ut the a b o ve are a b o ut as m a ny regular land t r o o ps as we k n ew to be in and a b o ut S e v a s t o p o l, and it is m o st likely t h at five or six battalions at least w e re left behind as a garrison in t h at fortress. This w o u ld bring the R u s s i a ns to a strength of 30,000 infantry, w h i ch m ay h a ve b e en a b o ut t he c o r r e ct n u m b e r. Their cavalry is said to h a ve m u s t e r ed 6,000 s a b r e s, b ut of c o u r se a good n u m b er of t h em w e re m e re C o s s a c k s. This m a r k ed superiority of t he allies deprives t he victory of t h at excessive glory 30 w h i c h, as o ur r e a d e rs will see in our e x t r a c ts from the English p a p e r s, it is attempted to attach to it. T he b r a v e ry a p p e a rs to h a ve b e en equal on b o th sides; a nd certainly the allied generals, w e re t h ey e v er so flushed with vic tory, never thought of marching into S e v a s t o p ol after their success, without any further delay or opposition, b a n n e rs flying a nd b a n ds playing. 25 35 40 T he result of the battle, t h o u gh morally great for t he allies, c an hardly p r o d u ce any profound dejection in t he R u s s i an a r m y. It is a retreat like t h at of L ü t z en or B a u t z e n; and if Menchikoff, from his flanking position at B a k s hi Sarai, u n d e r s t a n ds as well h ow to d r aw t he allies after him as Blücher did before the battle of the K a t z b a c h, t h ey m ay y et learn that such fruitless victories are of no great u se to t he gainer. Menchikoff is yet in force at their rear, and till t h ey h a ve defeated him a s e c o nd time and entirely driven him 525 Friedrich Engels a w a y, he will still be formidable. Almost everything n ow will d e p e nd u p on the arrival of r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts of the allied r e s e r ve on o ne h a n d, and of the R u s s i an t r o o ps from P e r e k o p, K e r t sh and A n a pa on the other. W h o e v er is first the stronger, m ay strike a great blow. B ut Menchikoff h as this advantage t h at he c an at any time elude an attack by falling b a c k, while t he allies are tied to t he spot w h e re are their d é p ô t s, c a m ps and p a r k s. F or t he m o m e n t, Sevastopol, though invested on o ne side, a p p e a rs safe, t he superiority of t he Allies not being marked e n o u gh to m a ke front in t wo directions. B ut should their r e s e r ve of 20,000 m en arrive s o o n er t h an M e n- chikoff's supports,—as a p p e a rs almost certain from our dispatch by the Niagara, received last night by telegraph from Halifax—a few d a ys m ay decide m u c h. A place like Sevastopol, if o n ce seriously a nd vigorously attacked, c a n n ot be e x p e c t ed to hold out a fortnight against o p en t r e n c h e s. T he r e s e r ve h ad all sailed from V a r na and should h a ve arrived by t he 4th or 5th, t h o u gh our Halifax dispatch does not m e n t i on their arrival; at any r a te b e f o re t he 16th or 18th, therefore, Sevastopol c an hardly be e x p e c t ed to fall. T h e re are c h a n c es that an active campaign in the o p en field might prolong its holding out for some time longer; b ut u n l e ss Menchikoff, with his m o v e a b le a r my in the rear of the allies, should gain s o me important advantage in the field, or unless sickness decimates t he allied t r o o p s, it must certainly fall. B ut we m ay be sure, from the p r e p a r a t i o ns a nd t e m p er of the R u s s i a ns that it will n ot be t a k en without d e s p e r a te r e s i s t a n c e, a nd terrible b l o o d s h e d; the sanguinary details of the battle on the A l ma will certainly be e x c e e d ed in their kind by t h o se of t he storm and c a p t u re of Sevastopol. 5 10 15 20 526 ψ Friedrich Engels The Military Power of Russia The Military Power of Russia. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4223, 31. Oktober 1854 We m ay safely leave J o hn Bull and J a c q u es B o n h o m m e, for a while, to then- rejoicings at t he "glorious v i c t o r y" of t he A l ma a nd their anticipations of t he fall of S e v a s t o p o l. T he w ar on t he D a n u be a nd in t he C r i m e a, w h a t e v er i m p o r t a n ce it m ay h a ve in t he e y es of t he allies a nd of t he u n i t ed Middle Class Liberalism of E u r o p e, h as v e ry little weight, as far as R u s s ia is c o n c e r n e d. T he c e n t er of gravity of t h at c o u n t ry is in no wise affected by its possible r e s u l t s; while a defeat in t he C r i m ea and forced r e t r e at of t he allies w o u ld cripple their l a nd o p e r a t i o ns for a c o n s i d e r a b le t i m e, a nd give t h em a moral c h e ck to r e c o v er from w h i ch would r e q u i re their u t m o st e x e r t i o n s. S o me a u t h e n t ic r e p o r ts of t he distribution a nd late m o v e m e n ts of t he R u s s i an forces h a ve lately c o me to h a n d, a nd it m ay be well to s um t h em up in o r d er to s h ow h ow little, c o m p a r a t i v e ly speaking, of the R u s s i an force is as y et engaged, a nd w h at t he r e m a i n d er is e x p e c t ed to p e r f o r m. As is well k n o w n, t he R u s s i an a r my consists, as n e a r ly as c an be stated, of the following b o d i e s: I. T he G r a nd Active Army— 2 c o r ps of élite, G u a r ds and G r e n a d i e r s, containing 76 battalions, 92 s q u a d r o n s, 228 guns. 6 c o r ps of the line, 300 battalions, 192 s q u a d r o n s, 672 guns. 3 Cavalry c o r p s, , 176 s q u a d r o n s, 96 g u n s. Total, 376 battalions, 460 s q u a d r o n s, 996 g u n s. II. Special C o r p s- Finland c o r p s, 12 battalions. O r e n b u rg c o r p s, 10 battalions. Siberian c o r p s, 15 battalions. C a u c a s i an c o r p s, 55 battalions, 10 s q u a d r o n s, 180 g u n s. R e s e r ve C a u c a s i an c o r p s, 36 battalions, 2 squadrons,—guns. C a u c a s i an line, 47 battalions,—squadrons—guns. Total, 175 battalions, 12 s q u a d r o n s, 180 g u n s. 5 10 15 20 25 30 527 Friedrich Engels I I I. C o s s a c ks a nd other Irregulars— A b o ut 700 s q u a d r o n s, 32 battalions, and 224 g u n s. I V. Reserves— 1. A b o ut 50 battalions of Interior G u a r d s, b e s i d es invalids, penal com panies, 77. 2. R e s e r ve of the grand army, or 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of G u a r ds a nd G r e n a d i e r s, 5th and 6th battalions of t he line, viz: t h r ee battalions for 24 regiments, and two battalions e a ch for 72 regiments, or in all, 216 battalions. As all the r e s e r v es are called in and fully organized, so far, t h at the forma- tion of the 7th and 8th battalions of e a ch regiment h as b e en c o m m e n c ed o ut of the lately d e c r e ed levy of 300,000 m e n, the a b o ve 216 battalions m ay be c o m p r i s ed in t he grand total, which would give 726 battalions, 472 s q u a d r o ns of regular, 700 s q u a d r o ns of irregular cavalry, and considerably a b o ve a t h o u s a nd g u n s. T he organization of t he r e s e r v es for cavalry a nd artillery n ot being well k n o wn o ut of Russia, t h ey are n ot included in t he a b o v e. This array, fortunately, looks m o re formidable t h an it really is. F r om it we m u st deduct, to arrive at t he n u m b er of t r o o ps actually available for a E u r o p e an w a r, the Siberian c o r p s, the Internal G u a r d, and at least one-half of t he C o s s a c k s; t h us leaving available about 650 battalions, 472 s q u a d r o ns of regular and 350 s q u a d r o ns of irregular cavalry, w i th a b o ut 1,200 g u n s. T h e se t r o o ps m ay be estimated, at a v e ry low figure, at 520,000 infantry, 62,000 cavalry, and 30,000 C o s s a c k s, or rather m o re t h an 600,000 together, s p r e ad on t he long line from t he Caspian along t he B l a ck S ea a nd Baltic to t he W h i te Sea. Since the beginning of the w ar with T u r k e y, the following t r o o ps h a ve b e en successively engaged against the allies on t he s o u t h e rn frontier of t he e m p i r e: 1. T he 3d, 4th and 5th corps of the line, with s o me of their r e s e r v e s, w h i ch a r e, h o w e v e r, mostly still on t he march. 2. T he w h o le of the t h r ee Caucasian c o r p s. 3. T he t wo divisions (two-thirds) of the first corps of the line, without r e s e r v e s. 4. A portion of the third cavalry corps (dragoons) in t he Crimea. This m a k es a total of a b o ut 240,000 m e n, before entering on the campaign, b ut n ow r e d u c ed to 184,000 m en at t he outside, of w h om 84,000 m ay be t a k en as the strength of the a r my in Bessarabia, 54,000 in t he C r i m e a, or marching t o w a rd it, a nd 46,000 in the C a u c a s u s. On t he Baltic t h e re w e r e, up to t he e nd of August: 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 528 Notizen von Marx ü b er das A b s e n d en e i n i g er Artikel an d ie „ N e w - Y o rk T r i b u n e" im O k t o b er und N o v e m b er 1854 The Military Power of Russia In Finland, the reserve of the 6th Corps The Finnish Corps The Guards and their reserves Of the Grenadier Corps at Revel Total T h e re w e re in Poland, or marching for it: The remainder of the Grenadiers and their reserves The 1st and 2d Corps and their reserves Cossacks and cavalry of different corps Various reserves Total Men. 16,800 12,000 66,800 10,000 105,600 Men. 55,000 120,000 30,000 25,000 230,000 M a k i ng all together a b o ut 575,000 m e n, w h i c h, with the O r e n b u rg C o r p s, (at Astrakhan,) the R e s e r ve Cavalry C o r p s, and t he d e t a c h m e n ts of t he White Sea and o t h e r s, c o m es up to the n u m b er stated b e f o re of the grand total. Of the t r o o ps in Poland, a b o ut 30,000 w e re on t he m a r c h, a b o ut 20,000 garrisoned W a r s a w, a b o ut 100,000 occupied the right b a nk of the Vistula, in the late K i n g d om of Poland, and about 80,000 r e m a i n ed as a r e s e r ve in Volhynia a nd Podolia, on t he Bug and Dniester. T h us the m a in bulk of the R u s s i an army, a nd a m o ng t h em the c r a ck regiments of G u a r ds and G r e n a d i e r s, w as con centrated on a line from St. P e t e r s b u rg to C h o t y n, or along the w e s t e rn frontier of t he E m p i r e. B ut t h e se positions did n ot a p p e ar significant enough. T he Grenadiers left R e v e l, to be replaced by a division of G u a r d s, a nd with the other t wo divisions of G u a r ds m a r c h ed off to Poland, the latter four battalions or regiments strong, leaving only the 5th and 6th battalions in Petersburg. T h us t he a r my of t he W e st w as i n c r e a s ed to a b o ve 270,000 m e n, and t he greater p o r t i on of the three R e s e r ve Cavalry C o r p s, which have as yet not been engaged at all, are m a r c h ed off to j o in t h e m; this will bring t he a r my of the W e st to s o me 300,000 m e n. 5 10 15 20 25 30 N ow the positions are changed. T he 100,000 m e n, occupying t he south e a s t e rn portion of t he K i n g d om of Poland, h a ve c r o s s ed t he Vistula a nd t a k en up a position along the Austrian frontier. T he 80,000 m en h a ve a d v a n c ed from Volhynia into Poland, a nd continue the line along t h at frontier. G u a r d s, 35 Grenadiers—possibly the cavalry c o r p s, w h en t h ey arrive—take a central position to t he rear. During the winter m o re t r o o ps c an be spared from t he ice-bound Baltic. By M ay the n ew levies, forming the 7th and 8th or n ew battalions of t he different regiments, or 192 battalions in all, (130,000 to 140,000 men,) will be so far drilled as to replace t h e m. T h e re is no d o u b t, t h e n, t h at Nicholas c a r es comparatively little w h at h a p p e ns to t he s o u th of his E m p i r e, so long as he can c o n c e n t r a te a b o ve 300,000 m en in the splendid 40 531 Friedrich Engels strategical position of Poland. A nd a splendid position it is. D r i v en in like a w e d ge b e t w e en Prussia and Austria, it outflanks b o t h, while it is p r o t e c t ed by t he strongest m e a ns of resistance w h i ch art a nd n a t u re c o m b i n ed c an p r o d u c e. N a p o l e on k n ew the military i m p o r t a n ce of the c o u n t ry inclosed by t he Vistula a nd its affluents. He m a de it his b a se of o p e r a t i o ns for t he campaign of 1807, until he took Dantzic. B ut he neglected p e r m a n e n t ly to fortify it, and paid dearly for it after the retreat of 1812. T he R u s s i a n s, e s p e cially since 1831, h a ve d o ne w h at their p r e d e c e s s o rs in p o w er omitted to d o. Modlin, (Novo-Georgievsk,) W a r s a w, Ivangorod, B r z e sc L i t e w s ki f o rm a s y s t em of fortifications stronger, in its strategical combination, t h an any other in t he world. This s y s t em offers a position in w h i ch a b e a t en a r my m ay defy double its n u m b e rs as long as it has plenty to e a t; and to cut off a w h o le c o u n t ry from all c o m m u n i c a t i o ns is a thing t h at h as not yet b e en a t t e m p t e d. This w h o le c o m p l ex system of fortresses, says a G e r m an military writer w ho k n o ws t he c o u n t r y, indicates e v en m o re an aggressive t h an a defensive spirit. It is planned n ot so m u ch to maintain the ground on w h i ch it stands as to s e r ve as a b a se for offensive attacks t o w a rd t he west. A nd t h e re are people w ho believe t h at N i c h o l as will sue for p e a ce if S e v a s t o p ol be t a k e n! W h y, R u s s ia h as not played one-third of h er t r u m ps yet, and t he m o m e n t a ry loss of Sevastopol and of the fleet is hardly felt at all by the giant to w h om Sevastopol and t he fleet w e re b ut a plaything. Russia k n o ws full well that her decisive action d o es not lie along the sea shores or within r e a ch of debarking t r o o p s; b ut on the c o n t r a r y, on t he b r o ad interior of the Continent, w h e re massive armies can be b r o u g ht to act c o n c e n t r a t ed on o ne spot, without frittering a w ay their forces in a fruitless c o a st defense against e v a n e s c e nt e n e m i e s. R u s s ia m ay lose the Crimea, the C a u c a s u s, Finland, St. P e t e r s b u rg and all such a p p e n d a g e s; b ut as long as her b o d y, w i th M o s c ow for its heart, and fortified Poland for its s w o r d - a r m, is u n t o u c h e d, she n e ed n ot give in an iota. 5 10 15 20 25 T he grand actions of 1854 a r e, we d a re say, b ut the p e t ty p r e l u d es of the battles of nations which will mark the annals of 1855. It is not until t he great Russian a r my of the west, and the Austrian a r my c o me into play, no m a t t er w h e t h er against e a ch other or with e a ch other, that we shall see real w ar on a large scale, something like the grand w a rs of N a p o l e o n. A n d, p e r h a p s, t h e se battles m ay be t he preludes merely of other battles far m o re fierce, far m o re decisive—the battles of the E u r o p e an p e o p l es against the n ow victorious and secure E u r o p e an d e s p o t s. 30 35 532 IF- - Friedrich Engels The Siege of Sevastopol The Siege of Sevastopol. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4236, 15. November 1854 5 10 15 20 25 N e xt to the battle of the Alma, the principal a c h i e v e m e nt ot t he Allies in t he Crimea has b e en L o rd Raglan's f a m o us f l a nk m a r ch from the A l ma to Balaklava, by w h i ch he changed the a p p a r e nt object of the campaign from t he c a p t u re a nd o c c u p a t i on of Sevastopol to a coup de main against a por tion,—and t he w e a k er portion, too,—of the fortifications, including, of c o u r s e, t he destruction of t he Russian fleet, d o c k y a r ds and arsenals, but involving the withdrawal of the allied forces as soon as this object should be attained. T h at such m u st be the c a s e, w as plain, from t he entire m o v e m e nt in question. It w as an a b a n d o n m e nt of the idea of attacking the n o r t h e rn front of the f o r t r e s s, w h i ch is the c o m m a n d i ng front, w h e re alone an a t t a ck could really be decisive; and thus it w as a p a t e nt confession of i n c o m p e t e n ce on the p a rt of t he expedition to accomplish w h at w as laid d o wn in its programme,—the complete capture and o c c u p a t i on of the place. N e v e r t h e l e s s, as we said, this v e ry m a r ch h as b e en glorified as a most brilliant stroke of generalship t h r o u gh columns on columns of high-sounding p h r a s es and rhetorical gibber ish; a nd e v en the great journals of L o n d o n, with their c o r r e s p o n d e n ts on t he spot, did n ot discover the t r u th till a m o n th afterward, w h en t he G o v e r n m e nt s e e ms to h a ve given t h em a hint of it. T h u s, The London Times of Oct. 28, for the first time opening its e y es to the true state of the c a s e, gently indicates t h at t he minor object of the campaign m ay be t he only o ne accomplished, and that the forts on the n o r th side of the b a y, if they do not voluntarily surrender, c an hardly be t a k e n. B ut The Times h o p es t h ey will b e h a ve respectably, and surrender, i n a s m u ch as all d e p e n d e nt fortifications ought to give in w h en o n ce t he main b o dy of the place is taken. B ut t he t r u th is, that it is not the N o r th F o rt w h i ch d e p e n ds u p on t he t o wn of Sevastopol, b ut t he t o wn of Sevastopol w h i ch d e p e n ds u p on t he N o r th F o r t, a nd we fear t he argument of our c o t e m p o r a ry will hardly suffice to t a ke so strong a fortress. 533 Friedrich Engels It is t r ue t h at since the "glorious m a r c h" in question nothing h as b e en d o ne by t he Allies of which a n y b o dy could boast m u c h, and, t h e r e f o r e, our t r a n s atlantic c o t e m p o r a r i es are not to blame for making the m o st of it. As for the siege itself so far as it h as p r o c e e d e d, it is o ne of t h o se things of w h i ch t h ey m ay well think that the less said the better. B ut as we are b o u nd to nothing b ut impartiality in t he p r e m i s e s, we shall not be so delicate. T he t r u th is that the w ar in general being an exceedingly curious w a r, this siege is o ne of its most curious points. T he great feature of t he w ar a p p e a rs to be a belief t h at field-works are impregnable. First at Oltenitza, the old-fashioned w ay of c a n n o n a d i ng was e m p l o y ed for a couple of h o u rs and t h en t he w o r ks w e re s t o r m ed b ut w i t h o ut s u c c e s s. At Kalafat the Russians did not e v en d a re to m a ke an attack. At Silistria a mere e a r t h - w o rk b o re t he b r u nt of t he battle, a nd held out, e v en w h en almost leveled, against the frantic onslaught of the e n e m y. N ow at S e v a s t o p ol a simple line of field-works is h o n o r ed with m o re extensive breaching batteries, and with far heavier artillery, t h an w e re e v er brought to b e ar against t he most regular fortress. This siege is a striking proof of t he fact t h at in t he same proportion as the material of w a r f a re h a s, by industrial p r o g r e s s, a d v a n c ed during the long p e a c e, in t he same proportion has the art of w ar degenerated. A N a p o l e o n, on seeing t he batteries b e f o re S e v a s t o p o l, bristling with eight and ten-inch g u n s, w o u ld b u r st out in a fit of irresistible laughter. B ut this is not the w h o le story by a great deal. A b o ut the 1st of O c t o b e r, t he Allies w e re in position, b ut it w as n ot till t he 8th or 9th that t he first ground w as b r o k e n, a nd fire w as n ot o p e n ed till the 17th. T he r e a s on of this delay w as that the g u ns could n ot be brought up sooner. T h e re w e re only four or five miles of g r o u nd to go over—all good, h a rd soil, w i th little undulation, and p a rt of it a p a s s a b le r o a d. B ut t h ey had no draught cattle. No draught cattle in the Crimea—the richest c o u n t ry for cattle in the w h o le w o r l d! W h y, t h e re w e re m o re bullocks in t he valley of Baidar, within sight from t he hights of the C h e r n a y a, t h an w o u ld h a ve b e en required to drag all the united fleet across the hills. B ut the valley of Baidar w as o p en to t he C o s s a c k s, and t he allied cavalry, in protecting a razzia, might be e x p o s ed to t h e se formidable o p p o n e n t s. B e s i d e s, the Allies m u st k e ep on good t e r ms with t he inhabitants, and not seize their p r o p e r t y. With s u ch e x c u s e s, our English cotemporaries seek to hide t he t r u th t h at Raglan and C a n r o b e r t, while blockading Sevastopol on t he south, are t h e m s e l v es block- aded by Menchikoff's outposts on the C h e r n a y a. A nd yet, t h at t h ey are so, is p r o v ed by t he simple fact t h at the allied soldiers, up to t he latest report, w e re compelled to live u p on salt meat, no fresh m e at being at h a n d. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 On t he 3d of O c t o b er five Russian battalions c r o s s ed the C h e r n a ya n e ar I n k e r m a n, and w e re allowed to enter the fortress from t he south, as "this could b ut be favorable to the Allies." An original m o de of making w a r! T he 40 534 The Siege of Sevastopol e n e m y, r e p r e s e n t ed as b e a t e n, demoralized, dejected, s e n ds 3,000 m en into Sevastopol, u n d er the v e ry n o se of the Allies. He m u st h a ve had a r e a s on for doing so. But if he h as r e a s o ns for sending t h e m, Raglan has his r e a s o ns for bowing t h em in. He supposes the place to be o v e r c r o w d e d, though u p on 5 w h at g r o u n d s, is not clear. At all e v e n t s, b e s i de t he four square miles inclosed within the Russian lines, there is t he w h o le of t he n o r th shore a nd all the c o u n t ry lying behind it, to which any e x c e ss of t r o o ps m ay be sent in t en minutes. To r e p r e s e nt a place as o v e r c r o w d e d, w h i ch is b l o c k a d ed on o ne side only, is certainly t he hight of absurdity. 10 15 20 25 W h en the landing w as first r e p o r t e d, we said that disease w o u ld be the w o r st e n e my of t he Allies if t he campaign should be lengthened. D i s e a se is t h e re in its w o r st f o r m s, coupled, at least as far as the British are c o n c e r n e d, with t he v e ry w o r st sort of a t t e n d a n c e. I n d e e d, to s u ch an extent h a ve t he sick b e en neglected from this c a u s e, t h at L o rd Raglan has b e en obliged to issue a v e ry p e r e m p t o ry r e p r i m a nd to t he medical staff. But this is not all. T he d o c t o rs are at Constantinople, t he medical stores at V a r n a, and the sick at Balaklava. Is not this a splendid illustration of t he n ew military doctrine lately held forth by L o u is B o n a p a r te at B o u l o g n e, that e v e ry army, to h a ve a g o od position, must be placed in a triangle? T he sickness increases with the r o u g h n e ss of the season, the regiments dwindle down—a British regiment, sent out 1,000 strong, n ow c a n n ot c o u nt m o re t h an 600 m en u n d er arms—and t he slowness of operations goes on its e v en c o u r s e. T he routine of t he H o r se G u a r d s, t he fruit of forty y e a r s' peaceful schooling, is n ot to be u p s et by trifles of that sort. Perish the a r m y, b ut let Sevastopol be t a k en according to H er Majesty's regulations! In c o m m on sieges t he besiegers usually try to place their first batteries as near as possible to t he e n e m y 's w o r k s, a nd six or seven h u n d r ed y a r ds is considered a great distance. B ut in a grand siege like this, particularly if against m e re field-works, just t he r e v e r se should be d o n e, according to 30 Raglan. T he e n e my allows us to c o me within s e v en h u n d r ed y a r d s, b ut we m u st never do w h at the e n e my w a n ts us to d o. So says Raglan, a nd o p e ns his batteries at 2,500 a nd 3,000 y a r ds distance—a f a ct we could n ot believe did t he r e p o r ts leave it possible to doubt. N e xt he c o m es d o wn to 1,500 a nd 1,200 y a r d s, a nd t h en states, as a r e a s on for n ot opening fire, t h at b r e a c h i ng batteries, to be effective, must be within t h r ee or four h u n d r ed y a r ds from the w o r ks to be b r e a c h e d! T he distant batteries are to h a ve L a n c a s t er a nd long-range ten-inch g u n s, since it s e e ms t he British artillerists are of opinion t h at t h e se guns are like t e l e s c o p e s, only good at a great distance. I n d e e d, this long-range question, which is perfectly in its place for naval a r m a m e n t s, has c a u s ed m o re confusion and h u m b ug t h an real good w h en applied to land artillery; we h a ve an e x a m p le of it in t h e se ridiculous batteries. 35 40 535 Friedrich Engels T he l a n d w a rd fortifications of Sevastopol, w h i ch h a ve p r o v o k ed all t h e se o u t b u r s ts of genius a nd perspicacity, are as follows: On t he w e s t e rn side (attacked by t he F r e n c h) o ne or t wo faces of the Q u a r a n t i ne F o rt are e x p o s e d. Behind this is a loopholed wall running up t o w a rd t he h e ad of t he Q u a r a n t i ne B a y, and ending on a hill, in a round t o w er which forms a réduit for an e a r t h - w o rk c o n s t r u c t ed around it. T h e n ce a wall of t h r ee feet average thickness is continued to the u p p er end of the harbor, t h us inclosing S e v a s topol on t he south-west. This wall is said to be incapable of a ny defense, although it might easily h a ve b e en m a de so ; it is, t h e r e f o r e, p r o t e c t ed by small e a r t h - w o r ks lying in front of it. F r om the e nd of t he h a r b or e a s t w a rd to t he Careening B ay (the British front of attack) there are no regular defenses w h a t e v e r, e x c e pt t wo t o w e rs surrounded a nd sheltered by lunettes, in a similar m a n n er with the o ne described a b o v e. T h e re are b e s i d es s o me earth w o r ks of irregular form, t he whole forming an e n t r e n c h ed c a mp of no great p r e t e n s i o n s, if we are to believe the published p l a ns of Capt. Biddulph, s k e t c h ed on t he spot. At all events t h ey show only o ne line of defenses, consisting of w o r ks o p en in the r e a r; there are no closed r e d o u b t s, of w h i ch as a general thing t he Russians are so exceedingly fond. B ut we c a n n ot believe t h at this is t he c a s e; if this w as the only line to t a k e, the British ought long since to h a ve t a k en it with the b a y o n e t. T h e re m u st be a s e c o nd line of r e d o u b ts behind it. T he whole of the Russian w o r ks have b e en a r m ed w i th h e a vy guns from t he fleet—the b e st use t he Russians could m a ke of t h e m. Y et their practice with t h em is despicable. T h ey fire a w ay w h o le d a ys a nd nights at the e n e m y, a nd m a ke o ne hit for a h u n d r ed r o u n d s. P e r h a ps it w as this v e ry b ad practice w h i ch induced L o rd Raglan to o p en his t r e n c h es at t he safe distance of 3,000 y a r d s. After t h r ee d a y s' b o m b a r d m e nt by t he allied fleets and armies, it is stated t h at the British, on their side, had m a de o ne b r e a c h, while the F r e n ch h ad not yet c o m p l e t ed theirs. As soon as this w as c o m p l e t e d, t he assault w as to take place. T h at it should take 200 guns of i m m e n se caliber t h r ee or four days to b r e a ch such defenses would be incredible, had we n ot v e ry good authority for t he respectful distance at w h i ch t he allied batteries h ad b e en c o n s t r u c t e d. So m u ch for t he results already a c h i e v e d; b ut w h a t e v er e v e nt m ay c r o wn t he o p e r a t i o n s, it is certain t h at t he siege of Sevastopol will stand unparalleled in military history. 536 Friedrich Engels The Campaign in the Crimea The Campaign in the Crimea. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4246, 27. November 1854 10 O ur r e a d e rs c a n n ot but be struck with the novel spirit breathing through the intelligence from t he seat of w ar in t he Crimea, received by t he Baltic y e s t e r d a y, a nd published in o ur columns this morning. Hitherto an over- 5 w e e n i ng and arrogant confidence h as distinguished t he c o m m e n ts of t he British p r e s s, and the r e p o r ts of British a nd F r e n ch c o r r e s p o n d e n ts con cerning t he m o v e m e n ts and p r o s p e c ts of t he war. But n ow this h as given w ay to a feeling of anxiety and e v en of alarm. It is confessed on all h a n ds t h at t h e re is no such superiority as has b e en claimed on t he p a rt of t he allied armies over their antagonists. T h at Sevastopol is stronger, Menchikoff an abler General, and his a r my far m o re formidable t h an was s u p p o s e d; a nd t h at instead of certain and decisive victory, t he F r e n ch and English n ow stand e x p o s ed to possible failure and disgrace. S u ch is the feeling e x p r e s s ed by o ur c o r r e s p o n d e nt at Liverpool, himself an Englishman, alive to all t he patriotic impulses and prejudices of his c o u n t r y; and this feeling is equally manifested by the v e ry energetic action of b o th the F r e n ch and English G o v e r n m e n t s. D e s p e r a te efforts are making to h u r ry r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts to S e v a s t o p o l; the United K i n g d om is drained of its last soldier; m a ny steam ships are t a k en up as t r a n s p o r t s; and 50,000 F r e n ch t r o o ps are sent forward, all in the h o pe of arriving at t he scene of action b e f o re it shall be too late to t a ke p a rt in t he final, decisive struggle. 15 20 25 We published on S a t u r d ay a copious quantity of d o c u m e n t s, relating principally to t he earlier stages of t he siege, and t he partially effective b ut y et disastrous cooperation of the fleets; and we n ow add the official r e p o r ts concerning L i p r a n d i 's m u r d e r o us attack on the allies near Balaklava, with other a c c o u n ts of t he s u b s e q u e nt progress of o p e r a t i o n s, all of t h e m, we m u st say, quite unfavorable to t he allies. F r om a careful examination of t h e se d o c u m e n ts we conclude t h at t h o u gh the position is, as we h a ve often stated, a difficult a nd e v en precarious one, it is hardly so bad as is implied by our 537 Friedrich Engels Liverpool c o r r e s p o n d e n t. We do not think t h at t h ey are in danger of a ny w o r se disaster t h an a c o m p u l s o ry retreat and embarkation. A n d, on t he o t h er h a n d, t h e re is still the possibility of their carrying the t o wn by a d e s p e r a te a nd sanguinary assault. But h o w e v er this m ay b e, it must, we think, be decided long before the r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts leaving F r a n ce and England c an r e a ch t he Crimea. T he campaign is evidently n e ar its turning point; t he m o v e m e n t s, the e r r o rs and the omissions w h i ch h a ve shaped its c h a r a c t er a nd g e n e r a t ed its results, are m a d e; we are in p o s s e s s i on of authentic a nd indisputable information as to the principal facts; and we accordingly p r o p o se succinctly a nd briefly to review the c o u r se of t he contest. It is n ow established that w h en the allies landed at Old F o r t, Menchikoff h ad u n d er his c o m m a nd in the field only forty-two battalions and t wo regi m e n ts of cavalry, besides some C o s s a c k s, while S e v a s t o p ol w as garrisoned by the marines a nd sailors of the fleet. T h e se forty-two battalions w e re of the 12th, 16th and 17th divisions of infantry; and supposing e a ch battalion to h a ve h ad its full c o m p l e m e nt of 700 men, t h e re w e re in all 29,400 m en of infantry; w i th 2,000 H u s s a r s, t he C o s s a c k s, artillery, s a p p e rs and m i n e r s; in all s o me 32,000 m en in t he field. With t h e se he could n ot o p p o se t he landing of the allies, as by so doing he would h a ve e x p o s ed his t r o o p s, w i t h o ut a sufficient r e s e r v e, to t he fire of t he allied fleets. A powerful a r m y, w h i ch could afford to h a ve sacrificed a part of its strength, might h a ve d e t a c h ed a force to o p en a p e t ty w ar of surprises and night-attacks against t he invaders while landing; t he R u s s i a n s, in this instance, required e v e ry m an for t he great battle to c o m e; b e s i d e s, t he Russian foot soldier is t he clumsiest fellow alive for p e t ty w ar o p e r a t i o n s; his forte is the action in c o l u mn by close o r d e r. As to t he C o s s a c k s, on t he other hand, their m o de of w a r f a re is t oo p e t t y, and is effective in proportion only as the c h a n ce of plunder i n c r e a s e s. B e s i d e s, t he campaign of t he Crimea seems to p r o ve t h at t he regularization of t he C o s s a c k s, w h i ch has b e en gradually carried o ut for the last thirty y e a r s, h as b r o k en their individual spirit of enterprise, and r e d u c ed t h em to a sub- dued condition, in w h i ch they are spoiled for irregular a nd n ot y et fit for regular service. T h ey s e em incapable n ow either of o u t p o st a nd d e t a c h ed duty, or of charging an e n e my in line. T he R u s s i a n s, t h e n, w e re quite right in reserving every sabre and b a y o n et for t he battle of t he Alma. On t he b a n ks of this river, the 32,000 R u s s i a ns w e re a t t a c k ed by 55,000 allies. T he proportion w as almost one to t w o. W h en a b o ut 30,000 allies h ad b e en engaged, Menchikoff o r d e r ed the retreat. Of the R u s s i a n s, up to t h e n, n ot m o re t h an 20,000 w e re engaged; a further a t t e m pt to hold t he position, w o u ld h a ve converted the Russian retreat into a c o m p l e te r o u t, for it would h a ve required t he engaging of t he whole R u s s i an r e s e r ve in t he battle. T he success of the allies, with their t r e m e n d o us numerical superiority, 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 538 The Campaign in the Crimea 5 being established b e y o nd doubt, Menchikoff b r o ke off t he battle, c o v e r ed his r e t r e at by his r e s e r v e s, a nd after o v e r c o m i ng the first disorder created on his left by B o s q u e t 's flank m o v e m e nt retired u n p u r s u ed a nd u n m o l e s t e d, "in p r o ud o r d e r ," from the field. T he allies say t h ey h ad no cavalry for the pursuit; b ut since we k n ow t h at t he Russians h ad b ut t wo regiments of Hussars—less, if anything, t h an the allies—this e x c u se falls to the ground. As at Zorndorf, at E y l a u, at B o r o d i n o, the R u s s i an infantry, t h o u gh b e a t e n, b e h a v ed up to the character given t h em by G e n e r al C a t h c a r t, w ho c o m m a n d ed a division against t h e m, and w ho p r o n o u n c ed t h em "incapable of 10 p a n i c !" B ut if the Russian infantry r e m a i n ed cool a nd unterrified, Menchikoff himself w as panic-struck. T he great numerical force of the allies, coupled w i th their u n e x p e c t ed decision and impetuosity in the attack, deranged, for a m o m e n t, his plans. He a b a n d o n ed t he idea of retreating into the interior of the Crimea, and m a r c h ed to the south of S e v a s t o p o l, in o r d er to hold the line of t he C h e r n a y a. This w as a great a nd u n p a r d o n a b le mistake. Over looking, from the hights of the A l m a, the w h o le allied position, he m u st h a ve b e en able to m a ke out t he strength of his o p p o n e n ts within 5,000 men. He m u st h a ve k n o wn that, w h a t e v er w as their relative superiority over his o wn forces, t h ey w e re n ot strong e n o u gh to leave an a r my to o b s e r ve Sevastopol while following him into the interior. He m u st h a ve k n o wn that if the allies w e re t wo to o ne against him on t he sea-shore, he could bring t wo against their o ne at Simferopol. A nd y et he m a r c h e d, as he himself confesses, to t he s o u th side of Sevastopol. B u t, after this retreat h ad b e en effected, without any molestation from t he allies, and his t r o o ps h ad r e s t ed a day or t wo on t he hills behind t he C h e r n a y a, t h en Menchikoff resolved to redress his mistake. He did this by a perilous flank m o v e m e nt from t he C h e r n a ya to Bakshi-Serai. It w as c o n t r a ry to o ne of t he first rules of strategy; y et it promised great results. W h en a blunder is o n ce c o m m i t t ed in strategy, y ou c an seldom get over its c o n s e q u e n c e s. T he question t h en merely is, w h e t h er it is less disadvantageous to abide by t h em or to get over t h em by a second, b ut intentional, e r r o n e o us m o v e m e n t. In this c a se we think Menchikoff w as perfectìy right in risking a flank-march within r e a ch of the e n e m y, in o r d er to get out of his absurdly " c o n c e n t r a t e d" position a r o u nd Sevastopol. B ut in this c o n t e st b e t w e en strategical mediocrities and routine generals, t he m o v e m e n ts of hostile armies a s s u m ed f o r ms hitherto u n k n o wn in war fare. T he fancy for flank-marches, like the cholera, w as epidemic in b o th c a m p s. At t he same t i me t h at Menchikoff r e s o l v ed on a flank-march from Sevastopol to Bakshi-Serai, Saint A r n a ud and Raglan t o ok it into their h e a ds to m o ve from the K a t c ha to Balaklava. T he r e ar of t he Russians and the v an of the British m et at M a c k e n z i e 's farm, (so called from a S c o t c h m a n, later 15 20 25 30 35 40 539 Friedrich Engels an admiral in t he Russian service,) and, as a matter of c o u r s e, the v an b e at the rear. T he general strategical character of the flank-march of the allies having already b e en criticised in The Tribune, we n e ed n ot n ow revert to it. On t he 2d or 3d of O c t o b er Sevastopol w as invested, a nd t he allies t o ok up t h at v e ry position from which Menchikoff h ad j u st extricated himself. F r om that m o m e nt t he m e m o r a b le siege of Sevastopol b e g a n, and at t he same time a n ew e ra in t he campaign. Hitherto t he allies, by their u n c o n t e s t ed superiority, had it all their o wn way. Their fleets, c o m m a n d i ng t he sea, insured their landing. O n ce landed, their superior n u m b e r s, and certainly also their superior storming qualities, insured the victory at t he A l m a. B ut n ow t he equilibrium of forces, which sooner or later is sure of be b r o u g ht a b o ut in o p e r a t i o ns distant from their b a se and in an e n e m y 's c o u n t r y, b e g an to develop itself. Menchikoff's army, it is t r u e, did not show itself y e t; but it m a de n e c e s s a ry the placing of a reserve on the C h e r n a y a, fronting to the east. T h us the actual besieging a r my was seriosly w e a k e n e d, and r e d u c ed to n u m b e rs n ot m u ch superior to those of the garrison. W a nt of energy, w a nt of system, especially in t he c o o p e r a t i on of the different d e p a r t m e n ts of t he British land and sea f o r c e s, difficulties of ground, a n d, a b o ve all, an invincible spirit of r o u t i n e, inherent, it a p p e a r s, in t he British administrative a nd scientific d e p a r t m e n t s, delayed t he c o m m e n c e m e nt of actual siege operations to the 9th of O c t o b e r. At last t he t r e n c h es w e re o p e n ed on t h at day, at the e n o r m o us distance of from 1,500 to 2,500 y a r ds from the Russian w o r k s. S u ch a thing w as n e v er s e en n or heard of in any p r e v i o us siege. It p r o v es t h at t he Russians w e re still able to dispute the ground a r o u nd the fortress, to the distance of at least a mile; and t h ey actually held it up to t he 17th. On the morning of t h at day t he siege-works w e re far e n o u gh a d v a n c ed to allow the allies to o p en their fire. P r o b a b ly this would h a ve b e en delayed a few days longer, as t he allies w e re by no means in a fit position to do so with success on that day, h ad it n ot b e en for the arrival of t he glorious n e ws that all England and F r a n ce w e re rejoicing at the c a p t u re of Sevastopol on the 25th of October. This n e w s, of c o u r s e, e x a s p e r a t ed the armies, and, in order to tranquilize t h e m, t he fire h ad to be o p e n e d. B ut it turns o ut that the allies brought 126 guns against 200 or 250. N o w, t he great axiom of V a u b a n, which has b e en again a nd again used by the A n g l o - F r e n ch to k e ep public opinion quiet, viz.: " t h at a siege is an operation of mathematical certainty and success, a m e re matter of time, unless interrupted from w i t h o u t ." This great axiom is b a s ed u p on that other axiom of t he s a me engineer that "in a siege the fire of t he a t t a ck c an be m a de superior to that of the d e f e n s e ." N o w, here at S e v a s t o p o l, we h a ve exactly the r e v e r s e; t he fire of the attack, w h en o p e n e d, w as decidedly inferior to 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 540 The Campaign in the Crimea t h at of the defense. T he c o n s e q u e n c es w e re v e ry s o on m a de apparent. In a couple of h o u rs t he Russians silenced the fire of t he F r e n ch batteries and k e pt up an almost equal contest, throughout the d a y, with the English. To c r e a te a diversion, a naval attack w as m a d e. B ut it w as neither better con- d u c t ed nor m o re successful. T he F r e n ch ships, attacking t he Q u a r a n t i ne F o rt a nd F o rt Alexander, supported t he land a t t a ck u p on t h e se forts; and h ad it n ot b e en for their aid, t h e re is no d o u bt the F r e n ch w o u ld h a ve b e en far m o re roughly handled. T he English ships attacked the n o r th side of the harbor, including F o rt Constantine and the Telegraph b a t t e r y, as well as a t e m p o r a ry b a t t e ry c o n s t r u c t ed to t he north-east of C o n s t a n t i n e. T h at cautious man, Admiral D u n d a s, h ad ordered his ships to a n c h or at 1,200 y a r ds from the forts—he is evidently a friend of t he long-range system. N ow it is an old established fact, that in a c o m b at b e t w e en ships a nd batteries on s h o r e, the ships are b e at unless t h ey can close up within 200 y a r ds or less to t he bat teries, so t h at their shot is certain to tell, and with the greater effect. Con sequently, D u n d as got his ships k n o c k ed a b o ut in a terrible m a n n er and w o u ld h a ve suffered a glorious defeat, h ad it n ot b e en for Sir E d m u nd L y o n s, who', it a p p e a r s, almost in defiance of o r d e r s, got t h r ee ships-of-the-line as close as he could to F o rt C o n s t a n t i ne and did it s o me d a m a ge in e x c h a n ge for w h at he received. A s, h o w e v e r, t he British and F r e n ch Admirals' r e p o r ts h a ve n ot yet said a single w o rd about the actual d a m a ge d o ne to the forts, we m u st conclude t h at h e r e, as well as [at] B o m a r s u n d, Montalembert Coast—forts and c a s e m a t ed batteries—proved a m a t ch for twice their n u m b er of guns on b o a rd ship. This is t he m o re r e m a r k a b l e, as it is n ow pretty certain t h at the e x p o s ed m a s o n ry of t h e se forts, as w as already partially p r o v ed at B o m a r s u n d, c a n n ot withstand t he breaching fire of h e a vy ship guns, e s t a b lished on s h o r e, for m o re t h an twenty-four h o u r s. 5 10 ís 20 25 30 T he F r e n ch w e re almost silent for a couple of d a ys afterward. T he English, having established their batteries at a greater distance from t he Russian lines, and mounting heavier calibers t h an their allies, w e re enabled to maintain their fire and to silence t he u p p er tier of g u ns in a m a s o n ry r e d o u b t. T he naval attack w as n ot renewed—the b e st proof of the r e s p e ct inspired by t he c a s e m a t ed forts. T he Russians m a de a defense w h i ch v e ry m u ch u n d e c e i v ed the c o n q u e r o rs of the Alma. F or e v e ry d i s m o u n t ed gun a fresh o ne was b r o u g ht u p. E v e ry e m b r a s u re d e s t r o y ed during t he day by the e n e m y 's fire w as restored during t he night. E a r t h w o r ks against e a r t h w o r k s, the c o n t e st w as v e ry nearly equal, until m e a s u r es w e re t a k en to give t he allies the superiority. L o rd Raglan's ridiculous order " to spare the t o w n" w as r e v o k e d, a nd a b o m b a r d m e nt o p e n ed which, by its c o n c e n t r ic e f f e c t ' u p on c r o w d ed 40 m a s s es of t r o o p s, and by its harassing n a t u r e, m u st h a ve d o ne the garrison great h a r m. Skirmishers w e r e, besides, sent out in a d v a n ce of the batteries, 35 541 Friedrich Engels to pick off, from any c o v e r ed position they could find, t he R u s s i an g u n n e r s. As at B o m a r s u n d, the Minié rifle did its w o rk well. In a few d a y s, w h at with the h e a vy guns and the Minié rifles, the Russian artillerymen w e re mostly p ut hors de combat. So w e re t he sailors from t he fleet, t he p o r t i on of t he garrison b e st instructed in the u se of h e a vy guns. T he u s u al r e s o u r ce of besieged garrisons h ad t h en to be resorted t o: t he infantry w e re c o m m a n d ed to serve the guns, u n d er the superintendence of the remaining artillerymen. B ut their fire, as m ay be imagined, was almost without effect, and t h us the besiegers w e re enabled to p u sh their trenches n e a r er and n e a r er the place. T h ey h a ve o p e n e d, it is stated, their third parallel at 300 y a r ds from t he o u t w o r k s. We do n ot k n ow yet w h at batteries t h ey h a ve e r e c t ed in this third parallel ; we c an only say t h at a third parallel, in regular sieges, is always m a de at the foot of the glacis of the w o r ks attacked, t h at is, a b o ut 50 or 60 y a r ds from t he ditch. If this distance has b e en e x c e e d ed before Sevastopol, we c an b ut see in this fact a confirmation of a r e p o rt contained in several British p a p e r s, t h at t he irregularity of the lines of defense, i n s t e ad of giving t he British engineers fresh scope for their inventive capacities, has b ut discon certed t h e se gentlemen w ho c an demolish, u p on t he most a p p r o v ed principle, a r e g u l a r b a s t i o n ed front, but w ho seem to be badly off as s o on as the e n e my deviates from t he rule prescribed by the b e st authorities on t he subject. T he s o u t h e rn attack o n ce decided u p o n, the parallel a nd its batteries should h a ve b e en directed against o n e, or at most t wo well-defined fronts of t he d e f e n s e s. T wo of the outer forts next to e a ch other—or, at t he v e ry outside, three—should h a ve b e en attacked with c o n c e n t r a t ed f o r c e s; a n d, o n ce de molished, t h en all the other o u t w o r ks would h a ve b e en useless. In this w a y, t he allies, by bringing all their artillery to b e ar u p on o ne point, could h a ve easily established at o n ce a great superiority of fire, and shortened the siege considerably. As far as c an be judged from plans and m a p s, t he front, from t he Q u a r a n t i ne F o rt to the upper end of the inner h a r b o r, or t he front against w h i ch the F r e n ch n ow direct their efforts, would h a ve b e en t he b e st to attack, as its demolition w o u ld lay the t o wn itself completely o p e n. T he o ne h u n d r ed a nd thirty guns of t he allies would h a ve at o n ce insured t h em a superiority of fire on this limited front. Instead of this, the desire to let e a ch a r my act independently of t he other, p r o d u c ed this u n p r e c e d e n t ed m o de of siege, in w h i ch the whole of the r a m p a r t s, extending over a length of t h r ee miles, is simultaneously c a n n o n a d ed on its whole extent. S u ch a thing h as n e v er b e en seen before. W ho e v er heard of an attack w h i ch allowed the d e f e n se to bring into play at o n c e, from plain bastioned w o r ks and lunettes t he e n o r m o us m a ss of t wo h u n d r ed and fifty g u n s? A single bastioned front can hardly m o u nt t w e n ty g u n s; a nd in an ordinary siege no m o re t h an t h r ee or four fronts c an contribute to t he defense. U n l e ss the allied engineers c an s h o w, hereafter, 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 542 The Campaign in the Crimea v e ry substantial r e a s o ns for their curious p r o c e e d i n g s, we must conclude t h at t h ey w e re unable to find out the w e a k e st points of the defenses, and, there fore, in order not to miss t h e m, fired upon e v e ry portion of t he line. In the m e an time, r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts arrive to b o th parties. Liprandi's h a r a s s- ing and partially successful attacks on the allied out-posts h a ve s h o wn t he p r e s e n ce of a stronger R u s s i an force than Menchikoff had led to Bakshi Serai. As yet, he does not, h o w e v e r, a p p e ar strong e n o u gh for a relieving battle. Considering the progress m a de by t he besiegers, considering that the d a m a ge d o ne to t he defense increases in a geometrical ratio as the besiegers a p p r o a ch the r a m p a r t s, considering that the o u t - w o r ks still hold out, but t h at t he inner wall a p p e a rs to be w e a k, we may e x p e ct t h at something decisive will h a ve occurred from the 9th to the 15th of N o v e m b er ; t h at either the south side of the t o w er has fallen, or that the allies h a ve suffered a decisive defeat a nd b e en obliged to raise the siege. B ut it m u st be recollected that all such predictions d e p e nd u p on c i r c u m s t a n c es which c a n n ot be fully k n o wn b e f o r e h a nd at such a distance from the spot. 5 10 15 543 Friedrich Engels The War in the East New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4249, 30. November 1854 The War in the East. T he arrival of t he Africa has p ut us in p o s s e s s i on of t h r ee d a ys later d a t es from E u r o p e, b ut nothing of additional interest from the seat of war b e y o nd an infernal episode describing the roasting alive of a v a st n u m b er of sick and w o u n d ed in hospital, and accounts of sufferings t h at r e n d er language a p a u p er in attempting to p o r t r ay t h e m. Of the b l o o dy and undecisive battle of t he 5th N o v e m b e r, brief intelligence of which w as b r o u g ht by t he Baltic, we h a ve n ow L o rd Raglan's curt dispatch, b ut not yet the c u s t o m a ry volumi n o us and exciting details by c o r r e s p o n d e n t s, w h e t h er a c t o rs or lookers-on. M u ch anxiety—much m o re than a p p e a rs on the surface of things—exists in England as well as in F r a n ce in regard to the i n c r e a s ed a nd increasing dif ficulties of the w a r; and the stubborn refusal of S e v a s t o p ol to fall before the allies, t h o se rivals in courage and sacrifices, is m o st ominously viewed. T he e x t r a c ts in another c o l u mn of this journal, from The London Times, exhibit an altered t e m p e r, and a spirit of doubt w h i ch m ay be m i s t a k en by some for approaching despair. In the absence of details respecting t he battle of the 5th sufficiently c o h e r e nt to b a se r e m a r ks u p o n, we shall n ow offer s o me on t he operations of the siege just previous to that time. T he 25th of O c t o b er w as the d ay on w h i ch the slow m o n o t o ny of the siege of S e v a s t o p ol was first interrupted by a dramatic incident. The^Russians, on that d a y, attacked the allied position covering the siege, and the advantages being m o re equally distributed, this time, to either side, t he result w as v e ry different from that of the battle of the Alma. This action, in fact, w as the v e ry c o u n t e r p a rt of t h at of the Alma: it w as a cavalry fight almost ex clusively, while at the A l ma no cavalry w as engaged; a nd instead of o c c u p y- ing a defensive position, t he Russians w e re t he assailants, while t he ad vantages of strong positions w e re with the allies. It w a s, indeed, a d r a wn battle as nearly as that of the Alma, b ut this time t he a d v a n t a g es r e m a i n ed to the R u s s i a n s. 5 10 15 20 25 T he Heracleatic C h e r s o n e s e, the peninsula south of the B ay of S e v a s t o p o l, 30 544 The War in the East b o r d e rs t o w a rd the main land of t he Crimea by a range of hights running from the m o u th of the C h e r n a y a, or the head of the B ay of S e v a s t o p o l, to the south-west. This range slopes d o wn gradually on its north-west side t o w a rd Sevastopol, while it is generally steep and bold t o w a rd t he south-east, facing 5 Balaklava. T he allies occupying t he Heracleatic C h e r s o n e s e, this range w as their natural defensive position against any R u s s i an a r my trying to raise the siege. B ut unfortunately, Balaklava w as t he " b a se of o p e r a t i o n s" of t he British, the chief harbor for their fleet, the grand d é p ôt for their s t o r e s; and Balaklava lay about t h r ee miles to the south-east of this range of hills. It w a s, 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 therefore, n e c e s s a ry to include Balaklava in t he system of defense. T he c o u n t ry a b o ut Balaklava is f o r m ed by a g r o up of v e ry irregular hights, running from the s o u t h e rn extremity of the aforesaid range, nearly d ue e a st a nd w e st along the coast, and like all hills in t he Crimea, sloping gently t o w a rd t he north-west, b ut steep and craggy t o w a rd the south-east. T h us an angle f o r m ed b e t w e en t h e se t wo groups of hights, is filled up by an undulating plain, rising gradually t o w a rd the east, until it e n ds in a steep d e s c e nt t o w a rd t he valley of t he C h e r n a y a. T he m o st r e m a r k a b le feature of this plain is a range of hillocks and of slightly elevated ground running north-west and south-east, uniting w h at we call the Heracleatic range with t he m o u n t a i ns on the s o u th coast. It w as on this elevation, about t h r ee miles east and north-east of Balaklava, that the allies had t h r o wn up their first line of defenses, consisting of four r e d o u b t s, defending the r o a ds from Bakshiserai a nd from t he U p p er C h e r n a y a. T h e se r e d o u b ts w e re garrisoned by T u r k s. A second line of field-works w as e r e c t ed immediately in front of Balaklava, a nd c o n t i n u ed up to t he a p ex of t he angle f o r m ed by the c o a st hights a nd the H e r a c l e a t ic range w h i ch latter w e re fortified by t he F r e n ch division of General B o s q u e t, stationed t h e r e. T h u s, while t he second line, defended by English soldiers, m a r i n es and sailors, w as continued and flanked by t he F r e n ch line of r e d o u b t s, the first or T u r k i sh line, nearly t wo miles in a d v a n c e, n ot only w as completely u n s u p p o r t e d, b ut strange to say, instead of forming a line perpendicular to t he r o ad on which the e n e my could c o m e, it w as constructed almost in the prolongation of that line, so that the Russians might first t a ke o n e, t h en the second, t h en the third and finally the fourth r e d o u b t, gaining ground e a ch time, and w i t h o ut the possibility of one r e d o u bt m u ch supporting the other. T he allied position w as occupied: t o w a rd Balaklava, by the T u r ks in the r e d o u b t s, or first line; by British marines, on t he hights, in the immediate vicinity of Balaklava; by the 93d Highlanders, and s o me convalescents in t he valley north of Balaklava. F u r t h er n o r th w as t he c a mp of t he British cavalry ; and on the Heracleatic hights, that of the a d v a n ce guard of B o s q u e t 's division. 545 Friedrich Engels At 6'clock on the morning of the 25th, G e n. L i p r a n di led the Russians to t he a t t a ck of this position. He had u n d er him a c o m b i n ed division consisting of six regiments of infantry, (Dnieper, Azoff, U k r a i n e, O d e s s a, Vladimir, Suzdal, t he 6th battalion Rifles, and o ne battalion T c h o r n o m o r s ki C o s s a c k s, or 25 battalions in all ;) t h r ee regiments of cavalry, (the 11th and 12th H u s s a r s, a nd a c o m b i n ed regiment of L a n c e r s, or 24 to 26 squadrons,) a b o ut t wo regiments of C o s s a c k s, and 70 guns, of which 30 w e re 12-pounders. He sent Gen. Gribbe by a defile on his left to o c c u p y, w i th three battalions D n i e p er Infantry, t he village of K a m a r a, in front of which t he first a nd strongest r e d o u bt is situated. G e n. Gribbe occupied the village, and his t h r ee battalions a p p e ar to h a ve spent the day t h e re very quietly, as t h ey h a ve n e v er b e en n a m ed during the fight which followed. T he m a in column, following first the c o u r se of the C h e r n a y a, and t h en a b y - r o a d, gained the high-road from Bakshiserai to Balaklava. H e re they m et t he r e d o u b t s, m a n n ed by T u r k s. T he first r e d o u bt being p r e t ty strong, L i p- randi h ad a fire of artillery o p e n ed u p on it, and t h en sent t he storming parties forward. A line of skirmishers hid the first, second and third battalion. Azoff advancing in c o l u m ns of c o m p a n i e s, which w e re again supported behind either wing, by the fourth battalion Azoff and one battalion D n i e p e r, in close attacking c o l u m n s. T he r e d o u b t, after a lively r e s i s t a n c e, w as t a k e n; t he 170 dead and w o u n d ed the T u r ks left in it, show that, in spite of the invidious assertions of t he British press, this r e d o u bt w as valiantly defended. T he second, third, and fourth r e d o u b t s, h o w e v e r, being hastily c o n s t r u c t e d, w e re t a k en by t he R u s s i a ns almost without resistance, and by s e v en o'clock in the m o r n i n g, the first line of defense of the allies w as completely in their h a n d s. 5 10 15 20 25 T he a b a n d o n m e nt of t h e se r e d o u b ts by the T u r ks m ay h a ve the good effect of dispelling the m o n s t r o us superstitions regarding T u r k i sh b r a v e ry w h i ch h a ve b e en c o m m o n ly a d o p t ed since Oltenitza a nd Silistria, yet t he British Generals and p r e ss play a very shabby part in turning, all at o n c e, u p on the T u r ks on this occasion. It is n ot so m u ch t he T u r ks w ho should be b l a m e d, b ut the engineers w ho contrived to shape their line of defense in such a faulty m a n n e r, and w ho neglected to finish it in time, as well as t he c o m m a n d e r s, w ho e x p o s ed the first line to an overwhelming s h o ck of the e n e my w i t h o ut a ny supports being at hand. 30 T he 93d Highlanders, steady and slow, as it b e h o v es S c o t c h m e n, got in 35 line by-and-by, and then advanced up the hights t o w a rd t he r e d o u b t s, but n ot b e f o re t h ey w e re taken. T he fugitive T u r k s, d e c i m a t ed by R u s s i an cavalry, at last f o r m ed again on t he flanks of the Highlanders. T h e s e, in order to shelter themselves from the Russian fire, laid d o wn behind the crest of an undulation of ground, in a d v a n ce of all t he positions still held by t he allies, and s u p p o r t ed by t he cavalry division only to their left. In the m e a n t i me the 40 546 The War in the East R u s s i a ns h ad formed their line of battle on t he hights w h e re the r e d o u b ts w e re situated—on their left flank Azoff, next to the right the U k r a i n e, n e xt the O d e s sa infantry. T h e se t h r ee regiments filled up t he space b e t w e en t he r e d o u b t s, a nd occupied w h at had b e en the first line of t he allies. F u r t h er o n, to t he right of the O d e s sa regiment, the undulating plain f o r m ed a favorable theater for cavalry m o v e m e n t s. Thither the t wo H u s s ar regiments w e re sent, and t h ey found t h e m s e l v es directly o p p o s ed to t he British cavalry, which w as d r a wn up about two miles distant. T he regiments of Suzdal and Vladimir, part of the artillery and t he L a n c e r s, w h i ch w e re just coming u p, r e m a i n ed in r e s e r v e. W h en t he 93d Highlanders, reënforced by the c o n v a l e s c e nt battalion and t he T u r k s, m a de a stand against t he Russians, t he H u s s a rs w e re launched against t h e m. B ut before t h ey could c o me u p, the British h e a vy brigade of cavalry charged t h e m. T he seven or eight h u n d r ed British h e a vy dragoons d a s h ed at the Russians and dispersed t h em in o ne of t he m o st brilliant and successful charges on record, considering their far inferior n u m b e r s. T he R u s s i an H u s s a r s, twice as n u m e r o u s, w e re scattered in a m o m e n t. T he few R u s s i an s q u a d r o ns which h ad charged the 93d H i g h l a n d e r s, w e re received with a quiet Scotch volley at fifteen yards from the infantry, and reeled b a ck as well as t h ey could. If the T u r ks had r un a w a y, the English, up to this time, h ad e a r n ed nothing b ut glory. T he daring of t he Highlanders w ho received cavalry in line, without deigning to form squares, the dashing attack of the h e a vy cavalry, w e re certainly things to b o a st of, especially as they w e re p e r f o r m ed before a ny r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts c a me u p. B ut n ow the F i r st (Duke of Cambridge's) a nd F o u r th (Cathcart's) Divisions, as well as B o s q u e t 's F r e n ch Division and t he brigade of C h a s s e u rs d'Afrique (cavalry) c a me u p. T he line of battle w as f o r m e d, and only n ow could it be said that t h e re w e re t wo armies in p r e s e n c e. T he F r e n ch of B o s q u et forming u p on the H e r a c l e a t ic hights, L i p r a n di sent t he regiments [of] Vladimir and Suzdal to form t he e x t r e me right wing on t he hights b e y o nd t he position of the cavalry. 5 10 15 20 25 30 T h e n, the fire having almost ceased, b e c a u se the armies w e re o ut of range of e a ch other, a misunderstanding which is n ot cleared u p, c a u s ed a charge of the British light cavalry—a charge which had no object and e n d ed in defeat. 35 An order arrived to a d v a n c e, and, in a f ew m o m e n t s, the E a rl of Cardigan led his light brigade up a valley opposite his position—a valley flanked by covering hights, c r o w n ed by batteries, concentrating their fire on t he lower ground below. T he w h o le brigade a m o u n t ed but to 700 s a b r e s; w h en within range of grape, t h ey w e re received by the fire of t he artillery a nd of t he rifles stationed on the slopes; t h ey charged the b a t t e ry at the u p p er e nd of the valley, received fire at t w e n ty y a r d s, r o de d o wn t he g u n n e r s, dispersed t he 40 547 Friedrich Engels Russian H u s s a r s, w ho m a de a second b ut wavering c h a r g e, and w e re on the point of turning b a ck w h en t he Russian L a n c e rs t o ok t h em in flank. T h ey h ad just c o me u p, and fell at o n ce u p on the panting h o r s es of the British. This t i m e, in spite of partial successes, t he British h ad to t u r n b a c k, a nd w e re fairly defeated by t he R u s s i a n s, but, it m u st be said, by far superior n u m b e r s, a nd by t he aid of a mistake, which sent t h e m, without an object, right against t he cross-fire of a n u m e r o us artillery. Of t he 700 m en t h at a d v a n c e d, n ot 200 c a me b a ck in a fighting condition. T he light cavalry brigade m ay be con sidered d e s t r o y e d, until re-formed by fresh arrivals. 5 10 This disaster to the British would h a ve b e en far greater, a nd hardly a m an w o u ld h a ve c o me b a c k, h ad it not b e en for t wo m o v e m e n ts m a de on either flank of the charging light h o r s e. On their right, L o rd L u c an o r d e r ed the h e a vy brigade to d e m o n s t r a te against t he Russian b a t t e r i es in front of t h e m. T h ey m a n e u v e r ed f o r w a rd during a few m i n u t e s, lost a b o ut ten m en by t he R u s s i an fire and galloped back. On t he left, h o w e v e r, t he F r e n ch C h a s s e u rs d'Afrique, t wo of the finest cavalry regiments in the w o r l d, on seeing their allies b r o k e n, rushed f o r w a rd to disengage t h e m. T h ey c h a r g ed t he battery w h i ch t o ok the British light h o r se in flank, and w h i ch w as placed higher up t he hill, in front of the infantry regiments of Vladimir, w e re within t he line of guns in a m o m e n t, sabred the gunners, and t h en r e t r e a t e d, having a c- 20 complished their object—which, t o o, t h ey would h a ve d o n e, e v en without the a d v a n ce the Vladimir infantry instantly m a de on t h e m. 15 H e re w as another instance of the British system of w a r f a re as manifested in this campaign, such as, m o re t h an o n c e, we h a ve h ad o c c a s i on to point out. T h ey first m a de a blunder, and t h en recoiled from t he untactical m o v e- m e nt which could h a ve alone averted its c o n s e q u e n c e s. B ut t he F r e n ch C h a s s e u rs instantly felt w h at w as to be d o n e. On their side of the cavalry action no flank attack of Russian horse t o ok place, b e c a u se their d a sh pre v e n t ed it: while t he cautious " h e a v i e s" of Brigadier Scarlett merely d e m o n strated, and that, of c o u r s e, w as not e n o u gh to p r e v e nt t he R u s s i an L a n c e rs from falling on the flank of the H u s s a r s. H ad they c h a r g e d, like t he F r e n c h, t he Russian L a n c e rs w o u ld h a ve t u r n ed tail v e ry soon. B ut while their fellow- brigade w as o r d e r ed to be over-daring, t h ey w e re o r d e r ed to be over c a u t i o u s, and the result w as the ruin of the light brigade. After this the action ceased. T he Russians demolished the t wo r e d o u b ts n e a r e st t he allies, and k e pt the t wo others strongly occupied. T h ey main tained the c o n q u e r ed ground, and L o rd Raglan, n ot venturing to attack t h e m, o r d e r ed the s e c o nd line of r e d o u b ts to be strengthened, a nd confined himself to its defense. T he first line w as given u p. 25 30 35 In this action the behavior of the 93d Highlanders is b e y o nd all praise. To receive cavalry in line in t he w ay they did, merely wheeling b a c k w a rd o ne 40 548 The War in the East c o m p a ny on their right flank en potence, to hold b a ck their fire to t he decisive m o m e n t, a nd t h en deliver it w i th such deadly steadiness, is a feat w h i ch v e ry few t r o o ps c an p e r f o r m, and which s h o ws in them the highest qualities required in t he infantry soldier. T he Austrians a nd t he British m ay be con- sidered t he only t r o o ps with w h om such an e x p e r i m e nt c an be p r e t ty safely tried; p e r h a p s, also, with some Russian t r o o p s, for their length of service qualifies t h em for such a task, although we do n ot recollect t h em having e v er b e en put to t he t e st and stood it. T he superiority of the British and F r e n ch cavalry o v er the Russian is incontestably p r o v ed by this action. T he t h r ee brigades of the allies w e re a b o ut the s a me strength as the t h r ee regiments of the R u s s i a n s; and had t h ey b e en sent to the charge simultaneously i n s t e ad of o ne after the other, a nd supported by artillery driving u p, and t he w h o le line of infantry m o v i ng o n w a r d, L i p r a n di and his t r o o ps w e re in great danger of being t h r o wn d o wn t he steep d e s c e nt t o w a rd the C h e r n a y a, and meeting with the fate Blücher p r e p a r ed for the F r e n ch at the K a t z b a c h. T he strength of the two armies m ay be t h us c o m p u t e d: T he Russians h ad 25 battalions, which mostly h ad b e en engaged at t he Alma, c a n n ot h a ve c o u n t ed m o re t h an 14,000 m en at t he v e ry outside. Cavalry, 24 s q u a d r o n s, having mostly m a r c h ed all t he w ay from M o s c ow a nd Kaluga, certainly n ot a b o ve 2,400 m e n; besides a b o ut 1,000 C o s s a c k s. Artillery, 70 g u n s. 5 10 15 20 T he allies had of infantry the greater p a rt of the first a nd fourth British divisions, a nd of B o s q u e t 's F r e n ch division; b e s i d es t h em an u n c e r t a in n u m b er of T u r k s, w h i ch we can only c o me at by c o m p u t i ng the n u m b er of 25 T u r k i sh battalions landed. T h e re w e re t en T u r k i sh battalions with the e x pedition from the first, and according to L o rd Raglan's dispatch of 18th O c t o b e r, six m o re battalions w e re landed at Balaklava. As t h ey w e re not e m p l o y ed on the siege, nor m o v ed far from Balaklava, all t h e se T u r ks m u st h a ve b e en p r e s e nt t h e r e; although, after their retreat from t he r e d o u b t s, t h ey w e re no longer mentioned in the dispatches and n ot considered w o r th mentioning. T h us we shall be p r e t ty n e ar t he fact, if we t a ke t he British at a b o ut 6,500, t he F r e n ch at a b o ut 3,500, and the T u r ks at 6,000 at least. B e s i d e s, t h e re w e re a b o ut 1,000 British marines and sailors in t he r e d o u b ts a r o u nd Balaklava. Total infantry, 17,000; or, if the T u r ks c o u nt for nothing, 11,000. Of cavalry, t he t wo British brigades a m o u n t ed to a b o ut 1,400, (in t he British reports r a nk and file only are counted;) the C h a s s e u rs d'Afrique at least 800; total, 2,200. Artillery, u n k n o w n, b ut inferior to the R u s s i a ns in n u m b e r, t h o u gh far supe rior in quality. 35 30 40 T a ke it all in all, we consider that on this o c c a s i on the allies w e re at least as strong as t he R u s s i a n s, h ad t he a d v a n t a ge of strong positions to fall b a ck u p o n, and might h a v e, by a bold attack, cavalry and infantry c o m b i n e d, 549 Friedrich Engels gained a decisive victory—not like the one of t he Alma, w h i ch h ad no results, b ut a victory w h i ch w o u ld h a ve saved t h em t he trouble of fighting that m u r d e r o us battle on t he 5th of N o v e m b e r. As it w a s, t h ey did n ot e v en retrieve the disadvantages which they had suffered, and by that curious mixture of over-daring and over-caution, of misplaced d a sh and misplaced timidity, of military fury n ot heeding the rules of the art, a nd of scientific disquisitions, letting slip t he m o m e nt for action—by t h at singular w ay of doing always t he w r o ng thing at the w r o ng m o m e n t, w h i ch h as signalized all the doings of t he allies, t he battle of Balaklava w as fairly lost to t h e m. 5 F r om the battle of the 5th N o v e m b e r, we can up to the p r e s e nt only d r aw the conclusion that it was the beginning of that crisis which we thought would o c c ur from t he 5th to t he 10th. As we said long since, as The London Times n ow says too—it is merely a question of supplies a nd r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s. 10 550 Friedrich Engels The Battle of Inkerman The Battle of Inkerman. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4261, 14. Dezember 1854 5 10 This sanguinary battle t o ok place on the 5th of N o v e m b e r, and y et it w as not till t he 23d t h at the r e p o r ts of t he allied c o m m a n d e rs and of t he cor r e s p o n d e n ts of t he leading journals r e a c h ed L o n d o n. V e ry brief a c c o u n ts of the affair w e re brought to this c o u n t ry by t he t wo r e c e nt steamers, b ut nothing in sufficient detail to enable us to form any satisfactory j u d g m e nt on t he features of the struggle. To-day, h o w e v e r, the mails of t he Pacific enable us to furnish the m o st complete a c c o u n ts of the w h o l e, including t he dispatches of Raglan, C a n r o b e rt a nd Menchikoff, with t he v e ry excellent and spirited letters of t he special c o r r e s p o n d e n ts of The London Times and The Morning Herald, b o th of w h i ch journals a re s e r v ed on t he spot by writers of distinguished ability. W i th all t h e s e, a nd o t h er d o c u m e n ts at h a n d, we p r o c e ed to analyze t he story of t he battle, with a view to enable our r e a d e rs to arrive at an impartial and intelligent opinion concerning it. 20 15 L i ke the Prussians at J e n a, the British forces facing t o w a rd I n k e r m an w e re stationed on a range of hights accessible in front by a few defiles only. Like the P r u s s i a n s, the British h ad altogether neglected to o c c u py an elevation on their e x t r e me left, on which, like N a p o l e on at J e n a, Menchikoff t h r ew a portion of his army—there establishing himself u p on t he flank of t he e n e my b e f o re daybreak. T he intention of t he R u s s i a ns w as evidently to profit by this circumstance in order to bring t he m a ss of their t r o o ps to b e ar u p on the flank of t he British, to deploy u p on t he hights t h us secured, and crush t he British divisions as t h ey c a me up singly during the fatal b ut inevitable m a n e u v er of changing their front, or to "roll t h em u p ," as it is technically called. To this m a n e u v er N a p o l e on o w ed his brilliant success over an a r my which, t h o u gh clumsy, slow, and badly c o m m a n d e d, w as yet at that time t he b e st of the old continental armies. T he rapidity of his m o v e m e n t s, e x e c u t ed with t r o o ps v e r s ed in t he n ew m o de of warfare i n t r o d u c ed by the A m e r i c an w ar of i n d e p e n d e n c e, by the F r e n ch revolutionary w a r s, and by N a p o l e on 30 himself, favored this bold stroke. H e r e, at I n k e r m a n, it w as with slow a nd 25 551 Friedrich Engels clumsy t r o o ps t h at Menchikoff attempted this same surprise u p on t he active and quick-moving t r o o ps of t he British and F r e n c h; and t he result w as accordingly t he opposite of t h at at Jena. T he negligence s h o wn by the British in the m a n n er of o c c u p y i ng their positions is utterly disgraceful to their c o m m a n d e r. T h e re is no e x c u s e, either for the n o n - o c c u p a t i on of the knoll on the south side of [the] C h e r n a y a, or for t he a b s e n ce of field-works in this important position, for t he a t t a ck of w h i c h, as he well k n e w, m a ny t h o u s a nd Russians w e re concentrating. T he R u s s i a n s, as we h a ve said, profited by this neglect at o n c e, by occupying t he knoll on t he n o r th e nd of the range, forcing the British position w i th h e a vy field artillery. T he British p a p e rs say the Russians h ad 24 and 32-pounders in t he field, b ut this only s h o ws their utter ignorance of artillery m a t t e r s. T he t r a n s p o rt of their o wn artillery from Balaklava to t he t r e n c h es should h a ve s h o wn t h em that 24 and 32-pounders c a n n ot be t a k en into the field, m u ch less into a night surprise. T he fact is, what they call 24 a nd 32-pounders w e re h o w i t z e r s, having a caliber similar to that of the 24 and 32-pound gun, b ut in fact light field g u n s, n ot heavier t h an t he British field-howitzers. T he howitzer, throwing a hollow projectile with a small c h a r g e, and obtaining range by elevation chiefly, c an be made of a larger b o re t h an t he c a n n on for solid shot. T he 24-pound howitzer c o r r e s p o n ds in weight and effect w i th the 6-pound g u n, and to 12-pounders; t h e se howitzers are attached in the R u s s i an service to the batteries of t h e se calibers. This shows h ow ignorance a nd national vanity unite in manufacturing h e r o es and enhancing t he glory of a nation's a r m s. t he so-called 32-pound (about 6-inch) h o w i t z e rs So far, everything w e nt in favor of t he R u s s i a n s. Their generalship h ad p r o v ed far superior to that of L o rd Raglan. Their plan w as excellent, and in a fair w ay of execution. A pivot h ad b e en secured, a nd t he e n e m y 's flank w as turned. I m m e n se superiority of n u m b e r s, r e a dy to a t t a ck the long and w e ak line of t he British at its w e a k e st point, a p p e a r ed to be a g u a r a n t ee of final s u c c e s s. B ut t he Russians did n ot yet fully k n ow the soldiers t h ey h ad to deal with. T he British, surprised as t h ey w e r e, coolly c h a n g ed their front from e a st to north, and m et the assailing columns w i th a deadly fire. A nd n ow a fight b e g an such as has not o c c u r r ed in E u r o pe since t he day of Albuera, as at Albuera the stubborn b r a v e ry of the British troops h ad to regain, with t he blood of three-fourths of their n u m b e r, a battle already lost by the p r e s u m p t u o us stupidity of their c o m m a n d e r. It is a fact, that at Inker- m an t h e re w as m o re actual bayonet-fighting t h an in t he w h o le Peninsular w a r, w h e re t he t wo b r a v e st armies of their time c o m b a t ed e a ch other for six y e a r s. F r om half-past six to half-past nine a b o ut 8,000 British stood t he s h o ck of a Russian a r m y, w h i c h, according to the R u s s i a n s' o wn statement, h ad at least 30,000 m en engaged. T he firmness with w h i ch t h ey again a nd again 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 552 The Battle of Inkerman repulsed t he R u s s i an a t t a c k s, m a de often with fresh t r o o p s, is a b o ve all praise, and it is doubtful w h e t h er any other t r o o ps in E u r o p e, e x c e pt the b e st battalions of R a d e t z k i 's a r m y, could h a ve d o ne the s a m e. This b r a v e r y, it must be said, w as aided by t he n a t u re of t he position. T he front, t o w a rd t he east, w as established on hights so a b r u pt t h at t h ey could not be forced. T he knoll to t he north, o c c u p i ed by t he R u s s i a n s, w as also s e p a r a t ed from t h e se hights by a couple of ravines, forming so m a ny defiles leading to the English position. E v e ry advancing c o l u mn of t he R u s s i a ns w a s, therefore, e x p o s ed to the full plowing fire of the British artillery, a nd had to a d v a n ce in close order up to t he t op of the hights before it could deploy. W e a k e n ed by the fire of the artillery, and, w h en n e a r e r, of the m u s k e t r y, the Russian c o l u m ns arrived on t he crest, and, before t h ey could deploy into line, a discharge a nd a r u sh with t he b a y o n et t h r ew t h em d o wn again. It w as found, in this fight, that, at close distances, t he Minié bullet h as an i m m e n se superiority over t he c o m m on m u s k et bullet, w h o se force of p e n e t r a t i on is barely sufficient to kill one m a n, while a Minié bullet often killed four or five, a nd h ad a telling effect u p on the d e ep R u s s i an c o l u m n s. 5 10 15 25 20 As the British divisions c a me u p, the fight b e c a me general, and e x t e n d ed u p on a longer front. T he R u s s i a n s, unable to m a ke m u ch h e a d w a y, a t t a c k ed the original front of the British position with their left, while their right tried to p e n e t r a te t o w a rd Sevastopol. T h ey s u c c e e d e d, partly, in establishing t h e m s e l v es on the British hights, without, h o w e v e r, being able to form a regular line of battle. T h ey tried to surround, a nd cut u p, one by o n e, t he separate small bodies of the British t r o o p s. T h o u gh the struggle w as hard, and t he British fought wonderfully, yet t h ey w o u ld h a ve b e en c r u s h ed in this u n e q u al contest, had n ot t he F r e n ch division of B o s q u et c o me u p. T he Z o u a v es and t he Foreign Legion charged t he R u s s i an left flank, a nd c o m pletely rolled it u p, while t he C h a s s e u rs d'Afrique found an occasion to c h a r g e, and t he Russian infantry h ad to retire. T h u s, fourteen t h o u s a nd allies, 30 w i th a loss of one-third of their n u m b e r, d e f e a t ed thirty t h o u s a nd R u s s i a n s, a nd yet it is acknowledged t h at t he R u s s i a n s, individually, fought v e ry well, while we h a ve s e en that their generalship, as far as t he plan of a t t a ck w as c o n c e r n e d, w as far superior to that of the Allies. 35 H o w, then, w e re they b e a t e n? It m u st be said t h at m o st of t he t r o o ps engaged w e re t he b r o k en a nd dispirited r e m n a n ts of t he besiegers of Silistria, and it is certain t h at D a n n e n b e r g 's c o r p s, n e xt to O s t e n - S a c k e n 's late c o r p s, is at p r e s e nt t he w o r st in the R u s s i an army. B ut this w as not t he decisive c i r c u m s t a n c e. T he battle w as lost, n e xt to t he b r a v e ry of the English, t h r o u gh t he essentially Russian w ay in which it w as c o n d u c t e d. It is R u s s i an warfare 40 w h i ch has s u c c u m b ed to E u r o p e an w a r f a r e. A nd this is the characteristic feature of t he battle. 553 Friedrich Engels T he R u s s i an c o m m a n d er begins by drawing up a v e ry good plan of attack, b o r r o w ed from o ne of N a p o l e o n 's most celebrated b a t t l e s, (for no Russian General e v er had an original thought, not e v en Suvaroff, w h o se only origi nality w as t h at of direct advance). He follows this up by setting a b o ut its e x e c u t i on in t he v e ry b e st m a n n er possible. He establishes himself on the e n e m y 's flank. T he strategical m o v e m e nt is c o m p l e t e d; t he tactical per f o r m a n ce begins. A nd h e r e, all at o n c e, the scientific a nd learned m o de of warfare, t he w o rk of w e s t e rn civilization, is t h r o wn a w a y, and t he p u re barbarism b r e a ks forth. This splendid army, with its old t r o o p s, m a ny of w h om h ad b e en twenty-five years u n d er a r m s, this m o d el of parade-drill, is so clumsy, so incapable of skirmishing and fighting in small b o d i e s, t h at its officers c an do nothing with it b ut t h r ow its h e a vy bulk in a single m a ss u p on t he e n e m y. All idea of tactical maneuvering is a b a n d o n e d; a d v a n c e, a d v a n c e, a d v a n c e, is t he only thing that c an be done. This d e n se m a ss of living flesh w a s, of c o u r s e, by its v e ry c o m p a c t n e s s, the best m a rk an artilleryman could w i sh for; a nd while t he thin British lines, lying d o wn b e h i nd t he c r e st of t he hill, w e re p r o t e c t ed from fire, t h ey plowed up the d e ep c o l u m ns w i th r o u nd shot, killing t h em by thirties and forties at a discharge, a nd rained a storm of Minié bullets u p on t h em hardly o ne of which could miss a target of such extent. T he mere b r u te p r e s s u r e, the weight of this m a ss w as to break, t he allied lines. B ut h e re t h ey found an o p p o n e nt a c c u s t o m ed to t h at style of warfare. T he British, in their Indian w a r s, h a ve learned to withstand t he s h o ck of d e n se m a s s e s, e v en if of superior n u m b e r s. A n d, if the R u s s i a ns are far a b o ve t he Sikhs or Beloodshis, yet t he t r o o ps w h i ch w e re a c c u s t o m ed to b e at six or eight times their n u m b er of Sikhs or Beloodshis, might well stand the attack of t h r ee times their n u m b er of R u s s i a n s, as s o on as the R u s s i a ns a d o p t ed t he tactics of t he Sikhs. T he Russian c o l u m n, w h en t h ey arrived on the top of the hill, w e re already b r o k en and disordered by the fire, a nd another volley at fifty y a r ds a nd a charge with t he b a y o n et w as sufficient to b r e ak t h e m. Afterward, as t he Russians c a me up m o re n u m e r o u s l y, t he British, like N a p o l e o n 's squares among the M a m e l u k e s, at t he P y r a m i d s, stood a m o ng t he flood of Russians surrounding t h e m. T he steadiness of forces having t h at full confidence in themselves w h i ch only the m en of a highly civilized nation c an p o s s e s s, and the superiority of t he a r m a m e nt a nd fire of the British, did the rest. T he Russians are the w o r st shots of all k n o wn t r o o p s, a nd t h ey s h o w ed it h e r e, else t h ey must h a ve laid low every English m an p r e s e n t. This w as the character, and this is the significance of the battle of Inker- man. It s h o ws t h at t he glories of t he Russian infantry are passing a w a y. It s h o ws that w h a t e v er progress Russia m ay m a k e, the W e st a d v a n c es at twice h er rate, a nd t h at she can h a ve no c h a n ce with w e s t e rn t r o o ps in an e v en 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 554 The Battle of Inkerman 5 10 15 fight, n or e v en with such o d ds as she had at I n k e r m a n. B ut for the disastrous loss of t he allied t r a n s p o r ts in t he Black S ea we should say that this battle w o u ld be sufficient, without v e ry gross blunders on t he p a rt of the English a nd F r e n ch Generals, to r e n d er their final s u c c e ss in t he C r i m ea b e y o nd a doubt. Of that h e a vy calamity we h a ve as y et no details b e y o nd t h o se of a telegraphic dispatch, from L o n d o n, received by o ur agent at Liverpool j u st b e f o re the Pacific sailed; we do n ot k n ow w h e t h er the last vessels carried t r o o ps or only victuals a nd munitions, a nd from t he silence of the telegraph we infer that t h ey did n ot carry t r o o p s; b u t, if t he large bodies of t r o o ps destined for t he Crimea w e re lost in this storm, t h e n, indeed, the Allies h a ve suffered a harder blow from the elements t h an from the e n e m y, and then- forces before Sevastopol m ay be d e s t r o y e d, by disease and harassing at t a c k s, before it c an be possible to send t h em n ew r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s. A n o t h er a nd a no less serious danger m e n a c es t h em in t he v e ry attitude of t he G e r m an p o w e r s. Austria n ow for the first time seems really inclined to b r e ak with t he w e s t e rn p o w e rs and join t he Czar, and all G e r m a ny will go with her. At a ny r a t e, it c a n n ot be d o u b t ed that the m o m e nt for the w ar to swell into m o re gigantic and terrible proportions, and to w r ap all E u r o pe in its flames, is n ow close at h a n d. 555 Friedrich Engels The Crimean Campaign The Crimean Campaign. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr. 4272, 27. Dezember 1854 Since t he d e s p e r a te and sanguinary day of I n k e r m a n, t he c a m p a i gn in the C r i m ea h as b e en m a r k ed by no military event of any i m p o r t a n c e; b u t, t he a d v e nt of winter without the capture of Sevastopol having given a n ew c h a r a c t er to t he enterprise, it b e c o m es p r o p er to review t he c o u r se of e v e n ts since t he landing of the Expedition, in order to d e t e r m i ne w h at are the c i r c u m s t a n c es and c h a n c es amid which it e n t e rs u p on t he n ew d e v e l o p m e n ts t h at n ow await it. First, h o w e v e r, we m u st add a few w o r ds to o ur f o r m er o b s e r v a t i o ns u p on t he last memorable battle. With regard to this e v e n t, extraordinary confusion and w a nt of perspicacity c h a r a c t e r i z es t he official r e p o r t s, all of w h i ch we h a ve published. L o rd R a g l a n 's dispatch w as evi dently written in a great h u r r y. Confounding that front of his a r my t o w a rd t he C h e r n a ya with t h at t o w a rd Sevastopol, he calls t he s a me flank of his position sometimes the right, sometimes the left, in t he s a me dispatch, so t h at it is impossible to get a clear idea of t he e v e n ts from this s o u r c e. C a n r o b- e r t 's dispatch is as diffuse and indefinite as it is short, and therefore quite u s e l e s s; and w h o e v er c o m p a r es t he so-called Menchikoff dispatch of t he Russian Invalid with t he f o r m er r e p o r ts of Prince Menchikoff, m u st s ee at a glance t h at this w as not p e n n ed by t he same man. N i c h o l a s, evidently, has found t h at he has allowed quite enough of t he liberty of the p r e s s, and since telling t he t r u th like a gentleman does not p r e v e nt his t r o o ps from getting b e a t e n, he considers it quite as well to r e t u rn to the old system of lying. By his Imperial will, t he ordinary c o u r se of events is altered after t he fact, and a defeated attack from his relieving a r my against t he besiegers is c h a n g ed to a victorious sally from within the t o w n. T he r e a s on is evident: T he sallying force necessarily retires into its fortifications so s o on as the object of the sally is obtained; t he r e t r e at t h us is explained a nd m a de a m a t t er of c o u r s e; while, if the facts w e re stated as they actually o c c u r r e d, the disgrace of the defeat could not be hidden. 5 10 15 20 25 556 The Crimean Campaign 5 15 10 20 A nd well might N i c h o l as do his b e st to hide the c i r c u m s t a n c es of this battle from his p e o p l e. N e v er since the battle of N a r va h as s u ch disgrace b e en h e a p ed upon the R u s s i an a r m s. A n d, considering the t r e m e n d o us difference b e t w e en the Russians of N a r va and t he R u s s i a ns of I n k e r m a n, the undrilled h o r d es of 1700, and the well-drilled a r my of 1854, the day of N a r va m u s t, in c o m p a r i s o n, be considered a bright one in Russian military history. N a r va w as the first grand disaster of a rising nation, w h o se determined spirit learnt h ow to c o n q u er by defeat itself. I n k e r m an almost a p p e a rs a certain indication of the d e c ay of that hot-house d e v e l o p m e nt w h i ch Russia has e x p e r i e n c ed since Peter t he Great. T he artificial g r o w th and t he mere effort to k e ep u p, with a b a r b a r i an material, a splendid show of civilization, a p p e a rs already to h a ve e x h a u s t ed t he nation, and inflicted a sort of p u l m o n a ry c o n s u m p t i on u p on it. In all the battles of the p r e s e nt c e n t u r y, from Austerlitz and E y l au d o wn to Silistria, t he Russians had s h o wn t h e m s e l v es excellent soldiers. Their defeats, w h e r e v er t h ey o c c u r r e d, could be explained ; t h ey left no stain u p on t he h o n or of the a r m y, if t h ey did u p on t he r e p u t a t i on of its generals. B ut n ow the m a t t er is completely changed. If B a l a k l a va showed t he superi ority of t he allied cavalry, if t he whole of t he siege of Sevastopol shows t he e n o r m o us superiority of the allied artillery o v er t he Russian, still the Russian infantry r e m a i n ed in p o s s e s s i on of its high r e p u t a t i o n. Inkerman has settled this point too. Strange to say, t he R u s s i an infantry h as forfeited its r e n o wn in a battle, in which, p e r h a p s, the individual R u s s i an foot-soldier fought m o re bravely t h an ever. T he sovereign mediocrity w h i ch has b e en the chief c h a r a c teristic of all military operations in this war, b o th on the Russian and t he allied side, has n e v er b e en m a de m o re apparent. E v e ry m o v e m e n t, and e v e ry step t a k e n, has p r o d u c ed a result exactly the opposite of w h at w as intended. A coup de main is u n d e r t a k e n, and it t u r ns o ut to involve a campaign—a w i n t er campaign even. A battle is fought, b ut its gain is only m o m e n t a r y, vanishing in less t h an a w e ek from the hands of the victors. An o p en t o wn is assailed 30 with h e a vy siege artillery; but, b e f o re t he siege train is b r o u g ht u p, t he o p en t o wn is changed into af ortif ied c a mp of the first o r d e r. A siege is u n d e r t a k e n; and, w h en at the point of being successful, it h as to be given u p, b e c a u se a relieving a r my c o m es u p, and is—not victorious, b ut defeated. A strong position t a k en up against t he relieving a r my b e c o m e s, by the very shortness of its front, the m e a ns in the h a n ds of the relieving a r my to turn the besiegers into t he besieged! T h us t en w e e ks are o c c u p i ed with a series of efforts, c o m b a t s, t r e n c h - w o r k s, plans and c o u n t e r - p l a n s; winter sets in, and finds b o th armies—but especially the allies—quite u n p r e p a r ed for the season: a nd all this with no result b ut a t r e m e n d o us loss on b o th sides, leaving a decision of the campaign as r e m o te a nd unlikely as ever. 40 35 25 T he forces w h i ch the allies brought into the Crimea, from t he first invasion 557 Friedrich Engels to the 5th of N o v e m b e r, did not e x c e ed 25,000 British, 35,000 F r e n c h, and 10,000 to 15,000 T u r k s, or from 70,000 to 75,000 altogether. W h en t he ex pedition w as u n d e r t a k e n, no m o re r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts from E n g l a nd or F r a n ce w e re e x p e c t e d; a few battalions and s q u a d r o ns w e re on t he r o a d, b ut t h ey are c o m p r i s ed in t he a b o ve estimate. All t he additional forces t h ey might h a ve b e en able to bring u p, at a short notice, m u st h a ve b e en T u r k s; and, in spite of T s h e t a te a nd Silistria, neither t he allied c o m m a n d e rs nor t he allied t r o o ps h a ve e v er s h o wn a ny confidence in them. T he 60,000 F r e n ch and English w e r e, t h e n, t he actually reliable portion of t he expedition, a nd t h ey alone c an be c o u n t ed as really effective. N o w, this a r my w as t oo small for a campaign, a nd t oo large for a coup de main. It could not be e m b a r k ed with rapidity; the m o n t hs e m p l o y ed in preparation w e re sufficient to p ut the Russians on their g u a r d; and, if t he p r e s e n ce of t he Austrians g u a r a n t e ed t he Principalities a nd Bulgaria from Russian attacks, it also guaranteed B e s s a r a b ia and O d e s sa from any serious danger ; for, the position of t he Austrians being on t he flank and rear of either line of operations, neither a r my could h a ve m a r c h ed f o r w a rd without being at their mercy. T h u s, the Russians m u st h a ve b e en certain t h at all t h e se preparations w e re directed against S e v a s t o p o l; beside which, t he p o r ts of C h e r s on a nd Nicolaieff, the d o c k - y a r ds of t he R u s s i an fleet, w e re the only points in a ny w ay seriously m e n a c e d. R u s s i an p r e p a r a- tion in t he Crimea w a s, therefore, sure to follow, step by step, t he prepara tions of the allies. And so t h ey did, until, at last, t he c o n t e m p l a t ed coup de main w as c o n v e r t ed into a regular campaign, c o n d u c t e d, however—as was clear from the w ay it w as commenced—in the m o st irregular m a n n e r. W h e n, at the Alma, the allies had to allow the R u s s i a ns to w i t h d r aw in perfect order from the field of battle, although a t t a c k ed by far superior n u m b e r s, the first glimpse of the truth b u r st u p on t h em ; t he original plan w as u p s e t, t he coup h ad failed, a n ew set of eventualities h ad to be provided for. Vacillation followed; d a ys w e re lost; the m a r ch to Balaklava w as at last resolved u p o n, a nd t he advantages of a strong defensive position overruled the c h a n ce of soon obtaining possession of the n o r th side of Sevastopol w h i ch c o m m a n d ed the t o w n, and w a s, therefore, t he decisive point. At t he s a me time Menchikoff m a de similar mistakes by his hasty m a r ch to S e v a s topol, a nd his equally h a s ty c o u n t e r - m a r ch to Bakshiserai. T h en followed the siege. N i n e t e en d a ys elapsed before the batteries of the first parallel could o p en their fire, and t h en the advantages r e m a i n ed p r e t ty equally divided. T he siege w e nt on with e n o r m o us slowness, but n ot v e ry surely for all that. H a rd w o rk in t he t r e n c h e s, a r d u o us out-post duty acting u p on m en w e a k e n ed by a climate to w h i ch t h ey w e re not bred, and by a fearful epidemic, thinned t he r a n ks of the allies wonderfully. Their c o m m a n d e rs h ad scarcely r e c k o n ed u p on t he c o m m on w e ar and tear of a campaign—they w e re t a k en quite 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 558 The Crimean Campaign u n a w a r es by such extraordinary losses. A nd t he medical and commissariat d e p a r t m e n t s, especially with the British, w e re totally o ut of order. Within sight lay the rich valley of Baidar, full of all the supplies m o st w a n t e d; y et they could n ot v e n t u re into it! T h ey had no h o p es of early r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s; yet t he Russians w e re coming up from all sides. T h en c a me t he affair of the 25th Oct. T he Russians gained the a d v a n t a g e, and o ne third of t he allied cavalry w as annihilated. N e xt followed t he battle of t he 5th N o v ., w h e re t he Russians suffered a r e p u l s e, b ut at a loss to the allies which they could n ot for a s e c o nd time afford. Since t h e n, b o th t he R u s s i an relieving a r my a nd t he allied besiegers h a ve b e en quiet. T he siege of S e v a s t o p o l, if carried on at all, is carried on pro forma. N o b o dy will p r e t e nd t h at the lazy, desultory fire w h i ch t he allies have kept up since the 5th of N o v. c an do any h a rm to t he defenses of t he place, or e v en prevent t he R u s s i a ns from repairing t he d a m a ge d o ne up to that time. T h e re is no d o u bt that t he siege, if t a k en up again, will h a ve to be d o ne over afresh, with t he only difference that, p e r h a p s, t he attacking batteries are brought s o me h u n d r ed y a r ds nearer the place t h an t h ey w e re at t he first beginning, unless t he fire from t he t o w n, supported by c o n t i n u o us attacks from I n k e r m a n, should p r o ve superior to t h at of t he allies, a nd d e s t r oy t he m o re a d v a n c ed batteries. H e r e, then, are the allies, in the beginning of D e c e m b e r, in a c o u n t ry with cold winters, badly provided with clothing a nd other materials to enable t h em to get through the b ad season in a passable m a n n e r; w e ak in spite of all r e ë n f o r c e m e n t s, arrived or on t he w a y; having lost a v a st n u m b er of m e n; entangled in t he pursuit of objects and in m o d es of action which t h ey never i n t e n d ed nor p r e p a r ed for, and having gained nothing, absolutely nothing, b ut a c o n s c i o u s n e ss of their individual and tactical superiority o v er their o p p o n e n t s. T w e n ty t h o u s a nd men, chiefly F r e n c h, must by this time h a ve reënforced t h e m, and m o re are e x p e c t e d; b ut if we recollect the difficulties a nd delays which a c c o m p a n i ed t he first allied expedition to Turkey—if we recollect, m o r e o v e r, t h at almost all the t r a n s p o r ts used for carrying the first a r my h a ve b e en k e pt b a c k, and that n ew ships m u st be found for the divisions n ow u n d er orders for the E a s t, we m u st c o n c l u de t h at the a r my of the Crimea will r e m a in without material increase of strength, for s o me time after t he arrival of the 20,000 m en a b o ve alluded to. T h us their strength m ay n ow be something like 55,000 to 60,000 m e n, one-third of w h om c o me fresh from comfortable garrison life, and will h a ve to suffer heavily before being inured to the hardships of a winter b i v o u ac u n d er a C r i m e an sky. In truth, t h e se v e ry r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts m ay p r o ve an i n c u m b r a n c e, instead of an increase of strength, after the disasters e n c o u n t e r ed by the F r e n ch and English t r a n s- p o r t s, in the furious t e m p e st of N o v. 13. T h e se d i s a s t e r s, h o w e v e r, c a n n ot be said to belong to t h at order of fatal and overwhelming accidents, which 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 559 Friedrich Engels 5 the b e st contrived plans are unable to foresee or p r e v e n t. T he storm of N o v. 13th w as a seasonable storm, and seasonable w e re the disasters t h at befell t he allied fleets. T he v e ry date on w h i ch the C r i m e an expedition started, after t h r ee m o n t hs of tedious and inexplicable delays, f o r e b o d ed s t o r ms a nd w r e c k s, with losses of ships, c r e w s, m en a nd supplies. T he framers of this extraordinary campaign w e r e, m o r e o v e r, again a nd again f o r e w a r n ed as to the incidents inseparable from Black S ea navigation at so a d v a n c ed a period of t he year. T h e y, t h e n, are responsible, e v en for t he misfortunes of N o v e m b er 13, which threaten the allied forces with the fate of N a p o l e o n 's a r my during t he Muscovite campaign. The London Times 10 estimates the total loss of m e n, incurred on the 13th, at the various stations of the Crimea, at a thousand, " b e s i d es t h o se that h a ve fallen into t he h a n ds of t he C o s s a c k s ." T he same journal also tells us t h at " t he P r i n c e, a magnifi c e nt n ew screw steamer, of 2,700 t u n s, carried out, t he o t h er d a y, to Balak lava, the 46th R e g i m e n t; all the winter clothing for the t r o o ps engaged in t he siege, including 40,000 great-coats, flannel suits, under-clothing, s o c ks a nd gloves, beef, p o rk and o t h er provisions; hospital stores for Scutari, and a v a st quantity of shot and shell to carry on t he siege. T h e se are wholly lost. T he R e s o l u t e, with 900 t u ns of gunpowder, also w e nt to t he b o t t o m. T h u s, it s e e ms all the materials for carrying on the siege and providing against t he severity of the winter, h a ve b e en carried off at o ne fell s w o o p; a n d, e v en if we t h i nk to c o n t e nt ourselves with merely maintaining our position on the hights b e f o re Sevastopol, it is evident t h at we are not in condition to stand our w o r st foe—the coming w i n t e r ." 20 15 25 T h o u gh the C r i m ea is an almost insulated portion of t he R u s s i an E m p i r e, a nd t h o u gh t he t r o o ps brought up against t he allies h a ve n ot b e en able to dislodge them w h en only 35,000 strong, yet n o b o dy will v e n t u re to say t h at t h e se 60,000 allies are strong e n o u gh to resist all t he t r o o ps R u s s ia m ay bring u p. T he R u s s i a ns h a ve six divisions of infantry and o ne r e s e r v ed division in t he Crimea, or a b o ut 100 battalions, (besides marines a nd s e a m e n, w h om we h a ve not counted on either side.) T h e se 100 battalions, one-half of w h i ch h a ve m a de a m u r d e r o us campaign of eighteen m o n t hs on t he D a n u b e, c a n n ot m u s t er m o re than 50,000 to 60,000 m e n; including cavalry, field artillery and C o s s a c k s, t he whole Russian force in t he field will e x c e ed t h at of t he allies by barely 10,000to 15,000 m e n. B ut if itis true that L ü d e r s 's c o r p s, or another 49 battalions of about 20,000 to 25,000 m e n, (for t h e y, t o o, h a ve left one-third of their n u m b er on the D a n u b e ,) is on the m a r ch to P e r e k o p, if s o me m o re r e s e r v es of t he new formations are concentrating in t he s a me direction, the opportunity m ay very soon p r e s e nt itself to the R u s s i a ns to strike a grand b l o w; a nd as superiority, moral, physical, and tactical, only goes a certain 40 w ay w h en o p p o s ed to superior n u m b e rs and a b o ut equal generalship, the 35 30 560 The Crimean Campaign 5 10 result m ay well be considered doubtful. At traordinarily severe winter should interrupt all o p e r a t i o n s, the allied armies are a v o w e d ly not in a condition to stand it. t he s a me time, if an e x This view of the state of things in the C r i m ea only justifies the d o u bt and hesitation with which we h a ve received t he a n n o u n c e m e nt that Austria has joined t he w e s t e rn p o w e r s. Certainly, the c i r c u m s t a n c es we have detailed are not such as would be likely to seduce the Cabinet of V i e n na o ut of its w o n t ed indecision, while the precarious position of the British Ministry, and the urgent necessity of covering this i m m e n se failure in t he E a st by t he show of something considerable gained e l s e w h e r e, affords an ample r e a s on for exaggerating a small treaty into a grand offensive a nd defensive alliance. We m ay be quite w r o ng in this; b ut our r e a d e rs know the r e a s o ns for our opinion, and time will show w h e t h er this v a u n t ed accession of Austria to the allies is a reality, or a trick specially designed for u se at t he meeting of Parlia- 15 ment. 561 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Progress of the War December 14/15, 1854 Progress of the War. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4276, I.Januar 1855 T he sun of Austerlitz has melted in water. A great battle, as w as con fidentially a n n o u n c ed and believed in Paris, w as to be fought b e f o re Sevas topol in celebration of the Second of D e c e m b e r; b ut from a dispatch of Gen. C a n r o b e r t, of t he 3d of D e c e m b e r, it a p p e a rs t h at " r a in w as falling in t o r r e n t s, the r o a ds w e re cut u p, the t r e n c h es filled with w a t e r, and the siege operations—as well as all t he works—put in a state of s u s p e n s e ." T he R u s s i a ns hitherto had the offensive, the Allies t he defensive, superi ority on t he C h e r n a y a; at t he walls of Sevastopol it w as t he r e v e r s e. In other w o r d s, t he R u s s i a ns w e re strong e n o u gh on the C h e r n a ya to hold the field, b ut t he Allies w e re not, though able to k e ep their position; while at S e v a s topol t he Allies, strong e n o u gh to carry on the siege, w e re so nearly equally m a t c h ed by the garrison, that the operations, t h o u gh n ot s t o p p ed from without, yet p r o c e e d ed with hardly any visible effect. T he proportions of force s e em about to c h a n g e, a nd t he Allies a p p e ar on the point of b e c o m i ng strong e n o u gh to repulse the Russians from the C h e r n a y a. In t h at c a se the R u s s i a ns c an act in t wo w a y s, after having lost their position a b o ve Inker- m a n. Either t h ey c an go r o u nd and take up the intrenched c a mp a b o ut the N o r th F o r t, or t h ey c an with their main b o dy retreat into t he interior, w h e re t he Allies c a n n ot follow t h em far. T he Allies can hardly be strong e n o u gh b e f o re F e b r u a ry either to invest the n o r t h e rn c a mp or follow a retreating a r my m u ch further than Bakchisarai. T h ey could scarcely fight a second battle against an a r my i n t r e n c h ed s o m e w h e re a b o ut Simferopol. In either c a s e, t h ey would h a ve to fall b a ck on the C h e r n a y a, a nd t h us this g a me of alternate a d v a n ce a nd retreat is likely to be played all t he winter over, u n l e s s, indeed, S e v a s t o p o l, on the s o u th side, s u c c u m bs to an assault. B ut as the n e w s, w h i ch we receive by t he Atlantic, respecting t he siege is v e ry meager, we c a n n ot say m o re on this point t h an that it is not at all likely. We a r e, indeed, a w a re t h a t, according to a dispatch of D e c e m b er 7th, published in t he Paris 5 10 15 20 25 562 w Progress of the War. December 14/15, 1854 Moniteur, and reprinted in the L o n d on p a p e r s, the allied armies h ad all of a s u d d en got t he u p p er h a n d, a nd only t wo d a ys after the deluge, " a l m o st completed the i n v e s t m e nt of the t o w n ." This spurious dispatch w as evidently c o n c o c t ed with a view to m a ke a m e n ds for t he baffled 2d of D e c e m b er p r o p h e c y. 5 10 A short time ago we gave a s t a t e m e nt of the sum total of the Russian a r m y, together with its disposal. We t h en s h o w ed t h at of t h e se nearly three-quarters of a million soldiers, up to the p r e s e nt t i m e, hardly one-third had b e en engaged in active operations, and t h at t he far greater portion of the remaining two-thirds w e re e m p l o y ed to m e n a ce Austria. In spite of the r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts sent to t he Crimea, m a t t e rs h a ve not b e en m u ch altered since t h e n; for D a n n e n b e r g 's c o r p s, the 4th, w h i ch m a r c h ed to t he relief of Sevastopol, w as w i t h d r a wn from t he a r my of t he D a n u b e, w h e re it h ad b e en previously reënforced. T he only essential change in the position of t he great W e s t e rn 15 A r my of Russia, as we m ay call the c o r ps of s o me 300,000 m en c o n c e n t r a t ed on the Austrian frontier, is a slight e x t e n s i on of its left wing t o w a r ds B e s s a r a bia, and t he Middle Dniester, in which position it is enabled, in c a se of need, to receive t he r e m n a n ts of the a r my of t he D a n u be in case of their retreat from Bessarabia. T he great W e s t e rn A r my m a y, besides, h a ve d e t a c h ed a couple of divisions to t he Crimea, and a few r e ë n f o r c e m e n ts to the D a n u b e, b ut in t he whole its strength is unimpaired, and t he m a r ch of t he 3d division of t he G u a r ds from Revel, a nd of some m o re r e s e r v e s, will h a ve m a de up for t h e se d e t a c h m e n t s. 20 25 30 35 T he D a n u b i an a r m y, h o w e v e r, m ay be considered as entirely b r o k en u p, a nd r e d u c ed to a mere c o r ps of demonstration, placed in B e s s a r a b ia to k e ep up the a p p e a r a n ce of a R u s s i an o c c u p a t i on as long as possible. By L i p r a n d i 's a nd afterwards D a n n e n b e r g 's d e p a r t u r e, t h at a r my w as deprived of t he whole of t he 4th c o r p s, (10th, 11th and 12th Divisions,) deducting from t he remain ing five divisions, t he 7th, 8th, 9th, 14th a nd 15th, the t r o o ps n e c e s s a ry for the occupation of t he coast, and the garrisons of t he fortresses from B e n d er a nd Ismail, to C h e r s on and Nicolaieff, and, considering the e n o r m o us losses of t he t wo D a n u b i an campaigns, t h e se five divisions could n ot m u s t er for field operations m o re t h an 15,000 men. T h ey are placed n e ar the coast, a nd w h e r e v er t h e re is coast, the Russian defensive, so efficient in the h e a rt of the continent, is lame in the e x t r e m e. It h as to guard n u m e r o us fortresses and d é p ô ts against the attacks of the hostile fleet, and thus it is explained, t h at of t he 30,000 or 35,000 m en c o m p o s i ng t h e se five divisions, n ot one-half is disposable for the field. T he dissolution of the a r my of the D a n u b e, like m o st of the great strategical 40 m e a s u r es t a k en by Russia, (for t he blunders generally c o m m e n ce with t he execution of them,) is a very well-chosen step. Since t he A n g l o - F r e n ch h a ve 563 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels engaged t h e m s e l v es over head and ears in the Crimea, no e n e my o p p o s es the R u s s i a ns on the D a n u b e. O m er P a s h a 's army, hardly amounting to some 40,000 m en after the w e ar and tear of t wo campaigns, n e v er m a de up for, h a s, by the aid of w e s t e rn diplomacy, b e en so b r o k en u p, as to l e a ve it scarcely sufficient to invest Ismail, m u ch less to d e t a ch a c o r ps to c o v er the siege, or to repel the Russians in the field. Besides, an a t t a ck u p on B e s s a r a bia, which would h a ve afforded a powerful diversion s o me m o n t hs ago, w o u ld n ow lack a definite military object, and, c o n s e q u e n t l y, O m er P a s h a 's a r my is n ow sent to t he Crimea. T he only force, t h e n, purporting to m e n a ce the Russians on the south-west, is now the Austrian a r m y, which, in a force of some 270,000, occupies Galicia, Transylvania and Moldavia. This force m u s t, a b o ve all things, be held in check. For, should it declare itself hostile to Russia, Bessarabia, and e v en the c o u n t ry up to the Bug w o u ld h a ve to be a b a n d o n e d, and operations have to be c o n d u c t ed either from the offensive basis of t he Polish fortresses, or from the defensive basis of K i ew and t he Dnieper. In b o th cases a D a n u b i an a r my would be cut off, and h a ve to find a b a se of its o wn s o m e w h e re in the steppes of the S o u t h, which is no easy matter, in a c o u n t ry which feeds m a ny horses and s h e e p, b ut v e ry few m e n. On the other h a n d, should Austria declare for Russia, or t u rn t he points of her neutral b a y o n e ts t o w a r ds the Alps and the R h i n e, t h en t he Polish a r my might either march into G e r m a ny as a r e s e r ve to the Austrians, after sending a strong corps t o w a rd the Danube,—or the Austrians p o ur in a m a ss upon t he D a n u be and risk a march to Constantinople. In either c a s e, a separate a r my on the D a n u b e, stronger than a d e m o n s t r a t i on c o r p s, w as super fluous. As to the cooperation of Austria in this war, we can, of c o u r s e, only s p e ak in an altogether hypothetical way. T he noisily t r u m p e t ed T r e a ty of Alliance said to h a ve b e en concluded by her with F r a n ce and England on the 2d of D e c e m b e r, t u r ns out to be but a snare laid for Parliament, as we w a r n ed our r e a d e rs immediately on the a n n o u n c e m e nt of the T r e a t y. 5 10 15 20 25 30 In the Q u e e n 's speech the Treaty is alluded to in t h e se w o r d s: " It is with satisfaction I inform y ou that, together with t he E m p e r or of t he F r e n c h, I h a ve concluded a treaty with the E m p e r or of Austria, from w h i ch I anticipate i m p o r t a nt advantages to t he c o m m on c a u s e ;" but, being h a rd pressed by L o rd D e r b y, A b e r d e en w e nt the length of declaring: " We p r o p o se only that t he H o u se should learn with satisfaction that H er Majesty has m a de a treaty from which she (viz., old A b e r d e e n ), anticipates important a d v a n t a g e s ." This is all the satisfaction he gave. L o rd J o hn Russell, in t he L o w er H o u s e, w as forced by Mr. Disraeli to advance a step further, and plainly to confess that the b o a s t ed treaty of alliance m e a ns neither a treaty nor an alliance. He a v o ws that it binds Austria to nothing at all, while it forces the W e s t e rn 35 40 564 F Progress of the War. December 14/15, 1854 5 10 15 20 25 P o w e rs into an alliance offensive and defensive with Austria, if she should c h o o se to declare w ar on Russia, and obliges t h em besides to p r o p o se to Russia, before t he end of the year, conditions of p e a ce on the basis of the f a m o us four points. After all, Austria might then, " w i t h o ut a b r e a ch of faith," release herself from t he alliance by saying, " at the last m o m e n t ," she did n ot c o n c ur in the interpretation put on the four points by the W e s t e rn P o w e r s. T he result of L o rd J o hn Russell's explanation of the glorious t r e a ty of D e c e m b er 2, w as an immediate fall of the funds, b o th at L o n d on and at Paris. A y e ar ago, the coalition p r e t e n d ed to h a ve allowed the m a s s a c re of Sinope to t a ke place in order to obtain t he alliance of t he G e r m an p o w e r s. N o w, a sham treaty with o ne of these p o w e rs is held o ut as the equivalent for the loss n ot of a T u r k i sh fleet, b ut of a British army. We are even assured by the latest G e r m an p a p e r s, t h at the opening of the British Parliament has given t he signal for the r e a p p e a r a n ce of t he specter of t he Vienna Conference, w h i ch w as a b o ut o n ce more to set its c u m b r o us machinery at w o r k. H o w e v e r, as Austria, according to L o rd J o hn Russell, declares it possible that she m ay be driven to w ar with Russia, a nd as the position t a k en by the R u s s i an a r my on the Austrian frontier indicates the same thing, we m ay suppose, for a m o m e n t, that Austria and t he rest of G e r m a n y, even including Prussia, are to join the W e s t e rn P o w e r s. H ow far would Russia be p r e p a r ed to meet such an eventuality? If in 1812 the Continental force launched against Russia, w as far w e a k er t h an t h at which she m ay p e r h a ps see on her frontiers in April or M a y; if t h en England w as her ally instead of her foe, Russia m ay console herself with the reflection that the more n u m e r o us the armies are which p e n e t r a te into h er interior, the m o re c h a n ce is there of their s p e e dy destruction, and that, on t he other hand, she has n ow t h r ee times t he t r o o ps u n d er arms which she had then. 35 30 N ot t h at we think " H o ly R u s s i a" unassailable. On the c o n t r a r y, Austria alone we consider fully her equal as to military r e s o u r c e s, while Austria a nd Prussia united, are quite able, if merely military c h a n c es are t a k en into account, to force her to an ignominious p e a c e. A ny forty millions of m e n, c o n c e n t r a t ed u p on a c o u n t ry of the size of G e r m a ny proper, will be able to c o pe successfully with t he scattered sixty millions of R u s s i an subjects. T he strategy of an attack u p on R u s s ia from the w e st h as b e en clearly e n o u gh defined by N a p o l e o n, and had he not b e en forced by circumstances of a non-strategic nature to deviate from his plan, R u s s i a 's s u p r e m a cy and in tegrity w e re seriously m e n a c ed in 1812. T h at plan w as to a d v a n ce to t he 40 D w i na and the Dnieper, to organize a defensive position, b o th as to forti fications, dépôts and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s, to t a ke h er fortresses on t he Dwina, 565 Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels and to delay the m a r ch to M o s c o w, until the spring of 1813. He w as induced to a b a n d on this plan, late in the season, from political r e a s o n s, from t he o u t c ry of his officers against winter quarters in Lithuania, and from a blind faith in his invincibility. He m a r c h ed to M o s c o w, a nd t he result is k n o w n. T he disaster w as immensely aggravated by t he mal-administration of t he F r e n ch Commissariat, a nd by the w a nt of w a rm clothing for t he soldiers. H ad t h e se things b e en better attended to, N a p o l e o n, on his retreat, might h a ve found himself at Wilna at t he h e ad of an a r my twice in n u m b e rs t h at w h i ch R u s s ia could o p p o se to him. His errors are before u s; t h ey are n o ne of t h em of a n a t u re irremediable: t he fact of his penetrating to M o s c o w, t he m a r ch of Charles X II to P u l t o w a, p r o ve that the c o u n t ry is accessible, t h o u gh difficult of a c c e s s; and as to maintaining a victorious a r my in its heart, t h at all d e p e n ds u p on the length of the line of o p e r a t i o n s, on t he distance and t he security of the b a s e s. N a p o l e o n 's line of operations from t he R h i ne to E y l au a nd Friedland, if we consider long lines of o p e r a t i o ns in their capacity of d r a w b a c ks u p on t he active force of an army, will be a b o ut equal to a line of operations from B r e st Litovski (supposing the Polish fortresses to be t a k en in t he first year) to M o s c o w. And in this supposition no a c c o u nt is t a k en of the circumstance that the immediate b a se of operations w o u ld h a ve b e en a d v a n c ed to Vitebsk, Mohilev and Smolensk, w i t h o ut w h i ch p r e p a r a t o ry act a m a r ch on M o s c ow w o u ld certainly be h a z a r d o u s. 5 10 15 20 25 R u s s ia is certainly thinly populated ; but we m u st n ot forget t h at the central provinces—the v e ry h e a rt of Russian nationality and strength—have a popula tion equal to that of central E u r o p e. In Poland—that is, t he five g o v e r n m e n ts constituting t he Russian kingdom of Poland—the average is a b o ut the same. T he m o st p o p u l o us districts of Russia—Moscow, Tula, R i a s a n, Nijni- N o v g o r o d, Kaluga, Yaroslaf, Smolensk, etc.—are the v e ry h e a rt of G r e at Russia, and form a c o m p a ct b o d y; they are continued, on the south, by the equally p o p u l o us Little Russian Provinces of K i e w, Pultowa, Tchernigof, W o r o n e s h, e t c. T h e re a r e, in all, 29 Provinces or G o v e r n m e n t s, in w h i ch the 30 population is quite half as dense as t h at of G e r m a n y. It is only t he e a s t e rn and n o r t h e rn P r o v i n c e s, and the steppes of the south, w h e re population is v e ry thin; partly also the formerly Polish Provinces of t he west—Minsk, Mohilev and Grodno—on a c c o u nt of extensive s w a m ps b e t w e en t he (Polish) B ug a nd Dniester. B ut an advancing army, having in its r e ar t he c o r n - p r o d u c- ing plains of Poland, Volhynia and Podolia, and in front, a nd for its t h e a t er of o p e r a t i o n s, those of Central Russia, need not be afraid of its subsistence, if it m a n a g es the matter anything like well, and if it learns from t he R u s s i a ns t h e m s e l v es h ow to employ the means of t r a n s p o rt of t he c o u n t r y. As for a d e v a s t a t i on of all r e s o u r c es by t he retreating a r m y, as in 1812, s u ch a thing 40 is only possible on o ne line of operations, and in its i m m e d i a te vicinity; and 35 566 Progress of the War. December 14/15, 1854 5 if N a p o l e on had not, by his hurried a d v a n ce from Smolensk, tied himself d o wn to a very short time in which to c o m p l e te his campaign, he w o u ld h a ve found plenty of r e s o u r c es a r o u nd him. B ut being in a h u r r y, he could not forage out t he c o u n t ry at a short distance from his line of m a r c h, and his foraging parties, at that time, appear actually to h a ve b e en afraid of penetrat ing far into the i m m e n se pine forests which s e p a r a te village from village. An a r my w h i ch can d e t a ch strong cavalry parties to h u nt up provisions, and the n u m e r o us c a r ts and w a g o ns of t he c o u n t r y, c an easily provide itself with everything n e c e s s a ry in t he shape of food; and it is not likely that M o s c ow 10 will b u rn d o wn a second time. B ut e v en in that c a s e, a retreat to S m o l e n sk c a n n ot be p r e v e n t e d, and t h e re the a r my w o u ld find its well-prepared b a se of o p e r a t i on provided with every necessary. B ut n ot only military questions are to be decided. S u ch a w ar m u st be brought to a close by political action t o o. It is possible that t he declaration of G e r m a ny against Russia would be the signal for the restoration of Poland by R u s s ia herself. Nicholas would certainly not p a rt with t he Lithuanian and other W e s t - R u s s i an p r o v i n c e s; b ut the kingdom of Poland, Galicia, P o s e n, a nd p e r h a ps W e st and E a st Prussia, w o u ld form a p r e t ty good-sized kingdom. W h e t h er s u ch a revival of Poland would be d u r a b l e, w ho c an tell? O ne thing is certain: it would put an end to what is hollow in the e n t h u s i a sm for Poland, which, for the last forty y e a r s, has b e en affected by e v e r y b o dy and a n y b o dy calling himself liberal or progressive. A R u s s i an appeal to H u n g a ry would be sure to follow; and, if the M a g y a rs should d e m u r, we m u st n ot forget t h at two-thirds of the population of H u n g a ry consists of Slaves, who consider the M a g y a rs as a ruling and intruding aristocracy. On t he other h a n d, A u s t r ia would, in s u ch a c a s e, not hesitate to r e s t o re t he ancient H u n g a r i an Con stitution, t h us aiming to blot H u n g a ry o ut of the m ap of revolutionary E u r o p e. This suffices to show w h at a wide p e r s p e c t i ve of military and political interest w o u ld be o p e n ed by the accession of Austria to t he w e s t e rn alliance, and a c h a n ce of a w ar of all E u r o pe against Russia. On t he c o n t r a ry supposi tion, t he spring is likely to see a million a nd a half of soldiers a r r a y ed against the W e s t e rn P o w e r s, a nd an A u s t r o - P r u s s i an a r my marching on t he F r e n ch frontiers. A nd t h en the m a n a g e m e nt of t he w ar is sure to be t a k en out of the h a n ds of its p r e s e nt leaders. 15 20 25 30 35 567 Friedrich Engels The Military Power of Austria The Military Power of Austria. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4281, 8.Januar 1855 5 It is a curious fact, that the English p r e s s, which, for the last six m o n t h s, has b u s i ed itself with nothing b ut the position of Austria, should n e v er h a ve given us a ny positive information about the real military force w h i ch A u s t r ia can t h r ow into the scale t he m o m e nt she may c h o o se to follow a definite line of policy. T he L o n d on daily journals h a ve b e en divided u p on the question w h e t h er t he Austrian alliance or an o p en rupture with Austria w as the prefer able thing. B ut t h e se journals, which r e p r e s e nt the public opinion of a nation priding itself u p on being the most businesslike in the world, h a ve never c o n d e s c e n d ed to enter into those details and statistics w h i c h, n ot only in 10 t r a de a nd political e c o n o m y, b ut also in national policy, form the ground w o rk of e v e ry m e a s u re intelligently adopted. In truth, the British p r e ss would s e em to be c o n d u c t ed by gentlemen w ho are as ignorant in their line of business as those British officers w ho think t h ey are doing all their d u ty w h en t h ey b uy a commission. O ne p a p er says the Austrian alliance must be culti- vated at all h a z a r ds and u n d er all c i r c u m s t a n c e s, b e c a u se Austria is an i m m e n se military power. A n o t h er says the Austrian alliance is w o r se t h an useless, b e c a u se all her energies are required to k e ep in c h e ck H u n g a r y, Poland a nd Italy. W h at the real military forces of Austria are, neither the o ne nor the other ever trouble themselves to k n o w. 15 20 T he Austrian a r m y, though managed up to 1849 according to a c u m b r o us and old-fashioned s y s t e m, was entirely remodeled in t h at year. T he defeats in H u n g a ry had as great a p a rt in it as the victories in Italy. T he Ad ministration w as freed from old traditional hinderances. T he a r m y, e m p l o y ed in a country w h e re revolution in the capital and civil w ar in t he p r o v i n c es had only j u st b e en subdued, w as organized on a regular w ar footing. T he distribution of the a r my into p e r m a n e nt brigades, divisions, and c o r p s, as it existed u n d er N a p o l e o n, and as it exists n ow in t he R u s s i an active army, w as introduced with s u c c e s s. T he 77 regiments of infantry, beside riflemen, 25 568 The Military Power of Austria and 40 regiments of cavalry, which h ad b e en split up during b o th t he Italian and H u n g a r i an campaigns, n ot only battalions of t he s a me regiment, b ut e v en c o m p a n i es of the same battalions being e m p l o y ed partly in H u n g a ry and p a r dy in Italy at the same t i m e - w e re n ow reunited and brigaded in such a 5 m a n n er as to prevent any similar disorder and to insure the regular c o u r se of regimental administration. According to this new plan, the Austrian force is divided into four armies, c o m p o s ed of t w e l ve c o r ps d ' a r m ée and t wo corps of cavalry. E v e ry a r my is n ot only c o m p l e te in the t h r ee a r m s, b ut provided with a perfectly i n d e p e n d e nt administrative staff, and t he material to insure its immediate readiness for action. T he first army—1st, 2d, and 9th a r m y- corps—generally occupies the G e r m an provinces of t he E m p i r e; t he second army—5th, 6th, 7th and 8th a r m y - c o r p s, and 2d cavalry-corps, and the third army—10th, 11th and 12th a r m y - c o r p s, and 1st cavalry-corps—generally o c c u py the H u n g a r i an and Slavonic p r o v i n c e s; while the fourth army, con- sisting only of the 4th a r m y - c o r p s, occupies Italy. 10 15 E v e ry army-corps consists of from two to t h r ee divisions of infantry, o ne or t wo brigades of cavalry, four batteries of reserve-artillery, and t he n e c e s sary d e t a c h m e n ts of pontonniers, train-commissariat, and medical officers. A cavalry-corps consists of t wo divisions, equal to four brigades, or eight regiments of cavalry, w i th a corresponding n u m b er of light batteries. An infantry-division consists of t wo brigades of five battalions, with o ne foot b a t t e ry e a c h, and from two to four s q u a d r o ns of cavalry. T he w h o le force thus distributed consists, as we h a ve stated a b o v e, of s e v e n t y - s e v en regiments of infantry, b e s i de riflemen, forty regiments of cavalry, and fourteen regiments of field-artillery, beside garrison-artillery, engineers, s a p p e r s, etc. T he infantry is c o m p o s ed of sixty-two regiments of t he line, fourteen regiments of frontier-infantry, and o ne regiment a nd twenty-five battalions of riflemen. A regiment of the line consists of five active and o ne dépôt-battalions, or of twenty-eight active and four dépôt- c o m p a n i e s. T he active c o m p a ny n u m b e rs t wo h u n d r ed and t w e n ty m e n, t he d é p ô t - c o m p a ny one h u n d r ed and thirty. A regiment of the line, c o n s e q u e n t l y, is e x p e c t ed to n u m b e r, in its five active battalions, 5,964 men, or, for 62 regiments, inclusive of d é p ô t s, 369,800 m e n. T he frontier-infantry, count ing fourteen regiments, has t wo active and one r e s e r ve battalions to each regiment, equal to twelve active and four r e s e r ve c o m p a n i e s. T he active c o m p a ny has the strength of 242 men, inclusive of 22 riflemen. A frontier- regiment, therefore, n u m b e rs 3,850 m e n, and t he whole of the f o u r t e en regiments n u m b e rs 55,200. T he rifle-force, or J ä g e r s, consists of o ne regi m e nt of seven battalions—32 c o m p a n i e s, inclusive of d é p ô t; and 25 battal- ions—125 c o m p a n i e s, inclusive of d é p ô t s; e v e ry c o m p a ny n u m b e r i ng 202 m e n, making the entire rifle-force 32,500. T he total is thus 470,000 m e n. 20 25 30 35 40 569 Friedrich Engels T he Austrian cavalry consists of 16 h e a vy regiments, (8 cuirassiers and 8 dragoons,) and 24 light regiments, (12 hussars and 12 lancers.) In the arm of cavalry, the different nationalities composing t he A u s t r i an E m p i re h a ve e a ch b e en u s e d, v e ry properly, according to their distinctive capabilities. T he cuirassiers and dragoons are almost exclusively G e r m a ns a nd B o h e m i a n s; the hussars are all H u n g a r i a n s, and the lancers are all Poles. In the infantry a similar distinction could hardly be kept up with any profit. As a general rule, the G e r m a ns and Hungarians form the élite battalions of grenadiers, while the Tyrolese ( G e r m an and Italian) and t he Styrians generally furnish the riflemen; and the great majority of the frontier infantry is c o m p o s ed of C r o a ts a nd Servians, w ho are equally well a d a p t ed to the duties of light infantry. T he h e a vy cavalry c o u n ts six active s q u a d r o ns and o ne d é p ô t - s q u a d r on to e a ch regiment—the s q u a d r on numbering 194 men. T he light cavalry c o u n ts eight active and one d é p ô t - s q u a d r on to e a ch regiment, w i th 227 m en to e a ch squadron. T he entire active cavalry force is 62,500, without d é p ô t s, a nd 67,000 m e n, including d é p ô t s. T he artillery consists of twelve field regiments, o ne c o a st regiment, and o ne r o c k et regiment. T he Austrians h a ve no horse-artillery. In w h at t h ey call cavalry-artillery, the m en serving the guns are t r a n s p o r t ed on the carriages. E v e ry field regiment h as four cavalry-batteries, (six-pounders,) a nd seven foot-batteries, (four six-pounders and three twelve-pounders,) beside r e serve c o m p a n i e s. E v e ry b a t t e ry has eight guns. T he c o a st regiment has no p e r m a n e nt batteries, b ut is only divided into battalions and c o m p a n i e s, and e m p l o y ed for garrisoning t he coast defenses. T he rocket-regiment has 18 batteries, of eight t u b es each. T he total of Austrian artillery is t h us seen to be 1,056 guns and 114 rocket-tubes. T he artillery h a s, b e s i d e s, eight battalions of garrison artillery, of about 10,400 m e n, with technical de t a c h m e n ts consisting of 4,500 men. T he engineering t r o o ps n u m b er a b o ut 16,700 m e n. B e s i d es t h e se active, r e s e r ve and garrison t r o o p s, A u s t r ia p o s s e s s es sepa rate corps organized for special service, w h o, although not available as active c o m b a t a n t s, p r e v e nt a r e d u c t i on of the active force by t h o se drafts of m en which v e ry often r e d u ce battalions to c o m p a n i e s, a nd regiments of cavalry to s q u a d r o n s. T h e re are t h r ee sanitary battalions, train-troops, a nd with e v e ry a r my c o r ps a d e t a c h m e nt of cavalry to do duty as orderlies. T he latter institution has just b e en introduced into the English a r m y, by the formation of the M o u n t ed Staff Corps. T he whole Austrian a r my c o u n ts altogether something like 476,000 m e n, and 1,140 guns of active t r o o p s; including d é p ô t s, technical t r o o p s, staff, garrison a nd police t r o o p s, (gens d'armes,) t h ey c o u nt a b o ut 620,000. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 570 The Military Power of Austria 5 10 T he Austrian soldier serves eight y e a r s, remaining for two y e a rs m o re in t he r e s e r v e. By this a r r a n g e m e nt a r e s e r ve is k e pt available, which, in t he c a se of w a r, c an be called o ut to the strength of a b o ut 120,000 m e n. In t he military frontier every Grenzer has to serve from his t w e n t i e th to his fiftieth y e a r. T h us t he active force of 55,000 frontier infantry c an be increased up to 150,000 or 200,000 men. During the year of 1849 t h e re w e re at least 150,000 of t h em u n d er a r m s. B ut at that time the military frontier w as so d e s e r t ed t h at the w o m en h ad to do all the w o rk of h u s b a n d r y. T he sum total of t h e se details, for the c o r r e c t n e ss of w h i ch we c an v o u c h, s h o ws that t he military organization of Austria allows h er to t a ke t he field, at o n c e, with a force of 600,000 m e n, of w h om 300,000, at t he u t m o s t, m ay be m a de available on any given point; and, at t he s a me time, a r e s e r ve of a b o ut 200,000 v e t e r an soldiers m ay be called out, w i t h o ut the necessity of a ny e x t ra recruiting, or e x t ra strain u p on t he p r o d u c t i ve forces of t he 15 c o u n t r y. T he Russian a r my is organized u p on a footing w h i ch allows of far greater n u m b e rs being admitted into its frame-work. T he population of R u s s ia is 60,000,000 to Austria's 40,000,000; yet, we h a ve seen t h at Austria, by merely calling in the r e s e r v e s, c an increase her a r my b e y o nd 800,000; while Russia, in order to attain the same n u m b e r, has b e en obliged not only to call in t he r e s e r v e s, b ut also to recruit fresh t r o o p s, at a ratio equal to four y e a r s' regular conscription. 20 571 A N H A NG Dubiosa The War New York Daily Tribune. Nr.4059, 21. April 1854 The War. 5 The most interesting feature of the news brought by the Asia yesterday is the announcement made in the City article of The London Times of April 8, that the Turkish loan had failed after all, and that Namik Pasha had gone home without any money. This is stated by the City writer of The Times with positiveness and circumstantiality, but we cannot give it perfect credence. In the first place our own correspondent at London, who is almost certain to be exactly informed on whatever related to the transactions of Turkey, there and at Paris, states the contrary with equal minuteness. In the second place, Namik Pasha had 10 brought his negotiations to a conclusion, whatever it was, and started for home on Monday, and it is not till Friday, after he had been gone four days, that the writer in The Times learns that he has failed, and that the loan is withdrawn from the market. Certainly, if he had gone home in disappointment, this fact would hardly have remained unknown, and the loan would hardly have been 15 kept for sale four days longer. Such are the circumstances which militate against this important statement; still there is an evident possibility of its truth, as well as of the inference of The Times, that the French Government has not advanced to Turkey the sum of $2,000,000 as stated in the journals of Paris. Should all this prove true, and should what is suggested by. the same writer also prove true, 20 namely, that the allies will not come forward to guarantee the proposed loan, it would go far to confirm the suspicion that they do not mean honestly by the Sultan. The only alternative to this inference is to be found in the fact that the Ottoman Government have taken possession of the mosques of the Empire and of their funds, which are believed to be considerable, undertaking on the other hand hereafter to support the priesthood and the other expenses of worship from the imperial treasury, just as is done in France and other countries of Western Europe. This measure, whose execution, as we learn from Constan tinople, is being energetically pushed forward, may possibly put the Porte at ease, financially, for the time being; otherwise it has no resource but in a loan, and if defeated in obtaining it, must be terribly embarrassed in prosecuting the war, at the same time that it is exposed to the danger of serious outbreaks on the part of the most zealous and trustworthy portion of its Mussulman sub jects. 30 25 577 The War Our correspondent at Vienna announces the conclusion of an alliance between the German powers, by which the entire Confederation, including Austria and Prussia of course, undertakes to maintain neutrality through the war. Whether they can succeed in keeping out of the quarrel for so long a time is a question on which a positive opinion cannot be formed at present. The new complications which may arise, and the new interests which may be developed in the course of the struggle, may very easily render nugatory the most exact calculations that can how be made. Certain it is that but for dread of revolution, against which Russia is supposed to offer a protection, the German powers, and especially the German people, must all desire the humiliation of the Czar, whose pre- pondérant influence they hate, and whose aggrandizement they spontaneously incline to resist. But on the other side, such is their pecuniary weakness, and so entire is their doubt of the loyalty of their subjects, that they must regard the risk of permanent Russian supremacy as far less formidable than that of engaging in a universal war with the revolution lying in ambush behind the eventualities of the contest. So they will remain neutral as long as they can, and will hold themselves ready, when they finally decide to go into the fight, to embrace whichever side offers them the greater advantages. We do not believe they will be led either way by any other motives than regard for their own interest. All the gratitude Austria owes Russia will indeed only prove a reason for her to attack the Czar should other causes seem to render it the more profitable course, and the same is true of all Germany as well. From the seat of War on the Danube there is no intelligence of great impor tance, we must, however, soon hear of fighting in that quarter. The allied fleets are in the Black Sea, and Sir Charles Napier is advancing in the Baltic. The Russians are said to have abandoned the Island of Aland, and he can occupy it without difficulty. We shall not have to wait long for him to begin; his fashion to strike rapidly and powerfully, and he will not now change. The steamers now about to arrive can scarcely fail to bring bloody intelli gence. is 5 10 15 20 25 30 In England the opinion is being adopted that the war must be a long and hard one. They are looking carefully into their state of preparation to carry it on. In the House of Lords on the 7th inst. Earl Grey made a speech showing that the administration of the British army is now and long has been in the highest degree faulty, extravagant, and opposed to efficiency, rapidity and unity in the service. The care and provision of the troops he proved to be of so very defective a description as to leave room to expect injurious consequences in the army now sent to Turkey; and he held up a radical reform in the administration of the whole military establishment as absolutely essential to success in the present war. His speech justly made a deep impression on the House, and we doubt not 40 will carry with it the opinion of the public. The London Times gives it a power ful indorsement. 35 578 The English Middle Class (First Article) The English Middle Class. New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4145, I.August 1854 10 5 With the rising power of the middle class element in England, it is natural to suppose that its old position toward the aristocracy should gradually become modified to suit the altered circumstances, and that the established relations between the two classes should begin to be practically inconvenient. Within the last five years some note worthy occurrences have taken place in harmony with this supposition. About five years ago Jones Lloyd, the wealthy Banker, was made a Peer with the title of Lord Overstone; he had invested some of his enormous wealth in purchasing an estate in the County of Northampton, and the aristocracy, true to their old policy, determined to allow him within their ranks, not because he was a millionaire, but because he was a "lord of acres broad." Now, what was the condition they demanded of Jones Lloyd? That he should quit all connection with banking and commerce. And Jones Lloyd submitted to the condition. Therefore it is evident the aristocracy have relaxed nothing of their traditional ideas concerning what is a meet qualification for a peerage. 15 But will everybody of the haute bourgeoisie be as pliant as Jones Lloyd? Probably not. Nay more, we have an instance on record of the highest authority where a peerage was rejected during life and forbidden to the sons after death. We allude to the memorable case of the late Sir Robert Peel. He, the son and grandson of a Lancashire mill-owner and manufacturer, aspired in the latter years of his life to lead the great 20 middle class, and though the peerage was for years within his grasp, he preferred to remain the first Commoner of England, and shrank from shelving himself from the sphere of public action in the House of Lords. We have the emphatic testimony of his life to the fact that somewhere within the middle class rests the attractive center of political power; and that clause in his will whereby he forbade his children ever to accept a peerage for any public services of his, when read by the light of the events of 1848, still fresh in the public mind—what a revolutionary example and precedent it was! Dying, he thus revenged himself terribly upon the aristocracy of mere birth for the many stings his sensitive soul had been made to suffer on account of his plebeian origin, since as a boy he first went to Harrow. Lord John Russell has so far 30 followed the precedent of Sir Robert Peel ; the peerage has long been within his reach, but though a son and brother of a Duke of Bedford, he also refuses to shelve himself. Quite lately this determination of his must have been put to a strong test. The office 25 579 The English Middle Class (First Article) of President of the Council is almost always held by a Peer, and when in the recent Ministerial changes he accepted that office it was generally believed that he would be raised to the peerage. But No! he preferred to remain a Commoner, to vacate his seat, address the Electors of the City of London, and be returned by acclamation. Sir William Molesworth likewise regards the rumor that he was about to be elevated to the House of Lords as an aspersion on his political character, and takes care to publish a positive denial that he was likely to accept a peerage. So much for the peerage; but it would seem that the Knighthood as it carries with it no political power, has been flung away to satisfy the parvenue bourgeoisie. On this ground we can explain the elevation to that rank of Sir Joseph Paxton, the Duke of Devonshire's head gardener, and Sir John Fox, a contractor. But will this satisfy the middle class sense of self-importance in all cases? Apparently not; for Stephen son, the engineer, contemptuously declined the trumpery dignity, and still more recently Dargan, the railway contractor, has followed his example, thinking, no doubt, that to accept it would be putting himself in a false position. In vain Royalty woos him, visits him in his handsome mansion, an honor previously vouchsafed only to the highest aristocracy; the coy burgher shrinks from the extended hand of majesty, while Queen Victoria, grasping the arm of the reluctant citizen, affords an expression of the need that feudalism has of being propped up in these days by the industrial leaders of the epoch. But while the middle class are thus slowly winning power from the aristocracy, it is natural to ask, how are the middle classes likely to use their newly acquired influence? This matter must be looked at from no class point of view, but from broad humanitarian grounds; and the question that overleaps all others is this one—how is the fate and social condition of England's toiling millions likely to be affected by the change? 5 10 15 20 25 Some politicians of the so-called liberal school have talked largely of the "union of the middle and working classes," but the idea is absurdly chimerical. Broad is the gulf that separates the employer from the employed—the master from the servant. As regards domestic service, let the last judicial words of Talfourd speak: "How painful," said he, "is the thought that there are men and women growing up around us ministering to our comforts and necessities, continually inmates of our dwellings, with whose affections and nature we are as much unacquainted as if they were inhabitants of some other sphere." And in order that there may be no confusion as to the respective inhabitants of the "two spheres," the middle class ladies, oblivious 35 of their own comparatively recent emancipation from serfdom, compel their female servants to wear "caps" as badges of the lower sphere, and seldom allow their maids to apparel themselves sprucely for fear of an obliteration, not of land, but of money marks. 30 And as regards the journeyman of all descriptions, in what relation does he stand 40 to his employer? All know with what opposition the employers met the "Ten Hours" bill. The Tories, out of spite for the recent loss of the Corn Laws, helped the working class to get it; but when passed, the reports of the district supervisors show with what shameless cunning and petty underhand treacheries it was evaded. Every subsequent attempt in Parliament to subject Labor to more humane conditions has been met by 45 580 The English Middle Class (First Article) the middle class representatives with the catch-cry of Communism ! Mr. Cobden has acted thus a score of times. Within the workshops for years the aim of the employers has been to prolong the hours of labor beyond human endurance, and by an un principled use of the contract system, by pitting one man against another, to cut down the earning of the skilled to that of the unskilled laborer. It was this system that at last drove the Amalgamated Engineers to revolt, and the brutality of the expressions that passed current among the masters at that time showed how little of refined or humane feeling was to be looked for from them. Their boorish ignorance was further displayed in the employment by the Masters' Association of a certain third-rate littérateur, Sidney Smith, to undertake their defense in the public press and to carry on the war of words with their revolted hands. The style of their hired writer well fitted the task he had to perform, and when the battle was over, the Masters, having no more need of literature or the press, gave their hireling his congé. Although the middle class do not aim at the learning, of the old school, they do not for that cultivate either modern science or literature. The ledger, the desk, business, that is education sufficient. Their daughters, when expensively educated, are superficially endowed with a few "accomplishments;" but the real education of the mind and the storing it with knowledge is not even dreamed of. 5 10 15 20 The present splendid brotherhood of fiction-writers in England, whose graphic and eloquent pages have issued to the world more political and social truths than have been uttered by all the professional politicians, publicists and moralists put together, have described every section of the middle class from the "highly genteel" annuitant and Fundholder who looks upon all sorts of business as vulgar, to the little shop keeper and lawyer's clerk. And how have Dickens and Thackeray, Miss Brontë and 25 Mrs. Gaskell painted them? As full of presumption, affectation, petty tyranny and ignorance; and the civilized world have confirmed their verdict with the damning epigram that it has fixed to this class "that they are servile to those above, and tyrannical to those beneath them." 30 The cramped and narrow sphere in which they move is to a certain degree due to the social system of which they form a part. As the Russian nobility live uneasily betwixt the oppression of the Czar above them and the dread of the enslaved masses below them, so the English middle class are hemmed in by the aristocracy on the one hand and the working classes on the other. Since the peace of 1815, whenever the middle class have wished to take action against the aristocracy, they have told the 35 working classes that their grievances were attributable to some aristocratic privilege and monopoly. By this means the middle class roused the working classes to help them in 1832 when they wanted the Reform bill, and having got a Reform bill for themselves, have ever since refused one to the working classes—nay, in 1848, actually stood arrayed against them armed with special-constable staves. Next, it was the repeal of the Corn Laws that would be the panacea for the working classes. Well, this was won from the aristocracy, but the "good time" was not yet come, and last year, as if to take away the last possibility of a similar policy for the future, the aristocracy were compelled to accede to a tax on the succession to real estate—a tax which the same aristocracy had selfishly exempted themselves from in 1793, while they imposed it on the succession to personal estate. With this rag of a grievance 45 40 581 The English Middle Class (First Article) vanished the last chance of gulling the working classes into the belief that their hard lot was due solely to aristocratic legislation. The eyes of the working classes are now fully opened: they begin to cry: "Our St. Petersburg is at Preston!" Indeed, the last eight months have seen a strange spectacle in that town—a standing army of 14,000 men and women subsidized by the trades unions and workshops of all parts of the United Kingdom, to fight out a grand social battle for mastery with the capital ists, and the capitalists of Preston, on their side, held up by the capitalists of Lanca shire. 5 Whatever other shapes this social struggle may hereafter assume, we have seen only the beginning of it. It seems destined to nationalize itself and present phases 10 never before seen in history, for it must be borne in mind that though temporary defeat may await the working classes, great social and economical laws are in opera tion which must eventually insure their triumph. The same industrial wave which has borne the middle class up against the aristocracy, is now, assisted as it is and will be by emigration, bearing the working classes up against the middle classes. Just as 15 the middle class inflict blows upon the aristocracy, so will they receive them from the working classes. It is the instinctive perception of this fact that already fetters the action of that class against the aristocracy. The recent political agitations of the working classes have taught the middle class to hate and fear overt political move ments. In their cant, "respectable men don't join them, Sir." The higher middle classes ape the aristocracy in their modes of life, and endeavor to connect themselves with it. The consequence is that the feudalism of England will not perish beneath the scarcely perceptible dissolving processes of the middle class; the honor of such a victory is reserved for the working classes. When time shall be ripe for their recog nised entry upon the stage of political action, there will be within the lists three 25 powerful classes confronting each other—the first representing the land; the second, money; the third, labor. And as the second is triumphing over the first, so, in its turn, it must yield before its successor in the field of political and social conflict. 20 582 The English Middle Class (Second Article) New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.4196, 29. September 1854 The English Middle-Class. 5 10 The whole system of Class Government in Britain hinges upon the political sub serviency of the middle-class to the aristocracy. The middle-class have the power, and lack only the will, to take a political position befitting their influence in the State ; but to do so would involve the overthrow of Class Government, and necessarily bring about considerable changes in the time-honored British Constitution. Any symptoms, therefore, that the middle-class are beginning to entertain a sense of independence and self-respect in the presence of the aristocracy are worth observing, not so much for themselves as for the consequences that are certain to result from the state of public sentiment which they attest. The refusal of the empty dignity of knighthood by Stephenson and Dargan is one such symptom, but manifestations of middle-class independence have been very frequent of late in the framing and working of Liberal Ministries into which a pure middle-class element is now sure to enter. 15 20 Eight years ago, in the flush of his free trade triumph, middle-class Cobden was offered by the Whig aristocracy the place of Under Secretary to the Board of Trade, without a seat in the Cabinet. He refused it because it was beneath his dignity; and middle-class public opinion applauded him for that act. Middle-class Milner Gibson, the Radical Member for Manchester, accepted the place, but soon resigned it as incompatible with his political independence; and he rose in consequence in middle- class estimation. In the present Ministry the antagonism of the two elements—aristo cratic and middle-class—has been far more conspicuous than ever before, and has reached a pitch that has made it a serious impediment to the harmonious working of the Cabinet. His aristocratic Lordship, Palmerston, undertook to alter in a material particular a bill relating to the Poor Laws, which had been drawn up and brought in 25 by his middle-class colleague, Mr. Baines, without deeming it worth his while to consult a subordinate like Baines on the matter; and Mr. Baines, feeling himself snubbed, resigned. Public opinion said he was right and Palmerston wrong. Lord Palmerston apologizes, and Mr. Baines resumes his office, having taught aristocracy a lesson. Lord Palmerston says, jauntily from his seat in Parliament, that his middle- 30 class colleague, Mr. Wilson, had talked "sheer nonsense," while the Radical member of the ministry, Molesworth, in answering Lord Palmerston on the ballot question, declares that he (Palmerston) had only "gone over arguments which he had heard 583 The English Middle Class (Second Article) urged in Parliament usque ad nauseam." In the first instance, public opinion says Lord Palmerston was impertinent, and in the second that Molesworth held the right tone. Molesworth was becoming unpopular and suspected at the time, but this hit set him straight again. While in the House Lord John Russell makes one of his solemnest constitutional appeals on behalf of Church-rates: in the lobby he discovers that the Attorney-General and the middle-class element of his Ministry have contumaciously divided against him to a man; and Lord John Russell finds himself considerably damaged by his position on this question. The climax was reached when wealthy but parvenu Mr. Strutt was unceremoniously begged to resign the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster to make way for Lord Granville, he, himself, not having been consulted till all had been agreed upon. When Strutt made his simple and gentlemanly explanation to the House, an explanation in which his wounded feelings struggled with that higher pride which forbade him to give expression to it, the cheers of the House and the sympathy of the journals let him know that his case had touched a responsive chord in the public breast, and that the middle-class resented his insult as their own. Not again will the Whig Aristocracy venture to outrage middle-class sentiment by such cavalier treatment of their representative. When the middle-class of England are prepared to throw off the yoke of Feudalism, they will have the example of their ancestors of the 17th century to embolden them. Let them take heart and imitate the men of the Long Parliament and the Commonwealth. 584 Artikel, die mit Hilfe von Marx und Engels verfaßt wurden Wilhelm Pieper The Coburgs New-York Daily Tribune. Nr.3991, I.Februar 1854 The Coburgs. Public opinion in England is excessively exasperated against Prince Albert, charging him with extending his influence from the royal drawing room and chamber to the Cabinet Councils, and even with divulging to his German kindred and friends the secrets of the Government concerning the momentous Eastern question. He is ac cused of being devoted to Russian interests, opposed to war, and very cold with regard to the French alliance. It is even said that this undue and unconstitutional interference will be brought before the next meeting of Parliament, and that the well-known Mr. Roebuck is to be the accuser on this occasion. Prince Albert is charged with doing all this, if not for the further aggrandizement of his family, at least for the con solidation of the Coburgs in the various positions occupied by them throughout Europe. 5 10 15 These Coburgs are petty princes belonging to the innumerable sprouts of German ruling families who trace back their common origin to Wittikind the Saxon, for long years an undaunted antagonist of Charlemagne. Their principal branch is now fixed among the green hills extending on both sides of the Thuringian forest, in the Duke dom of Coburg and Gotha, over which rules the elder brother of the accused Prince Consort. This monarchy is composed of about 185 square miles of land, with some 150,000 inhabitants. The yearly revenues of the State amount to $160,000, with a 20 promising yearly deficit, and an old debt of $1,700,000. The military force consists of from fifteen hundred to two thousand men. The country is generally fertile, well watered and cultivated. The Coburgs were once a rather warlike race, and one of them was a distinguished commander in the German armies during the wars in the last century between the Emperors and the Turks. During the recent convulsions in 25 Germany, the present reigning Duke showed some martial impulses in the war be tween Holstein and Denmark, in which he took part. As a volunteer he commanded a part of the army and contributed to the capture of the Danish frigate Gefion, which now forms the principal strength of the Prussian navy. This campaign had, however, an ulterior purpose. The German Imperial Crown had been proclaimed vacant, and the Diet of Frankfort was looking around for some one to offer it to. Coburg was simply trying to win the purple with the sword in this popular war of Holstein. 30 But the prominent qualifications of this race seem to consist mainly in furnishing 587 Wilhelm Pieper 5 fathers for the breed of royal lineages in Europe. The Coburgs are generally hand some, vigorous and well proportioned fellows. The first to start in this new career was the present Leopold of Belgium, who is now called the Ulysses of European kings. He is an uncle of Prince Albert, and, as it is said, his political adviser. Leopold is now 63 years old. In his youth he married the Princess Charlotte Augusta, daughter of George the IVth, King of England, and eventual heiress to the Crown. She died, however, in the year 1817. The second wife of Leopold was a daughter of Louis Philippe, who died nearly two years ago. His son and heir has lately married an Austrian arch-duchess. Prince Albert followed luckily in the footsteps of his uncle. Born in 1819, after having finished his studies at the University of Bonn, he went 10 in search of fortune, and landed in the royal apartments of Windsor Castle. One of his uncles married in 1816 a Princess Cohary, a rich Hungarian heiress, and from this marriage issued, first, Ferdinand, the husband of the deceased Maria de Gloria of Portugal, now King Regent there; second, Auguste, married to Princess Clementine, daughter of Louis Philippe ; and third, the Princess Victoria, now the wife of the Duke 15 of Nemours. An aunt of Prince Albert was in 1796 married to the Grand Duke Constantine, elder brother of the Emperor Nicholas, and was divorced in 1820. For nearly forty years she has lived in Switzerland, with the advantages of a considerable income paid from Russia. She is 72 years old. Another aunt of Albert was the wife of the Duke of Kent; she is the mother of Queen Victoria, and this royal match was made between two cousins. 20 All these intermarriages easily point out what are the Coburgs' interests, and in what direction they use their influence. It cannot suit them to strengthen Napoleon and thus endanger the independence of Belgium. They must propitiate the good will of Nicholas, and at any rate avert ageneral war whose results must be deeply injurious to their tribe. 25 588 Ernest Jones Different Features of Popular Feeling The People's Paper. Nr. 103, 22. April 1854 10 5 The East and West of Europe alike present new features of peculiar interest. In Turkey and in Spain, new, but vastly different features of popular feeling are rising to the surface. A feeling of doubt, mistrust, and hostility against their western allies is gaining possession of the Turkish mind. They begin to look on France and England as more dangerous enemies than the Czar himself, and the general cry is—"they are going to dethrone the Sultan, and divide the land"—"they are going to make us slaves to the Christian population." It must be said that there appears some ground for the accusation. Landing south of Constantinople instead of north of Varna they are fortifying Galipoli as though against the Turks themselves. The tract of land on which that village is situated is a long peninsula joined by a narrow isthmus to the continent, and admirably adapted for a stronghold for invaders. It was there the Genoese of old defied the Greek Emperors of Constantinople. The appointment of the new Sheik ul Islam is filling the true Moslemim with indignation, since he is little better than a tool of the Greek priesthood, and a strong feeling is pervading the Turks of sooner 15 yielding to the one demand of Nicholas than being made the playthings of a knot of greedy powers. On this subject they have made a fable. "Menchikoff," say they, "came to Constantinople and asked for the Koran. He looked at the book, marked several passages, and said, 'Erase these.' The English and French then came and asked also for the Koran. After reading, they said, 'Throw this book into the Bospho- r u s . '" 20 Austria is pouncing upon Servia. Greece is intent on Thessaly and Epirus. France on Egypt—England on Canada and the islands. To obtain these, Russia would receive more than the Principalities in compromise. "What," say the Turks, "What further could we lose to the Czar? Nay, he would not take from us half as much, if, by yielding to him, we get rid of our hateful and treacherous allies." 25 Meanwhile, the district north of the Balkan is utterly exhausted of provisions; and those supplies that might be sent from the south are now actually stopped to maintain the French and English soldiers. So unprovided have the allies come, that, few as have yet arrived, they are obliged to borrow Turkish tents. It must take at least three 30 months before they will be able to get as far north as Varna, which they might have reached in a few days by sea; a clear proof that they do not intend to fight the Russians, but to gag the Turks. The French and English officers are out of spirits, and the only feat they have as yet achieved is to turn some poor Dervishes out of their convent at Galipoli, and instai themselves instead. 589 Ernest Jones The Turks, on the other hand, are expelling the Greek population, subjects of King Otho. About fifty thousand will be driven from Constantinople and its neighbour hood; an ill-judged measure, since they only go to greaten the insurrectionary force of Greece. Immense bodies of Russians are on the right bank of the Danube, and the Pasha of Varna has only 3,000 men in his fortress, to defend which 12,000 are re- quired. 5 Terrible excesses are being perpetrated by the irregular Turkish troops, on their retreat, who burnt the city of Kostendje in retiring. The Russians, however, appear resolved, after they shall have extended their operations to an impregnable line of defence, to act on the defensive, and throw the difficult task of aggression upon their 10 enemies, leaving the latter as best they may to grapple with famine and disease, sowing dissension between the allies, and creating distrust towards them in the Turkish mind. Fokshani, in Wallachia, has been destroyed by fire, with all the Russian stores, hospital, and ammunition. In this terrible emergency, the Duke of Cambridge has been feasting at Paris, and now, instead of going by sea, must needs travel by land through Vienna, where he will delay among fresh festivals and balls. The Austrian Emperor's marriage is about to take place in a few days, and his ambassador in Paris has deserted his post to dance attendance at the wedding. The Turkish army in Asia is being slowly re-organised, but the terrible snow keeps the forces of Prince Woronzoff inactive. The Russian fleet maintains undisputed possession of the Black Sea, and has just performed one of the most brilliant achieve ments, by taking off all its garrisons from the Circassian forts in the actual presence of two British frigates. In the Baltic, the Russian fleet is scattered in different ports. The Czar is seeking to re-unite his ships beneath the guns of Cronstadt. Nine Russian ships of the line are preparing to leave Sweaborg. We shall see whether Admiral Napier thinks proper to intercept them. A few Russian merchantmen have been taken as prizes by Admiral Plumridge. 15 20 25 30 In the West of Europe matters look most promising. Discontent spreads in France, unfortunately at the cost of suffering. Trade is excessively dull, and scarcity keeps threatening. It is an ominous fact, which the French government has tried to suppress, that the African troops, on landing at Malta, replied to the "God Save the Queen" of the British regimental bands, by the "Marseillaise," the proscribed and penal air 35 of the revolution! But it is in Spain where the most important movement of the week has taken place. We last week recorded the turn-out of 40,000 operatives in Barcelona, and the sup pression of the unarmed movement by the military force. Since then, churches and. factories have burst out in conflagration, and the leaders of the turn-out have issued 40 an address to the people, in which they state that they had advised them to resume work in expectation that their grievances would have been redressed. Deceived in that expectation, they now call on them to turn-out again, and trust in their cause, and their own arms. Five thousand muskets have been landed at Arenys del Mar. The terrified authorities released all the prisoners they had made, excepting twelve, 45 590 Different Features of Popular Feeling but the people insisted upon the liberation of these as well. At Saragossa a terrific ferment reigns. In reply to it the government has amnestied the military prisoners. But the best feat was that performed by the Queen and King, who washed the feet of twelve old women and twelve old men, and then waited on them at dinner. The 5 Queen, however, was so frightened at the Duke of Parma's assassination, that she abandoned her intention of visiting the churches on foot. The financial crisis in Spain is unparalleled. There has been a terrible run upon the Bank of San Fernando, and the Government have sought to meet their difficulties by asking the people to pay a quarter's taxes in advance. 10 America seems determined to take advantage of the difficulties of Spain by picking a quarrel about Cuba. The Spaniards have replied by ordering every slave to be registered, as a check upon the slave trade, and allowing free labour of all description, to be imported. They even hint that they would sooner liberate the slave population, and make it another San Domingo, than allow it to pass into the hands of the 15 Americans. 591 Ernest Jones Discoveries Made Too Late Discoveries Made Too Late. The People's Paper. Nr. 130, 28. Oktober 1854 5 How often, when the stern observer of events sees through the abominable treachery of those in power, the people laugh at him who exposes it! How reluctant the masses are to believe that their enemies are their enemies, and that their friends can be their friends. How easily a few soft words, or an artful stroke of policy on the part of government, disarms the resentment, or blinds the judgment of the governed! If cabinets are forced into a war against their own will, they get credit for energy. If, after infamous treacheries, they are compelled to let their armies fight a battle, and the courage of their soldiers conquer,—who gets the laurel and the praise? Not the people who drove them, but the ministry that had to be driven. Not the soldier who 10 fought, but the vile official clique that caused him to fight at an inconceivable dis advantage, and suffer a loss that earlier action might have avoided altogether. And such is the gullibility of the people, that they can't believe that "great men" can be great scoundrels. "Why should lords, and peers, and princes betray u s ?" they cry. Why? To save their infamous rule from extermination at the hands of mankind. To prevent the people rising anywhere—lest they should rise everywhere. Why? Because existing government is the art of murdering soul and body, destroying the morals, perverting the intellect, and abasing the manhood of the many for the advantage of the few. Because existing governments are the triumph of organised rebellion against God and man. Because existing governments are the science of making miserable 20 the greatest possible number for the benefit of the smaZ/esrpossible number. Because, in the words of democratic Luther, "What are 'great men'?—great knaves, who fatten on the credulity and misery of the people. Princes and thieves, you know, are syn onymous terms." Because, if one of them is exposed and falls—if the tree of freedom is planted in the heart of one dead tyrant,—every nation will rush to pluck the fruit. Do you believe that those who oppress at home, can ever fight heartily against an oppressor abroad? Yes—they may in those ages, and in those countries, in which democracy does not exist—in which the people are ignorant and blind. Russia may risk a war with hearty strokes, having nothing to fear in its interior. Austria, England, Prussia, France, Denmark, Sweden, and the lesser German powers dare not. Their 30 wars are tricks and shams, and their every step a base delusion for the people. 25 15 When Palmerston and Aberdeen, Russell and his colleagues, were exposed in these 592 Discoveries Made Too Late columns, how many were disinclined to believe in the treachery we denounced! And now that active operations have been forced on our rulers by the threatened mutiny of the French army, (an army on whose allegiance Napoleon's throne depends), how many more are ready to become the dupes of the vile Whig-Liberal cabal! 5 Let a terrible warning of the past show you what British governments are, were, and will be, so long as they are the nominees of mere class legislation:— 10 England took part in the seven years' war, as an ally of Frederick the "Great," of Prussia. France was the opponent against whom England and Prussia fought. At this time there was a stronger democratic action in this country than there has, perhaps, ever been since Junius wrote his famous letters, and Wilkes made aristocracy and the House of Guelph, tremble for their position. Lord Bute was "our" minister, the Duke of Choiseulwas the minister of Louis XV., and Marshal Belleisle commanded the armies of France. The French had been beaten out of Wilhelmsthal, and had retired across the Fulda. Triumph was waiting for the arms of the allies. What hap- 15 pened then? Revolutions are strange things, and the last French change has shaken the following facts out of the Archives of France, and they have been printed by the French people. The British government desired peace; the Guelphs trembled for Hanover, and, above all, the aristocracy trembled before the democratic action that was beginning to pervade the masses in England, and the stir preparatory to the great Irish insurrection. The English minister, Lord Bute, therefore, wrote to the French minister, the Duke de Choiseul, chiding him for letting the French be so easily dis couraged, and retreating across the Fulda; telling him, "unless you beat us, we dare not conclude a peace. Why do you let yourselves be so beaten?" and urging the Duke to let Marshal Belleisle with the French army advance once more, and that the English forces should be played into his hands and destroyed! So complete was the under standing, that the French generals—the generals who were fighting against us—re ceived their orders from the English ministry, direct from London! 25 20 The correspondence has now been extracted from the Archives des Affaires Étrangères de France. 30 These discoveries are made too late. Had they been made at the time (1762), had Wilkes and his friends been able then to prove these facts, there would have been a revolution, and the House of Guelph been sent back like scared rats to their petty German sinks of f lunkeyism and oppression. But, on the contrary, when victory was gained against the ministry's will, the ministers were praised for vigour; when peace 35 was concluded after reverse and defeat, caused by such infamous treason, the ministers were praised for their prudence and moderation! So goes the world. But, to prove that nothing good can come (not out of Nazareth, but out of Whig- Liberalism and aristocratic democracy), we will give an instance of treachery from the other side—the drunken sham-radical Fox. This man sent a private ambassador to Catherine of Russia, in 1792, exhorting her to take and partition Poland, and telling her that if Pitt tried to prevent it, he would be turned out of office on the instant! This exposure has been recently made in Lord Malmesbury's Diary. 40 What say you now to "our" Governments? Sending our armies to the field, and instructing the generals opposed to them how to destroy them! Going to war, because the people force them ; and then having a private understanding with the enemy that 45 593 Ernest Jones 5 he shall not be injured, but that their own army shall be wasted away. Positively, it is just as though the present government were to have said to Turkey, "Don't resist Russia;" and to Russia, "Go on! Cross the Pruth, and take them unprepared." As though they had said to Turkey, when Turkey was resolved to fight, "We'll send succour; don't do anything till we come;" and to Russia, "We'll keep them waiting so long, that you will be able to bring up an overwhelming force." As though they had said to Omar Pasha, "Let Silistria fall;" and to Russia, "Go on with the siege—the place shall not be relieved." As though they had sent a fleet to the Baltic, under a secret understanding with the Czar that-it should do nothing. As though, when the people clamoured, they had said to the Czar, "We must do something, where can we 10 strike to hurt you least?" and the Czar had answered, "Bomarsund!" As though, when the French army compelled an attack on Sebastopol, it had been prearranged with Nicholas that the Russians should take a strong position, which they could defend with little loss, and which could be taken only with great slaughter. As though they intentionally had no cavalry, (which could have been embarked as well as infantry, and in the room of some of the latter that was useless), in order that the Russians might retreatwith little injury, and so as to lose only three of their 100 guns ! ! As though it had been then arranged that the allies should make a promenade around Sebastopol, and 15,000 Russians come on the English, the English come on 25,000 Russians, "quite unawares," while each was trying to get out of the way of the other. As though by 20 mutual consent, the allies were to leave the northern forts of Sebastopol (the most important) in the hands of the Russians,—those forts being next to Russia, open to the Russian reinforcements, and commanding the town, harbour, and southern forts of Sebastopol, which thus become untenable to the allies; whereas, if the allies had taken the northern forts of the harbour, they would have interposed between Sebas- topol and Russia, and cut it off from all reinforcements. As though, having given the Czar time to fortify Sebastopol, which was almost totally unfortified on the land side during the summer, and postponed the attack to the unhealthy season, they had ensured the crippling of our army by ball, bayonet, and disease, and pre-concerted with the enemy that, after perhaps storming a few bastions and entrenchments on 30 the south, they should re-embark, while the Russians fired the last shots after their retiring fleet, and at once re-occupied and restored the fortifications that had been destroyed. As though—as though—what? Simply, as though the present government of aristocratic-royalist-liberals acted in the same way in which all aristocratic-royal ist-liberals and tories have always acted before them—that is all. 25 15 35 I accuse no one. No doubt Lord Aberdeen shudders at the horrors of war; and that is the reason why our gallant soldiers are without surgeons, medicines, and lint. No doubt Lord Palmerston intends to destroy despotism; and that is why he sacrificed Poland, Cracow, Hungary, Portugal, Lombardy, Naples, Sicily, Rome, Venice, and the people of Austria, Prussia, Baden, Bavaria, Saxony, and Holstein, to despots— 40 though he is the "friend of Kossuth's bosom." No doubt Sir James Graham loves the patriots of Italy; though by felony on their letters, the act of a common thief and the most depraved spy, he basely betrayed their noblest to the hangman's hands. No doubt Russell has a vigorous policy; though he appeals to the restoration of the status quo; then repudiates it; then talks of taking Sebastopol; then denies his words; then 45 594 Discoveries Made Too Late beholds the British forced by French mutiny to sail, and march, and fight; and when asked what we're fighting for, and what he means, says we've no fixed object, but that must depend on the position of the armies and the events of the campaign! Unparalleled confession of imbecility and disgraceful incompetence. No doubt they "all are honourable men;" but the sooner we get rid of them the better, and see, to the great glory of our commonwealth, a Blake lead our fleets, a Cromwell our armies, and a Hampden presiding in our Senate Halls. Ernest Jones. 595 Von Marx und Engels mitunterzeichnete Dokumente Programme of the Labour Parliament Programme of the Labour Parliament. The People's Paper. Nr. 100, I.April 1854 1, The organisation of a system for the collection of a national revenue for labour. 2, A plan for the security of the funds thus raised. 3, The application of the same, and the securing of the rights of the working 5 classes. 4, The constitution of the Mass Movement. 1.—The Raising of a National Labour Revenue. a. A weekly levy on wages, graduated according to the price of labour, as follows :— 10 15 Children working half time Up to 4s. per week „ 8s. " >, „ „ „ » 12s. » „ „ 15s. „ „ „ „ » 20s. .. ,, „ 30s. „ „ » „ 40s. » „ V4d. V2d. 3/4d. Id. lV2d. 2d. 3d. 4d. b. The officers of the several bodies of working men who act in conjunction with the Mass Movement forward the monies thus raised to its directing head. 20 II.—Security of the Funds a. The local officers forward weekly all monies they receive on behalf of the Mass Movement to the directing head of the same, as shall be further specified below. The duly appointed officers for the reception of the same return receipts immediately for the monies thus received. b. The directing heads shall invest all monies they receive on behalf of the Mass 25 Movement (having power to retain in hand a sum not exceeding £50) in a Bank, in their collective names; no such sum or sums, nor any part of the same, to be drawn out of the Bank, except on presentation of the minute books of the said Executive, 599 Programme of the Labour Parliament containing an order for the same to be drawn, signed by four-fifths of the members of that body. c. The money thus drawn shall be paper money (unless under £50); the numbers of such notes shall be entered in a book, open to inspection, and published in the papers; the notes thus received shall be cut into parts, and each part entrusted to a separate member of the directing body, and, where large sums are drawn, be held in equal proportions by each member. 5 d. Each member thus entrusted with a portion of the said money shall give a promissory note amounting to his proportionate share of the money drawn supposing the same divided into equal parts, according to the numbers of the directing body; 10 and, should he refuse to apply for the purposes for which the money was drawn such part of note held by him, the document thus held against him shall at once be put in force, but be cancelled on his paying over said part of note. The promissory notes thus given shall be deposited in a chest or safe, which shall be placed in the custody of an independent and responsible person, not a member of the Executive, who shall not allow any document to be taken therefrom, except in presence of four-fifths of that body; the said notes shall be made payable to a duly-appointed party, who shall give a written undertaking that, in case of default, they may be acted on. 15 e. The money thus drawn for any payment or purchase shall be paid by the Execu tive only in the mutual presence of each member of the body, if the sum exceeds 20 £50. III.—Application of the Funds. a. To support all towns or places now or hereafter on strike or locked-out, that recognise the Mass Movement, or may hereafter do so. Equal support shall be afforded to all towns in proportion to the numbers on strike or locked-out. On the 25 same principle on which, when provisions run short on board of ship all receive alike, the same relief shall be given without distinction of high or low paid trades, with the exceptions hereafter mentioned in the Constitution of the Mass Movement. In order to provide a separate fund for liquidating the debts incurred by strikes and lock-outs during the last twelve months, and a fund for the future defence of those who may be victimised by employers, every person on becoming a member of the Mass Movement shall pay one penny, and one penny quarterly, so long as he or she shall continue a member of the same. 30 b. A department shall be opened for regulating the price of labour. For this purpose a monthly statement shall be issued of the price of the raw material employed in all 35 the trades in connexion with the Mass Movement; the price of labour in the same, the selling price of the articles produced, and the other working charges. On the evidence thus furnished, the directing body shall issue a statement of the profits of the employers; being open to receive from the latter a statement of any peculiar and additional charges which they (the employers) may have to meet. On the basis thus 40 laid, the price of labour shall be regulated, and a tariff of wages be fixed in accordance with the same. A similar plan shall be applied to the agricultural interests of the country. c. While the working-man has an undoubted right to participate in the profits of 600 Programme of the Labour Parliament the employer, he has a right higher still,—that of employing himself; and for the purpose of self-employment, as also for the purpose of more effectually regulating wages by removing the power of surplus labour from the employers' hands, the funds of the Mass Movement shall be further applied in the purchase of land. The estates shall be purchased in the names of individuals not being members of the directing body. The estates shall be divided into farms, varying in size according to the nature of the soil, and the purposes to which they are to be applied, viz., whether as individual tenancies or large co-operative undertakings. The said lands shall be retained by, and never alienated from the Mass Movement. That the land be let to tenants on short leases, and at a fair and moderate rental. A clause be inserted in the lease whereby any tenant making default in payment of rent shall immediately lose his right of tenancy. That a fourth clause be inserted whereby the tenant binds himself to pay the rental to the parties appointed by the deed of assignment hereafter named. The parties in whose names the estates are bought execute a deed of assignment, whereby the tenant shall pay the rent, not to them, but to the individuals then being directors of the Mass Movement. The directors of the Mass Movement for the time being shall execute a deed binding themselves in a penalty of £5,000 each to two individuals not being purchasers of any of the estates, such penalty to be enforced should they, on leaving office, not execute a deed of assignment of the said rental to their successors in office; to be forfeited should they, at a given time, to be identical with that of the expiration of office, not execute a deed of assignment of the same rental to certain individuals being their successors in office, the details hereof to be specified in the constitution of the Mass Movement. 5 10 15 20 The title deeds of the property bought shall be deposited with the bankers of the 25 Mass Movement—not to be given up except to persons appointed for that purpose at a meeting of the Labour Parliament of the said Movement, consisting of representa tives from not less than thirty organised and previously recognised branches of the same. Each estate shall be bought in the names of the two individuals, not being members of the executive; the said individuals not to purchase a second estate until they have deposited the deeds of the first with the bankers of the Mass Movement. 30 d. That independent self-employment and relief of the labour market from its surplus be still more secure, the available fund shall be applied for the establishment of co-operative factories, workshops, and stores, such to be the property of the Mass Movement. 35 Those employed therein shall receive, as far as practicable, that amount of wages regulated by the tariff for the price of labour, previously named, and one-third of the net profits realised on the articles produced and sold, the other third of the profits to go to the revenue of the Mass Movement. The chief manager of each co-operative undertaking be elected by the operatives 40 engaged therein, subject to the approbation of the directing body. The said manager of each respective undertaking shall regulate the purchases and sales connected therewith, and return weekly to the directing body a statement of the purchases, sales, payments, and loss or profit connected with the same. In case grounds of complaint or differences arise between the operatives and 45 manager, the operatives shall have the power of dismissing the manager and electing 601 Programme of the Labour Parliament another by a majority of not less than three-fourths of their number. Two-thirds of the net profits of each co-operative undertaking shall be sent monthly by each re spective manager to the directing body. The property for co-operative purposes purchased by the Mass Movement be placed under a system of security similar to that applied to the landed estates. 5 IV.—Labour Legislation. The power of this Movement shall be further exerted to secure a due restriction of the hours of labour; a limitation of female labour in manufacture, as also an entire abolition of the labour of young children in mines and factories; a cessation of the tyrannical system of discharge notes, of fines, abatements, and other unjust modes 10 of reducing wages; of the truck system, of the silent system in factories, of the custom of locking operatives up in the same, and of all the inhuman machinery of oppression now in excercise against the employed in all branches of industry. V—Constitution of the Mass Movement. a. Membership: The payments as already specified; each individual becoming a member is entitled to vote for the election of delegates to the Labour Parliaments, for the election of the officers of the general Movement, and those of his own branch, as soon as he commences paying, but loses his membership if one month in arrear with payment, except in proved cases of non-employment and sickness. 15 b. The Executive shall issue the following form for the collection of money.— Mass Movement of the Working Classes. 20 Weekly Collecting Sheet for Branch. (All monies received by the Collectors are to be forwarded weekly to the Executive of the Mass Movement, who, in a printed form, will return a receipt for the same on each ensuing Monday, to be shown by the Collectors to the Members. The 25 Executive will publish weekly a list of all monies received, in a public paper, with the name of the branch and the officers who forward them.) [Hier folgt das Formular S. 605 oben.] Form of Receipt. Mass Movement of the Working Classes. We, the undersigned, being the Executive Committee of the Mass Movement, have from on the Treasurer and Secretary of the said Branch. the 1 Executive ? „ J Committee. Branch, per Messrs. , Signed. received the sum of day of 18 c. The Executive Committee: The direction of the Movement is divided into the following departments, each managed by a special secretary:— 1. A Board of Agriculture. 2. A Board of Manufacture. 602 30 35 40 Programme of the Labour Parliament 3. A Board of Distribution. 4. A Board for the Regulation of the Price of Labour. 5. A Board of Assistance in Strikes, Lock-outs, and Labour Legislation. 5 The above form the Executive and Finance Committee, their deliberations being decided by the vote of the majority, but, in the execution of the measures adopted, each being alone answerable for, and independent in, his own department, with those financial exceptions already specified. 10 d. The Secretary of Agriculture is to superintend the purchase and management of landed estates, and all connected with the same. The Secretary of Manufacture is to exercise like functions, in reference to all the factories, workshops, etc., estab lished by the Movement. The Secretary of Distribution shall regulate the exchange and conveyance of goods to the co-operative stores and markets, with all the duties in connexion with the same. The Secretary for Regulation of the Price of Labour is to collect, arrange, and publish all the details for the price of wages already specified. 15 The Secretary of the Board of Assistance shall manage the entire department con nected with strikes, lock-outs, and disputes between employed and employer, and all questions of labour legislation between the same. The Executive are to be elected by the members for one year, their period of office dating from the 18th of March in each year. The nominations to be given from the 10th of February to the 1st of 20 March—the votes to be all returned by the 10th of March. If any of these days fall on a Sunday the following day to be counted instead. The first Executive will be appointed by the Labour Parliament. The Executive are eligible for re-election. In case of dissatisfaction with all, or any of the members of the Executive, it shall be in the power of a Labour Parliament, consisting of the duly elected representatives of not less than thirty branches, to dismiss them, or any one of them complained against, from office. The offices of the Executive shall be in London. 25 e. The supreme authority is invested in a Labour Parliament, to meet not less frequently than once in each year, in such town as may be decided on, at the adjourning of the previous Parliament, or in extraordinary meetings of the Labour 30 Parliament, when convoked by the Executive, the latter to decide on its place of meeting; when convoked by the desire of the members, these to fix the place of meeting. The Parliament shall assemble on the first Monday in March, the Execu tive being bound to take the necessary steps for the same, but they may likewise summon it for a special meeting, should they find it necessary; and on the demand of a majority of the members of the Mass Movement they shall be compelled to summon it whenever required. 35 f. The Labour Parliament shall be elected by the members of the Mass Movement, at Public Meetings, of which four days' notice shall be given. 40 g. The Constitution of Local Branches. The members of each branch shall have the power of electing their own officers, those to consist of a Secretary, Treasurer, and Collectors, and these to form the Council of the Branch. h. Each branch, where required by its size, shall be divided into localities, and a Collector be appointed to each. i. Each existing Trades' Union in connexion with the Movement shall be considered 45 as a branch, to act in accordance with its own regulation. 603 Programme of the Labour Parliament j. Payment of Officers: Each member of the Executive shall receive 17.16s. weekly in payment of his services, independent of travelling expenses. k. Each collector in payment of his services shall receive five per cent, on the monies he may collect until the salary thus obtained shall reach 11. 16s. weekly. 1. The Branch Secretary shall report weekly to the Executive the price of labour in the various trades in his branch of the Mass Movement; the price of the raw material, of goods sold, etc., according to the annexed form:— 5 [Hier folgt das Formular S. 605 unten.] m. The Secretary shall be paid by his branch, who shall determine the amount of his wages. n. The duties of the Executive: To afford assistance to all strikes and lock-outs on the following conditions:— 1st. Existing Strikes and Lock-outs: To afford assistance to those existing strikes and lock-outs that have sent delegates to the Labour Parliament. 2nd. Future Strikes and Lock-outs: a. No strikes and lock-outs to be supported in the future, the participators in which shall not, before such strike or lock-out take place, have joined the Mass Move ment. 10 15 b. No strike shall be supported unless previously sanctioned by the Executive, who are hereby instructed so to regulate strikes, should any become unavoidable, that they 20 may not interfere with each other, and thus defeat the general object. 3rd. Relief during Strikes—The amount of support afforded during strikes or lock-outs shall be determined by the Executive according to circumstances; boys and girls under twelve years shall receive one-third, and above twelve and under sixteen, one half the amount paid to adults. 25 VI.—The Regulation of Labour. a. The share of remuneration for his labour to which the working man is entitled so long as he works for the present class of capitalist employers shall be one-half of the net profits realised by the joint action of labour and capital. This to be attained by such a gradual rise of wages or partnership in profits as the Executive may find prudent to attempt and practicable to accomplish. b. The Executive shall prefer the co-operative system on the land to the individual system. In the former case, the lands shall be farmed by the Executive through their own officers and labourers; the latter to receive one-third of the net profits as in the department of manufacture. c. Those employed by the Mass Movement in any branch of industry to be, as,a general rule, persons accustomed to the same avocations before, but those members of trades and other operatives suitable for agricultural purposes may be employed for the same. 30 35 d. All persons desirous of individual tenancies upon the land may be located on 40 farms not exceeding 5 acres each in extent, if they pay, in addition to their weekly levy as members of the Mass Movement, the sum of per acre, subject to the fol lowing conditions:— 604 Names General Fund Debt and Defence Fund Total Total Total Total Signed, Collector. Mass Movement of the Working Classes. Returns for Regulating the Price of Labour. Branch. Name of Trade. Weekly Wages. Cost of Material. Working Charges. Extras. Selling Price. day of 18 Signed, Secretary. 605 Programme of the Labour Parliament The payment of a moderate rent, in accordance with the average of the district, to the Mass Movement: location by ballot. e. The land bought for individual tenancies shall be bought out of this fund alone. f. Cottages shall be erected on the farms for the tenants, for which they shall pay a moderate rent, either out of the special fund, in which case the rent shall accrue to the same, or out of the general funds of the Mass Movement, in which case the rent for the same shall be credited to that fund. 5 g. The allottee shall have his farm stocked, and an advance, when necessary, made to enable him to provide for the first contingency he may have to encounter; but in no case shall he be allowed to sublet his farm. 10 of the farm, and the amount advanced. Such advance never to exceed h. The advance shall be repaid by easy instalments, regulated according to the size per acre. i. The land thus bought shall be mortgaged to the Mass Movement. The Executive having the power on behalf of the Mass Movement, to become mortgagees of the same. With the monies thus advanced, other estates shall be purchased; thus enabling every contributor to be located by ballot. The Executive shall fill up the blanks according to the circumstances of the case. j. The securities, with reference to the mortgage deed, etc., shall be precisely 15 analogous to those adopted in case of purchasing the estates. V I I. Out of every payment for individual tenancies a certain percentage, viz. : per cent. shall be set apart for the purpose of establishing a Life Assurance Department, to the benefits of which the contributors shall become entitled, if they continue to contribute weekly according to the graduated tables, which shall be properly drawn up and certified with a view to the security of the rates of payments. The Executive are to prepare proper and authenticated tables for this department. 20 25 This department of Life Assurance shall be open to the general public, both to members and non-members of the Mass Movement. The funds thus raised shall, as far as prudent, be invested in land, but not in manufacture. The land purchased from the Assurance Fund shall be applied for 30 co-operative farms, and not for individual tenancies, in order not only to further the principles of co-operation, but to give a more perfect security to the funds invested. V I I I. It shall be at the discretion of the Executive, where they may find it suitable, to establish house property for the Mass Movement, so that the operatives in the 35 co-operative mills, etc., and the agriculturists, may reside in the dwellings of the Mass Movement, independent of the capitalist landlord. It shall be at the discretion of the Executive to erect either cottage dwellings or model lodging houses. 606 Programme of the Labour Parliament IX. The stewards and managers of co-operative undertakings in land, manufacture, etc., shall be paid according to the judgment and decision of the working man and Execu tive. 5 X. The first Executive shall be appointed provisionally, to hold office until the next meeting of the Labour Parliament. X I. The following five persons are hereby duly appointed:— 10 15 James Finlen, London. Abraham Robinson, Wilsden and Thornton. James Williams, Stockport. Joseph Hogg, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. George Harrison, Nottingham. Honorary Member, (with power of moving resolutions and amendments), but not of voting, Mr. Ernest Jones. X I I. The present Parliament recommends for consideration at its next meeting the propri ety of the Mass Movement becoming its own banker. 20 X I I I. The following individuals are appointed missionaries, with the annexed route, and the duty of starting upon their missions with all possible speed:— James Finlen, Western Counties. A. Robinson, Northern ditto. James Williams, Midland ditto. 25 X I V. The duties of the Board of Assurance are provisionally annexed to those of the Board of Distribution. 30 The Labour Parliament adjourns until the first Monday in August, then to meet in the town of Nottingham. X V. Ernest Jones, James Bligh, Henry Jeffries, James Finlen, 35 London. 607 Programme of the Labour Parliament Birmingham. Manchester. E. C. Cropper, John Teer, John Petzler, John Oxford, William Jackson, John Westray, John M'Lean, Prince Humphries, Mortimer Grimshaw, Wallace Bee ver, John Matthew, George Cowell, John Robinson, Coxhoe, Potteries. William Emmett, Bingley and Keighley. Preston. James Williams, Stockport. Abraham Robinson, Wilsden and Thornton, Yorkshire. John Hemming, Bedford. 1 James Candelet, ,. f North Lancashire, Cordwainers. „ j , _ VT _ , ., James Smith, George Candelet, Hyde. George Brewer, Torquay. E. Tidswell, Haworth, Yorkshire. H. Hudson, Leek. Isaac Fogg, Leek. Joseph Hogg J Newcastle. George Stobart, ι James Brierley, Cotton Skin Dyers, Manchester. Benjamin Armfield, Doncaster. William Wilson, Crook. William Hill, Stalybridge. M. M'Quire, George Young, John Smith, George Harrison, Nottingham. Edwin Goldering, Barnsley. William Poole, Exeter. Joseph Radford, Radcliffe and Pilkington. Matthew Shaw, Bury. Surgeon M'Elheran. Nadaud. Dr. Marx. Louis Blanc. Frank Dobson. Card Room Hands of Lancashire, Cheshire, etc. 608 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40